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The task of constructing a geologic map is a cognitively and physically
demanding field-based problem. The map produced is understood to be an individual’s
two-dimensional interpretation or mental model of the three-dimensional underlying
geology. A popular view within the geoscience community is that teaching students how
to make a geologic map is valuable for preparing them to deal with disparate and
incomplete data sets, for helping them develop problem-solving skills, and for acquiring
expertise in geology. Few previous studies have focused specifically on expertise in
geologic mapping. Drawing from literature related to expertise, to problem solving, and
to mental models, two overarching research questions were identified: How do geologists
of different levels of expertise constrain and solve an ill-structured problem such as
making a geologic map? How do geologists address the uncertainties inherent to the
processes and interpretations involved in solving a geologic mapping problem?
These questions were answered using a methodology that captured the physical
actions, expressed thoughts, and navigation paths of geologists as they made a geologic
map. Eight geologists, from novice to expert, wore a head-mounted video camera with an
attached microphone to record those actions and thoughts, creating “video logs” while in

the field. The video logs were also time-stamped, which allowed the visual and audio
data to be synchronized with the GPS data that tracked participants’ movements in the
field.
Analysis of the video logs yielded evidence that all eight participants expressed
thoughts that reflected the process of becoming mentally situated in the mapping task
(e.g. relating between distance on a map and distance in three-dimensional space); the
prominence of several of these early thoughts waned in the expressed thoughts later in the
day. All participants collected several types of data while in the field; novices, however,
did so more continuously throughout the day whereas the experts collected more of their
data earlier in the day. Experts and novices also differed in that experts focused more on
evaluating certainty in their interpretations; the novices focused more on evaluating the
certainty of their observations and sense of location.
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CHAPTER 1
EXPERTISE IN SOLVING A GEOLOGIC MAPPING PROBLEM
1.1 Introduction
To the untutored, a bedrock geologic map is a page filled with irregular and
colorful shapes decorated with various small black markings and three-letter labels. To
the trained eye, the colors, shapes, and labels on the page convey details about the rocks
underfoot such as their age, their type, their orientation, and even sometimes indications
of how they came to be where they are. Bedrock geologic maps represent how geologists
see not only the rocks exposed at the surface, but also rocks hidden deep in the ground
and how they came to be in that configuration.
The value of a geologic map extends beyond being a means for understanding the
structure of the Earth. Geologic maps are essential documents for those involved in the
exploration of natural resources such as petroleum, gas, coal, water, and metallic mineral
deposits (GSA Position Statement, 2008). Geologic maps illustrate the risks of natural
hazards including volcanoes, earthquakes, landslides, and land subsidence (GSA Position
Statement, 2008). And they guide the planning of roads and the construction of buildings.
Moreover, to be a certified professional geologist by the American Institute of
Professional Geologists, one is expected to have completed a course in Field Geology
(http://www.aipg.org/). American universities have been offering multiple-week Field
Geology courses or camps since the mid-1930s (Sisson, Kauffman, Bordeaux, Thomas,
& Giegengack, 2009; Whitmeyer, Mogk, & Pyle, 2009a); a common component of the
1

curriculum of such courses is the training in how to make a geologic map. The
geosciences community sees value in having students learn how to make geologic maps
for several reasons. First, making maps prepares students to deal with disparate and
incomplete data sets (Whitmeyer et al. 2009). Second, map making helps develop
problem-solving skills (Riggs et al. 2009). Third, learning how to make a geologic map is
vital if one is to become “acquainted with the primary phenomena of geology” (Pettijohn
1984, 248) and to gain an “understanding of the architecture of the Earth” (Ernst 2006,
14). Thus, to learn how to make and see meaning in these maps is considered
instrumental for acquiring expertise in geology.
A theme throughout expertise research is the question of how an expert sees
problems, decisions, tasks, and concepts differently than a novice (e.g. Chase & Simon,
1973; Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1981; Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew, 2002; Jacobson, 2001;
Wineburg, 1991). In geology, this seeing of problems is often coincident with the
physical experience of being in the field (e.g. Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben, 2009;
Petcovic, Libarkin, & Baker, 2009; Raab & Frodeman, 2002). The novice’s challenge in
learning the expert perspective is expressed well by Robert Frodeman. He originally
trained as a philosopher but returned to school later in life to study geology (Frodeman,
1996). Drawing upon his unusual background, Frodeman (1996) reflects on his own
initial field experiences and in so doing provides a voice for the novice geologist:
The trained geologist does not merely stare at the outcrop, picking up data like
one picks up acorns. He or she has learned to see the mark or shape as something
significant, to see into the rock as a complex set of interactive processes frozen in
time, in contrast to the mute seeing where the object of our gaze signifies nothing.
[Emphasis in original]
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Vision is commonly thought of as something “purely given,” as simple
receptivity; seeing is considered to be simply a matter of “taking a good look.”
But rather than being a mere receptor of information, the eye requires its own
education. (pp. 423)
Frodeman clearly recognizes that training one’s eye is part of the learning by which a
novice is transformed into an expert geologist. For a novice, thus, the goal is not only to
see as an expert, but also to emulate the actions of an expert. How does this
transformation take place? In particular, what are the characteristics of this
transformation for expertise in geologic mapping? These questions are at the core of the
present study.
While expertise research has a long history in many different domains such as
chess (Chase & Simon, 1973; de Groot, 1965), physics (Chi et al., 1981), map reading
(Chang, Lenzen, & Antes, 1985), history (Wineburg, 1998), complex systems in science
(Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer, 2004), and orienteering (Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew, 2002b),
few empirical studies have investigated expertise in the geosciences (e.g. K. C. Anderson
& Leinhardt, 2002; Bond, Gibbs, Shipton, & Jones, 2007; Petcovic & Libarkin, 2002)
and fewer still in geologic mapping (e.g. Petcovic, Libarkin, & Baker, 2009). These more
general studies provide a broad context for our understanding of expertise in geosciences
and serve as a means to describe characteristics of experts and novices that cross
disciplines, and to identify questions that may be specific to the geosciences.
Additionally, despite a dearth of research on geologic mapping as a whole, there
are pertinent studies related to its different aspects. The process of making a bedrock
geologic map is a cognitively and physically demanding task that requires a geologist to
navigate through the field area, to locate and identify rocks, structures, and other geologic
3

features. In tandem with data collection, the geologist is using the field data to inform the
creation a three-dimensional mental model while also working to convert that mental
model into a two-dimensional map. This process requires the geologist to self-monitor
and to reflect on his or her progress during each of these stages. Motivated by the
importance of mental models to geologic mapping, the literature review presented in this
study includes research on how individuals construct a mental model and transform that
mental model into a physical one, either on a piece of paper (Mckenna, Quinn, Donnelly,
& Cooper, 2008) or a three-dimensional model of a geologic structure (Kastens et al.,
2009). The abilities to read maps and to use a map to navigate in space are also essential
facets of geologic mapping. Therefore the literature review also includes studies on
factors that contribute to how individuals identify their location on maps (Liben, Myers,
& Kastens, 2008), and how individuals navigate in both familiar (Spiers & Maguire,
2008) and unfamiliar locations (Riggs, Lieder, et al., 2009) to achieve different goals.
The integration of the broad literature on expertise and more specific studies
related to mental models requires a flexible as well as detailed theoretical framework.
The concept of embodied cognition provides such a framework; it is a means with which
to consider the mental and physical processes that go into making a geologic map
(Wilson, 2002). Embodied cognition “focuses attention on the fact that most real-world
thinking occurs in very particular (and often very complex) environments, is employed
for very practical ends, and exploits the possibility of interaction with and manipulation
of external props” (M. Anderson, 2003, p. 91). When the problem is making a geologic
map, a geologist is embedded within the region in which he is trying to form a mental
model. The real-world thinking in a very particular environment is the thinking that goes
4

into the mapping of a certain area. The interaction with and manipulation of external
props includes the use of the different tools of the trade needed to complete the map –
such as a Brunton compass, a ruler, and colored pencils. Thus the different dimensions of
embodied cognition offer a theoretical lens with which to consider expertise in geologic
mapping.

1.2 Framing the research interest: Expertise in geologic mapping
The strategies, behaviors, and cognitive processes that a geoscientist uses for
constructing a geologic map are arguably the result of education and prior experiences in
field mapping. Ernst (2006) offers a personal narrative on the techniques of geologic
mapping. Reflecting on more than four decades of experience in the field, he outlines the
litany of questions that goes into a geologic map:
But just how is the mapping to be conducted? What features are to be measured in
general or in great detail and geographically and/or geometrically described?
What relationships can be ignored, or at least not mapped? The specific style and
nature of the work depend critically on the questions to be addressed and partly or
fully answered by the field work. The geologic units to be distinguished, the
degree, intensity, and size of aerial coverage, the systematic sample collecting
program, the measurements made in the field and in the laboratory, and the scale
of the mapping effort all reflect the anticipated goals of the project. (Ernst, 2006,
pp. 14)
If Ernst’s observations are a reflection of years of experience, when, how, and where did
he learn the skills and knowledge necessary to complete a geologic map? In essence,
what does it mean to a geologist to be an expert in geologic mapping?
An undergraduate studying geology typically first encounters field mapping as
part of a field method course or camp that is completed toward the end of his or her
college career. The intent is that such courses are capstones in which students apply what
5

they have been learning throughout the curriculum to a real surrounding landscape (Pyle,
2009). Indeed, field camp has been a component of the undergraduate geology
curriculum since the 1930s (Sisson et al., 2009). F.J. Pettijohn (1984), a geologist whose
career spanned from the 1920s to the 1980s, argued that “most important of all is
development of some competence in field mapping for all students of geology, whether
they go into the field or remain in the laboratory. For only by a first-hand acquaintance
with the primary phenomena of geology, obtainable only by field study, can significant
research be distinguished from the trivial” (p.248). Ernst (2006) also echoes this
perspective: “the most efficient, effective way to increase one’s understanding of the
architecture of Earth, or at least the nature of the near-surface geologic environment, is to
conduct mapping as a necessary step to subsequent investigations” (p. 14). The
geosciences community’s public support for field mapping was reiterated again in a
recent a position statement on the value of geologic mapping from the Geological Society
of America (2008). Among other recommendations, they advocate the following:
Teaching geologic mapping skills and methodology is important and deserves the
full support and recognition by academic institutions and departments. GSA
members should engage students in geologic mapping activity to the maximum
extent practicable and strongly support teaching of geologic mapping. They
should also support the offering and funding of geologic field mapping courses
and other educational initiatives that provide financial support to equip and
engage students in geologic mapping as well as to publish the resulting geologic
maps. (GSA Position Statement, 2008, para 8)
The continuity of the argument for learning geologic mapping underscores the
supposition that, in order to understand the primary phenomena of geology and to be
prepared to continue the study of geology, one must understand what it is to be immersed
in the field.
6

As a discipline, geology is a hermeneutic (interpretive) and historical science
(Frodeman, 1995). In an analysis of geologic reasoning, Frodeman (1995) makes the
following observation:
The geologist assigns different values to various aspects of the outcrop, judging
which characteristics or patterns in the rock are significant and which are not.
Examining an outcrop is not simply a matter of ‘‘taking a good look.’’ Rather, the
geologist picks up on the clues of past events and processes in a way analogous to
how the physician interprets the signs of illness or the detective builds a
circumstantial case against a defendant. (pp. 963)
This characterization of a geologist’s task as the process of deciphering clues similar to
the way a doctor interprets signs of illness is in keeping with Pettijohn’s comment
regarding the ability to distinguish trivial from significant. Frodeman explains, too, that
in historical sciences such as cosmology, geology, paleontology, and human history, the
focus is on both the circumstances that led up to an event or entity and the consequences
that follow from it. This historical aspect of geology is particularly manifest in the
principle of uniformitarianism: the processes that occur on earth today also occurred in
earth’s past, but not necessarily at the same rates (Dott, 1998; Frodeman, 1995). For
example, if a geologist finds a rock composed of sand-sized particles, the assumption is
that the rock formed in a beach environment because that is where we find collections of
sand-size particles today. Another aspect of geology as historical science is the presence
of narrative logic within geologic explanation. For example, explanatory articles or keys
are commonly printed along with geologic maps. Thus, a complete geologic map should
not only document the geologist’s observations in the field, but should also include the
geologist’s interpretation of the chronology of events that produced the observed patterns
of rocks.
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By definition, experts are recognized to have more knowledge and more
structured knowledge than novices (Ericsson, 2006a). Adopting the relative view of
expertise assumes individuals have the potential to advance to higher and higher positions
along the spectrum (Chi, 2006a). Stages along this progression are characterized using
terms dating back to the ‘craft guilds’ of the Middle Ages: naivette, novice, initiate,
apprentice, journeyman, expert, and master (Hoffman, 1998). Progression along path is
driven by deliberate practice over time (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer, 1993).
Initially the skills and content will be entirely unfamiliar to the individual. Then with
specialized training and practice, the basic aspects of the domain become rote. A skilled
teacher or coach incrementally adjusts the training regime to keep the level of challenge
adequate but not overwhelming. Eventually, the student acquires enough expertise to
self-moderate and implement new training practices without feedback from their teacher
or coach (Ericsson, 2006b). Thus, while the expertise spectrum is defined by the
development of knowledge and skills in a particular domain, it is also defined by the
development of knowledge and skills in improving one’s own level of expertise.
This latter point about an individual’s ability to reflect on his or her own thinking
has been touched upon in the analysis of the geologic mapping process. A recent study on
geologic expertise has begun to add to our knowledge of how geologists of varying levels
of expertise work on a field-based problem like making a geologic map (Petcovic,
Libarkin, & Baker, 2009). The authors identified elements of geologists’ mental checklist
used while mapping: What am I looking at? What does it all mean? and How am I doing?
(Petcovic, Libarkin, & Baker, 2009). Based upon the idea of deliberate practice, the
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assumption is that those internal questions relate to performance. But the data are unclear,
however, about the exact nature of that relationship.
In summary, Pettijohn (1984) and Ernst (2006) offer personal perspectives on the
importance learning how to make geologic maps and emphasize the value of being
surrounded by the object of study, the Earth itself. Frodeman (1995) articulates the
novice sentiment of uncertainty about how to look at rocks in the field. The heart of this
present study, then, is to discover more about how an individual progresses from being a
novice not sure what he sees to the expert who is able to separate the significant from
insignificant, to construct a narrative, and to give meaning to colorful shapes on a piece
of paper.

1.3 Theoretical framework: Embodied cognition
Within cognitive science, embodied or situated cognition is an area of research
involving the study of human cognition as a product of connections and interactions
between the mind, the body, and the environment (M. Anderson, 2003; Robbins &
Aydede, 2009; Wilson, 2002). Embodied cognition can appropriately be applied to both
experts and novices because it is a description of all human cognition. Before exploring
the theory in more detail, however, it is necessary first to address an issue of terminology
within the literature on embodied and situated cognition.
The exact relationship between situated cognition and embodied cognition
appears to be still unresolved. On the one hand, situated cognition is portrayed as a
precursor that is perhaps being replaced by embodied cognition (Gentner, 2010) or as a
component or “cornerstone” of embodied cognition (Wilson, 2002). On the other hand,
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the relationship between situated cognition and embodied cognition is also described via
taxonomical metaphor in which situated cognition is the “genus” and embodied cognition
is the “species” (Robbins & Aydede, 2009, p. 3). Yet a third view considers that neither is
subordinate to the other (M. Anderson, 2003; Gallagher, 2009):
One often encounters these terms used together – embodied cognition and situated
cognition – and it is clear that situated cognition cannot be disembodied, although
some authors emphasize one over the other or provide principled distinctions
between them. Philosophical thought experiments notwithstanding, however, the
often-encountered brain in a vat is, to say the least, in a very odd and artificial
situation. Given what seems to be an essential connection between embodiment
and situation, I will take the more include and holistic route and view them
accordingly. (Gallagher, 2009, pp. 35)
I would propose that the message of the above passage is that unless there is a particular
reason for doing so, the distinction between embodied cognition and situated cognition is
not of the utmost priority for those outside of cognitive science. In essence, both terms
conceive of human cognition using “a picture of mental activity as dependent on the
situation or context in which it occurs…” (Robbins & Aydede, 2009, p. 3). However, in
order to provide a summary, I must choose one term or the other. For the purposes of this
review, I follow Wilson (2002), adopting embodied cognition as the “banner” over
situated cognition. This choice is driven largely by the fact that Wilson explicates six
different claims associated with embodied cognition and reviews their respective
strengths and limitations. The division of the theory into its constituent parts enables me
to be more specific and purposeful in the application of this framework to this study. It
should be noted, however, that Wilson discussion is not inconsistent with other
summaries (M. Anderson, 2003; Clark, 1999; Robbins & Aydede, 2009). Indeed, Wilson
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finds particular fault with one of the six claims and her critiques are echoed by other
authors.
The first claim is that “cognition is situated” (p. 626) or perhaps, more aptly, some
cognition is situated1. Driving a car is one example of situated cognition. Being engaged
in the task includes not only the motor activities involve in driving but also the cognitive
activities of processing the constantly-changing environment. Spatial cognition is
typically situated; assembling a jigsaw puzzle is an example of a problem that requires
spatial cognition and that is situated. There are also human cognitive processes that are
not situated and that can occur “off-line”, or “in the absence of task relevant input and
outputs” (p. 626). An example of non-situated cognition is “our ability to form mental
representations about things that are remote in time and space” (p. 626).
The second claim is that “cognition is time pressured” (p.627). Furthermore,
cognitive processes that are time pressured are also situated. This is not mean to imply,
however, that all situated cognition is time pressured. An example of situated and timepressured cognition is driving in traffic whereas an example of situated and not timepressured cognition is completing a crossword puzzle. Time-pressured cognition has the
effect of imposing a “representational bottleneck” on an individual:
When situations demand fast and continuously evolving responses, there may
simply not be time to build up a full-blown mental model of the environment,
from which to derive a plan of action. Instead, it is argued, being a situated
cognizer requires the use of cheap and efficient tricks for generating situationappropriate action on the fly. … The force of this argument, though, depends
upon the assumption that actual cognizers (humans, for example) are indeed

1

Unless otherwise noted, the following discussion is based on and quotations all come from Wilson
(2002).
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engineered so as to circumvent this representational bottleneck and are capable of
functioning well and “normally” in time-pressured situations. (pp. 628)
The reality is that people are often debilitated by the “representational bottleneck” and
struggle to succeed in time-pressured situated cognition.
The third claim is that as individuals, “we off-load cognitive work onto the
environment” as a way to cope with on-line cognitive limitations (i.e. cognitive activities
that occur with task-relevant inputs and outputs). The strategy is used when individuals
are forced to function in time-pressured situations. They off-load task-relevant
information into the environment in order to avoid overwhelming short-term memory.
There several different examples of this type of strategy. In the computer game Tetris the
user has to position different shape pieces within a set area. The pieces enter the field of
view at the top of the screen and start falling toward the bottom, where other pieces are
already located. The aim is to orient the piece so as to leave as few open spaces as
possible between the pieces at the bottom of the screen. To accomplish this, the player
uses a remote control to rotate the piece on the screen to help her identify where the piece
will best fit, instead of having to rotate the piece just in her mind’s eye. As the game
progresses, the pieces fall at faster rates. Thus the challenge is to rotate the piece fast
enough to find the best position before the piece reaches the bottom of the screen and can
no longer move. Another example of the off-loading strategy in practice is to turn one’s
self and another person to face a destination when giving directions. Off-loading is not
restricted only to spatial tasks. For instance, drawing any kind of diagram involves
“exploiting external resources to achieve a solution or a piece of knowledge whose actual
application will occur at some later time and place, if at all” (p. 629).
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The fourth claim is that “the environment is part of the cognitive system” (p. 629).
More specifically, this claim consists of two parts:
1) The forces that drive cognitive activity do not reside solely inside the head of the
individual, but instead are distributed across the individual and the situation as
they interact.
2) Therefore, to understand cognition we must study the situation and the situated
cognizer together as a single, unified system. (pp. 630)
This claim differs from the others in that it is not just a claim about some aspect of
embodied cognition but is also about how to study embodied cognition. Wilson has no
particular argument against the first part of the claim that cognitive activities can extend
from the mind into the environment. However, she has a more pointed critique of the
second part regarding implications for the study of embodied cognition. Ultimately, the
discussion seems more the purview of readers directly engaged in embodied cognition
research (e.g. Clark, 1999; Robbins & Aydede, 2009). For someone outside of the
community, it seems evident that while perhaps all claims regarding embodied cognition
are still being refined in their details, the claims regarding extended or distributed
cognition are contentious in fundamental ways. Thus, I will not linger further on this
claim at present.
The fifth claim is that “cognition is for action” (p. 631). This claim refers to the
ways in which the ventral and dorsal systems in the brain may influence human
perception, memory, and cognition. This fifth claim is a challenge for someone outside of
cognitive science since most of the discussion centers on some of the neurological bases
of cognition. This aspect of the discussion is neither helpful in this review nor especially
accessible to a reader outside of cognitive science lacking background in details of brain
neurology. However, Wilson does offer a more general description about how
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individual’s perceptions, concepts, and memories may manifest themselves in action.
Wilson proposes that “cognition often sub-serves action via a more indirect, flexible, and
sophisticated strategy, in which information about the nature of the external world is
stored for future use without strong commitments on what that future use might be”
(p.632). She supports this synthesis with the following example:
I can notice a piano in an unfamiliar room, and being a non-musician, I might
think of it only as having a bench I can sit on and flat surfaces I can set my drink
on. But I can also later call up my knowledge of the piano in a variety of
unforeseen circumstances: if I need to make a loud noise to get everyone’s
attention; if the door needs to be barricaded against intruders; or if we are caught
in a blizzard without power and need to smash up some furniture for fuel.
(pp.631)
In essence, her observation is that the brain can encode information about objects or
surroundings and then recall and apply that information at later times and for different
purposes.
The sixth claim is that off-line cognition is body-based. In other words, while
some cognitive activities are not situated, or are off-line, they may still be associated with
an individual’s sensorimotor functions. Examples of these cognitive activities include
mental imagery, working memory, episodic memory, implicit memory, and reasoning
and problem solving skills. Mental imagery – whether visual, auditory, or kinesthetic –
can be used as an analogue to represent the external world. Similar to the way in which
individuals support short-term memory by off-loading cognitive work onto the
environment, they also off-load cognitive work onto perceptual and motor control
systems. Episodic memories (or long-term memories) “consist of recordings of
spatiotemporally localized events, as experience by the remembers” (p. 633). Implicit
memory enables us to learn skills such that we can complete tasks automatically.
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Developing skills to a level of automaticity may also be a way in which individuals can
cope with time-pressured situated cognition:
Compare, for example, a novice driver and an expert driver making a left turn, or
a novice juggler and an expert juggler trying to keep three balls in the air. In each
case, the degree of control over the details of the behavior is quite poor for the
novice, and the phenomenological experience of the situation may be close to
chaos. For the expert, in contrast, there is a sense of leisure and clarity, as well as
a high degree of behavioral control. These aspects of automatic behavior become
less mysterious if we consider the process of automatizing as one of building up
internal representations of a situation that contains certain regularities, thus
circumventing the representational bottleneck. (pp. 634)
Lastly, cognitive activities such as reasoning and problem solving can benefit greatly
from the use of sensorimotor simulations such as mental models (especially if they are
spatial).
Wilson (2002) concludes by emphasizing the following point: embodied
cognition includes both on-line and off-line cognitive activities. The on-line activities are
those that are situated and sometimes also time-pressured. In on-line embodied cognition
“the mind can be seen as operating to serve the needs of a body interacting with a realworld situation” (p. 635). The off-line activities are those that draw upon sensory or
motor resources for tasks that “are distant in time and space or altogether imaginary” (p.
635). In off-line embodied cognition “we find the body (or its control systems) serving
the mind” (p. 635).
Finally, in Table 1.1, I have contrasted different aspects of geologic mapping
against five of the six claims of embodied cognition; I have not included the contested
claim regarding the environment as part of the cognitive system. These examples
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highlight how different aspects of geologic mapping align well with the claims of
embodied cognition.
Table 1.1
Aspects of geologic mapping reflected in claims of embodied cognition
Claims of Embodied Cognition

Cognition is situated

Cognition is time pressured
We off-load cognitive work onto
the environment
Cognition is for action

Off-line cognition is body based

Aspects of Geologic Mapping
Making a geologic map involves task-relevant
inputs—e.g. using equipment specific to the task
such as a Brunton compass or bottle of HCl, finding
and identifying types of rocks—and outputs—e.g.
recording meaningful notes and measurements into a
notebook or onto a map—and thus is therefore an
example of situated cognition.
Making a geologic map may involve some time
constraint due to limits on available time to be in the
field to collect data for map.
Geologists off-load cognitive work into the
environment by writing notes, making sketches,
coloring the maps, and making hand movements.
Geologist recall general knowledge about rocks and
structures that can then recalled and used as needed
in the field.
Geologists rely on content knowledge, skills in using
field equipment, and experience in developing
mental models of large areas in order complete a
mapping task.

I am not the first to draw out the parallels between the thinking that goes into
geologic field work and embodied cognition. In developing a phenomenology of “what is
it like to be a geologist?” Raab & Frodeman (2002) emphasize the integral role of a
geologist’s experiences in the field to a geologist’s thinking in the field. While I agree
with their overall argument, I contend that their discussion overlooks or misapplies an
important detail regarding the nature and acquisition of expertise. However, I reserve
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further analysis of their phenomenology and my critique until sub-section 2.4. Indeed, the
substance of this literature review is a necessary precursor to that analysis.

1.4 Significance
One particular implication of this study will be for instruction in geologic field
methods courses and camps. Despite the longevity of such courses as part of an
undergraduate student’s curriculum in geology (Sisson et al., 2009; Whitmeyer et al.,
2009b), little empirical research exists on anything related to field camps—such as best
practices for instructional design, learning outcomes, teaching practices—or on the
characteristics of expertise in geologic mapping (Petcovic et al., 2009). The particular
focus here will be on discovering more about the cognitive and physical activities that
occur during the process of mapping. Taking a step back still further, another broader
goal will be to search for patterns in those activities that relate to success in mapping,
whether one has hardly any experience or decades. As interesting as the characteristics of
successful experts may be, presumably for instructors, it is the characteristics of
successful novices that are even more so.
Another expected outcome for this study is to contribute to a growing dialogue
within the community of geosciences education research on the topic of situated and
embodied cognition (e.g. Brodaric & Gahegan, 2007; Brodaric, Gahegan, & Harrap,
2004; Herrera & Riggs, 2011; Raab & Frodeman, 2002). The setting in which the
geologist is mapping is already understood to influence strategies and decisions (Brodaric
et al., 2004; Riggs, Balliet, & Lieder, 2009; Riggs, Lieder, et al., 2009). This study aims
to expand our understanding on embodied cognition by looking at the interactions
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between the mind, the body, and the environment that occur during the process of making
a geologic map.

1.5 Chapter summary
A bedrock geologic map is the end product of a geologist’s observations, data
collection, and interpretation of these data in a given field area. To make such a map, a
geologist spends hours, weeks, and sometimes months in the field making observations,
measuring the orientation of rocks, and recording the location of the data, all in service of
constructing a three-dimensional mental representation of the regional geology.
Throughout the data collection process, the geologist is working to craft his or her threedimensional mental model into a two-dimensional map. Moreover, that two-dimensional
map should also be decipherable by any other geologists so that even those who have not
been to the area can use it to reconstruct a three-dimensional mental model of the area.
The cognitive and physical activities that go into geologic mapping align well with the
perspective that cognition involves not just the brain, but the body and the environment
as well. For many geologists, a geologic field methods course is where they first learn to
put together all the necessary cognitive and physical activities to complete these complex
tasks. However, after that introductory experience, the way a student progresses from
novice to expert in geologic mapping is not well understood. The goal of the following
chapter then is to synthesize from the existing literature what is known and what
questions remain about expertise in geologic mapping. It is out of that synthesis that the
research questions for the present study emerge.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
Expertise in geologic mapping as a field of research inhabits the intersection of
three broad domains: expertise, problem solving, and mental models. In order to pursue
research related to mapping expertise, and taking into account these constraints, I devised
the following approach for this literature review. I created four categories for which I
would identify and divide studies: those pertaining to 1) expertise combined with
problem solving; 2) expertise combined with mental models; 3) problem solving
combined with mental models; and 4) all three taken together. These four categories are
now separate sub-sections of this literature review (Figure 2.1).

Research
on
Expertise

Research
on
Problem
Solving

2.2.1

2.2.4
2.2.2

2.2.3

Research
on Mental
Models

Figure 2.1. Organization of the literature review by topic and sub-section; numbers
indicate sub-sections for each topic.
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It is important to emphasize that this figure (a Venn diagram) is a simplification.
For one thing, such a Venn diagram ordinarily assumes that the different sub-regions
have the same levels of generality or specificity and that the boundaries between the
different sub-regions are well-defined. Yet within each sub-section is a collection of
studies, some of which are more directly related to geologic mapping while others are
more general. Furthermore, certain studies could appear in multiple sub-sections. For
example, I included Chi et al., (1981), a study on expertise in problem solving in physics,
in sub-section 2.2.1. But I could also put it in sub-section 2.2.2 because the investigation
also addresses how the participants conceive of different types of problems (i.e. their
mental model). It is within each sub-section that specific arguments are made as to the
justification for inclusion of particular articles.
Overall, the literature critiqued in this review was selected based upon the
following criteria: empirical studies in peer-reviewed journals, seminal studies that
established the foundation of the domain; specific studies that targeted particular topics
related to my research interest; and specific studies that included methodologies that may
have implications for my research interest. Furthermore, I gave preference to studies that
targeted college-level or adult populations. For example, although the study of Vosniadou
& Brewer (1992) is prominent in the field of mental models in the geosciences, the
sample in that study is restricted to children in grades 1-5. Consequently, based on the
fact that the sample is so disparate from my sample of interest (college age and older), I
did not include a critique of that article in this review.
In section 2.3, there are no additional critical reviews. Instead, this section
includes a synthesis of different methodologies discussed in the previous section. The
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intent is to assemble a picture of the type of methods used, the nature of research
questions explored with each method, and the strengths and limitations of the claims
made with each method. Section 2.4 provides a final synthesis of main conclusions as
well as a series of questions to emerge from the literature review.
The penultimate section, section 2.5, features descriptions of two precursor
studies that I have already completed (Callahan, Petcovic, & Baker, 2010; Callahan &
Petcovic, in revision). The two studies contribute to the conclusions from the literature
review and add insight to the list of emergent research questions. Finally, in section 2.6, I
have drawn upon the observations and experiences of the precursor studies, to identify
two overarching research questions for my dissertation. These two questions are
supported further with a set of secondary research questions.
In summary, the design of this literature review is driven by the simple fact that
there are few existing published studies specifically on expertise in geologic mapping.
There are, however, substantial bodies of literature related to expertise, problem solving,
and mental models that can be woven together to construct a research base upon which to
build an understanding of expertise in geologic mapping. The literature on expertise
included here comes from a range of domains including chess, map reading, and the sport
of orienteering. For example, in section sub-section 2.2.3, I compare a study of taxi cab
drivers navigating in London with a study of undergraduate geology students navigating
in the mountains. Although expertise in chess, map reading, orienteering and driving a
taxi cab may seem unrelated to expertise in geologic mapping, each study contributes
either to our understanding about differences in how experts and novices solve problems,
construct mental models as well as how to study those differences. Thus, as there is no
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single research tradition into which I can place an interest expertise in geologic mapping,
my goal in this literature review is to create one.

2.2 Critical review of the literature
2.2.1 Expertise and problem solving
2.2.1.1 Introduction
The focus of this section is on studies related to expertise and problem solving.
While craftsman in the Middle Ages established the practice of elders training
apprentices in a trade, it was not until the mid 1940s that Adrian de Groot (de Groot,
1965) sought to characterize how an expert’s thinking differed from a novice’s (Ericsson,
2006a). Following de Groot’s (1965) ground-breaking work with chess players of varying
levels of expertise, Chase and Simon (1973) pushed the research forward still further with
investigations into memory and expertise. In the time since, expertise research has
diversified not only in terms of the domains of study but also in the questions about
expertise being pursued.
The literature included in this sub-section feature a collection of research domains
of expertise such as chess, physics, history, and geology. There are also differences in the
types of problems posed to the novices and experts in the studies. Problems are identified
as being somewhere on a spectrum from well-structured to ill-structured (Reitman, 1965;
Simon, 1973). The studies included here are selected on the basis that they investigate
expertise in solving problems that represent different positions along the well- to illstructured continuum. Geologic mapping falls more on the ill-structured end of the
spectrum. As will be explained more below, ill-structured problems can be understood, in
part, by contrasting them with well-structured problems. Thus, given an interest in
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understanding how novices and experts solve geologic mapping problems, it seems
fruitful to develop an understanding of how novices and experts think about and solve
well-structured problems as well.
Before reviewing the literature, however, the first step is to describe the spectrum
of problem types in general terms. Following this discussion are a series of critical
reviews of different empirical studies beginning with examples that feature more wellstructured problems and then progress to examples that feature more ill-structured
problems. Finally, the sub-section will conclude with a summary of the different studies
so as to identify what characteristics of how experts and novices solve problems appear
constant across different types of problems and what characteristics appear limited to
certain types of problems. Moreover, the summary will also draw out a comparison
between geologic mapping as a type of problem solving and other examples of problem
solving.
2.2.1.2 Elements of well-structured and ill-structured problems
“…If we are trying to understand how people solve problems of some sort, it is
necessary to have a good grasp of the structure of the problems they undertake”
(Reitman, 1965, p. 132). Reitman (1965) is credited with the first detailed discussion of
the concept of problems and problem types (Newell, 1969; Simon, 1973; Voss & Post,
1988). In particular, Reitman establishes the idea of ill-defined problems. Citing the
earlier work of Minksy (1961) in which well-defined problems are those problems for
which it is possible to determine if a solution is acceptable, Reitman proposes that many
problems simply do not adhere to such a criterion; writing a term paper is an example of
one such problem: “We take on such tasks with nothing remotely resembling a statement
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of the necessary and sufficient conditions for a solution” (p. 148). Accordingly, the
spectrum from well-defined to ill-defined problems is defined, in particular, by the degree
to which the solution can be tested against an expected outcome. Reitman goes on to
contrast the problem of assembling a jigsaw puzzle and the problem of composing a piece
of music such as a fugue. In the former, the solution is clear and testable; all the puzzle
pieces must fit together and match the picture on the box. In the latter, the solution cannot
so easily be tested; while a composer must adhere to certain criteria in order for the piece
to merit the label of a fugue, the musical themes within the piece are entirely at the
composer’s discretion.
As far as the acceptability of a solution to an ill-defined problem, such as a fugue,
Reitman observes that that is determined by the specific community of problem solvers
engaged in similar endeavors. The reality is that “no solution to an ill-defined problem
can count on universal acceptance” (p.153). Ambiguous solutions—those that have
multiple interpretations—are a hallmark of ill-structured problems (Reitman, 1965;
Simon, 1973). In other words, the solutions are ambiguous not because they are unclear
or vague, but because there is no one precise right answer.
Simon (1973) recasts Reitman’s idea ill-defined problems with the phrase of illstructured problems2. The difference is largely semantic; Simon makes no explicit
comment on the reasoning for the change in term. Both authors argue for a continuum of
problem types. Both authors also identify some of the same means of defining problems
along the spectrum. Simon, however, argues that ill-structured problems are incorrectly
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In this literature review, I will use well‐defined and ill‐defined when I am writing about or referring to
Reitman’s work. Otherwise, I will use well‐structured and ill‐structured.
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framed as being what well-structured problems are not. Instead, he proposes “… that
many kinds of problems often treated as well-structured are better regarded as illstructured” (p. 182). For example, chess would appear to have a clear solution, on each
turn the player should complete the best moves so as ultimately to win the game. Simon
supposes that the “best moves” may be well-defined in theory, but not in practice:
The ill-structuredness, by the usual criteria, of chess playing becomes fully
evident when we consider the play of an entire game, and do not confine our view
to just a single move. The move in the real game is distinguished from moves in
dynamic analysis by its irrevocability—it has real consequences that cannot be
undone, and that are frequently different from the consequences that were
anticipated. (p.186)
Simon, therefore, suggests that a single-move within a chess game could be construed as
a solution to well-structured problem; the series of moves that comprise an entire game
are more suitably considered the solution to an ill-structured problem. This idea of scale
to distinguish a well-structured problem from ill-structured problem is a particular
contribution of Simon’s.
The problem statement is another characteristic that varies along the well- to illstructured spectrum. Using Reitman’s example again of a jigsaw puzzle, all the pieces
and information necessary to complete the puzzle are before the solver. In other words,
the more well-structured a problem, the more information necessary to solve the problem
is included in the problem statement. By comparison, a problem statement such as
compose a fugue or design a house provides little restriction on the nature of the solution
for the solver. Reitman defines the phrase open attributes as an attribute of the problem
without a specific value. Ill-structured problems typically have more open attributes than
well-structured problems. This is not necessarily a hindrance for finding the solution;
25

Reitman suggests that in some cases open attributes offer the solver flexibility and room
for creativity that might otherwise not be possible.
Both Reitman and Simon contrast solutions arrived at from algorithms with
solutions arrived at from heuristics approaches. A solver—human or machine—can use
an algorithm for well-structured problems because all components of the problem can be
clearly defined: the initial conditions in the problem statement, the criteria to evaluate the
solution, and the process to convert the initial conditions to the solution. Conversely, a
heuristic or “rule of thumb” approach is not expected to guarantee success at solving a
problem. Within research on artificial intelligence, Reitman contends that heuristics
approaches tend to be applied more well-defined problems than ill-defined problems
because machines are not quite able to handle heuristic approaches for the latter. This
observation is certainly plausible for Reitman writing in 1965, but is also likely to be
significantly outdated more than forty years later; however, a further discussion of the
status of artificial intelligence is beyond the scope of this literature review.
A notable difference between Reitman and Simon is evident in their respective
discussions of the solution process. While both authors discuss the idea that new
problems emerge throughout the process of solving the original problem statement, they
differ in their description of how the solver progresses from one sub-problem to the next.
Reitman describes problem solving as the transformation of an initial state (or problem
statement) to a terminal state (or solution). He refers to closing open attributes “by setting
up and solving detailed sub-problems or simply by assuming values and filling them in”
and goes on to explain that “the closing of the attribute is equivalent to setting up a new
transformation of the immediately preceding [sub]problem” (p.158). But he does not
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address the details of how the solver goes about solving the sub-problems or on what
basis the individual is able to assume certain values. Simon does.
Simon proposes a general model for solving a sub-problem. It starts with a
problem solver (man or machine) working on some sub-problem. This solver has “a
retrieval system, which continually modifies the problem space by evoking from longterm memory new constrains, new sub-goals, and new generators [for the original
problem]” (p. 191-192). This retrieval system also has “a recognition system that attends
to features in the current problem space and in external memory (e.g. models and
drawings), and, recognizing features as familiar, evokes relevant information from
memory which it adds to the problem space (or substitutes for other information currently
in the problem space” (p. 192). Simon notes “to the outside observer, the continuing shift
in attention from one part of the assembled task information to another would still look
like a series of transformations of the problem space” (p. 193). This harkens back to
Reitman’s idea of transformation. But the noticeable difference between Reitman’s more
general explanation and Simon’s more detailed model is that while the former process is
more linear in nature, the latter process is more iterative. In other words, Simon’s
description highlights that solving ill-structured problems requires self-monitoring and
modification of ideas; this sense of revision is missing from Reitman’s description.
Finally, to conclude this discussion of well- and ill-structured problems, I want to
consider the relationship between problem types and expertise. Voss & Post (1988), in
their own synthesis of the two works, make the following observation:
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Neither Reitman nor Simon specifically addressed the issue of expertise in
solving of ill-structured problems. The papers of Reitman and Simon, however,
suggest that experts should excel with respect to two particular aspects of such
solving – namely, that they should be better able than novices to decompose an
ill-structured problem into appropriate sub-problems; similarly, that they should
be better able to select parameter values for open constraints in a manner that
leads to a meaningful solution, given the goals at hand. (p.265)
I agree with their interpretation of Reitman and Simon. Indeed, it is an intriguing
supposition about the potential difference between how experts and novices solve
problems. In the following section I will critique a series of empirical studies on expertise
and problem solving and evaluate whether there is evidence to support Voss and Post’s
conjecture. But I would also propose that Voss and Post miss an important point that both
Reitman and Simon make about memory and what it implies about expertise and problem
solving.
Reitman quotes from an earlier work of Simon (1959) to introduce the role of
memory into the problem solving:
As every mathematician knows, it is one thing to have a set of differential
equations, and another thing to have their solutions. Yet the solutions are logically
implied by the equations—they are “all there,” if we only knew how to get to
them! By the same token, there are hosts of inferences that might3 be drawn from
the information stored in the brain that are not in fact drawn. The consequences
implied by information in the memory become known only through active
information-processing, and hence through active selection of particular problemsolving paths from the myriad that might have been followed. (pp.164)
Notable within this quotation is the idea that solutions exist and it is the ability and
process of accessing them that are uncertain. But what if the knowledge for the solution

3

Emphasis in original
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does not exist? What if the individual is a novice without the information in memory to
be processed?
I suggest that it is possible to glean some ideas about these questions within
Simon's (1973) discussion of how a robot might solve an ill-structured problem:
A different aspect of structure comes to the forefront when we consider the design
of an intelligent robot capable of locomoting and solving problems in a real
external environment. The robot’s planning and problem solving must be carried
out in terms of some internal representation of the external environment. But this
internal representation will be inexact for at least two reasons: First, it must
abstract from much (or most) of the detail of the actual physical environment. …
Second, the internal representation includes a representation of the changes that
will be produced in the environment by various actions upon it. …The robot,
therefore, will continually be confronted with new information from the
environment: features of the environment which have become relevant to its
behavior but are omitted from, or distorted in, its internal representation of the
environment… The problem representation can be revised continually to take
account of the information—of the real situation—so that the problem solver is
faced at each moment with a well-structured problem, but one that changes from
moment to moment. If the continuing alteration of the problem representation is
short-term and reversible, we generally call it “adaptation” or “feedback”, if the
alteration is more or less permanent, we refer to it as “learning”. (p.195)
What if the individual is a novice without the information in memory to be processed?
Simon appears to be suggesting that it is possible to learn the information during the
problem solving process. I would argue that this passage about robots invites an
interesting comparison with novices. Both share a lack of long-term memory in the
content relevant to the problem. Indeed, long-term memory implies extensive experience
and therefore presumably expertise (Simon & Chase, 1973). Thus, if Simon is right that
robots can be programmed to be successful at solving ill-structured problems, can similar
training methods help novices as well? These questions and in addition to the earlier
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questions raised by Voss and Post will be revisited in the summary discussion of this subsection.
2.2.1.3 Solving problems toward the well-structured end of the spectrum
The following discussion includes critiques of two studies that loom large in their
impact within the literature of research on expertise and problem solving: Chase & H. A.
Simon (1973); and Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser (1981). While Chi et al. is more widely
cited4, both are foundational contributions to our understanding of differences in how
novices and experts solve problems in the domains of chess and physics.
Participants in both studies engage in solving problems that are relatively wellstructured. In Simon's (1973) discussion of problem types, he observes that selection of a
single chess move is a relatively well-structured problem whereas selection of a sequence
of moves over the course of an entire game is more of an ill-structured problem. In Chase
& H. A. Simon (1973), the focus is on the scale of individual moves of pieces on a chess
board; in other words, the focus is on the well-structured part of a chess game. In a
similar vein, physics problems suitable for undergraduate students are generally
perceived as well-structured (e.g. Voss & Post, (1988), Wineburg, (1998)). Participants in
Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser (1981) were presented with a series of introductory-level
physics problems and then asked specific questions about their understanding of the
problem and their approach for solving it. In both Chase & H. A. Simon (1973) and Chi,
Feltovich, & Glaser (1981), the intent is to study differences in how novices and experts
solve problems that are also doable for novices; the intent is not to study expert
4

Chi notes that in 2006 Chi et al. (1981) was recognized as the most referenced paper in Cognitive Science
(http://chilab.asu.edu/honors.html).
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performance in context. This methodological distinction will be discussed further in
Section 2.3.
Chase & H. A. Simon (1973) wanted to understand what a chess player “sees”
when looking at a chess board. Their efforts are built upon the prior work of de Groot
(1965, 1966). In de Groot’s dissertation, he aimed to describe the thought processes of
expert and novice chess players during the course of one move during a game. While he
could not identify any particular differences in either the number of moves considered or
the methods for searching for a move, he did find a couple of distinctions between
players. For instance, though the masters considered a similar number of moves as the
novices, the more experienced players were more successful at finding the best moves.
The participants in de Groot’s study also completed a series of short-term memory
experiments. De Groot showed each player a series of chess boards with different
configurations of pieces, some of which were based upon real games while others were
merely random arrangements of pieces. The participants were allowed to view a board for
five seconds before the board was hidden from view. They then had to recreate the
configuration of pieces from memory. Masters were highly successful in recreating the
realistic configurations in contrast to the novices. Masters and novices alike struggled
with the random configuration of pieces. Chase and Simon (1973) summarize the
implications of de Groot’s work:
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Hence, the masters appear to be constrained by the same severe short-term
memory limits as everyone else (Miller, 1956), and their superior performance
with “meaningful” positions must lie in their ability to perceive structure in such
positions and encode them in chunks. Specifically, if a chess master can
remember the location of 20 or more pieces on the board, but has space for only
about five chunks in short-term memory, then each chunk must be composed of
four or five pieces, organized in a single relational structure. (pp. 55-56)
Chase & H. A. Simon (1973) accept as a starting point the interpretation from de
Groot that the difference in performance between experts and novices is that experts
group individual pieces into chunks of pieces. Chase and Simon observe, however, that
this interpretation “provides no direct methods for delimiting the chunk boundaries or
detecting the relations that hold among the components of a chunk. Evidence is needed
on these points in order to discover how many pieces typically constitute a chunk, what
the relative sizes are of the chunks of masters or weaker players, and how many chunks
players retain a brief view of a position” (p. 56). In other words, if de Groot’s results are
correct and chess expertise is not a result of superior memory ability, then the next
question is to try and find out what the experts are seeing that the novices are not.
Chase and Simon constructed their study to include two separate tasks. In the socalled perception task, the focus is on participants’ perception of chess boards.
Participants had to reproduce as quickly as possible the arrangement of chess pieces on
one board with pieces on another board. The example board stayed within view as the
participant worked. The two boards were six inches apart on the same table top. The
authors videotaped the participants so as to capture their glances between the boards as
well as order of piece placement. An underlying assumption of the task is that
participants only encode one chunk per glance. Therefore, the results of the perception
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task – the recording of the glances and sequence of piece arrangement – are used to
determine how and if participants grouped the pieces into chunks.
Second, in the task known as the memory task, the focus is on participants’
memory of a chess board. Participants had five seconds to study the arrangement of chess
pieces on one board before it was hidden from view. The participants then had as long as
they needed to reproduce from memory the arrangement of the pieces on a different
board. If the participant was unable to reconstruct the arrangement perfectly, then the
participant was given another opportunity to see the original pieces. However, all the
pieces previously positioned were removed from the participant’s board. After viewing
the example again for five seconds, the participant again tried to reproduce the
arrangement from memory. The participant continued in this way until he was able to
reproduce the position of all pieces correctly. As with the “perception task,” the authors
videotaped the participants as they worked for the same purpose: to determine how and if
participants grouped the pieces into chunks. Chase and Simon argue reasonably that a
benefit of the two tasks is the opportunity to test how the chunks identified using the
perception task compare with the chunks identified using the memory task.
In both tasks, the different trials included both realistic configurations of pieces
as might occur during a normal game and random configurations of pieces. It was only in
the memory task with realistic arrangements, however, that participants had to go through
multiple attempts until they successful reproduced the configuration of chess pieces on
the original board. Chase and Simon attribute the difference in design to the fact that the
random configurations “were too difficult to continue to criterion” (p. 58). In total, each
participant completed a series of 28 trials, 14 for each task. In addition, the authors note
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that the “memory task” is similar to the procedure in de Groot (1965) with both realistic
and random arrangements of pieces; however, in the earlier study, participants only made
one attempt per arrangement and did not complete multiple trials until matching the
configuration of pieces perfectly. Nonetheless, Chase and Simon argue, reasonably so,
that the procedures are similar enough to allow for this study as a test to see if the earlier
results can be reproduced.
The study includes three participants: a master chess player (M), a Class A player
(A), and a beginner (B)5. Chase and Simon offer no further description of the
participants; essentially, however, the three participants reflect an expert, intermediate,
and novice. There is no description of the subject recruitment or selection process. There
is also no discussion about the small sample size. However, as will become apparent over
the course of this literature review, expertise studies commonly have small sample sizes
(for example, see later discussion in this sub-section of Wineburg, 1998). The emphasis is
on detailed description of an individual’s approach to a particular problem with less focus
on accumulating large amount of data to test specific quantitative hypotheses.
For analysis of both tasks, Chase and Simon used the video tapes to construct
time-stamped records (or protocols6) of when and where participants placed each piece
on the board. These data are used to test the hypothesis that “long pauses would
5

The titles reflect rankings determined by the United States Chess Federation
(http://www.glicko.net/ratings/rating.system.pdf).
6
The term protocol is commonly used within expertise research to refer to some kind of documentation
of a participant’s actions or spoken thoughts during a task. It is worth noting that this use differs from the
idea of protocol as a procedure for data collection in a research study, such as an interview protocol.
However in this literature review, unless otherwise noted, protocols are primarily going to refer to the
former meaning.
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correspond to boundaries between successive chunks, while short time intervals between
pieces would indicate that the pieces belonged to the same chunk” (p. 59). Chase and
Simon devote the first third of the results section to the analyses targeting this hypothesis.
These include data on accuracy of piece placement from the memory task as well as time
data for within-glance intervals (“intervals between pieces placed without looking back at
the original position”) and between-glance intervals (“intervals between two pieces
separated by a glance back at the original position”) (p. 62). Raw data is presented in the
form of graphs with certain points mentioned explicitly within the text. The authors refer
to statistical significance of results of the time data but do not elaborate on the type of
tests used; they do note, however, significance level (p < .05).
Chase and Simon calculated accuracy on the memory task by determining how
many chess pieces were placed correctly after each five-second opportunity to view the
board. In general, there is a relationship between the player’s expertise level and
performance in remembering. The Master is consistently more accurate and needs few
trials to match the original board than either of the other players. The Class A player is
similarly more accurate and needs fewer trials than the Beginner.
The authors note that these results differ slightly from comparable data in de
Groot (1966). In particular, whereas M was able to place 16 pieces correctly, the
grandmaster and master in the earlier study were able to place 23 or 24 pieces out of 25
correctly with a similar five second opportunity to study the board. The realistic
arrangements of pieces in de Groot’s study were from games of grandmasters. The
realistic arrangement of pieces in Chase and Simon were from games of much less
experienced players. In a post-task interview, M commented about some of the
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“unreasonable” positions of pieces. Chase and Simon explain that they retested the
participants with positions from games of higher mastery players. In those test the results
were more in keeping with those of deGroot: “For these new positions, B, A, and M
averaged 33, 49, and 81% correct, respectively, as compared to 18, 34, and 62%,
respectively, on the first trial of the previous positions. These figures are in very close
agreement with those published by de Groot (1966)” (p. 62). These data appropriately
support Chase and Simon’s interpretation that they successfully replicated de Groot’s
results.
The authors also present data for both the perception task and the memory task in
graphical form. Inter-piece interval (seconds) appears on the x-axis. Frequency (%)
appears on the y-axis. The plots show the total frequency of the time intervals between
when pieces went on the board for each player. Again, the within-glance intervals are the
“intervals between pieces placed without looking back at the original position” (p.62).
The shape of the graphed data for the within-glance intervals on the perception task is
roughly the same for all three participants: there is a rapid decrease in frequency from a
peak at less than one second to two and half seconds; after that the frequencies remain
low, in the single percentages, and stop after six seconds. The modal frequencies for all
three participants were around half a second.
The shapes of the graphs for the between-glance intervals on the perception task
are different for the three participants. Again, the between-glance intervals are the
“intervals between two pieces separated by a glance back at the original position” (p.62).
The mean time delay between-glances was 2.8, 3.2, and 3.5 seconds for the M, A, and B
players, respectively. Chase and Simon comment that these values are statistically
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significant (p < .05). The challenge to the reader, however, is forming an understanding
of the practical importance of means measured on tenths of a second. While the authors
offer no explicit assistance on this point, the graphs actually provide some help. For M,
the frequency of between-glance intervals peaks at less than two seconds and then
steadily drops off to close to zero by six seconds. For A, the frequency of between-glance
intervals peaks between 2 and 4 second and then rapidly decreases down to zero. For B,
the frequency of between-glance intervals rises steadily from less than a second to peak at
4 seconds and then decreases quickly down to zero. This visual evidence of the gradual
shift from longer to shorter between-glance frequencies with more experience is a more
compelling argument for a difference between the participants than the statistical
difference of means that are all within one second of each other.
Chase and Simon also compare the time intervals of the memory task with the
time intervals of the perception task. Again they plot inter-piece time intervals (seconds)
versus frequency (%). The graphs have a similar pattern to the within-glance interval
plot, with a peak at half a second and a decrease in frequencies after two and a half
seconds. To put these data in some context they explain that it takes “at least one second
to retrieve a piece from the side of the board” (p. 63). They also comment that intervals
of half a second or less were instances where the participants had picked up multiple
pieces at once and so could put them down in very rapid succession.
Based upon the preceding data and analyses, Chase and Simon propose that time
“intervals of less than 2 seconds between successive pieces correspond to a single chunk”
(p. 64) and that “time intervals of 2 seconds or more correspond to boundaries between
chunks” (p.65). This interpretation is plausible given the data provided. It also
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accomplishes one of the goals stated at the outset of the paper, to define the boundaries
between chunks. Moreover, by affirming the interpretation that chess players perceive the
board in chunks of pieces (de Groot, 1965), Chase and Simon are able to proceed with
their investigation into the characteristics of those chunks. They state the following
hypothesis: “If we are right in equating the significance of the long (intervals > 2
seconds) and short time intervals (intervals < 2 seconds) in the two distinct tasks
(perception and memory) then the within-chunk and between chunk chess relations in the
perception task should be highly similar to the corresponding relations in the memory
task”(p.65). The latter two-thirds of the results section focuses on this hypothesis.
Chase and Simon identify five different categories of “chess relations” between
pieces on a chess board:






Attack (A): either one of the two pieces attacks the other;
Defense (D): either one of the two pieces defends the other;
Proximity (P): each piece stands on one of the eight squares adjacent to the other;
Common color (C): both pieces are the same color; and
Common type (S): both pieces are the same type (e.g. both are pawns, rooks, etc.).
(pp. 59)

They also identify 16 different possible combinations: null, A, P, C, S, AP, AS, DC, PC,
PS, CS, APS, DPC, DCS, PCS, and DPCS. The combinations vary from pieces having no
relation to each other (null) to progressively more and more complex multiple relations to
each other. For example, DPCS is assigned for “pieces that have a defense relation, are
within one square of each other, are of the same color, and are of the same type” (p. 65).
As the authors constructed the time-stamped protocols recording placement of
pieces, they also used these categories to note the relationship between successive pieces.
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Reported data for each participant include the mean inter-piece latencies (or time delays)
for the 16 possible combinations as well as probabilities for each combination.
The latencies for the 16 combinations are similar across the three participants.
The product moment correlations between participants for the within-glance data are as
follows: M vs A = .93, M vs B = .95, and A vs B = .92. The product moment correlations
between participants for the between-glance data are as follows: M vs A = .89, M vs B =
.89, and A vs B = .90. The interpretation is that players perceive “the same kinds and
degrees of relatedness between successive pieces” (p.65) regardless of expertise level.
Therefore the authors propose that it is appropriate to group together the data from all
three participants for subsequent analyses.
The authors compare the between-glance probabilities and within-glance
probabilities using z-scores. The z-scores for the between-glance probabilities of different
chess relations are close to chance (ranging from -7 to +4). The z-scores for withinglance probabilities for pieces with multiple types of relations to other pieces are
generally greater than expected by chance (e.g. 8.6 for “pieces that have a defense
relation, are within one square of each other, are the same color, and are of the same
type” such as a series of pawns); the z-scores for within-glance probabilities for pieces
with few or no relations to other pieces are less than expected by chance (e.g. -30.1 for no
relation between pieces). Chase and Simon interpret these data to suggest that “it appears
that [participants] are noticing the pawn structure, clusters of pieces of the same color,
and attack and defense relations over small spatial distances” (p. 68). The authors
speculate that the between-glances are used to remind the participant of a forgotten
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location for one piece or to get new information about the location of another piece.
These results were similar for both realistic and random configurations of chess boards.
Looking at the memory task data, Chase and Simon identify a couple of pieces of
evidence in support of the hypothesis that pauses reflect times when the participants are
recalling the next chunks. First, the latencies tend to be longer for pieces with fewer
relations to other pieces. There is no explicit description of why this result serves as
evidence. Presumably, however, the reason is that the pieces were isolated in the
participant’s memory and not associated with other pieces on the board. As a result the
longer latencies reflect the time the participant needed to search is or her memory for the
position of the piece. Second, latencies of all the combinations have a -.73 correlation
with the z-scores of the error on probabilities. Chase and Simon explain that participants
tended to make errors at the end of the protocol. The errors usually occur after longer
latencies and with pieces with fewer relations. Again, the implication is that pauses
reflect the mental effort to recall isolated pieces.
Data from the memory task also address the question of whether two second
intervals represent divisions between different chunks: “If this hypothesis is correct, the
chess relations with latencies greater than 2 seconds ought to look like chance
occurrences, whereas the relations occurring within 2 seconds ought to show even more
structure” (p. 72). Most of the z-scores for the latencies greater than 2 seconds, save
three, hover close to zero (ranging from -2.8 to 1.6). Chase and Simon note that “the only
relation that is considerably above chance is that of adjacent pieces with a defense
relation (DPC)” (p. 74). They surmise that participants are not remembering chunks
entirely at random. In particular, defense relations are likely to be common enough to be
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valuable in reconstructing piece positions. On the video recordings participants also
appeared to use strategies like recalling chunks in either a counterclockwise or clockwise
direction. For the latencies less than 2 seconds, z-scores for pieces with multiple types of
relations to other pieces were all greater than expected by chance (ranging from 6.0 to
11.0); the z-scores for within-glance probabilities for pieces with one or no relations to
other pieces are less than expected by chance (ranging from -36.4 to -12.7). Citing these
data, Chase and Simon argue that the hypothesis that the two second intervals represent
divisions between different chunks is supported.
Amongst all the data and analyses in the study, Chase and Simon acknowledge
that a key question of this study was whether the results from the perception task would
yield the same story as the results from the memory task. Chase and Simon include a
table that juxtaposes the probabilities for different chess relations from the perception
task and the memory task against
a priori probabilities for different chess relations. Evident within the table are only small
differences between the perception and memory probabilities versus large differences
between those data and the a priori probabilities. The authors also calculated an intercorrelation matrix for the three sets of probabilities. Notable within these results is a .89
correlation between within-glance probabilities (from the perception task) with shortpause probabilities (from the memory task). There is a .92 correlation for between-glance
probabilities with pauses longer than two seconds, a .81 correlation for between-glance
probabilities and a priori probabilities, and a .87 correlation for pauses longer than two
seconds and a priori probabilities. Chase and Simon, therefore, make the following
conclusions:
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The processes that occur during an interval of more than 2 seconds between the
placing of two pieces appear to be significantly different from the processes that
occur during an interval of less than 2 seconds. Moreover, the nature of the
differences in frequencies of the relations in the two cases makes it reasonable, at
least tentatively, to apply the term “chunk” to the set of pieces placed on the board
in either experiment within the boundaries of a pair of long time intervals. (pp.
75)
These conclusions are well-supported and justified based on the data presented.
While most of the data from the perception task and memory task were internally
consistent, there was at least one area in which they differed slightly. As noted earlier,
there was a difference between M, A, and B in terms of the peak frequencies for betweenglance intervals, with the highest frequency interval being the shortest for M and longest
for B. These differences in time did not correspond to a difference in number of pieces
placed per interval as a function of chess skill: 2.0 for M, 2.8 for A, and 2.0 for B. In the
memory task, however, there was a slight difference; the average number of pieces
placed per short interval as a function of skill: 2.5 for M, 2.1 for A, and 1.9 for B. Chase
and Simon suggest that these results indicate that “chess skill is reflected in the speed
with which chunks are perceived in the perception task and the size of the chunks in the
memory task” (p.76). In this case, however, the data are somewhat less convincing. The
numbers of pieces placed per interval in the perception task purportedly show no
difference as a function of skill while the numbers of pieces placed per interval in the
memory task do? There is actually a greater difference between 2.8 and 2.0 than 2.5 and
1.9, but it does not vary with expertise. Chase and Simon acknowledge the tenuous nature
of these data in the conclusion section.
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The final hypothesis in the article is that an individual’s ability to “recall is
limited by the number of chunks that can be held in short-term memory” (p. 76). The
authors propose that if this hypothesis is true then more experienced players will recall
more pieces per chunk than less experienced players. They also expect that all three
players will recall roughly the same number of chunks (7±2).
Chase and Simon observe that players M and A placed more pieces per chunk
than player B for the first few chunks. After the early chunks, different players placed the
highest amount of pieces per chunk. The authors also note that the average number of
chunks/first trial also appear to be related to chess skill.
Chase and Simon propose that these results could be attributed to several different
factors. The more experienced players may initially have remembered more pieces per
chunk. There may be some amount of interaction between recall and short-term memory
that distributes the pieces into more chunks, hence reducing the number per chunk. As far
as the difference in average number of chunks per first trial, M may have had some
specific method for organizing the pieces in his head that has otherwise been undetected
in this study. With respect to this final hypothesis, Chase and Simon interpret the data to
support the first part – the number of pieces per chunk is greater for more experienced
players – but refute the second part – the number of chunks per first trial is not constant
for all skill levels.
In conclusion, from a reader’s perspective, the paper includes a dizzying number
of hypotheses. Overall these hypotheses are treated thoroughly, albeit there are times
when the reader is left to do some of the work of connecting the dots from the data to the
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text. This critique notwithstanding, Chase and Simon successful augment the earlier work
of de Groot (1965) and identify several more characteristics that distinguish a chess
master from a chess novice. The expert is able to perceive and extract larger chunks
composed of pieces arranged by recognized chess relations than those by the novice.
Before describing the purpose of Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser's (1981) study, it is
necessary first to establish definitions of two concepts underlying their research: problem
representation and problem categorization. Chi et al. define problem representation as “a
cognitive structure corresponding to a problem, constructed by a solver on the basis of
domain-related knowledge and its organization” (p.121-122). They go on to explain that a
problem representation may simply be specific details or givens included in a particular
question. But it may also include additions or abstractions that a solver may introduce
based upon past experience with problems in that domain. Problem categorization assists
with representation because it “would cue associated information in the knowledge base”
(p. 122) that is necessary to solve the problem. The research presented in Chi et al. is
actually a series of four separate studies that build upon each other with the overall
hypothesis being “that the representation [of a problem] is constructed in the context of
the knowledge available for a particular type of problem” (p.122). They conjecture that
differences in expert and novice ability to solve problems can be tied to expert and novice
ability to categorize and represent physics problems.
In the first study, the goal was to identify how participants categorized 24 physics
problems. The participants included eight advanced Ph.D. students in physics and eight
undergraduate students; the eight Ph.D. students are identified as the experts while the
undergraduates are the novices. There are no details regarding participant recruitment or
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selection. There is also no definition of “advanced” for the Ph.D. students. Notably the
identification of advanced graduate students as experts contrasts somewhat with the idea
that did exist in the literature at the time of this study of an expert as having a minimum
of 10 years of experience (e.g. Simon & Chase, 1973). Chi et al. do report having physics
professors participate in the subsequent studies included in the same article; they also cite
Simon and Chase (1973) among their references. The reader is left to speculate why the
experts in the first study were graduate students whereas in the later studies the experts
were professionals7.
The participants had to read 24 problems from an introductory college-level
physics textbook covering a range of topics (e.g. particle dynamics, and equilibrium of
bodies). They had to sort, not solve, the problems based on the expected similarities of
the solutions. The authors asked them to repeat the sorting process to test for consistency
in their sorting. After they completed the sorting stage, the participants had to explain
why and how they grouped together different problems. The authors also recorded how
long each participant took to complete a sort.
The data reported for this study are mostly provided in summary form. There are
examples of figures that the novices and experts put together into categories. The authors
also created two separate tables detailing the expert and novice categories.
Chi et al. found no significant differences in the number of categories created by
the experts and novices or in the number of trials to get consistent (or very close) sorting
7

As an addendum to this question, there is an interesting comment by Chi in a synthesis chapter on
laboratory methods for studying expertise. Chi (2006b) comments that the graduate students in the 1981
study “technically would be apprentices or perhaps journeymen on the proficiency scale, but probably not
fully expert” (p. 174). In a sense, this statement confirms that referring to the graduate students as
experts was something of an overstatement.
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results. However, there was a difference in the time it took the experts and novices to
complete the initial sorting. The experts took an average total time of 18 minutes (45
seconds/problem) while the novices took an average of 12 minutes (30 seconds/problem).
Both groups took considerably less time to complete the second sort: 4.6 minutes average
for the experts; 5.5 minutes for the novices.
Using a cluster analysis technique, Chi et al. identified several patterns in how the
experts and novices categorized the problems. The novices tended to group problems
based on objects mentioned in the question (e.g. springs or planes), physical concepts
mentioned (e.g. friction, center of mass), or the physical arrangement of object in the
question. By contrast, the experts grouped problems by which law of physics applied
(e.g. Law of Conservation of Energy, or Newton’s Second Law). In general, there was
little overlap in the categories between the experts and novices.
The aim of the second study was to test explicitly the following prediction based
on the outcome of the first study: “novices would group together problems that have the
same surface structure, regardless of the deep structure, and experts would group together
those problems with similar deep structures” (p.131). The authors again had participants
sort a series of problems, this time 20 in all, specifically designed to have both shared
surface features and deep structure features in common with other problems.
The information about the participants in this second study is also limited. There
were four different participants: a novice (an undergraduate who had taken a course in
mechanics), an advanced novice (a fourth-year undergraduate physics major), and two
experts (a graduate student and a physics professor). No other information about
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recruitment and selection is included. In addition, the authors do not provide any
information about the timing of this study relative to the first study. Considering that the
second study is specifically designed in response to the results of the first, it would seem
natural to assume some length of time between the two studies. How much? Is there
overlap between the participants who took part in the first study and the second? If so,
what else might have happened in the intervening time?
Chi et al. report the categorization of problems as separate tables for each
participant and discuss them accordingly. There was an expected series of categories for
the 20 problems based on an expert approach of sorting using laws of physics. As
predicted, the novice developed categories based on surface features of the problem, with
the more advanced novice using the surface features somewhat less so. The expert
graduate student’s sorting differed from the expected sort for three problems. The
professor’s sorting different from the expected sort for just one problem.
The combined results of the first two studies raises an important question: “what
is the relation between categorization and a subject’s representation of problems?” (Chi et
al.,1981, p.134). The authors propose that problem representation and categorization is an
iterative process: “a problem can be at least tentatively categorized after some gross
preliminary analyses of the problem features. After a potential category is activated, then
the remainder of the representation is constructed for solution with the aid of available
knowledge associated with the category” (p.135). They go on to argue that “it is the
content of these problem schemata [or the knowledge base] that ultimately determines the
quality of the problem representation” (p.135). The question for the reader is how this
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idea of quality of representation will be related to ability to solve the problems. Indeed,
this question motivates their next two studies.
For the third study, Chi et al. investigate how the category labels experts and
novices use may be associated with larger knowledge schemata. The task for participants
was to describe everything that came to mind about physics problems from 20 different
categories. The categories were those that had been previously proposed by both experts
and novices.
Again in this third study there is limited information about the participants: two
experts and two novices. The initials for one of the novices match the initials for the
novice in the previous study who had completed the mechanics course. Chi et al. make no
explicit comment, however, that it was the same student; they might have had two
different students with the same initials.
Chi et al. converted the protocols into two different formats for analysis. First,
they constructed node-link structures, diagrams with ideas inside a circle that are
connected to other ideas with links. The circles and links are arranged such that ideas that
occur temporally together in the protocol are spatially close as well. The further away a
node is from another, the further apart the nodes are in the person’s mind. Second, the
authors converted the protocols into production rules: “This can be done simply by
converting all statements that can be interpreted as reflecting if-then or if-when structures
in the protocol” (p.139).
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Chi et al. refer to the raw data – the participants’ spoken protocols – but do not
include any direct quotations from the participants: The following passage is the authors’
paraphrasing.
The casual reference to the underlying physics principle given by the novice in
the previous example is in marked contrast to the expert’s protocol in which she
immediately mentioned general alternative basic physics principles, Newton’s
laws of Force and Conversation of Energy, that may come into play for problems
containing an inclined plane. The expert not only mentioned alternative methods,
but also the conditions under which they can be applied. Therefore, the expert
appears to associate her principles with principles with procedural knowledge
about their applicability. (pp. 137)
The absence of raw data is somewhat disappointing; it would be interesting to see
quotations. But the absence does not distract from the strength of their interpretations.
The authors do include shorter quotations in the fourth study.
Using the analyses of the node-networks and production rules, Chi et al. conclude
their third study by noting that novices do identify relevant laws of physics when reading
the problem statements. But novices do not know what to do with those observations or
how to apply the ideas to a solution. The experts also note the surface features of the
problem. But those surface features are integrated into schemata organized by the laws of
physics and an understanding of how to apply the laws to solve the problem.
Finally, building upon the three previous studies, the purpose of the culminating
fourth study was “to determine problem features that subjects use in eliciting their
category schema and hence, their solution methods” (p. 140). Four participants, two
experts and two novices, read 20 physics problem statements (the same 20 as used in
study two). They spoke aloud their thoughts about how they would go about solving the
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problem. They also had to identify what features in the problem made them decide on
their approach.
Chi et al. refer to both experts as physicists with experience teaching
undergraduate introductory-level mechanics. One of the two experts had also completed
the tasks for the second study. The authors describe the novices as having finished and
received an A grade in a mechanics course.
The experts reported that they would use major principles to guide how they
would solve different problems. They went on to describe that they would look for details
in the problem statement regarding the physical condition or state involved (e.g. before
and after situations or situations without external forces). In some cases, this information
would have to be derived; Chi et al. refer to any derived information as second-order
features because they were not explicitly provided in the problem statement.
The novice protocols included only very broad and general statements on their
approach to solving the problems: “First, I figured out what was happening… then I, I
started seeing how these different things were related to each other…I think of formulas
that give their relationships and then…” (p.142). As far as noting which features assist in
deciding on methods to solve the problem, the novices comments on objects such as
springs or inclined planes.
The following passage summarizes not only the results of the fourth study, but
ties in conclusions from previous studies as well.
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For experts… Literal cues from the problem statements are transformed into
second-order (derived) features which activate a category schema for a problem
type. This schema is organized by a physical law. It guides completion of the
problem representation and yields a general form for the equations to be used in
problem solution. For novices, problem representation is organized by schemata
for object categories, for example, “spring problems” or “falling bodies.” These
yield equations specific to problems at these levels, and much of the process of
problem representation involves instantiating the variables in these equations.
[emphasis added] (pp.149)
Recalling the original hypothesis, what is apparent from the above passage—and
highlighted in bold—is the confirmation that problem representation is related to the
context knowledge, or categories, available to the solver. In the combined results of the
four studies presented in Chi et al. illustrate that the categories experts and novices use to
approach problem solving are fundamentally different. Experts start the process from the
perspective of overarching principles. With further consideration, the focus narrows to a
smaller and more specific perspective. Novices start the process looking at the literal
details. Then they try to scale out to bigger and bigger ideas.
2.2.1.4 Solving problems toward the ill-structured end of the spectrum
This section includes a critique of a study of expertise in history and historical
problem solving (Wineburg, 1991, 1998) and two studies of expertise in geology and
interpreting geologic diagrams (Bond et al., 2007; Polson & Curtis, 2010). The choice to
couple of them together into one section is driven by a couple of factors. First, based
upon Reitman's (1965) and Simon's (1973) description of the well- to ill-structured
spectrum of problems, all four studies are more ill-structured than well-structured. In
each case, while the initial state was defined by materials provided, the final state was left
open to interpretation. Furthermore, while there was potential for wildly incorrect
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solutions in all four studies, there was also no one single or expected solution. In other
words, the problems all have ambiguous answers.
Second, as noted in the previous sub-section, geology is a historical science and
shares some commonalities with the discipline of history. Frodeman (1995) makes the
following comment about historical sciences as part of his discussion of geological
reasoning:
… historical entities do not spring into being fully formed, nor do they remain
unchanged to the time of their destruction. The researcher in the historical
sciences is faced with identifying the set of characteristics that define an
individual entity, and with deciding how much change can occur before we have a
new entity rather than simply a modification of the old (p. 965-966).
As Frodeman explains in the above passage, geologists and historians share the similar
challenge of understanding historical entities that constantly undergo change. I would
argue that in all four studies, participants are tasked with making an interpretation of a
historical entity. For the historians and students, the entities were documents and images
of paintings related to the Revolutionary War and the Battle of Lexington or documents
related to Abraham Lincoln; the task was to review the materials and come up with a
historical interpretation. For the geologists, the entity was a seismic profile of rocks
underground and the task was to come up with an interpretation of the geological features
present. What becomes apparent in critical review of these studies is that problem solving
in the historical sciences also means contending with ill-structured problems.
Wineburg (1991) introduces his study by priming the reader to the fact that
historical interpretation is constrained by the reality that a “solution” is already known.
For example, the Babylonians sacked the First Temple in 586 B.C.E.. The question of
interest for Wineburg is how people come to understand events in the past. The study is
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framed by a review of previous research related to the learning sciences and expertise in
domains such as biology, physics, mathematics, and medicine. Wineburg argues that
what sets historical inquiry apart from inquiry in some of those other domains is the illstructured natured of the problem, especially the absence of a verifiable answer. The
purpose of the study his three-fold: 1) “How do people construct an understanding of
historical events from a group of fragmented and contradictory documents? (2) What
heuristics or rules of thumb help individuals fill in the gaps left by such documents? and
(3) What beliefs do people hold about history that help or hinder their ability to make
sense of historical evidence?” (p. 74).
Wineburg (1991) selects participants that represent a continuum of expertise in
historical interpretation. His justification of this study as an expertise study is brief at the
outset. The argument is largely based upon the identified value in previous research
comparing how novices and experts solve problems in different domains. It is not until
later in the discussion section, in which Wineburg summarizes the implications of the
results for education, that the benefit of designing this as an expertise study becomes
clearer.
In this study, there are eight historians (the experts) and eight students (the
novices). This is the first of two studies in this literature review to include students
younger than college-age as participants in the research. Certainly there is no minimum
or maximum in terms of age for either end of the novice to expert spectrum. The
literature presented will largely concentrate on college-age students as the novice end of
the spectrum because the task of geologic mapping is not typically part science
curriculum at the middle school or high school grades. In this case, the benefit of
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including this critique is the explicit discussion of heuristics used to constrain and solve
an ill-structured problem such as historical interpretation.
The experts in this study included four with graduate specializations in American
history, and the other four with specializations in other areas of history. While two of the
eight were advanced doctoral graduate students, the other six all had doctoral degrees.
The eight high school students were selected based on prior course experience, teacher
recommendations, performance on the Scholastic Aptitude Test as well as performance
on a pretest with items drawn from the National Assessment of Educational Progress
(NAEP) examination in American history. The high school students had a mean G.P.A.
of 3.54 (SD = .35). All planned to go to a four-year college. Implicit within the
description of the high school students is the goal of selecting high-performing students.
The method of the study involved having the participants think aloud into an
audio recorder as they worked to complete each task for the study. In the first step,
participants read a set of eight primary and secondary sources regarding the Battle of
Lexington during the Revolutionary War. After participants finished reading the written
documents twice, they examined a trio of paintings with differing depictions of the battle
none of which match the historical record precisely. The participants were meant to use
the information they gleaned from the documents to select a painting that they thought
best reflected the historical event. The next step was to rank the written texts in order
from most to least trustworthy accounts of the battle. The last step was to complete a test
meant to assess content knowledge; participants had to define 12 terms such as “names,
events, and concepts drawn from the Colonial period” (p.75). Throughout all of the
stages, participants were encouraged to speak aloud their thoughts related to the task.
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The different steps of the data collection yielded different steps for the data
analysis. For the analysis of the participants’ thoughts while reading the documents,
Wineburg explains that the intent was not to generate “a computer simulation of
cognitive performance” (p. 76). Instead, the strategy was to code at a macroscopic level
with the intent of identifying heuristics that “carry promising instructional implications”
(p. 76). This comment is meant to signal to the reader that data analysis in this thinkaloud study does not follow methodological approach typical associated with think-aloud
studies (Ericsson & Simon, 1993), though he does not cite the work specifically.
Wineburg coded participants’ transcripts from the picture evaluation using four
categories: description; reference (to written documents or mental model of event);
analysis (of artists’ intent or motive, also estimates on date of painting); and qualification
(of other statements). Analysis of the content knowledge test was limited to descriptive
statistics.
To establish reliability of coding, a second “rater” who was “unfamiliar with the
study and blind to the backgrounds of the subjects” (p. 76) coded the transcripts of
participants’ analysis of the written documents as well as the transcripts of participants’
analysis of the paintings. The inter-coder agreement for the former was 96% and for the
latter was 90%. Differences in coding were resolved via discussion.
Wineburg found that “there was no a significant difference in the number of
descriptive statements made by the two groups [historians and students]” instead it was
“the quality of these statements [that differed], particularly in the extent to which the
groups described features that had bearing on the historical accuracy of the paintings” (p.
76). Wineburg summarizes his observations of the students’ and historians’ comments
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and provides illustrative quotes to support his analysis. Students seemed to select
paintings based on their estimating of its quality and their general schemas about
battlefield warfare. Historians appeared to select paintings based on how they represented
details described in the written documents. For instance, they rejected a painting from
1859 because it illustrates gunfire coming from behind the British front lines toward the
Colonialists; the historians reason that this is unrealistic given the hazard such a shot
would have posed to fellow British soldiers. For the historians, any selection required
compromise. As a result, their selections were accompanied with hesitation and
qualification whereas the students’ selections were not.
A substantial portion of the results section is devoted to the description for the
three heuristics that participants used while making interpretations of the documents and
paintings: corroboration, sourcing, and contextualization. Wineburg describes these
heuristics as “sense-making activities” but notes, too, “use of these heuristics, however,
does not guarantee success because there is much personal leeway in deciding when they
are appropriate and what conclusions to draw from them” (p. 77).
First, corroboration simply involved testing documents against one another. For
instance, the documents included contradictory descriptions of the size of the colonial
force present that morning as well as the actions of the colonial troops. Historians
observed the inconsistencies and took them into consideration when interpreting the
paintings. By contrast, only one student noticed the problems between the documents,
and even then did not little with the observations.
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Second, sourcing refers to looking first at the author or source of the material as a
variable to consider when interpreting a particular text. It is important to note that the
attribution information was always at the end of the document, not the beginning. In this
study, the source was taken to be an indication of possible bias, either in favor of the
British or the Colonialists. Among the participants, “historians used this heuristic 98% of
the time; students used it 31% of the time” (p. 79). For example, one of the historians
happened to be familiar with the work of an author of one of the texts and made explicit
comments about how the author’s bias could have influenced his account of the battle. In
another instance, a historian comments about likely bias within a textbook entry related to
the battle. Students also used the heuristic. However, Wineburg’s examples for their use
of source information refer only to instances when it was used late in a student’s reading
of the text. Because the definition of the heuristic includes that the participant read the
source information first before reading the rest of the document, those examples do not
qualify as instances of the students using the heuristic. He notes that “the nonuse of the
sourcing heuristic impeded the construction of meaning” (p. 79).
Third, contextualization is defined as “when trying to reconstruct historical
events, pay close attention to when they happened and where they took place” [emphasis
in original] (p. 80). In this case, the when means were certain reports of the battle written;
the where refers to context (i.e. timing, place, weather, etc.) of the report. For example,
one student commented about visualizing the battle scene based on the content of the
description in one text while a historian reflected on the possible emotions of the
Colonialists in the early morning hours before the fighting began. Contextualization was
also used to analyze the veracity of some texts. In one document, three historians noted a
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reference to bayonets glittering in sunlight while the early morning timing of the battle
made the statement impossible. Evident in all three heuristics is that it is the historians
who employ the strategies more than the students.
Wineburg reports that students and historians also differed in their evaluation of
the texts. However, his depiction of these results in the text contrasts somewhat with
results as they are shown in a figure. The figure has eight columns, one for each of the
eight documents that the participants’ analyzed. The rows are numbered from 1: most
trustworthy to 8: least trustworthy. Within each cell of the table are symbols showing the
number of students or historians that ranked the document at that particular level of
trustworthiness. The figure shows that six of the eight historians ranked a personal diary
of a British officer present that day as the most trustworthy. The other two chose a diary
and deposition from Colonialists as most trustworthy and the personal diary of the British
officer as second-most trustworthy. Three of the students also picked the Colonialist’s
diary and one student picked the deposition. In the text, Wineburg states that “figure 1
shows no overlap between historians and students on the highest ranked document: All
eight historians ranked Lt. Barker’s diary (Document 4) as the most or second most
trustworthy document, whereas no student ranked it this high” (p. 77). While I agree with
this statement, the writing obscures the fact that there was overlap between some of the
students and the historians.
Wineburg continues by commenting that three students ranked the textbook
excerpt as either the top ranked or second-most trustworthy document. In fact, the figure
shows that it was one student that ranked the textbook excerpt as most trustworthy. By
comparison, seven of the eight historians selected the textbook excerpt as the lowest or
58

second-lowest trustworthy source. However, according to the results in the figure, three
of the students also ranked the textbook excerpt as the lowest or second-lowest
trustworthy source. In other words, the same number of students that ranked the textbook
excerpt as most trustworthy also ranked it as least trustworthy. Here, too, Wineburg has
highlighted where there were differences between the students and historians without
noting the similarities as well.
I recognize that this data is hardly the keystone within the study. My critique,
however, is that the characterization of the data in the text versus the figure illustrates a
minor misalignment between the research questions and the data analysis. I would argue
that the message Wineburg seems to be conveying is that students in general focus on the
textbook excerpt to the exclusion of the most trustworthy primary documents. But I am
not persuaded that Wineburg has enough data here to support such a claim.
In summary, Wineburg observes that for all the historians, “the end result was
more of a suggestion than an answer, more of a forced choice from flawed alternatives
than a committed decision executed with resolve” (p. 83). He goes on to say that
“students, on the other hand, generally sized up the pictures and made a selection without
regret or qualification. … [they] responded as if the three pictures were analogous to
three options on a multiple choice test” (p. 83). The implication from this study is that
student performance is less related to content knowledge and more related to the ability to
decipher contradictions, a reliance on textbooks as “facts”, and a limited linear approach
to analysis. Wineburg acknowledges, however, that it remains an open question whether
it is possible to teach students the historians’ heuristics for solving such ill-structured
problems.
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In Wineburg (1998), the focus is not on differences between novices and experts
but on differences between experts with specialization in different domains within
history. This theme was touched upon in the earlier study. For instance, Wineburg (1991)
made the following comment about one of the historians: “Thrown into unfamiliar
territory, H5 [a historian with expertise in Japanese history] could find routes and
pathways because she knew how to use the disciplinary equivalent of a compass. In some
respects, her expertise lay not in what she knew, but in what she was able to do when she
did not know…” (Wineburg,1991, p. 84). It is with this following study that Wineburg
investigates differences in experts in more detail.
To frame the study, Wineburg (1998) makes a distinction between routine versus
adaptive expertise. Routine expertise allows an individual to apply the knowledge and
skills pertinent to a domain to a problem that comes from that domain. Adaptive expertise
is an indication if the individual is able “to apply, adapt, and otherwise stretch knowledge
so that it addresses a new situation – often situations in which key knowledge is lacking”
(p. 321). Wineburg assigns two historians with different areas of expertise the task of
reading documents related to Abraham Lincoln, more specifically documents related to
Lincoln’s perspective on race and slavery. The goal is to investigate how the two experts
use both routine and adaptive expertise to solve a history-based problem.
The participants in this study are two male history professors, both of whom hold
the rank of full professor. Both men received their doctorates from programs regarded as
among the top three in the country. Both are well-published authors of books and articles.
Both have backgrounds teaching courses that cover the extent of American history.
Professor H1 is the professor with particular expertise in Abraham Lincoln and the Civil
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War. Professor H2 is also an American history professor, but does not specialize in
research on the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln, or Reconstruction; H2 had studied these
areas in graduate school, but not since.
The historians had to review seven different documents: three from Abraham
Lincoln, one from Stephen A. Douglas, two from religious racists John Bell Robinson
and John Van Evrie, and one from abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison. The experts had
to use the documents to come up with their own interpretation of Lincoln’s views on race.
Wineburg trained H1 and H2 in the think-aloud procedure as defined by Ericsson
& Simon (1984) using a sample text from the science section of the New York Times.
The directions specifically asked the historians to "say whatever's on your mind," "don't
over-explain or justify," "don't worry about complete sentences"(p. 323). This approach
is consistent with concerns that thinking aloud can have a reactive influence on the
individual’s thought processes during the problem solving task. The emphasis on not
explaining or justifying is meant to avoid having the subject interpret his thoughts for the
researcher. Thus, Wineburg is using the term protocol differently than previously used by
of Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser's (1981); in that study, protocols referred to verbal reports in
which the participants were specifically asked to reflect on their own thinking.
The actual procedure involved each man receiving the seven documents on
separate pieces of paper. The documents were read in a specific order, but could be
referred to again at any point in the process. The researcher only spoke to remind the
participant to think-aloud when the participant had been silent for some length of time.
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Wineburg does not explain how long he waited before prompting the historian to
continue speaking.
After each participant finished with a specific document, they were asked to give
a retrospective report of their thoughts while reading it and discuss any other thoughts
that might have occurred to them but did not say earlier. While Wineburg appropriately
acknowledges that retrospective think-aloud protocols are critiqued as being susceptible
to the product of participant interpretation, he proposes the reporting still offers an
additional layer of insight into the historian’s thinking. Furthermore, Wineburg notes that
during analysis of the protocols he separated the concurrent think-alouds from the
retrospective think-alouds.
Data analysis for this study occurred in four stages. The first three stages involved
analyses of only the concurrent think-aloud protocols. In the first stage, the transcribed
protocols were divided into conceptual units (a set of comments that pertained to a single
idea). The conceptual unit was limited to be less than eight lines long; if the text was
longer than eight lines it was divided into two. The second stage of analysis involved
systematically reviewing the transcripts with the purpose of creating an emergent coding
scheme. In stage three, each unit was assigned one of three broad codes: self; text; or
context. A second researcher without knowledge about the participants coded the
protocols using the three broad codes; the agreement between the codes resulted in a
Cohen’s Κ = .86. The broad category of context was also divided into six sub-categories:
spatio-temporal; social-rhetorical; biographic; historiographic; linguistic; and analogical.
A third researcher coded the protocols for these contextual sub-categories; in this case,
the inter-coder agreement resulted in a Cohen’s Κ = .84. Wineburg does not explain if the
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third reviewer had knowledge of the participants nor the reason for why the second
reviewer did not also code the contextual comments.
Lastly, during stage four, the protocols were coded for evidence of other types of
cognitive behaviors including inter-textual linkages (references to other documents in the
set provided for the study) and specification of ignorance (expressions of confusion or
uncertainty). In this stage, the analysis included both concurrent and retrospective thinkaloud protocols. Again, a second reviewer coded the protocols; there was 100%
agreement for the inter-textual linkages and 96% agreement for the specification of
ignorance. The 100% agreement is striking, but is also plausible because of the particular
code in question; it seems reasonable that comments specific to other documents would
be unambiguous.
H1 (the historian with expertise in Abraham Lincoln) completed the text analysis
in 2 hours and 45 minutes (uttering 5073 words), and H2 (the historian without expertise
in Abraham Lincoln) completed the text analysis in 1 hour and 50 minutes (uttering 2992
words). Wineburg reports finding a statistically-significant difference between the two
protocols (χ2(2) = 16.03, p <.01) based upon the codes applied to the conceptual units.
The protocol for H1 was broken into 105 conceptual units. The proportion of units
in H1’s protocol for self, text, and context were 9%, 30%, and 61% respectively. The
protocol for H2 was divided into 77 conceptual units. The proportion of units in H2’s
protocol for self, text, and context were 18%, 51%, and 31% respectively. Wineburg also
gives example quotes from each historian associated with each code. For H1, the
proportion of the codes, especially the 61% attributed to context, is a reflection of H1’s
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expertise in the background knowledge relevant for the task. By comparison, H2 raised
more questions on his own knowledge and commented on confusion than H1; this helps
to understand H2’s proportion of codes, in particular the 18% of codes associated with
self.
Wineburg gives an overview of each historian’s reading of the documents. The
reporting of the verbal protocols as results includes excerpts for both historians as well as
general comments about what was said as well as how it was said. For H1, Wineburg
explains that even before completing review of the first document, he made statements
reflecting his interpretations of the content. H1 proceeds to refine and elaborate his
opinion as he reads over the other documents with passages of the protocol resembling
“the cadence and rhythm of a university lecture” (p. 331). He also made few inter-textual
links between the documents, only referring back to other documents three times in the 2
hours and 45 minutes. By contrast, H2 is quick to acknowledge his uncertainty about his
ability to interpret the documents. Wineburg describes that his protocol is like a dialogue
with the materials as he raises questions, grapples with inconsistencies, and reviews the
documents multiple times. Indeed, H2 made 20 inter-textual links to other documents
within his 1 hour and 50 minute protocol.
From the fourth stage of analysis, Wineburg reports that H1 included 7 examples
of specification of ignorance whereas H2 included 21 examples. Notably, he contrasts
each historian’s response to Lincoln’s use of the phrase “capable of thinking like white
men.” For H2, the use of the phrase is perplexing. For H1, it suggests a new research
question. H1 wonders if in Lincoln’s day the phrase may have been a synonym with “free
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men.” H1 proposes seeking out other writing from the time, particularly by abolitionists,
to look for evidence of the phrase being used interchangeably.
At the outset of the paper, Wineburg asserts that “the overarching goal of the
study was to explore how interpretations are formed when experts draw on different
kinds of cognitive resources” (p. 321). In explication of the results, he clearly lays out
how verbal reports capture the cognitive resources that the historians brought to bear on
the task. In the data from H1, the image of expertise that emerges is an example of
routine expertise. He readily assimilates the information in the new documents into his
well-established and intricate knowledge of Lincoln’s ideas about slavery. He is able to
propose a possible explanation and course of further research in response to Lincoln’s use
of the phrase, “capable of thinking like white men.” Notably, his protocol is also the
longer of the two, by 55 minutes. Thus, though he made fewer inter-textual links to return
to previous documents and was faster to come up with his identification of the key issues,
he still took longer to solve the problem than H2.
In the data from H2, we have an example of adaptive expertise. Although the
specific historical context of the problem was unfamiliar to H2, he was able to overcome
confusion and construct an interpretation. His process required multiple readings of
different documents. But as Wineburg notes “it was how he responded in the face of what
he didn’t know that allowed him, in short, to learn something new” (p. 340).
Herein lays an important characteristic of expertise in terms of implications of this
research for education: experts keep learning (Wineburg, 1998). In this study, the focus is
more particularly on the ideas H2 gained as evident in his final conclusions being similar
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to those of H1. Yet I will note again that H1 spent more time with the documents. Thus,
while the problem may have been routine for H1, that does not necessarily equate with it
being rudimentary. Indeed, this study raises questions about how routine expertise may
change in complexity and nuance from the process of solving a seemingly routine
problem.
In Bond et al. (2007), the objective was to quantify the range of uncertainty in the
interpretation of a single geologic data set. Geoscientists commonly have to convert
partial or sparse data into three-dimensional models, termed framework models; these
models may show the orientation and sequence of different stratigraphic layers of rock
units or faults offsetting layers of rock units. The concern, however, is that the models are
developed based on data such as boreholes or seismic surveys, data which are neither
continuous across wide areas nor high-resolution in nature. Thus Bond et al. sought to
identify the extent to what extent prior knowledge, length of experience, and type of
training might influence how geologists see a two-dimensional image of a seismic
section.
The study is framed by larger research questions on the how prior knowledge may
bias interpretational uncertainty. The authors offer that economics is an example of
another discipline in which similar studies have been done. But prior to this study, little
research has been done on the biases in geologic interpretations. A consideration
throughout the article—and thus throughout this critique—is the journal in which the
article is published: GSA Today. The journal is the science and news magazine of the
Geological Society of America. The peer-reviewed science articles in the journal are
limited to six pages. This restriction understandably limits the amount of detail the
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authors can include. Thus, while the following discussion notes what details were not
included in the article, the absence of those details is understood to be likely attributable
to the page limit imposed by the journal.
Bond et al. recruited 412 participants to complete the survey. The motive for
collecting so many responses was to try and reach the limits of possible interpretations of
the seismic section. This is a plausible argument; within qualitative research, one of the
methods for determining the limit of the sample size is end data collection when
additional responses no longer add new perspectives to the research questions—although
that does not usually mean getting data from over 400 people (Creswell, 2007). The
authors collected the 412 responses at conferences, workshops, and universities in
Europe, North America, and the Middle East. The information about the sampling
procedure is very minimal. The apparent geographic breadth from which the sample was
drawn would seem to auger well for a diverse population. But there is no information
about the relative proportion of the geographic distribution. In addition, the authors offer
no justification for why and how they decided to recruit participants from such diverse
areas or explanation of the circumstances under which the participants were selected.
Bond et al. designed this study as survey-based research. The primary survey
instrument was a figure, a picture of seismic section constructed from a two-dimensional
geologic model; the model is a fault that first underwent extension followed by thrusting
(also called inversion). Though the fact that the seismic section was generated from a
known model and so has a “correct” interpretation, the authors note that multiple
interpretations would be possible. The task for the participants was to look at the figure
and provide a single interpretation. Each participant who completed the task also
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completed a background survey that had questions about education level, length of
technical experience, primary expertise, and perception of ability in structural geology
and seismic interpretation.
The first stage of data analysis involved sorting the participants’ interpretations
into groups based on how each person classified the tectonic setting of the seismic
section; these groups were extension, thrust or shortening, inversion, strike-slip, diapirism
(salt or mud), other (such as carbonate reefs or stratigraphy concepts), and unclear. The
correct tectonic setting for the seismic section is inversion. Of the participants, 10%
identified the diagram as inversion. The authors also allowed that those participants that
identified both extension and shortening to have arrived at a correct interpretation; doing
so increased the total percent of correct responses to 21%. Bond et al. emphasize that the
interpretations have to be explicit in order to be put into one of the groups. If the person’s
notations were not clear, the response was classified as unclear. After reviewing all
responses, 32% of the answers were classified as unclear.
As noted earlier, the participants had to identify their main area of tectonic
expertise (e.g. thrust/shortening, inversion, extension, diapirism, strike slip). The authors
identified the percent of participants who identified the seismic section as the same type
of tectonic setting in which they also identified as their primary area of expertise. This
was compared to percent of participants who also identified the seismic section as that
same tectonic setting but reported expertise in some other type of setting. For example,
25% of those with expertise in inversion classified the tectonic setting of the seismic
section as inversion. By comparison, 20% of those with expertise in other tectonic
settings classified the tectonic setting of the seismic section as inversion. The authors did
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not say whether they had the demographics at the beginning or at the end of the survey. If
the demographics were at the beginning and this question was asked, there could have
been unintentional cuing. For example, by prompting the participant to indicate their area
of expertise, then that may have unconsciously encouraged the participant to consider the
problem from that perspective.
There is a problem with way in which Bond et al. report these results. They state
that “some” participants identified more than one area of expertise. Data for those
individuals were removed from the analysis described above. The authors speculate that
those individuals may have had more breadth of knowledge from which to pull to
interpret the diagrams. However, the authors provide no n values for how many
individuals’ data are excluded. The authors also provide no n values for how many
individuals reported areas of expertise in just one area. Thus, the reader is left to question
how reasonable are these comparisons. Bond et al. also note that “differences between the
expertise categories are not all statistically significant” (p. 8), yet offer no specific details
about which ones are or are not significant or the basis by which they determined
statistical significance. Thus, the veracity of these particular results is difficult to judge.
At best, the results may be taken as a general absence differences between groups.
Bond et al. also grouped the participants by number of years of technical
experience. The four groups are 0-5 years, 5-10 years, 10-15 years, and 15 or more years.
The authors report the same percent (76%) of students (0-5 years) as those with 15 or
more years experience interpreted the diagram incorrectly. Again, there are no raw data
included. The overall discussion of the length of experience is also minimal.
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Within the discussion of interpretation techniques, the authors do give some raw
data. They report the number of participants who used 1, 2, 3, or 4 different techniques in
their analysis of the seismic section. Alongside those n values, there is also the percent of
how many participants using different number strategies made the correct interpretation.
Two participants used four techniques and both made the correction interpretation. There
were 31 participants that used three techniques and 52% of them made the correction
interpretation. Using two techniques was the most common, 202 participants, and 25%
made the correct interpretation. The remaining 176 participants used 1 technique and
13% of them made the correct interpretation.
The different interpretation techniques include identification of features,
identification of horizons, drawing sticks, annotating the diagram with features or
horizons, and sketching or writing out (not on the diagram itself) the interpretation.
Though there is data that participants used multiple techniques, there is no separate
analysis of which strategies were used in combination.
Bond et al. claim that prior knowledge (i.e. expertise) seems to have biased some
but not all of the participants’ interpretations. Length of technical experience did not
necessarily mean the participant was more likely to make the correct interpretation.
Participants who used more than technique in the interpretation process were more likely
to make the correct interpretation of the seismic section. The authors propose that the
number of techniques may be a proxy for the level of scrutiny with which the participant
considered the seismic section.
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Overall, the reporting of results in this study is problematic from the perspective
of one interested in the finer details of the study. There is too little specific data included
for a reader really to evaluate the interpretations made by the authors. Furthermore, the
analysis is organized in terms of some of the self-reported characteristics of the
participants. Bond et al. acknowledge that several questions involved terms that were not
well-defined and so were left open to interpretation (e.g. primary area of expertise, length
of technical experience). Thus, while one can appreciate that the results of survey
research will inevitably be influenced by how the participants interprets the question, the
authors needed to have shared more details about those participants to justify the analysis.
These problems notwithstanding, Bond et al. appropriately juxtapose their
interpretations with a discussion of types of bias. First, availability bias is identified as
using a model that is most dominant in the individual’s mind. Second, anchoring bias is
defined as failure to adjust from experts’ beliefs, dominant approaches, and initial ideas.
Third, confirmation bias involves seeking opinions or facts from others to support one’s
own beliefs or hypotheses. Bond et al concluded that all three of these biases existed
among the participants involved in this study, and the data, especially some of the casestudy example interpretations, convincingly reinforce that conclusion.
Another interesting outcome from their work was the observation that the number
of years of experience did not relate to whether or not someone made the correct
interpretation. Bond et al. propose that this may imply that type of experience may have a
greater influence than length of experience. There is a connection here to our
understanding of experts and expertise. Time alone does not determine expertise. Instead,
expertise is very context specific and is developed by extensive and deliberate practice
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over a period of years – a minimum of 10 years is the typical demarcation for time to
become an expert (Ericsson et al., 1993). Yet the question on this survey instrument in
this study was broad enough that a Ph.D. student may have counted his or her two years
of experience in a program toward a professional experience whereas another
professional indicated two years based on length of career since obtaining degree.
In conclusion, the study is intriguing for what it attempts to do. It is especially
interesting to see the way in which they tried to determine how an individual’s area of
expertise influenced his or her interpretation. In terms of the suppositions stated at the
outset, the geological framework model does seem to be influenced by prior knowledge,
length of experience, and type of training. Unfortunately, however, the study is not wellenough constrained to determine the relative influence of these factors or if they are the
only ones involved.
Whereas Bond et al. sought to quantify the range of uncertainty in the
interpretation of a single diagram Polson & Curtis (2010) explore how uncertainty can
vary for an individual and a group. The study is predicated on the recognition that
experts’ interpretations are affected by bias from prior knowledge and experience.
Collaboration among scientists relies upon sharing of knowledge, the result of which may
be the reduction of individual bias. However, Polson & Curtis note that another previous
study has also implied that an interpretation based upon a discussion by a group of
experts may also be susceptible to bias.
In this study, Polson & Curtis do not articulate specific research questions.
Instead, they explain their purpose in more general terms. They designed an elicitation
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process to chart the evolution of an expert’s interpretation before, during, and after
discussion of the problem with other experts. The individuals’ interpretations are also
compared to the group consensus interpretation that emerges out of the group discussion.
The authors provide no details regarding the background of the four participants.
Though this is a significant omission, I do not think it negates completely the outcomes
of the study. The research is focused on how interpretations of individuals vary as a result
of group dynamics. Ultimately, the conclusions are based on those interpretations more
than the individuals. That said, the absence of information on the participants restricts a
reader’s ability to put the results in context. For instance, the four geologists may all be
from the same sub-discipline (e.g. structural geology) or different sub-disciplines (e.g.
structural geology or sedimentology). Presumably, the nature of the group discussion
would be influenced by the diversity, or lack thereof, of the backgrounds of those in the
room. For that matter, Polson & Curtis do not assure the reader that the participants do
not know or know of each other prior to meeting to participate in the study. Given the
prominence of the group interaction as part of the research design, it would be valuable to
have some measure of assurance that this was not a factor in the group discussion.
Similar to Bond et al., the problem posed to participants in this study involves the
interpretation of a seismic cross section. In this case, however, the data are real and not
the result of a synthetic model. In this study, the seismic cross sections are identified as
being from a certain basin in Scotland. Other geologists have previously suggested the
presence of three different features in the basin: a sandstone unit with the potential of
being a reservoir (for what exactly, is not explained); a shale unit that would be expected
to form a seal above the sandstone; and a north-south fault extending the length of the
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basin. There is no consensus within the community that any or all of these features are
absolutely present in the area.
The procedure in this study involves six stages. First, each participant was asked
to use the seismic data to determine on his or her own the probability that the proposed
structures are present in the basin. They also had to estimate the lower and upper bounds
of the probability of their interpretation. In the second stage, the four participants met as a
group with the researchers. At this point, the researchers explained possible sources of
bias in their interpretations. Third, the participants again completed an independent
interpretation of the seismic data. In the fourth stage, the participants regrouped with
other participants and had to present and justify their interpretations. This stage blended
into the fifth stage in which the participants developed a group consensus interpretation.
The sixth and last step was for each participant to make a final independent interpretation
of the data.
The results of this study are presented primarily in the form of summaries with
no raw data given. Polson & Curtis plotted the probability of the interpretation along the
x-axis and the integral of the probability along the y-axis. Essentially, the y-axis is meant
to indicate relative confidence of the interpretation. For each possible interpretation of
seismic cross section (e.g. the reservoir, seal, and fault), there are four graphs, one for
each of the three separate times the experts made independent estimates of the probability
and a fourth plot showing an average of the experts interpretations at each stage.
Superimposed on all three figures is the consensus probability estimated by the group in
stage five.
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For two of the three interpretations of the diagram, there was little in the way of
initial agreement between the experts; the experts all had differing opinions about the
probability that the profile could be explained by the reservoir or seal models. By
comparison, they all had similar estimates of 20-40% probability that the profile could be
explained by the fault. For all three models, group discussion resulted in convergence of
estimates of probability for the different interpretations.
Polson & Curtis emphasize a key conclusion from this study is the importance of
being attentive to the possible consequences of one expert. In particular, Expert E1
appears to have steered the group toward the fault model as the most likely interpretation.
Experts E2 and E3 appear to have been somewhat convinced, though not entirely as their
final estimates were still somewhat lower than the agreed-upon consensus estimate. By
comparison, Expert E4 appears to have been willing to compromise with the group; yet
his or her final estimate is notably different not only from the initial estimate but also
different from the other members of the group.
In summary, the goal of this study was to explore whether experts would
influence each other’s interpretation of a specific set of data. Polson & Curtis do provide
evidence to support their claim that expert interpretations are susceptible to both
individual and group bias. Yet, the lack of information about the participants means that
the conclusions are less convincing then they might have been had the authors included
that essential information. Furthermore, their conclusions would have been more
compelling had they collected and reported qualitative data such as excerpts of the
conversation between the participants as they discussed their interpretations. That type of
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dialogue could have added to our understanding of how groups of scientists deal with
uncertainty in problem solving.
A common theme to both of these articles is the question of how the background
of an individual can affect his or her interpretation of geological data. In Bond et al.,
participants demographic are part of the analysis. In Polson & Curtis, the demographic
data is missing entirely and so a curious reader is left to wonder how it might be a factor.
2.2.1.5 Section summary
Wineburg (1998) draws an interesting parallel between historical interpretation
and cooking in the closing of his discussion section that highlights an important aspect of
the spectrum of well- to ill-structured problems:
“…an analogy can be drawn between the act of cooking and the processes of
historical interpretation. Elements of the documentary record can be likened to
ingredients in a kitchen. The culinary variations one can produce with, say, flour,
tomatoes, eggs, cheese, and salt—from pizza to pasta, to quiche and soufflé—are
endless. But if a group of cooks claimed they could produce ice cream, meat loaf,
or aspic from these same ingredients we would send them back to cooking
school…” (p. 339-340).
He introduces this analogy to explain that technically there could be some “wrong”
interpretations of the documents pertaining to Lincoln’s views. For example, he contends
that it would be unsupportable to claim that Lincoln’s views aligned more with those of
the religious racists John Bell Robinson and John Van Evrie instead of being closer to the
views of the abolitionist William Lloyd Garrison. But the other part of the analogy is the
implication of the potential for variation in interpretation. In other words, solutions to illstructured problems may be ambiguous (Reitman, 1965), but this does not mean that all
solutions are possible. For example, each seismic profile had multiple justifiable
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interpretations (Bond et al., 2007; Polson & Curtis, 2010); at no point was there any
suggestion that any interpretation would be possible.
The difference between how novice and experts use heuristics to solve problems
is a theme throughout these studies. For experts in Chi et al. (1981), the problem
statement activated category schemata based on the relevant physical law. By contrast,
for the novices, the problem statement triggered recall of equations and a quest to find
values for variables. For different example, the historians in Wineburg (1991) reading
about the Battle of Lexington were especially concerned with identifying the source of
the material. Authorship did not go unnoticed by the novices, but appeared to have little
sway in their interpretation. It seems striking that in both studies—one of which
concerned well-structured problems, the other an ill-structured problem—experts were
concerned with putting the problem into a larger context. The students, on the other hand,
tended to focus more on what information was most obvious.
In the discussion of types of problems at the outset of this sub-section, I noted a
conjecture proposed by Voss & Post (1988) regarding how experts might differ from
novices when solving well- and ill-structured problems:
… experts should excel with respect to two particular aspects of [ill-structured
problem] solving – namely, that they should be better able than novices to
decompose an ill-structured problem into appropriate sub-problems; similarly,
that they should be better able to select parameter values for open constraints in a
manner that leads to a meaningful solution, given the goals at hand (pp.265).
Before considering whether the literature supports or refutes this assertion, I would like to
note that this statement makes no distinction between the type of expert and type of
problem. This section has included studies in which experts such as historians or
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geologists solved problems specific to certain specialties within history and geology.
Wineburg (1991, 1998) has twice demonstrated that the historians without specializations
specific to a problem were capable of making comparable interpretations to those
historians with that specialization. While the historians may not have shared a common
knowledge base, they evidently shared expertise in heuristics that aid historical
interpretation. Additionally, Bond et al. (2007) found that geologists who used multiple
strategies for interpreting the seismic image, regardless of their areas of specialization,
were more successful in the task than those who used only one or two strategies.
But while the historians reached the same conclusions, they did so via different
approaches. Reitman (1965) proposed that solving an ill-structured problem involved
closing open constraints by either solving for or assuming values. Simon (1973)
described solving an ill-structured problem as a more iterative process with multiple
transformations of the problem representation. Revisiting the historians presented in
Wineburg (1998), H1 discussed a preliminary interpretation early on and then made few
inter-textual links between documents. By comparison, H2 expressed hesitancy and made
multiple inter-textual links between documents as he worked to a solution. I would
suggest that H1’s approach is more similar to Reitman’s model while H2’s approach is
more similar to Simon’s model.
Thus, returning to the Voss and Post’s (1988) conjecture about an expert’s ability
to solve ill-structured problems, I would argue that literature does support the statement
in general. What I find particularly interesting, however, is that experts can arrive at
similar conclusions via different routes. In other words, Voss and Post are right in
describing experts as capable of revising the ill-structured problem into manageable
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problems and closing open constraints. But Wineburg (1991, 1998) appears to
demonstrate that experts are capable of doing this both for problems that are specific to
their specializations and those that are not. The nature of the survey study by Bond et al.
(2007) make it impossible to know to what extent geologists with similar interpretations
reached those conclusions via the same or different approaches. Thus, we still need more
information to know how geologists go about the process of solving an ill-structured
problem.
Another observation I made at the outset of this sub-section concerned the role of
memory in problem solving. Simon (1973) suggested that a robot without long-term
memory for a problem could “learn” through the process of “continuing alteration of the
problem representation” (p. 195). Notably, Wineburg (1998) makes the following
comment about H2:
By following H2’s interpretative tracks, we see how his understanding emerges as
a result of a dialectical process between the questions he asks and the textual
materials he encountered. Expert problem-solving has sometimes been depicted as
a unidirectional process in which the knowledge-base of the expert is brought to
bear on a particular problem. Here, however, the arrow goes in the other direction:
Aspects of the textual case provoked, challenged, and altered the knowledge base
of the expert (cf. Scardamalia & Bereiter, 1991). Novice readers encounter the
past in primary documents and judge it. H2 encountered the past in this task and
learned from it (pp. 337-338).
The H2 historian, without expertise specific to Abraham Lincoln, the Civil War, or
Reconstruction but expertise in other aspects of American history, is able to solve the
unfamiliar problem through the robot’s technique of continuing alteration of the problem
representation. Earlier I raised a question as to whether the seeming parallels between the
robot and novices could imply that methods to train robots to be successful at solving illstructured problems might be useful for novices as well. Based upon the performance of
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H2 in Wineburg (1998), I would amend that earlier question. What strategies can we train
novices to do that would enable them to continually alter the problem representation of
ill-structured problems? In fact, Wineburg (1991) poses a similar question when
reflecting on the potential for teaching high school students the historians’ heuristics for
reading and interpreting descriptions of historical events.
Finally, what else do these studies imply about expertise in solving problems in
the geosciences? Something that emerges out of Bond et al. (2007) as well as Polson &
Curtis (2010) is the influence of bias. Interestingly, though, bias does not come up in
Wineburg (1998). I would argue that methodologies of the different studies are vitally
important. First, the case study approach in Wineburg (1998) means that there is more
clarity regarding the participants and their background knowledge. In Bond et al. (2007) ,
the survey data on the participants’ background is not well constrained; in Polson &
Curtis (2010), there is no data on the participants’ backgrounds. Second, the think-aloud
protocols, both concurrent and retrospective, capture the thought processes of the
historians as they worked out their interpretation of the documents. The survey data
reflects the final interpretation with no details about the process or evidence used to reach
that interpretation. Of course the survey data captures the ideas of many more individuals
than is possible to obtain in a think-aloud study. However, given what goes into
processing think-aloud data, there is simply no way to collect n values on the order of
several hundred responses.
Thus, I would propose that the influence of bias in geologic problem solving
needs to be explored further. The model for problem solving in Simon (1973) emphasizes
the importance of long-term memory. For the physicists in Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser
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(1981) and the historians in Wineburg (1991, 1998), long-term memory as an implication
of expertise was not a source of bias, but a benefit. What makes the long-term memory in
geosciences different? Or is it the nature of the problems in geosciences?
2.2.2 Expertise and mental models
2.2.2.1 Introduction
A theme in the previous sub-section was the question of how experts see
problems differently than novices. In Chi et al. (1981), when experts and novices were
asked to read and explain how they would solve the same physics problems, the former
focused on the relevant major principles while the latter concentrated on the surface
characteristics of the question. Using node-link structures as a way to diagram the
participants’ ideas, Chi et al. demonstrated that there was actually overlap between the
content of the experts and novices ideas types of physics problems. Experts referred to
surface features. Novices did discuss major principles. The distinction was way their
ideas were organized. For the experts, the major principles were central to their
representations of the problem, the surface features were peripheral. For the novices, their
ideas were structured in the reverse order. Thus, Chi et al. documented differences in how
experts and novices approach solving problems as well as in how experts and novices
constructed ideas about those problems.
This sub-section shifts from comparing how experts and novices solve problems
to comparing how experts and novices build and use mental models about different
objects, phenomena, and situations. In science education, a goal of instruction is to align
students’ mental models of different phenomena with the science communities’
explanations (Greca & Moreira, 2000). For something like geologic mapping, the goal is
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somewhat different. The correctness of the map is determined by the community who
reads and uses the map. There is no scientific model against which to compare a mental
model. Instead, the goal for the geologist is to build a mental model that is consistent with
data collected in the field as well as one that is geologically plausible. Recall the
following observation about the nature of geologic mapping: “It is difficult for some to
realize that mapping needs to be redone from time to time. It is not that the rocks have
changed; it is our ideas about them have grown and require different and better maps”
(Pettijohn, 1984, p. 244). In other words, there may come a time when a geologic map
needs to change. But that will only happen when the geologist’s mental model of the area
changes as well. Thus, the intent here is to delve into more detail on what we can learn
about expertise in geologic mapping by focusing on the overlap between expertise and
mental models.
As in the previous sub-section, the first portion is devoted to establishing
definitions of some key terms and concepts related to this section. Following that
explanation, there are two sections of critical reviews. The first section includes pair of
critiques (Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004; Jacobson, 2001) that focus on expert-novice
differences in mental models of complex systems. It is important to note that the
discipline content of the critiques is not particularly relevant to geologic maps as mental
models. However, these studies do explicitly consider differences in mental models of
novices and experts. I found this to be unusual in the literature and so selected the articles
for this review. In addition, to looking at differences in mental models of experts and
novices, Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer (2004) also looks at difference in mental models of
individuals with different types of expertise. Therefore their study also serves as a nice
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comparison with Wineburg (1998) and the historians with two different types of
expertise.
The second section includes another pair of critiques (Chang et al., 1985;
Mckenna et al., 2008) but now concerning maps as mental models. The two articles are
slightly different examples of expertise studies. Chang et al. is fairly typical in that they
are exploring variations in performance by groups with different levels of expertise.
McKenna et al. is about a community of fishermen and their expert mental model of a
lough (lake). In comparing the first two critiques to the second two, it is somewhat easier
to identify the characteristics of different types of mental models in the discussion of
ideas related to complex systems. Thus the first two critiques help establish an
understanding of mental models before transitioning to discussion of maps, which are a
special category of mental models (Tversky, 2005).
2.2.2.2 Views on mental models
A general definition of a mental model is “a representation of some domain or
situation that supports understanding, reasoning, and prediction” (Markman & Gentner,
2001, p. 228). This definition encapsulates the two main types of mental models: logical
models (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 2005) and causal models (Markman & Gentner, 2001).
Logical models are based upon a specific model theory (Johnson-Laird, 1983,
2005). The goal of model theory is “to explain all sorts of thinking about propositions,
that is, thoughts capable of being true or false” (Johnson-Laird, 2005, p. 185). In practice,
this model theory is used to support research on how humans understand different types
and structures of systems (Rouse & Morris, 1986; Tversky, 2005). Logical models are
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also known as structural models (Tversky, 2005). Logical mental models essentially
consist of an understanding of the components of a problem or system.
Causal models “are mental representations that are used in reasoning and that are
based on long-term domain knowledge or theories (Gentner & Stevens, 1983)”
(Markman & Gentner, 2001, p. 229). In other words, an individual can constructs a
causal model by using long-term memory of a particular domain. Whereas logical mental
models help an individual identify the components of a system, causal mental models
help an individual explain the function of the different components of a system (Tversky,
2005). Causal mental models, therefore, consist of an explicit understanding about how
the components interact or influence each other.
As far as differences in how experts and novices construct and use these different
types of models, Tversky (2005) cites the findings from the chess studies of de Groot
(1965) and Chase and Simon (1973) as evidence that experts are more successful at
formulating causal mental models. Recall that in those studies, the experts were more
successful at finding the “best” moves (de Groot, 1965) and were faster at perceiving
chunks and could associate more pieces within a chunk than the novices (Chase and
Simon, 1973). The implication is that experts are “seeing” how pieces would interact and
influence each other. Tversky (2005) notes, too, that there is typically no difference
between how experts and novices construct logical mental models. Again, the chess
studies are useful evidence in support of the claim; both experts and novices could
perceive the complicated relations between chess pieces. The difference lay in what they
were able to do with those observations.
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Rouse & Morris (1986), in their own synthesis of literature on mental models, do
not focus on types of mental models, but on ways of distinguishing between mental
models in different domains. They start off by reviewing four general methods for
identifying an individual’s mental models (Rouse & Morris, 1986). First there are
empirical studies such as those in experimental psychology. Second, empirical modeling
assumes “that [if] humans actually perceive what is displayed and response execution is
very simple, then techniques such as regression can be used to identify input-output
relations” (Rouse & Morris, 1986, p. 351). Third, analytical modeling may be used when
the assumptions of empirical modeling are not suitable. Instead, analytical modeling
“involves using available theory and data to formulate assumptions about the form,
structure, and perhaps parameters of mental models for particular tasks” (Rouse &
Morris, 1986, p. 352). Fourth, is the approach “simply to ask people about their mental
models” (Rouse & Morris, 1986, p. 352). While each method has its strengths and
limitations, a detailed discussion of those points is not the main purpose at the moment.
Instead, the reason for the preceding summary pertains to an argument put forth by Rouse
& Morris (1986) regarding a relationships between these different methods and a
proposed taxonomy to distinguish between mental models from different domains.
Rouse & Morris (1986) propose a mental model space defined by the nature of
model manipulation along the x-axis and level of behavioral discretion along the y-axis.
They define nature of model manipulation as how much a subject is “aware of his or her
manipulation of a mental model” from not at all (implicit) to completely aware (explicit)
(p. 354). They suggest that level of behavioral discretion “can range from none to full,
where these terms refer to the extent that a subject’s behavior is a matter of choice, as
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opposed to being dictated by the task” (p. 354). The authors emphasize that within this
proposed model space there is no way to claim that the positions are exact. The relative
placements, however, suggest something important the distinctions between mental
models.
Rouse & Morris (1986) contend that domains with lower levels of behavioral
discretion are best suited to inferential methods such as empirical studies and modeling
(either empirical or analytical). In these domains, the mental models are not really at the
discretion of the individual. By contrast, domains that rely on more explicit manipulation
of mental models can be well characterized by verbalization methods: “this is because the
need for explicit manipulation may result in verbalization being a ‘natural’ part of a task”
(p.354).
There is an interesting connection now between this mental model space and
types of problems discussed earlier. For example, let us consider the problem of
constructing a bicycle. The bicycle will come will directions. An individual would have a
clear sense of the initial conditions (i.e. the pieces involved and the equipment needed)
and have a clear sense of the final solution (i.e. the completed bicycle). In other words,
assembling a bicycle is a well-structured problem. Based on Rouse and Morris (1986),
assembling a bicycle is also an example with explicit information as to how to manipulate
the problem space from the initial condition to the final condition. There is also little
behavioral discretion—or we could say uncertainty—in how to solve the problem. Thus,
it seems possible to amend our understanding of the difference between well-structured
and ill-structured problems to include the idea that the former involves no or little
behavioral discretion while the latter has some or full behavioral discretion.
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The question emerges, where would ‘reading maps’ or ‘making maps’ fall within
this mental model space? Thus, this idea of position of reading or making maps in this
mental model space will be another interest at the end of this sub-section.
2.2.2.3Mental models of complex systems
A main purported goal in Jacobson (2001) is to identify how expert and novices
solve problems related to complex systems. I would argue, however, that the study is
better described as a test of whether experts and novices conceive of distinct mental
models when solving complex system problems. To explain more fully my different
interpretation, I need first to summarize how Jacobson frames his study.
As defined by Jacobson, a complex system consists of “… the interactions of
numerous individual elements or agents (often relatively simple) which self-organize to
show emergent and complex properties not exhibited by the individual elements”
(Jacobson, 2001, p. 42). For example, an animal such as a bird has an immune system
that affects the internal function of the bird. That same bird can also be part of a
formation of a flock of many birds. The entire flock of birds is also a part of a larger
ecosystem. Collectively, the bird’s immune system, the single bird, the flock of birds, and
the ecosystems of which they are a part comprise a complex system. Accordingly
understanding of complex systems hinges on learning about randomness, stochastic
processes, and the idea of multiple sources of control in a system instead of a single
centralized source (Jacobson, 2001).
Building upon this idea of what one needs to learn to understand complex system,
Jacobson (2001) makes a series of claims some with support of citations, others not. First,
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he states that “to deeply understand a knowledge area means, among other things, that
one can solve problems in that area” (p.42). Second, “engaging students in solving
authentic problems has also been identified as an essential component of the learning
process (17-19)” (p.42). Third, he argues that “these two perspectives suggest that efforts
dealing with learning complex systems could be informed by an appreciation of how
scientists and students solve problems dealing with complex system phenomena” (p.42).
The first two claims are clear and intelligible. The third has a couple of ideas
compressed into the one statement and that ought really to have been separated. I want to
start with the end of the sentence: an appreciation of how scientists and students solve
problems dealing with complex system phenomena. Jacobson does not explicitly mention
scientists within the first two claims. Instead, he makes rather oblique references to
scientists that the reader must infer. The first claim refers to a deep understanding. It
seems plausible that he is assuming that scientists are the ones who are likely to have a
deep understanding and thus a scientist’s deep understanding is something of interest. In
the second claim, Jacobson uses the phrase of authentic problems. The implication of the
third sentence seems to be that authentic problems are those that scientists solve. Again,
this is plausible definition; but it also one that should have been made more explicit. Now
looking back to the whole sentence of third claim – these two perspectives suggest that
efforts dealing with learning complex systems could be informed by an appreciation of
how scientists and students solve problems dealing with complex system phenomena – the
tangle of ideas is more interpretable. Jacobson appears to be arguing that an investigation
into how experts (i.e. scientists) solve problems that are authentic to their profession may
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yield insight into what strategies should be taught to students learning how to solve
complex system problems.
This interpretation is supported with Jacobson’s subsequence comment regarding
the literature. He observes that there are few existing studies on the solving of complex
system problems and “no reported research has examined complex system problem
solving in a manner intended to identify differences between experts (complex system
scientists) and novices (e.g. university students)” (p.42). The latter statement is surprising
in its absoluteness. How is he defining “complex problem solving”? There exist relevant
medical expertise studies (e.g. Lesgold et al., 1988). Would not research on how doctors
develop diagnoses and interpret medical data constitute solving a complex system
problem? While the claim seems like an overstatement and is inconsistent with existing
literature, it does set up the explanation of the study.
Jacobson presents the reader with two alternative scenarios that need to be tested.
On the one hand, if advanced undergraduate students acquire knowledge of components
of complex systems through their high school and early college education, then teaching
them how to solve complex system problems “would be fairly straightforward” (p. 42). In
other words, if advanced undergraduate students acquire components of an expert-like
mental model for a complex system through earlier education, then it should be relatively
easy to teach them how to solve a complex system problem with their mental model. On
the other hand, if advanced undergraduate students have not acquired an expert-like
mental model of a complex system through their earlier education, “…then the types of
complex systems instructional materials and learning activities students experience in
their schooling may need to be quite different from what is currently available” (p. 42). It
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is based on these two scenarios that Jacobson states that the intended purposes of the
study, therefore, is to examine novice and expert solving of complex system problems so
as to distinguish what specific recommendations for science education may be most
suitable.
My critique is that Jacobson’s claim that the focus is on problem solving is really
a misnomer. These two scenarios hinge on whether or not advanced undergraduate
students have expert-like mental models of complex systems. What Jacobson does is to
investigate the nature of the student mental models by asking them to solve a complex
system problem. Thus, while problem solving is a part of the overall study, it is the
assumptions regarding the mental models that are the essence of it.
The participants in this study included seven undergraduate students as the novice
participants and nine professional scientists and advanced graduate students as the
experts. None of the undergraduate students were majoring in math or science; instead
they were majoring in one of the social sciences or humanities. Jacobson (2001) provides
no details about the recruitment process but does state that the undergraduates received
financial compensations for participating. The experts were recruited through an
electronic discussion board of the New England Complex Systems Institute. Unlike the
novices, the experts did not receive any financial compensation.
The data collection procedure was different for the novices and experts. The
novices met one-on-one with a researcher for a single interview session. The researcher
read the questions to the novices and asked them to respond verbally with additional
clarifications as necessary. The experts completed the research instruments through
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electronic written correspondence. After receiving and reviewing the experts’ written
responses, researchers did contact some of the experts again by email for additional
explanations.
All participants complete two different survey instruments. One of the research
instruments was a demographic and background survey with questions such as gender or
major area of study in college. The second research instrument was a series of questions
pertaining to complex systems (e.g. “How do ants find and collect their food? How would
you design a city so that there will be goods and services but minimal shorts or surpluses?
How did cheetahs evolve to run so fast? Is it possible for a butterfly in Brazil to cause a
snowstorm in Alaska? How do traffic jams form?). All of the questions from the second
instrument appear as an appendix at the end of the article.
Jacobson (2001) coded participant responses according to a predetermined
complex systems mental model (CSMM) framework developed based on his own work
and the work of others (see references therein). The CSMM consists of eight categories:
understanding phenomena, control [of system], causes, action effects, agent actions,
complex actions, final causes or purposefulness of natural phenomena, and ontology.
Jacobson proposed that the novices and experts will express certain beliefs for each one
these categories. These anticipated beliefs are purportedly based upon an earlier pilot test
data; however there are no further details regarding the nature of that study nor citations
offered. Participants’ responses were also inspected for explicit mention of different
complex system concepts such as “emergence, self-organization, or multiple agents” (p.
44). Jacobson includes a list of the tracked complex systems concepts as part of a table
within the text.
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Jacobson (2001) reports that “one trained rater coded all of the responses, and a
second rater coded a subset of the responses (approximately 15%), with few differences
discussed until a consensus was achieved” (p.44). He also completed several statistical
tests of the participants’ coded responses; these analyses will be described in more detail
below as part of the discussion of the results.
Jacobson (2001) supplies several illustrative participant quotes as evidence of the
differences between the mental models of the experts and novices. Below are examples of
a novice and expert response to the question, “It has been said that a butterfly flapping its
wings in Brazil can jiggle the air and thus can help cause a snowstorm in Alaska. Is this
possible? If so, how? If not, why not?”
Sandra (a major in early childhood education): Theoretically, it’s possible, but in
my opinion the global site, global scale is so great that changes of that magnitude
are so infinitesimal. Maybe a whole flock of butterflies, but not just one butterfly.
I wouldn’t think. The scale of the globe as a whole is just too great for something
that small to affect it in any major way. (…). (pp.45)
John, one of the complex systems experts: The concept is that a small perturbation
in a remote area can, through nonlinear amplification, impart an effect (possibly
large) somewhere in a distant area. It has been said that the butterfly “causes” the
storm—this is false—it is a component in a complex nonlinear system. It no more
“causes” a storm than a baseball pitcher “causes” a home run. (pp.45)
Jacobson interprets this example and most others to support the assumed set of beliefs
(i.e. the mental models) ascribed to the novice and expert, respectively. Jacobson only
notes one exception; there was one student whose statement indicated a complex systems
with multiple causes instead of a single cause.
The CSMM framework is further tested with a couple of statistical tests. Jacobson
(2001) tabulated the number of expert and novice participant responses that matched the

92

beliefs for each component of the CSMM. He then calculated a Cronbach’s alpha to
determine the reliability of the beliefs in each set (i.e. the proposed set of expert beliefs
and the proposed set of novice beliefs). The resulting α value for the expert set was .76
and for the novice set was .72. He also reports r values from a correlation matrix to
determine how beliefs correlate with the overall set. For the novice set, there were five
beliefs with r values > 0.4 (r ranging from .45 and .87): understanding of phenomena
(reductive); control (centralized); action effects (small  small); and action agents
(predictable). For the expert set, there were five beliefs with values >.4 (r ranging from
.55 and .79): understanding of phenomena (non-reductive); control (decentralized);
causes (multiple); action agents (randomness); and ontology (equilibration processes).
The final set of results reported is a tally of the number of complex system
concepts expressed by the experts and novices. In all, Jacobson (2001) identified 142
examples of complex systems concepts within the experts’ responses and 52 examples
within the novices’ responses. Examples of these complex system concepts include:
multiple agents, evolution and selection, positive feedback, hierarchical levels, and
homeostasis.
Jacobson (2001) begins the discussion by noting the “significant” difference
between the total numbers of complex systems concepts used by experts versus novices.
The choice of the word “significant” is slightly misleading because there was no
statistical analysis of this data. Nonetheless, Jacobson notes that the obvious conclusion is
that the difference is due to the experts simply knowing more about complex systems.
Yet he also returns to the earlier suggestion that the university students should have been
exposed to many of the concepts through general high school and college curricula. Thus,
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he speculates that the difference may also be a reflection of students’ struggles with
learning concepts related to complex systems.
In the latter portion of the discussion, Jacobson (2001) acknowledges that the
sample size of this study is too small to make claims about the statistical significance of
differences in the mental models of the experts and novices. Instead, the focus is more on
interpreting the tests of the differences between the expert and novice set of beliefs.
Jacobson introduces the phrase “conceptual ecology” to refer to the two different sets of
beliefs (Table 4). Reflecting on the observed variations in the two sets (e.g. the novice set
being characterized by a reductive understanding of phenomena and the expert set being
characterized by a non-reductive perspective), he supposes that “a critical educational
challenge for helping students to learn about complex systems will be to change, or
perhaps more accurately, to cultivate and enrich the conceptual ecology that novices have
available when learning about and dealing with complex systems phenomena” (p. 47).
This final analysis regarding the conceptual ecologies is the most compelling part
of the paper. While I still find fault with the absence of data or citations on the pilot
study, I accept Jacobson’s claims that there are a differences between the novice and
expert conceptual ecologies and that the differences align with the two proposed mental
models. Thus, I am also inclined to accept Jacobson’s argument that an implication of
this study for science education is the identification of explicit areas to address when
developing curriculum on complex systems.
Similar to Jacobson (2001), Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer (2004) also work to relate
their study mental models to science education. Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer (2004)
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concentrate on different individuals’ understanding of complex systems in biology,
particularly that of an aquarium ecosystem. In their review of relevant literature, Hmelosilver & Pfeffer (2004) remind the reader that it is common that students’ understanding
of a complex system is largely limited to its perceivable components. Also students are
frequently missing a conception of processes in a complex system that cannot readily be
seen, of how components and processes interact with each other, and of the different
scales at which these interactions can take place (from the macro to the micro).
Furthermore, it is rare to find documentation indicating an understanding that complex
systems do not necessarily obey cause-and-effect relationships or that the connections
can be unpredictable or emergent (Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer, 2004, and references therein).
In response to these recognized gaps in understanding of complex systems,
Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer (2004) introduce the concept of the Structure-Behavior-Function
(SBF) framework: “the SBF framework allows effective reasoning about the functional
and causal roles played by structural elements in a system by describing a system’s
subcomponents, their purpose in the system, and the mechanisms that enable their
functions” (p.130). They propose the use of the SBF framework not only as a framework
for their research but also as a possible tool for instruction in science classes. Their
supposition is that explicit instruction regarding the behavior and function of different
structures in a system, along with instruction regarding the structures will contribute to a
better understanding of complex systems. For this research study, they query two groups
of novices and one group of experts about the structure, behavior, and functions of the
components within the ecosystem of an aquarium to test the claim about the possible
benefit of the SBF framework.
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The novice participants in this study included seventh grade students from a
public suburban middle school (n = 11) and pre-service teachers attending a large public
university (n = 11). The expert participants included professional research biologists with
advanced degrees in biology (n = 8) and recreational biologists or hobbyists (n = 8) with
experience maintaining aquaria for more than 10 years and active participants in local
aquarium society. Only one student and one pre-service teacher had an aquarium at
home. Three students, three pre-service teachers, and three experts reported studying
about aquaria at some point in the past. As compensation for participating, the pre-service
teachers received academic course credit and the professionals were paid. There is no
explanation for why the different compensations for the different groups. There is also no
explanation of the subject recruitment and selection process.
This is the second study in this literature review to include students younger than
college-age as participants in the research. In describing the participants, Hmelo-silver &
Pfeffer (2004) do not address their rationale for extending their novice-expert spectrum to
students in middle school. Nonetheless, I would argue that there was cause to include this
critique even still. This study is one of few identified thus far that explicit compares
mental models of “novices” with those of “experts”.
Hmelo-silver and colleagues expanded upon the research completed in Hmelosilver & Pfeffer (2004) with another paper published in 2007 (Hmelo-Silver, Marathe, &
Liu, 2007). In the follow-up study, the objective was to test the conclusions of the paper
published in 2004. In other words, the research design and sample were essentially the
same; they again grouped middle school students and pre-service teachers as novices. In
this later article, however, they included the following comparison: “Most pre-service
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teachers had not participated in any significant science instruction since high school, so it
is not surprising that they performed no better than middle school students…” (HmeloSilver et al., 2007, p. 328). This latter observation seems to introduce a different research
question: How do pre-service teachers’ conceptions about an aquarium ecosystem
compare with those of middle school students’? However, that is not the original research
question for either the 2004 or the 2007 study. Thus my critique is less about the
inclusion of the students at all, and is more about the structure of the research questions
that motivated collecting data from the middle school students in the first place. As
presented in Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer (2004), the justification is incomplete.
All participants in Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer (2004) completed the same series of
tasks. Over the course of a 20 to 40 minute interview, participants drew a picture of the
inside of an aquarium. They had to think out loud as they drew and provide additional
explanations when prompted by one of the researchers. Also, as part of the interview,
participants answered questions about aquarium systems. The intent was to probe their
knowledge about the systems structure (“e.g. what is in a fish tank?”), the behaviors of
different components of the system (“e.g. what happens when a filter breaks?”), and the
functions of different components of the system (“e.g. what do fish do in an aquarium?”)
(Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer, 2004, p. 131). Lastly, the researchers asked participants to
comment on likely outcomes of different scenarios (“e.g. What do you think would
happen if you decide to add 10 new fish to the 12 guppies already existing in a twenty
gallon tank?”) (Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer, 2004, p. 131).
Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer (2004) coded the interviews using an expected list of
aquarium structures along with associated behaviors and functions. The statement “There
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is sand on the bottom” is an example for the structure code. The statement
“Bacteria…changes the ammonia into nitrite and then nitrite into nitrate back into clean
water” is an example for the behavior code because “it refers to a mechanism for how the
cleaning of water (a function) was accomplished” (p.131). Lastly, the statement “A filter
filters out the organic waste” is an example for the function code.
Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer (2004) make the following comment about how they
divided the coding responsibilities among two researchers and checked for reliability of
the coding: “One primary researcher conducted the majority of the coding and a second
independent research assistant coded 20% of the transcripts. Inter-rater agreement
conducted on 20% of the interviews was 96.5% for structures, 92.5% for behaviors, and
93% for functions” (p. 131). These two sentences are a bit confusing. The first sentence
seems to indicate that they divided the coding responsibilities so that one researcher
coded 80% of the interviews and another researcher coded 20% of the interviews. The
second sentence, however, suggests that one researcher coded all of the interviews and
the second researcher coded 20% of the interviews to test for inter-rater agreement. It
seems plausible that the second sentence is correct and that the first sentence is
unintentionally ambiguous. However, given that such details are of particular note to a
reader interested in the study, it seems as if this awkwardness should have been caught
and resolved in the review process.
Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer (2004) report the means and standard deviations for the
total number of structures, behavior, and function for the middle school students, the preservice teachers, and the experts. The authors appropriately calculated a 2 × 3 ANOVA to
test for differences between the experts and novices and the number of SBF concepts.
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The difference was significant for the overall interaction between expertise levels and
SBF concepts (F(4,52) = 14.30, p < .001) as well as expertise levels, behaviors, and
functions (F(2,27) = 24.58 (behaviors) and 24.19 (functions), p < .001). The difference
was not significant for expertise and structures. They calculated post hoc StudentNewman-Keuls tests to determine if the differences in the means for the middle school
students and pre-service teachers were statistically significant; the results were not
significant.
This latter result brings me back to my earlier critique regarding the inclusion of
the middle school students in the study. The n values of total participants in each group
are relatively small. In recognition of that limitation, Hmelo-Silver et al. (2007) doubled
the size of participants in each group in the follow-up study and had the same results.
From the perspective of the implications of their research studies for education, the
message seems to be one of concern that pre-service teachers are not statistically different
from middle school students in their expression of understanding about complex systems.
Another way to view this is that conceptions of scientific concepts are highly resistant to
change; in which case, these results are hardly surprising. Thus, as a reader, I still feel as
if I am left to do the intellectual work of resolving the suitability of including the middle
school students as participants.
Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer (2004) devote much more of the results section to the
reporting of the qualitative data, quotes from the participant interviews, than reporting of
the quantitative data. In particular, they document some differences that they observed
between the biologists and hobbyists. The biologists’ comments tended to contain
discussion of abstract biological processes and mechanics of an aquarium. The hobbyists’
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were more pragmatic in their thinking, focusing on what is necessary to the health of the
fish.
The biologist: “. . . It has to be balanced food containing carbohydrates, fats and
proteins and for the younger ones you wanna [have] more proteins, and for most
fish, around 40% protein is very good diet . . .” (pp. 133).
The hobbyist: “There’s Aquarian or Tetramin or some of the other color flake
foods that are very good for a basic diet. Never over feed them, just feed a little
bit and just let them look hungry . . . There are pellets you can get that sink or
float, uh you can buy frozen food, frozen brine shrimp is a wonderful basic food
for fish, but you can also get frozen blood worms, uh Daphnia, all sorts of stuff.”
(pp.133).
They acknowledge that these differences between the biologist and hobbyist were
unexpected. They suggest that the differences are indicative of a possible relationship
between an individual’s explanation of a particular concept or system and an individual’s
goals; they propose that this is a question that needs further research.
They conclude the article by returning to the idea mentioned at the outset that
incorporating the SBF framework into instruction will assist students with learning about
complex systems. Their position is that the SBF framework would be an asset because it
provides a means to make explicit connections between elements of a complex system.
They note, too, this is idea also needs further consideration.
2.2.2.4Mental models of maps
In this section, the focus shifts away from mental models of systems to mental
models of maps. Hmelo-silver et al. noted a difference between how the hobbyists and
biologists perceived the fish tank ecosystem with the former being more pragmatic and
focused on health of the fish. In Mckenna et al.(2008), there is a similar kind of
comparison. On the one hand, there is a mental map of a lake as constructed by the local
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fishermen. On the other hand, there is a geophyiscal map of the lake produced with
measurements from echo-sounders and sidescan sonar.
The study originated out of a series of events over twenty years. In 1996-1997,
three of the four authors participated in a sidescan sonar study of Lough Neagh, a lake in
Northern Ireland. The purpose was to document possible impacts of then-active dredging
of sediment out of the lough. Ten years before that sonar study, a physical geographer
had published a map of the lough’s substrate based upon fishermen’s local ecological
knowledge (LEK). McKenna et al. (2008) did not discover the geographer’s book until
ten years after completing the sonar study. Intrigued McKenna et al. sought to compare
the mental map of the fisherman against not only the sonar map, but also the published
Admiralty map with the echo-sounding data. They identify that the particular contribution
of this study is the “semi-quantitative comparison of a ‘traditional’ mental map with two
science-based maps, after careful assessment of the error margins of the latter” (p. 2).
Residents near Lough Neagh have been fishing the fresh-water lake for centuries.
The fishermen’s mental map of the lough’s bathymetry and surface sediments has been
developed and maintained over generations. Variations in the lake’s sub-surface are
important to know because of the possible dangers certain areas could pose to fishing
equipment. In addition, their collective mental understanding of the lake also incorporates
knowing that fish migrate to different depths over the course of the year. The function of
the fishermen’s mental map—or mental model—is to ensure safe, efficient, and
successful fishing.
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The narrative behind the explanation of the study is engaging to read. However, it
raises a question that is never addressed in the whole of the study. The authors explain
that the sidescan sonar was commissioned “because of concerns that the scale of ongoing
sand extraction by licensed section dredges might be negatively impacting the lough” (p.
2). If the extraction had been significant enough to merit the sidescan sonar map, would it
not follow that there had been some amount of change to the lough? Therefore, would not
that also date the fishermen’s mental map? Mckenna et al.(2008) do not specify the
relative timing of the sand extraction. It is possible that it occurred before Donnelly, the
geographer, completed his map based on the fishermen’s LEK. But even that explanation
seems like a stretch because of the ten years between Donnelly’s work and the sidescan
sonar study. Unfortunately, the reader is left to accept the ambiguity.
I should note at this point that this particular study is unusual in this literature
review and as such this critique will be unusual as well. While it is still possible to raise
questions or concerns about the research design, the methods of analysis, and the
justification of the conclusions, there are other aspects which have been included in other
critiques that are not possible here. The units of analysis are the three separate maps.
While the fishermen are an important part of the study, they are not the primary focus.
Consequently, it is impossible to address some of the typical questions regarding sample
recruitment and selection. Furthermore, while the fishermen’s mental map is arguably the
result of generations of expertise, this is not an explicit study of expertise. Thus, it is not
suitable to make generalizations regarding the nature of expertise based upon the results
of this study. What this study does offer, however, is a picture of how mental models
contribute to expertise in practice.
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Mckenna et al.(2008) describe the study as a “retro-comparison” (p. 16) of three
different data sets: the fishermen’s mental map published by Donnelly in 1986, an
Admiralty chart surveyed in 1981 and published in 1983, and the sidescan sonar map
surveyed in 1996-1997 but never previously published. The mental map includes both
bathymetric data as well as data on the different substrate materials at the bottom of the
lough. The different types of substrate include mud, clay, level ‘hard’ bottom, sand,
gravel beds, rocks/stones, sand and mud. The Admiralty chart maps the water depths in
the lough. The sidescan sonar maps the variations in substrate across the lough. In order
to make the mental map comparable with the other two maps, the authors did have to
georeference the data. This involved converting depth and distance measurement from
feet to meters. They calculated approximate locations of the fishermen’s annotations
using locations of on-shore landmarks. With those transformations complete, it was
possible to compare the three data sets.
The results of the “retro-comparison” yield generally consistent measurements of
depth between the mental map and the Admiralty chart. They compare the fishermen’s
depth estimates for a series of points in the lough. Of seven different points shown, all
fall within a meter difference between the fishermen’s depth estimate and the contour
depth intervals on the Admiralty chart.
The authors elected to test the substrate maps—the mental map and the sidescan
sonar map—with a series of spot comparisons across the lough. They compared the maps
by sight. There was no quantitative comparison of the maps with a computer program.
Seven spots were identified on the two maps and compared for the types of substrate and
the shape of the boundary between types of substrate within the spot area. In general
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there was good qualitative agreement between the two maps. In two instances where
there were slight disparities between the maps, Mckenna et al.(2008) had arguments that
the differences could be attributed to likely problems in resolution or nature of the data.
At no point does McKenna et al. refer to the fishermen’s mental map as in any way
incorrect.
This approach for analysis does make sense. However, given the year of the
publication, 2008, it is a bit surprising that they did not attempt more sophisticated
analysis with ArcGIS. Based on the data presented in the figures, it does appear as if they
had enough to make more quantitative comparisons of the shapes of the substrate. But
this apparent missed opportunity does not diminish the conclusions. The qualitative
similarities between the mental and sonar maps are compelling.
Mckenna et al.(2008) consider and dismiss the possibility that previouslypublished maps could have influenced the fishermen’s mental map. For instance, the
Admiralty chart had only spare information on the substrate and no position data on
graticule (lines of latitude or longitude). Among the academic studies that published
maps of the lough, they were too generalized and without georeference data to be useful
to the fishermen. If anything could have introduced a source of bias into the mental map,
it would be the scale imposed by Donnelly and the way he set up the task. The fishermen
had to draw the lough features inside a designated outline.
For a relatively simple study, the depth of detail in the discussion is slightly
surprising in a positive sense. Mckenna et al.(2008) begin with a general discussion of the
fishermen’s mental map, how the map is maintained over time, the influence of
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technology on the map, and the possible benefit of a map based on LEK for natural
resource exploration.
The fishermen constructed their map based on fixing locations on the water by
sighting to different shore locations. They inferred the substrate by dropping a line
overboard with a rock tied to the end. They held on to the line to feel what happened to
the tension when the rock hit bottom. Different substrate had different affects on the
tension. Mckenna et al.(2008) comment that “the accuracy of the Lough Neagh map is
even more noteworthy because, in this environment, there can be no question of
‘inferential structuring,’ a term that describes the anticipation or prediction of the spatial
organization of a given environment from experience elsewhere. For example, urban
dwellers can anticipate elements of city structure from previous experience of block
patterns in another city” (p.8).
The fishermen of Lough Neagh learn the trade from their elders. The younger
fishermen acquire the mental map by “osmosis” (p. 10) and working alongside their
fathers, grandfathers, and uncles. The entire community of fishermen, not just one
individual or family, maintains the map overtime. There is a sense of shared ownership.
The authors raise the intriguing question, “it may be asked if and how the
fishermen’s mental map has been modified by data from new technological aids such as
echosounders and GPS instruments that have been introduced over the last quarter
century” (p. 11). They speculate that either the map would be worse or there would be no
change. It could be worse because of the breakdown in the tradition of passing down
information from one generation to the next. In particular, the added technology would
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mean that data about the lough was not incorporated into the younger generations’ mental
map.
On the other hand, there may be no change. The fishermen report using GPS units
to fix buoy positions or location long-line buoys. They also use echosounders to doublecheck depths as a kind of safety precaution. Overall, however, as the new technology has
not evidently changed the fishermen’s practices, then there seems little likelihood that it
would affect the fishermen’s mental map.
Lastly, Mckenna et al.(2008) noted at the outset that there is increasing interest in
using LEK to support resource exploration and development. While other examples of
comparing LEK with scientific models are commonly fraught with implied
condescension, the comparison of the fishermen’s LEK of Lough Neagh is different.
Their map is a scientific model. It includes depths, distances, and descriptions of
substrate. McKenna et al. argue that there is no reason then that a map of natural
resources produced by LEK should not be subject to the same level of scrutiny that a
natural resource map produced by other means might receive.
In Chang, Lenzen, & Antes (1985), we return to focusing on people as the
primary unit of analysis. The authors propose that “common sense” (p. 89) would suggest
that individuals with more experience in reading topographic maps should perform better
at reading and interpreting maps than those without much experience. They summarize
that map reading has been interpreted to be a combination of two processes. The first
process is deduction, using contour lines and labels to decide if the landscape is going up
or going down. The second process is visualization, creating some mental understanding
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of the landscape. This latter process is simultaneously described as developing a “feel”
for the landscape as well as acquiring a practical skill. Ultimately, the authors never do
settle on a clear definition of this second process; it remains slightly ambiguous.
Nonetheless, the main point is that map reading involves two tasks: first, the fairly
straightforward one of noting data, contour lines, and labels; second, the somewhat more
complex one of assembling that raw data into a mentally-useable mental image of a
landscape.
Though some previous research has explored, with inconclusive results, how selfreports of experience relate to performance at map reading, there appear to be no
empirical studies that investigate how experience influences performance and the process
of map reading (Chang et al., 1985). Consequently, the specific research questions of this
study are as follows: 1) “How does the process of topographic map reading differ
between the experienced map reader and the inexperienced map reader?” and 2) “Does
the experienced map reader perform better in topographic map reading than the
inexperienced map reader?” (p. 90).
The 44 participants in this study were undergraduate and graduate students at the
same university. The inexperienced group included 22 students, all undergraduates from
a psychology course, none of whom had experience with topographic maps. The 22
students in the experienced group represented the geology, geography, and aeronautical
studies departments. Thirteen of the experienced were undergraduates who had two or
more classes in which they had used topographic maps. Nine of the experienced were
graduate students who had either taught topographic map reading as teaching assistants or
used topographic maps in their research. Of the 44 participants, six were female, with
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three in each of the groups. There is no comment or explanation why so few women were
included. Though the research questions are not gender specific, it would still have
seemed appropriate to acknowledge or speculate on how the disproportion between the
genders affects the results of the study.
The data in this study come from two sources. First, the authors collected eyetracking data of the participants looking at different topographic maps. The purpose for
this data was to address the research question related to the process of map reading. There
are three particular variables of interest in the eye-tracking component of this study: the
number of fixations (where is a person focusing? What are the areas of most interest?);
the duration of fixations (what features are difficult to process and so need longer time to
study?); and the distance between the fixations (what is the “useful field of view”?).
Chang, Lenzen, & Antes (1985) support the claims associated with each variable
(number, duration, and distance between fixations) with references to previous studies.
The prediction is that eye-tracking data for more experienced map readers will document
shorter fixation lengths because they can more readily interpret the maps and longer
inter-fixation gazes because they are taking in a larger field of view. Peculiarly, the
authors make no explicit prediction related to number of fixations.
Second, the participants then had to complete a memory test based upon the maps
that they observed. The purpose for this data was to address the research question related
to performance in map reading. The prediction is that the memory test results for more
experienced map readers will suggest better comprehension of the maps. The inclusion of
the memory test within the research design is not explained at all. The authors do not
seem to intend to triangulate the eye-tracking and memory test data. It may be the fact
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that the authors refer to the seminal study of Chase & Simon (1973), in which the
perception and memory tests are so explicitly used as tests of each other, that as a reader I
am tempted to look for a similar design in this study. But even recognizing that that is not
the approach that Chang, Lenzen, & Antes (1985) are taking, the design is still
problematic. The authors offer no explanation as to why success on a memory test should
be taken as an indication of performance in map reading, forcing the reader to take the
relationship as a given. It is only is only after reading the results and interpretation that
one is empowered to decide whether the assumed relationship between memory and
performance seems plausible.
The procedure in this study started with a calibration of the fixed-position eyetracking equipment for each participant. The researchers also did a brief review on
topographic maps along with an explanation of the task involved in the study. With the
inexperienced participants, the researchers augmented the review with a threedimensional model to help them make a connection between a landscape and contour
lines on a map. The authors do not comment on the possible effect of the unequal
treatment between groups. However, the approach seems reasonable from the perspective
that it is unclear what value the data from participants completely unfamiliar with
topographic maps might have.
The next step in the task involved having the participants study 10 different
topographic maps in succession while their point of gaze was tracked. Each map
appeared on a screen for 20 seconds. The maps were all at the same scale (1:24,000) and
showed the same amount of area (2 miles × 2 miles). The maps differed, however, in the
visible topography, some showing relatively flat areas with few contour lines, others
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showing areas of more relief with contour lines crowded close to each other. Five of the
maps also had shading to show land forms. The researchers alternated between showing a
map without shading and then a map with shading. Although there is no explicit
explanation for the use of the shaded maps, the likely reason was to see if a hint at the
shape of the landscape, as expressed by shading, influenced fixations and reading of the
maps.
After completing the eye-tracking portion of the study, the participants than had
to complete a memory test based on the topographic maps. The test is described as
follows:
The memory test involved a printed questionnaire for each group. The top half of
the questionnaire contained a 4 x 4 grid facsimile of the map. The subject was
asked to place the letter H and the letter L in squares corresponding to the
locations of the highest and lowest elevations on the map. An outline map with
three separate lines (unique for each map) was included in the lower portion of the
questionnaire. The subject was asked to circle the end of each line segment that
corresponded to the higher elevation on the map. (pp. 90)
I have included the full passage describing the memory test for a particular reason. I find
the writing very difficult to understand. Thus, in addition to the fact that the justification
for the memory test is absent, the actual description is unfortunately unclear as well.
Chang, Lenzen, & Antes (1985) report the results of the memory test first. Each
question on the memory test was scored as either right (1 point) or wrong (no points). A
participant, therefore, could get a maximum of 50 points: 10 maps with five questions on
each map, two questions on absolute height (identification of the high and low elevation
points) and three questions on relative height (ordering the relative elevation of the three
contour lines).
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The authors use a t-test to compare the means for the total absolute height and the
relative height scores for the inexperienced group (n = 22) and experienced group (n =
22). They also compare the means of the experienced undergraduates (n = 13) and
graduate students (n = 9), the experienced undergraduates with the inexperienced group,
and the experienced graduates with the inexperienced group. The use of the t-test is
certainly suitable for comparison of the means of the inexperienced and experienced
groups, but the other comparisons are cause for concern.
One of the central assumptions of the t-test is equal population variances. The
suitability of this assumption could be tested if sample variances were provided, but they
were not. Moreover, the division of the experienced group into the undergraduate and
graduate students results in two relatively small samples relative to the inexperienced
group. Thus, for the purposes of this review, lacking confidence in the appropriateness of
the comparison of the groups of unequal size, I will focus on the results comparing the
inexperienced and experienced groups.
The experienced students had a significantly higher total mean score (29.32/50)
and relative height mean score (22.86/30) than the inexperienced students (total mean
score = 26.09/50; relative height mean score = 20.72/30; p < .05 using a one-tailed t-test).
The absolute height scores were 6.45/10 and 5.36/10 for the experienced and
inexperienced groups, respectively. It is unfortunate that the authors do not provide the
standard deviations as part of the data. Without those values it is a bit unclear if, for
instance, the two or three point differences are really significant. Furthermore, is a two or
three point difference in a score a reflection of a real practical difference in performance
in map reading?
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Chang, Lenzen, & Antes (1985) also compare the performance – again by way of
mean total score, absolute height score, and relative height score – of the experienced and
inexperienced groups on each map. The difference between the means was significant
(p < .05) with the experienced students scoring higher than the inexperienced students on
five maps with pronounced relief variations. The inexperienced students had significantly
higher scores on maps with highly irregular topography than they did on map with fewer
features.
With respect to the eye-tracking data, there were additional distinctions between
the experienced and inexperienced group. It is worth noting that the particular eyetracking device in the study records a gaze position 60 times per second. Again, the
researchers showed the map for a total of 20 seconds. This means that the number of gaze
points per map per participant is 1200; this helps explain the decision to show the map for
a total of 20 seconds. The mean values for duration of fixation are reported without units
and vary from approximately 320 to 390. Based on the gaze collection rate, I am going to
assume that the duration of fixation values are in units of a 60th of a second, meaning that
the mean fixation durations are roughly 5 seconds.
There was no statistical difference between the two groups in the durations of
their fixations. The mean fixation duration of the experienced group was 344.76 and not
significantly less than (p < .05) the fixation duration of 388.27 for the inexperienced
group. The difference amounts to a difference in gaze length of approximately .75
seconds; without extensive knowledge of typical variations in eye-tracking data, this is
particularly hard data to assess in terms of the importance of this difference.
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For the number of fixations, however, Chang, Lenzen, & Antes (1985) do provide
a reader with a way to put their results in context. They compare the number of fixations
of each group to the number of fixations that could have occurred by chance. While the
number of fixations of the experienced group (43.65) was significantly different (p < .05)
than what could have happened by chance, there was no such distinction for the
inexperienced group.
In conclusion, Chang, Lenzen, & Antes (1985) demonstrate, using the results of
the memory tests, performance seemed to improve somewhat with experience. They
interpret this result in terms of schema theory and conclude that experienced students,
whose previous experience has helped them establish a framework (schema) with which
to view other topographic maps, are able to read and interpret the maps in this study more
successfully than students without previous experience to draw upon. This interpretation
is plausible. However, it seems important to remember the small differences in the scores.
One possible explanation for that small difference is that the task is not particularly
discriminatory as far as expertise. Perhaps the observed differences in scores are as great
as possible?
The scoring inversion on maps of more unusual topography is interpreted to be a
reflection of domain-specific chunking. Chang, Lenzen, & Antes (1985) compare this
result to previous research on chess expertise (e.g. Chase & Simon, 1973; de Groot,
1965). Specifically, chess experts are able to recall, with much more success than chess
novices, positions of chess pieces after only looking at a chess board briefly if the pieces
are arranged in a realistic configuration. If, on the other hand, the chess pieces are
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arranged at random in such a way that could not occur within a chess game, the experts
perform no differently than the novices.
The irregular topographic maps are taken to be the equivalent of the random
arrangement of chess pieces. The students who were more experienced struggled with
irregular topographic maps because they could not identify patterns in the contour lines.
By contrast, when those experienced students looked at the maps with more recognizable
and distinctive terrain, fixation duration times were shorter—interpreted as indicative of
less need to process—and identified and fixated on areas of high and low elevation.
2.2.2.5Section summary
Earlier in this sub-section I laid out several ideas and questions regarding mental
models to be redressed here at the end.


Experts are more successful than novices at formulating causal mental models
(Tversky, 2005).



Experts and novices do not differ in their success in constructing logical mental
models (Tversky, 2005).



Where does ‘map reading’ fall in the mental model space proposed by Rouse &
Morris (1986)? Are the positions consistent with their ideas about methods of
identifying mental models?

With respect to the first two bullet points, while I would argue that the first two critiques
included here further support these conclusions, the results of Chang, Lenzen, & Antes
(1985) differ. In Jacobson (2001) the experts and novices discuss complex systems in
terms of similar component beliefs (or structures). In Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer (2004), the
difference was not significant for levels of expertise and structures identified. By
contrast, in Chang, Lenzen, & Antes (1985), map reading is described in part as a process
114

of deduction; are the contour lines showing the landscape to be going up or going down?
The memory task was intended to be a test of this component of map reading
performance and the results found a difference with levels of expertise. How can this
apparent contradiction be resolved?
At issue may be the nature of the task. In a discussion of how performance may
vary with experience, Ericsson (2006) also discusses how that performance may vary for
different types of skills. He supposes that for some experts there can come a point at
which further advancement is no longer particularly important. The individual’s
performance will plateau. This can be seen in everyday skills such as driving a car. What
about reading maps? Is it a skill that people can continue to hone and so stay within the
cognitive/associative phases for an extended length of time and experience? It does not
seem likely. Indeed, this may explain the fact that the results in Chang, Lenzen, & Antes
(1985) as far as difference in map reading performance were not that substantial.
Furthermore, in reflecting on the results of Mckenna et al.(2008), the fishermen’s mental
map is a fairly static body of knowledge. The fisherman must work to acquire the
knowledge so as to perform successfully – i.e. be valuable members of the profession –
but once acquired, it is not likely to need significant practice to maintain. The action of
being a professional fisherman will provide the necessary practice for the mental model
to stay function. Therefore, with respect to the first two bullet points, it seems plausible
that the distinction between experts and novices may be true for some domains of mental
models, but not all.
Lastly, with respect to the questions regarding where ‘map reading’ or ‘map
making’ may fall in the mental model space as proposed by Rouse & Morris (1986), I
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would suggest that ‘map reading’ would fit on the lower left-hand corner of the diagram,
characterized by a lower level of behavioral discretion and more implicit level of model
manipulation. As predicted by Rouse & Morris (1986), Chang, Lenzen, & Antes (1985)
were able to study map reading using an empirical approach. Based upon Mckenna et
al.(2008), I would propose that ‘map making’ falls in the upper right-hand corner of the
mental model space. The fishermen have a high level of behavioral discretion over the
use of the model and are explicit in their use of the model. Furthermore, they pass the
mental map from one generation to the next verbally. Thus, the fishermen of Lough
Neagh further support the idea that explicit mental models can be successfully elicited via
verbalization techniques. It should be noted, however, that Mckenna et al.(2008) did refer
to the younger generation learning by “osmosis” through working with their elders. This
would seem to imply that some of the instruction could have been implicit as well as
explicit. Additionally, if this so, it seems important to consider that explicit models may
also be elicited via non-verbal techniques as well.
2.2.3 Mental models and problem solving
2.2.3.1 Introduction
In this section, we briefly set aside the concept of expertise in favor of
concentrating on how an individual’s mental model contributes to how an individual
solves different types of problems. The task of solving a geologic mapping problem relies
on an individual’s mental representation of space both in reality and on a map as well as
the individual’s mental model of the local or regional geology. To solve a mapping
problem, an individual needs to negotiate between location in space and location on a
map. The individual has to navigate between different locations in search of evidence to
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help construct their mental model of the local or regional geology. Lastly, the individual
must combine the field observations and data into a coherent geologic map.
The critiques in this sub-section attend to these different aspects of the task of
making a geologic map. In the first section, Liben, Myers, & Kastens (2008) investigate
individual differences in being able to locate oneself on a map. In addition to looking at
variation in ability to self-locate, the authors also investigate how that ability relates to
performance on other measures of spatial ability.
The second section includes critiques related to navigating in familiar and
unfamiliar locations. Daily modern life requires us to navigate in familiar and unfamiliar,
indoor and outdoor environments on a regular basis. Within the literature on individual
navigation, also called wayfinding, a common interest is the identification of the
cognitive processes and strategies that people use as they proceed from one location to
another. The critiques in this section include a research study on taxi cab drivers in
London navigating in a virtual reality (Spiers & Maguire, 2008) as well as two studies on
geology undergraduate students navigating a field area while working on a bedrock
mapping task (Riggs, Balliet, et al., 2009; Riggs, Lieder, et al., 2009). Admittedly, a
study pertaining to the taxi cab drivers in London may seem irrelevant compared to a
study specifically about geological mapping given my research interest in expertise in
geologic mapping. However, the methodology in the study by Spiers & Maguire (2008)
accomplishes something that the methodology in the studies by Riggs and colleagues
does not. Thus, my intent in selecting this trio of critiques is to raise questions about what
else we might learn about expertise in geologic mapping with an approach more similar
to Spiers & Maguire.
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Finally, the last critical review in this sub-section (Kastens et al., 2009) focuses on
transforming observations in different locations into a three dimensional model. The
participants were guided to different artificial outcrops meant to represent different rock
layers. The task was to make observations and then interpret the overall regional geology.
Notable in the design, the participants did not just have to make observations, but had to
support their interpretations with arguments. In this sense, the study explores not only the
participants’ logical mental model but also their causal mental model of their field area.
2.2.3.2 Locating self on maps
In the study by Liben, Myers, & Kastens (2008), the focus is reading maps to find
one’s location. They state that the motivation for the study is both practical and
theoretical. In the first instance, maps are not only resources to help in navigation, but
also sources of spatial data utilized in an array of disciplines including geology,
geography, ecology, and epidemiology. In the second instance, studying how adults read
and interpret maps may contribute new ideas to our understanding of spatial cognition.
Liben, Myers, & Kastens (2008) note that previous research on map reading has dealt
with questions related to how people construct mental representations of outdoor
environments or use maps “to represent vista spaces, that is, spaces that extend beyond
the tabletop, but can still be seen from a single vantage point…” (p. 172). They argue that
what is missing in the literature is research on how people use maps when actually
embedded within the space represented by the map. The goal of this study is four-fold: 1)
to explore the strategies and success of adults in finding their location on a map; 2) to
identify how map characteristics affect the strategies and the success of adults at finding
their location on a map; 3) to determine if spatial skills and gender affect the strategies
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and the success of adults at finding their location on a map; and 4) to discover if there is a
difference in results if the task is computer-based instead of outdoors.
The participants in this study included 69 students (50 women and 19 men) from a
large state university psychology department subject pool. They do not address the
unequal numbers of women and men in the study. It seems probable that the sample
reflects relative proportion of women and men who are in the psychology department
subject pool; but this is speculation on my part. The students were in their first year of
attendance at the school and participated in the different exercises within the first 10
weeks of arriving; the assumption is that the participants had still a limited familiarity
with the campus. There is no evidence included to back up this assumption.
The exercises were divided into two sessions. All 69 students participated in the
first session, which included an outdoor mapping activity as well as a set of paper-andpencil tests; the first session occurred six weeks into the semester. A subset, 43 students,
participated in the second session, which included a computer-based map task; the second
session occurred 10 weeks into the semester. The students in the first session received
course credit for participating in the project. The students in the second session had the
option of additional course credit or $10.
The research study is divided into three main parts: a task using a campus map8, a
series of spatial skill tests, and a task using a computer software program. For the task
using a campus map, the participants were guided to five different locations on campus
and told to identify their location on a map each time with a sticker. The participants
The authors actually refer to this is a mapping task. However, as I have used the phrase “mapping
task” to refer to making a geologic map, I have rephrased the description of their procedure for
clarity.
8
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were randomly assigned one of four different versions of the campus map. The maps
were either square or circular and either plan view or oblique view. Each map included
outlines of the campus buildings, roads, and parking lots. All written text was removed
from the maps. At each location, the researcher accompanying the group would hand
each participant a fresh map on which to mark his or her location. After they marked the
location, the participants handed in their map to the researcher and did not have a map to
follow en route to the next destination.
At each location the researcher recorded whether the participant rotated the map
upon receiving it, in what orientation the participant held the map relative to his or her
body, and how long it took the participant to mark the current location. The location
sticker had to be within a 6 mm radius of the true location to receive a point for being
correct. There is no comment about how many participants completed the exercise at
once, nor for that matter, how many researchers were on each trip around campus.
Though it is not completely clear, the implication is that there was more than one
participant on each trip, though it is not explicit: “…experimenters chatted with
participants as they walked to reduce the likelihood that participants would focus on their
routes” (p. 47). The concern is the apparent logistical challenge of recording such fine
scale data. How did the researcher manage to record all that data about each participant?
For that matter, how easy was it to see actually, for example, when the participant
attached the sticker to the map?
The spatial tests included previously developed instruments such as the paper
folding test (identify which piece of unfolded paper matches a folded piece that had been
hole-punched), the water level test (draw on water levels to outlines of various tipped
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bottles), and a mental rotation test (compare a line figure to five others and identify which
figures have been rotated). The paper folding test (PFT) had 20 questions; the score was
the sum of one point for each correct answer minus a quarter of a point for each incorrect
answer. The water level test (WLT) included 6 sketches; the water line had to be within
5° to receive one point for being correct. The mental rotation test (MR) included 21
questions; the score was the number of correct answers minus the number of incorrect
answers. The PFT and MR tests were both timed and limited to two minutes. All of these
tests are common instruments with which to assess spatial skills.
In session 2, participants used a software program that is part of a map-skills
curriculum called Where Are We? that was developed by one of the authors of this study
[Kastens]. The program gives two different views of an area: an aerial view from above
and an eye-level view to simulate the perspective of an individual in the environment.
The user can then navigate through the environment, with the program changing the eyelevel and the aerial views appropriately. The participants had to complete three different
problem tasks using the software and were allowed eight minutes for each task. One
problem required the participant to navigate to a particular location on the map from a
known starting position. The other two problems required the participant to identify his or
her location without knowledge of the starting position. The results were scored based on
whether the location was found, whether the location was identified correctly, how long it
took to complete the task, and how many steps (i.e. clicks with the computer controls)
were necessary.
The participants’ success at identifying their location varied from some getting all
the locations correct, to others getting none of the locations correct. Liben, Myers, &
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Kastens (2008) include a sample map view of the campus with the range of incorrect
answers. The actual position is marked and appears to be in a courtyard with buildings on
all four sides. Some of the incorrect answers are particularly out of place, such as a corner
of a parking lot or the middle of a large open field. The almost haphazard locations would
seem to imply that perhaps some participants were not attending to the task. Liben,
Myers, & Kastens (2008), however, anticipate this cynical interpretation and volunteer
that the participants did appear engaged and genuinely committed to the task. This almost
charitable response to some of the more unusual responses does not account for the
reasoning behind the odd locations.
Liben, Myers, & Kastens (2008) wanted to explore what factors may contribute or
relate to success at someone being able to identify correctly their location on a map. To
investigate the possible relationship between success at the task and map variables,
Liben, Myers, & Kastens (2008) appropriately used a two-way ANOVA to test if either
map shape (square or circle) or map angle (plan or oblique) had any effect on accuracy of
sticker placement, response time to place sticker, map turning, or map orientation. There
were no significant interactions between shape, angle, and accuracy of sticker position or
map turning. For square maps, the response times were significantly longer (p = .01) for
plan view maps (Ms (SDs) = 38.7 (21.7) seconds) than oblique maps (Ms (SDs) = 19.1
(9.3) seconds). Also for square maps, participants held the map in a canonical orientation
(with one of the straight sides parallel to the body) more than those with circular maps (p
= .024). There was no significant difference in response times for the different angles on
circular maps.
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To examine the possible relationship between success at the task and participant
variables, Liben, Myers, & Kastens (2008) first calculated a series of correlations. Using
one-tailed, directional tests, they reported the following correlations and corresponding p
values between sticker accuracy and the different spatial skills tests:
Mental rotation (MR), r (67) = .048, p = .357
Spatial visualization via paper folding test(PFT), r (67) = .321, p = .004
Spatial perception via water level test (WLT), r (67) = .219, p = .038
Note that the n values are lower than the total 69 because data for two participants had to
be removed because stickers fell off the map during the data collection process and so
could not be included in the data analysis. The authors also calculated correlations
between the different spatial skill tests:
MR with PFT, r (69) = .425, p < .001
MR with WLT, r (68) = .410, p < .001
PFT with WLT, r (68) = .253, p = .019
Liben, Myers, & Kastens (2008) do not actually discuss this data in detail. Instead, they
go on to report results of a stepwise regression to see if any of and to what extent
different variables may account for the variances in sticker accuracy.
At the first step of this regression calculation, they entered the results of the
spatial skills. They report that all three spatial skills accounted for 15% of the variance in
sticker accuracy (R2 = .15, F(3, 66) = 3.61, p = .18). However, it was only the PFT that
was actually necessary to predict success (standardize β = .34, p =.01). Though the
authors do not comment on it, this is consistent with the earlier reported correlations with
PFT and sticker accuracy having a significant moderate correlation (using a heuristic for
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moderate correlation 0.30 to 0.50); the correlation with the WLT was also significant, but
with a relative low correlation.
At the second step, they entered the gender of the participants. The introduction of
gender did not add any additional constraints on the variance.
At the third step, they entered the number of locations at which the participants
turned the map. They state that this variable “significantly improved the prediction” (p.
180) (R2-change = .108, p-change = .004, standardize β = .35, p = .004). In addition, PFT
remained a significant predictor in the model (standardize β = .27, p = .033). The final
overall model accounts for 25% of the variance in the sticker accuracy scores.
Liben, Myers, & Kastens (2008) completed the same series of calculations on the
performance in the computer tasks as those just described for performance on the outdoor
task. They reported the following correlations with spatial skill tests:
Mental rotation (MR), r (43) = .495, p < .001
Spatial visualization via paper folding test(PFT), r (43) = .317, p = .019
Spatial perception via water level test (WLT), r (43) = -.009, p = .478
Note that the n values are different because the computer tests were completed in session
2 by a subset of the total participants in session 1. With respect to the stepwise regression
model, they found that the MR test accounted for the most variance among the different
spatial skills R2 = .30, F(3, 42) = 5.44, p = .003, standardize β = .52, p = .003). Again,
though not noted by the authors, this is consistent with the earlier significant moderate
correlation between MR and the computer task (using a heuristic for moderate correlation
0.30 to 0.50).
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Lastly, Liben, Myers, & Kastens (2008) compared the scores on the computer
tasks and campus map task to see if there was a correlation in performance. There was no
significant correlation (r (43) = .121, p = .22).
In summary, Liben, Myers, & Kastens (2008) found that adults do have
noticeable difficulty finding their location on a map. The authors conclude that different
shape and angle of the maps had no impact on performance in adults finding their
location, despite hypotheses that had predicted that round and oblique maps may have
been more accessible.
In comparing results of spatial skill tests against the results of the campus map or
computer map tasks, two different factors emerged. For the campus task, spatial
visualization via paper folding was a contributing predictor of performance. For the
computer task, mental rotation was a contributing predictor of performance. Liben,
Myers, & Kastens (2008) suppose that the differences may be understood by recognizing
that people may use an array of spatial visualization strategies (e.g. attending to the
configuration of streets, looking for a particular landmark). The outdoor campus task
inherently allowed participants more options for these strategies and others with which to
identify their location on the map. By contrast, the computer task had very limited views
of the environment in which the participant had to navigate. Thus, it is reasonable to
imagine that mental rotation of spatial data between the two different perspectives was
helpful for successful completion of the tasks.
With respect to the lack of correlation between the campus task and computer
task, Liben, Myers, & Kastens (2008) suppose that the implication of the result is that
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“the computer mapping task cannot be used as a substitute for the campus mapping task
for studying spatial cognition”(p. 184). This study would seem to have important value
for those interested in the possible learning benefits of computer simulations and virtual
field trips.
2.2.3.3 Navigating in familiar settings
The motivation behind Spiers & Maguire (2008) is the interest in understanding
how people are able to develop a mental representation of large-scale space to assist them
during wayfinding. To provide context for the reader, Spiers & Maguire (2008) explain
that numerous studies in wayfinding are built upon analysis of think-aloud protocols, the
spoken record of a research subject speaking aloud his or her thoughts regarding the task
either as a concurrent recording during the wayfinding or as a retrospective recording
after completing the wayfinding. After reviewing existing literature, Spiers & Maguire
(2008) identify several limitations and unresolved questions.
First, previous studies have not included tasks in which participants have to
navigate through familiar outdoor environments; instead, the tasks usually involve a task
indoors or in an unfamiliar outdoor setting. We more frequently need to navigate through
a familiar outdoor location, and yet researchers know less about wayfinding strategies in
this context. Second, research questions have mostly been targeted at understanding
decision-making and related strategies; absent among the studies is an exploration of
visual processing on a second-by-second basis. Third, somewhat as a consequence of the
previous issue, there has also been no quantitative sequence analysis of types of thoughts
during a wayfinding task. Fourth, missing in the literature is sufficient analysis of verbal
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reports to test different cognitive models of wayfinding. In Spiers & Maguire (2008), the
goal is to address these four gaps within the wayfinding literature with a study in which
participants navigate through a virtual reality environment, have their point-of-gaze
captured with an eye-tracking device, and record a retrospective think-aloud protocol of
the task.
Of the gaps identified by Spiers & Maguire (2008), the second, third, and fourth
are of interest to me in terms of geologic mapping. It may not be realistic to pursue
finding out how geologists thinking evolves on a second-by-second basis while
navigating in the field. It may, however, be useful to look at thinking on a minute-byminute basis. Therefore, this study might offer some ideas for how to work with finescale temporal data of thoughts during wayfinding.
There were 20 male participants in this study. All subjects were healthy, righthanded, licensed taxi-drivers that had either grown up or spent most of their lives in
London. The men ranged in age from 27 to 59 (mean age = 49.8; standard deviation =
8.5). They ranged in experience as taxi drivers from 1 to 38 years (mean career length =
18.3; standard deviation, 10.9). The researchers selected taxi drivers so as to have
participants that would be familiar with the environment—a dearth of wayfinding studies
in familiar settings being one of the limitations noted in the introduction. One participant
was able to complete only four of the seven wayfinding tasks due to discomfort; a
different participant was able to complete only four of the seven wayfinding tasks due to
a technical problem with the virtual-reality equipment.
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In this study, participants have to drive a “passenger” from one location to another
within the virtual reality game ‘The Getaway’. The computer controls allow the
participant to drive through downtown London, complete with passing busses,
pedestrians, other cars, intersections, and even road blocks. To test for the ecological
validity of the virtual world, researchers asked pilot-study participants to give feedback
on the similarity between driving in the game-version of London and driving in the real
London. All participants reported that the virtual world was highly accurate and realistic.
Spiers and Maguire (2008) made no explicit comments regarding revision of the software
after the pilot test.
Two weeks prior to the experimental study, each participant attended a two-hour
training session in which he practiced using the virtual reality equipment. Thirty minutes
prior to the experimental tasks, each participant had another opportunity to practice with
the equipment. This second session required that the participants respond to a destination
request from the virtual passenger.
In broad terms, the study was divided into two stages. The first stage of the study
included a series of seven different virtual wayfinding trips for each participant. In the
second stage, the participant viewed a video recording of his wayfinding for each task
and then completed a retrospective think-aloud protocol of his thoughts during the tasks.
The first stage begins when the participant is shown a scene of downtown for a
few seconds to get oriented. The virtual passenger then asks to be taken to a specific
destination. At some point on the journey the passenger then asks to change the
destination to a different location in the city; in some cases the passenger also asks that

128

the driver go by an additional landmark or area en route to the final destination. A video
recording captures the constantly-moving scene as determined by the route the taxi driver
takes through the city. A second video recording captures the point-of-gaze of the taxi
driver during the process. This eye-tracking recording requires calibration to be
meaningful; researchers obtained accurate calibration on nine of the 20 subjects.
From personal experience, this calibration rate is not particularly surprising. In
my case, I was trying to calibrate a head-mounted eye-tracking device for use in an
outdoor setting. The results were generally poor. The technology is sensitive to several
variables movement of the subject and the amount of sunlight. I would have expected that
with a desk-mounted eye-tracking device within the climate-controlled and less-active
setting of a virtual-reality, the calibrations problems I experienced would not have been
as much an issue. Thus, while perhaps the results are not surprising, they are
disappointing, especially for such an expensive device.
After the participants completes the first stage, the researchers brought the
participants into a separate room to view the video recording of the scene (not the eyetracking video) and, while watching the video, to recall and speak aloud what he had
been thinking about along each route. A third video and audio recording was made of this
debriefing session with each participant; this recording was the retrospective think-aloud
protocol. The interviewer had a prepared protocol of questions, interrupting the
participant only when necessary to clarify a particular comment by the participant. The
driver was done with the study after completing the think-aloud protocol.
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Spiers and Maguire (2008) refer to the process of recording the retrospective
think-aloud protocol as “a surprise debriefing” (p. 236). There is no further elaboration
on to what extent this stage of the study was a surprise to the participants, how it was
received, and how this may have influenced the outcome of the results. It is possible that
this was done to prevent the participants from mentally-preparing comments and/or
somehow filtering their experiences with interpretation. Typically the intent of a think
aloud is to steer the participant to speak about what he is thinking, not to provide
commentary about what he is thinking.
At the start of the data analysis phase of the study, the audio files from the videos
were sent to a professional company to be transcribed. Researchers were able to timestamp statements in the think-aloud protocol by integrating time data from the video
recordings. Categories of codes had been developed through the course of an earlier pilot
study. A first reviewer went through all the think-aloud statements and grouped
statements into pre-determined categories. A second reviewer reviewed a sample of the
statements to establish reliability of categorizing the codes. The eye-tracking videos were
also compared with the think-aloud protocol to evaluate how the individual’s recollection
of where he thought he directed his attention matched with where he was observed to
direct his attention. Lastly, the sequence of categories of thoughts in each think-aloud
protocol was put through a statistical analysis to determine if the order of the thoughts
was similar to an order that might occur by chance.
Overall, the categorization of statements in the think-aloud protocol was
interpreted to be reliable and consistent across the 20 participants in the study. The two
independent reviewers attained a 93% agreement in coding of the random sample of
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statements. In addition, the description in the think-aloud protocols of where a driver was
focusing was 94% consistent with implied the object(s) of attention from the eye-tracking
point-of-gaze recording.
Based on the comments in the think-aloud protocols, Spiers and Maguire (2008)
outline a model of the taxi drivers’ cognition during wayfinding. The process starts with
an initial plan to the destination. The route may be modified along the way based on
opportunity (e.g. realization/recollection of different road) or impediments (e.g. blocked
or obstructed road). Some drivers planned only part of the route initially and did not
complete making the plan until reaching some intermediate and self-selected (i.e. not
based on input from the passenger) location. In that familiar environment, the coasting
time – the time when driver is essentially on “automatic pilot” – is a common component
of wayfinding. Drivers also build up expectations (e.g. looking for a particular road onto
which to turn or a particular landmark) and those expectations are either confirmed (i.e.
event happens) or violated (i.e. event does not happen). They also monitor carefully
conditions around them and try to anticipate reasons for actions, such as avoiding buses
because of a higher risk of collision or needing to change lanes to prepare for the next
step in route. Emotions can have an impact on wayfinding, too; observed emotions of
participants included happiness at reaching the destination, anger at finding a road
blocked off, and anxiety at nearly crashing the virtual taxi.
Spiers and Maguire (2008) calculated a series of Chi-squared tests to determine if
there were statistical relationships between the sequences of different categories of
thoughts (χ2 = 2402.9, df = 90, p < .0001). Expectation for roads or landmarks was
followed by expectation confirmation or violation (χ2 = 1048.0, df = 9, p < .0001). Action
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planning occurs after the driver monitors the environment (χ2 = 338.6, p < .0001), thinks
about different road-rules (χ2 = 40.3, df = 9, p < .0001) as well as events involving
expectation confirmation (e.g. seeing a landmark). Moreover, expectation confirmation
could occur both before and after moments of monitoring the environment (χ2 = 243.0, df
= 9, p < .0001). Route planning that occurs after initial planning only happens after
events involving expectation violation (χ2 = 135.4, df = 9, p < .0001). Lastly, coasting
periods occurred after both action and route planning (χ2 = 75.3, df = 9, p < .0001).
Results of this study are noted to be both consistent and inconsistent with preexisting cognitive models of wayfinding. The extent of agreement or disagreement,
however, is qualified by the difference between the environmental settings of this study
in contrast to the environmental settings upon which the models are based. The observed
use of coasting time is one example of a unique contribution to the literature on
wayfinding from this study. A second example of a new finding is that a driver might
look at a feature in the environment out of general curiosity, not just because it relates to
the route plan. Third, the influence of emotion on wayfinding is yet another example of a
new finding. Thus, the main conclusion is that this study supports many elements of
current models of wayfinding. However, those models also need revision to reflect more
completely the thoughts and strategies of individuals’ wayfinding in a familiar outdoor
setting like the taxi drivers from London.
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2.2.3.4 Navigating in unfamiliar settings
In Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009), the participants are advanced undergraduate
students enrolled in a summer geology field camp. The study is an investigation of
variations in field mapping performance as a result of navigation strategies.
The authors explain that in field camp, students routinely map in areas dominated
by sedimentary rocks; the reason is that with sedimentary rocks it is possible to interpret
the geometry of the rocks underground from exposures of the rocks at the surface. As a
result, they suppose that mapping in such an area involves generation of “multiple
working hypotheses that can be tested by planned traverses of a field area optimized to
search for data that confirms or rejects hypotheses” (p.49). The purpose of this study is to
test the proposition that “the navigation decisions made by students while investigating
this type of field problem [where the rocks are dominantly sedimentary with a
deterministic geometry] reflect their internal problem solving approaches as they fit
testing and verification strategies derived from their mental model” (p.49).
Of central concern to Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009) are the conditions and
challenges inherent to field mapping as a type of problem solving. They emphasize that
trying to complete a geologic map means dealing with limited and poor-quality data
beyond the logistical concerns of map reading, equipment use, and navigating skills. In
recognition of the complex and natural restrictions of field mapping, they select the
theory of Naturalistic Decision Making (NDM) out of cognitive science as the theoretical
framework for their study.
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Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009) present NDM as an area of research that “deals
with problem solving and decision making in data-poor situations, usually under time
constraints, where the presence of expertise has a strong influence on moment-to-moment
decisions made by problem solvers” (p. 49). They justify their use of NDM “as an
appropriate context for geosciences education research especially in a field setting
because it places an emphasis not only on the cognitive tasks and actions of an individual
or group, but also on the context in which that person or group of people is responding to
the task at hand – in this case the geology, exposure, and topography of the field area
itself… [NDM] is more suited to decision making processes informed by intuition rooted
in expertise rather than analytical, algorithmic, or optimization types of solutions
(Lipshitz et al., 2001)” (p. 50).
This account of NDM by Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009), as well as their
justification of its suitability for their study, raises a couple of questions. Lipshitz et al.
(2001), the same reference which Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009) cite, explain that the
definition of NDM has evolved over time. The previous definition “emphasized the
shaping features of the context in which many decisions of interest were made: illstructured problems, uncertain, dynamic environments, shifting, ill-defined, or competing
goals, multiple-event feedback loops, time constraints, high stakes, multiple players, and
organizational settings” (Lipshitz et al., 2001, p. 334). Recently, the study of NDM has
been more particularly associated with studying the decision-making strategies and
behaviors of experts (Lipshitz et al., 2001; Shattuck & Miller, 2006). Moreover,
according to Lipshitz et al. (2001), novices have been excluded as participants in studies
of NDM under high-stakes conditions.
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Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009) are studying the decision-making behaviors of
advanced undergraduate students. They do refer to the fact that NDM as a construct is
linked with expertise (see instance, in the quote above). Yet they do not acknowledge that
advanced undergraduates do not readily fit with the definition of an expert as being
someone with a minimum of 10 years of experience in the field (de Groot, 1965; Simon
& Chase, 1973). Herein lies a question: what are the implications of applying a
theoretical framework that is based upon experts for a study using a sample population
that is not suitably identified as expert?
Notably, the language that Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009) use to justify their
choice of NDM is actually rather evocative of embodied cognition, with reference to the
individual, the tasks and actions of the individual (i.e. the body), and the topography of
the field area (i.e. the environment). Another question, therefore, is why did the authors
select NDM instead of embodied cognition as their theoretical framework?
NDM primarily manifests within Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009) because, as the
basis for interpreting their results, they selected a schema model for problem solving that
was originally developed within an NDM study. The schema model includes the
following stages (Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet, 2009, p. 51):
Identification knowledge (“the ability to recognize relevant information and
assess from clues in the environment when a situation is similar to prior
experience or education”);
Elaboration knowledge (“the immediate associated recall of related facts and
elements which aid in the confirmation or adjustment of initial assessment of a
situation…”);
Planning knowledge (“the ability to draw inferences and estimates, create goals
and plans…”); and
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Execution knowledge (“the ability to utilize skills and procedures as needed…”).
Upon reading this schema model, I do recognize a potential to divorce the origin
from the ideas. In addition, Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009) make a reasonably persuasive
argument that these stages have analogies in the process of field mapping:
“In the field, geologists identify rocks and make relevant measurements, elaborate
through multiple working hypotheses to explain how these data are fit by largerscale solutions, make plans to traverse the landscape to most efficiently test these
hypotheses, and then execute the plans safety as terrain conditions allow” (pp.51).
The undergraduate students in this study were all geology majors. At the time of the
advanced field camp, they had already completed a beginning and intermediate semesterlong field course. In addition, Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009) explain that the students
were from the area and so had familiarity with the local topography, field conditions, and
general geologic history of the area.
The first author was also the instructor for the field camp these students attended.
However, he had no knowledge regarding which students had agreed to participate in the
study and which had not; the second author had been the researcher to establish informed
consent with the participants. The authors appropriately note that personal familiarity
with the participants may have introduced some bias into their interpretations; they did,
however, make efforts to minimize any possible impact through triangulation of data.
The procedure in this study involved the participants completing a timed geologic
mapping project. The task was to be treated as an exam and, as such, had to be completed
individually without consulting fellow students. They had approximately 7 hours to
complete the map covering an area of 2 km2. The instructions for the task required that
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the students write field notes and include a notation for the location of each stop, or
station, made during the exam.
Each student wore a GPS unit set to record a position every 3 minutes. A Global
Positioning System (GPS) track is a more quantitative source of data that records how a
participant responds to and completes an authentic field-based task. Used with research
on human navigation, GPS tracks document whether people move slow or fast, make
broad treks to get an overview of an area, or explore one area in great detail. The unit was
solely for research purposes and could not be used by the student to locate his or her
position on the map. Due to problems with the units, the authors obtained only 8 of 15
GPS tracks of the participants’ time in the field. A selection of participants also took part
in semi-structured interviews at the end of the day to explain about their geologic map as
well as their mapping process, both in terms of thoughts and navigation in the field.
The analysis of the participants’ data is divided into three parts. First, their
geologic maps were scored based on identification and placement of geologic structures,
of rock types, and of contacts between rock types. Second, they authors used the GPS
tracks to identify sections of the field area, so called hotspots, that participants visited the
most; they found from subsequent analysis that the hotspots did correspond to key rock
exposures in the field area. Third, the authors connected five consecutive GPS points to
form a closed-polygon that represented the location of the participant over a 15 minute
period, and then did this for the duration of the exam to form a chain of polygons.
Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009) developed a scoring-rubric as well as two
different coding schemes for the GPS polygons. The rubric was based on the extent of
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overlap between the polygons and the hotspots. The primary coding scheme for the
polygons involved assigning a label for whether the polygon indicated the person was
moving fast, normal, slow, or static. The secondary coding scheme involved assigning a
label for patterns in the polygons. The authors developed six different codes based on
patterns to correspond to different levels of interpreted efficiency in the field: double
back, back and forth, retrace, path cross, branching, and touch and go.
For each of the eight participants, the authors describe the type and number of
secondary codes. Adrianne, the student with the highest scoring map (33/38), had four
secondary codes as does Julie, another high scoring student (24/38). The other two
students with above average scoring maps, Jay (24/38) and Bob (18/38) received eight
and nine secondary codes, respectively. The lowest scoring student, Jesse (3/38) also
received nine secondary codes. The other three students in the lower than average map
score, Jesus (15/38), Mark (13/38), and Jesse (12/38) received seven, twelve, and twelve
secondary codes, respectively. Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009) propose that lack of
secondary codes is a “substantial predictor” of performance. I would hesitate to agree or
disagree with their interpretation because data for eight participants seems insufficient to
determine the presence of absence of a predictor. My skepticism is partly because of the
small n value with which they are making the claim.
More significantly, however, it seems odd to have absence of data be an indicator
of performance. Clearly the student who received the highest score on her map was using
her time in the field somehow. The secondary coding scheme designed by Riggs, Lieder,
& Balliet (2009) only tells us what she did not do. Thus it would seem potentially more
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meaningful to explore using a coding scheme which informs us instead about successful
strategies.
There were no particular patterns among participant speed variations, and most of
the eight students showed variation in speed over the course of the day. Riggs, Lieder, &
Balliet (2009) incorporate the discussion of participants’ relative speeds into a description
of the general pattern of the tracks. The development of these categories is not explained,
nor do they explain if there was any attempt to establish reliability of this coding scheme.
The following are some example descriptions of tracks; note that these are not participant
quotes.
Jay had one of the most orderly traverses through the field as he completed one
full clockwise circuit (pp.59).
Bob initially starts out in a clockwise circular pattern, but his traverse quickly
becomes inefficient as he executes a zigzag pattern up and down steep terrain
throughout the field area (pp.59).
Bill’s traverse is the only non-circular/loop pattern that appeared to be planned as
such. Bill’s traverse looks like a 3 pronged approach as he starts out by heading
west, heads uphill, comes back down to the valley and heads to the far east, where
he heads up the terrain again before back coming down, heads down the valley,
stops halfway between the previous 2 approaches and heads uphill, before finally
returning to his starting point (pp.59).
Jesus had one of the most complex navigation patterns and his maneuvers appear
relatively random and unplanned… Significantly, he also has a one-hour static
period near the end of the exam time spent near the isolated data point on his map
in the northeast sector of the field area, suggesting a total state of confusion
and/or a subject has completely given up on the exam (pp.60).
Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009) do not explain how they are classifying orderly versus
random, planned versus unplanned, and efficient versus inefficient. They make an
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oblique reference to student interview data and notes but offer no direct evidence to
support attributing intent and mental state to the track data.
Little attention is devoted to the polygon scoring rubric based on overlap of
polygons with hotspots. The authors posit that the overlap between the polygons and the
hotspots indicates that students completed the identification step in the schema model
because they recognized the importance of the geologic information at those locations.
They attribute the variation in map scores to “a failure [of the students] to elaborate
successfully on the information gained, and/or a misinterpretation of the information
gained at these sites that led to erroneous elaboration into mental models of the field area
that could not be substantiated with further investigation” (p. 61). This interpretation of
the data seems plausible.
Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009) address several limitations of this study. For
instance, they grant the need to find out more about the influence of prior education or
field experience as well as the influence of topography on navigation strategies. They
grant that they do not know what expert behaviors might look like for this task. They also
acknowledge the need to expand their data set and the need to collect more qualitative
data from interviews and observations to test their interpretations.
In a publication later in the same year (Riggs, Balliet, & Lieder, 2009), Riggs and
colleagues expand upon some of the earlier results and address a couple of the limitations
they identified in their previous article. The primary supposition remains the same: “the
navigation strategies of students while mapping reflect their internal problem-solving
approaches as they fit testing and verification strategies derived from their mental model
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to their traverse plans” (p. 325). Furthermore, they continue to frame their study with the
theory of Naturalistic decision making (NDM) and to use the schema model of problem
solving.
None of my previously-mentioned concerns or questions regarding the authors’
choice of framework are addressed in this later publication. However, as stated before,
the schema model does appear to be broadly applicable when considered separately from
NDM.
The students in this second study of Riggs, Balliet, & Lieder (2009) are a subset
of the students included in the previous study. In other words, Riggs and colleagues
collected additional data from the student participants in the same year. In this instance,
the students are completing another mapping exam in a new location. They had
approximately 7 hours to map the field area of ~1.5 km2. Indeed, the reason to use the
same students is to establish which aspects of their navigation strategies are due to
topography and which are due to individual methodology.
As before, the authors had the students wear GPS units while mapping. This time
the GPS units were set to record the students’ locations once every minute over the
course of the day. Unfortunately, there were more problems with the data. Out of the
original eight from the previous study, they had complete track of both mapping exams
for only four participants. The authors note, however, that the four participants do
represent a range as far as students’ performance.
Riggs, Balliet, & Lieder (2009) scored the maps essentially the same way as
before, except that, because of the complexity of the field area, they allowed points for
141

maps that were internally consistent but had rock units misidentified. The same technique
was also used to analyze the GPS points: constructing and applying codes to chains of
polygons for every 15 minutes of work. They also constructed and coded polygon chains
for five minutes of work. They report coding the polygons using the same primary speed
codes and secondary efficiency codes, though they focused more of their analysis on the
latter. Analysis of field notebooks was integrated with analysis of the tracks so as to
enhance the investigators ability to interpret the students’ problem-solving strategies.
Riggs, Balliet, & Lieder (2009) provide a much more detailed narrative describing
the four students’ tracks and field note than in their earlier study. There are no quotes
from the participants. The wording belongs to the researchers. Yet the summaries
accomplish something the previous article did not. They conveyed the sense of pressure
on the students to complete the task within a certain amount of time. This does not mean
that they changed my mind regarding NDM. Rather, they raised another question. If the
study is really capturing students in the process of taking an exam, why not relate this
study to research on test-taking dynamics?
That question aside, by integrating analysis of the field notes into the discussion,
the application of the schema model seems more justified. Riggs, Balliet, & Lieder
(2009) link together pauses in the GPS track, locations where students stopped, and
sections of notes in the notebooks as a means of picking out times when the student is
engaging in either identification or elaboration. The authors elaborate more fully the
connection between where participants spent their time and how that related to the quality
of their map. They propose that both the 5 and 15 minute tracks can be linked to planning
and execution stages by picking up on some of the small-scale movements in some areas
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and long traverses in others. Overall, I find the claims more convincing in this study than
the previous one, largely due to the inclusion of data from field notes. I would have
appreciated it if they had offered a way for the reader to determine independently if their
interpretations are justified. There are a couple of inferences that do still seem to be
unclear. For example, they interpret one student’s zigzag pattern as inefficient. Why?
Depending on the topography, a zigzag pattern might be very practical.
Riggs, Balliet, & Lieder (2009) propose that effectiveness of navigation strategy
may be more important than efficiency of navigation strategy. For instance, Adrianne
again received the highest score on this map exam. Her GPS polygons indicated that she
retraced her steps and revisited a certain section of the field area, an action that did
increase her total number of secondary efficiency codes. But she did so to good effect and
improved her map in that area. Her example contrasts with another student, Jay, whose
GPS polygon chains include many more instances of retracing. In this sense, Riggs,
Balliet, & Lieder (2009) interpret that too much retracing indicates confusion and relates
to a lower quality map.
Finally, in terms of the question and critiques raised in this sub-section, Riggs,
Balliet, & Lieder (2009) do acknowledge that their studies are limited by the small
number of participants and that their model for decision making during field mapping
needs to be and will be tested. Moreover, they include the potential use of having
geologists’ record think-aloud audio logs during mapping as one way of testing their
interpretations and conjectures.
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2.2.3.5 Constructing a three-dimensional model of a geologic structure
Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben (2009) introduce their study with the observation that
visualization as a process and visualizations as objects or images are important aspects of
science education. For example, science textbooks abound with illustrations of models
showing different processes or concepts. The authors go on to frame their research on
students’ ability to visualize three-dimensional geologic structures as a case-study within
the broader context of research on visualization in science education. For the purposes of
this critique, however, I will focus initially on the results and conclusions that center
more on reasoning related to the geologic models before later tending to their discussion
of the broader implications of their research for science education.
The participants in this study included undergraduate non-science majors (n = 13),
undergraduate science majors (n = 14), and professional geoscientists with minimum of a
decade experience in field geology (n = 6). The non-science majors had no college-level
geology coursework. The authors recruited the science majors from among students who
were part of a research experience for undergraduate program at nearby institutions; there
is no indication if the science majors have college-level course work in earth science.
There is also no explanation of the background of the professional scientists.
The instruments in this study included artificial rock outcrops and small-scale
physical models of a larger geologic structure. The eight artificial outcrops were made of
wood, generally one meter in length, and scattered across a university campus as if they
were exposures of rock units beneath the surface. Each exposure had two layers of wood
painted different colors to represent two different rock units. In all, the exposures were
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designed to have the two rock units form a basin 180 meters in length and 120 meters
wide with the middle of the basin trending in north-south direction. The authors also built
14 three-dimensional models of different geologic structures intended as possible
interpretations of the artificial outcrops.
The procedure started with one researcher meeting individually with each
participant. The first step was to provide some background instructions using as few
technical terms as possible on how geologists collect data in the field and what data they
collect. From there, the researcher took that participant to the eight outcrops in a specific
order. The participant had unlimited time at each outcrop and was free to walk around or
touch the outcrop; they could not, however, return to an outcrop once they left it. The
researcher explained that “we will ask you to combine information from all of the
outcrops to envision a large structure that could be formed by all of the outcrops taken
together, keeping in mind that most of the structure would be buried or eroded” (p. 367368). After completing the field component of the procedure, the researcher took the
participant back to the start area and then asked the participant to choose one of the scale
models that fit their mental model based on their observations of the outcrops. The
participants also had to explain their choice by saying both why they picked the model
they did and why they did not pick the others.
The researchers videotaped the participant’s consideration and explanation of the
small scale models. Initially, the videos were transcribed and coded based on the
participants’ statements, gestures, and actions; analysis of the latter two are the foci of
sister-studies to this publication (Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben, 2008; Kastens, Liben, &
Agrawal, 2008). To chart the participants’ logic, Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben (2009)
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transformed the participants’ spoken explanations into a diagram designed to show the
progression from observations to inferences and then a final decision regarding the
model. The authors also explained that they adopted Toulmin’s vocabulary (e.g. data,
claim, warrants, backing, qualifiers, and rebuttals) for assessing the participants’
explanations.
In reporting the results, Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben (2009) begin with a task
analysis of the essential constituent elements for success in the artificial outcrop task.
They identify three major components necessary for success on the task: “comprehend
the problem posed; observe outcrops, completely and accurately; and interpret observed
information [and] infer plausible shape for geological structure” (p. 317). The
descriptions of the first two components are completely general, and only a few example
participant quotes are offered for the third component. In addition, the authors explain
that development of the task analysis was based on statements of both experts and
novices (i.e. students). However, they offer no clarification as to whether and to what
extent the experts or novices did or did not perform the different components during the
task. Indeed, throughout the article, data from the experts are not well demarked from the
student data. Ultimately, this does not hinder the impact of the results as the authors focus
especially on the student data. However, the title of the article suggests that the expert
perspective is a more substantial part of this study than it appears to be. Thus the
inconsistency is more perplexing than problematic.
After the task analysis, Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben (2009) compared the total
number of claims given by each student and whether the student supported the claims
with evidence. The authors appropriately used ANOVA to test whether science majors or
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non-science majors were statistically more likely to support a claim with evidence or not.
They report that mean number (SDs) of claims supported with evidence for science
majors 8.5 (5.9) is statistically different (F (1, 23) = 5.11, p = 0.03) from the mean
number for non-science majors 4.1 (2.7). They report, too, that mean number (SDs) of
claims not supported with evidence for science majors 5.2 (3.6) is statistically different (F
(1, 23) = 3.48, p = 0.07) from the mean number for non-science majors 9.0 (5.9). There is
a small peculiarity in the reporting of these results in that the total number of student
participants is 27, which would suggest that the degrees of freedom should be 25, not 23
as given. However, the difference does not affect the interpretation of the statistical
results.
Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben (2009) developed a list of valid arguments, arguments
that included evidence or observations, a warrant, and a claim, based upon the expert and
high-performing student participants and “by reflecting on the nature of the task”. The
latter comment regarding their own reflections implies that their arguments have both an
etic and emic origin. This is acceptable and understandable in this type of study; the
researchers have an expected solution to the problem and so are in a position to generate
a plausible set of supporting arguments for that solution. Yet a reader is also justified in
wondering exactly to what extent prior experience of the researchers influenced the
categories; it would have helped the reader for the authors to have, at some point,
explained their own backgrounds. Regardless, the key point is that a valid argument is
both correct and complete.
The authors also define a reference argument for the entire model to consist of a
combination of valid arguments that support the interpretation that the artificial outcrops
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represent an elongate, deep, and closed basin. To do this, they needed to have made
observations of several different aspects of the exposures. First, in order to determine that
the structure is a basin, they would have needed to note the direction in which the rock
units were dipping and that that they were all dipping inward, bending in the shape of a
bowl rather than a dome. Second, in order to conclude that the basin was more elongate
than round, the participants needed to have picked up on the pattern in the orientation and
location of the rock units as they moved from one exposure to the next. Third, to surmise
that the basin is more of a deep than shallow bowl, they would need to have recorded that
the rock units were dipping steeply inward. Fourth, the interpretation that the basin was
closed depended upon the observations of the position of the exposures, the orientation of
those exposures, and how the observation that the dip of the units formed a complete oval
at the surface, instead of being tilted and thus part of the oval’s rim must be hidden
underground.
Notably, Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben (2009) had intended that the basin be
symmetric. However, none of the experts came to this conclusion. The experts and
several students noted variation in the steepness of the rock units (or variation in dip
angle) as they progressed around the basin, and they interpreted this as an indication that
the basin was asymmetric. Moreover, the elevation differences of the exposures also
suggested the possibility of an asymmetric basin. Thus, the authors conceded that the
exposures were more consistent with an asymmetric basin and proceeded with their
analysis accordingly.
Among the range of observations and inferences just described, the following
were used by at least eight students: the dipping beds became a basis for concluding that
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the exposures formed a basin; the positions of the exposures were used to infer that the
basin was elongate; the steepness of the dipping beds was thought to be associated with a
deep basin instead of shallow; and the variations in the steepness were used to suppose
that the basin was asymmetrical. Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben (2009) observe that dip
direction, location of exposures, dip angle, and dip angle variation are not uniquely
related to geology, but rather are related to spatial thinking in general. Moreover, students
actually favored these more generalized lines of reasoning than the geological arguments.
Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben (2009) calculated the number of valid arguments that
participants gave for each attribute of the reference argument (concave/convex,
elongate/circular, deep/shallow, closed/open, and asymmetric/symmetric). The authors
report a statistical difference (ANOVA, F (1, 23) =30.93, p = .03) between the means
(SDs) for the science majors of 3.2 (.9) versus the means for the non-science majors of .8
(1.2). The significance of this difference contrasts with the finding that two-thirds (8/12)
of the non-science majors did not provide a single valid argument for their
interpretations. All 13 of the science majors put forth at least one valid argument.
The authors identified three categories of arguments that fell outside the reference
argument and so were termed invalid. First, participants had difficulty relating what they
saw at a particular outcrop with an overall model. For example, one participant selected
one of the oval scale models because the artificial outcrops had been themselves oval.
Her field notes on the outcrops included comment such as “oval shape” or “Easter egg
form” (p.383). Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben (2009) interpreted this as an example of the
participants not understanding the problem.
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Second, participants made inferences based on faulty observations. For instance,
one participant surmised that the structure must be round because the path participants
had been shown in the field had also been round. However, it was indeed more of an
oval.
Third, participants did not always integrate all their observations into their
interpretation. Instead, they focused on the multiple implications of one parameter. For
example, one student focused solely on dip angle and did not consider another parameter
until a researcher prompted her to do so. Indeed, upon further inspection of the data
pertaining to this participant, I can see that she did use dip angle correctly to remove
certain scale models from consideration. The error occurred when she misapplied the dip
angle as a rationale for deciding if the structure was circular. The authors could have
emphasized more that the participant denied herself the opportunity to test her
interpretations, by comparing some of her observations with analysis of her other
observations.
Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben (2009) discuss the implications of their results for
science education. For instance, they draw the readers’ attention to the observed
differences that science majors versus non-science majors use of supported claims. They
contend that this is an indication that students are weak at connecting inferences with
observations, and this is something of concern to science education. They also observe
that many of the students’ observations and inferences are more generally spatial skills
than geological thinking and reasoning. They propose that more explicit instruction in
spatial skills within college-level geosciences programs may be beneficial to students.
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This study design controlled for variables that are typically unconstrained in
geologic field work. The participants were guided to the outcrops. There was no concern
about navigation between exposures. There is no mention of participants struggling to
find their location on the map; however there is comment that participants have a map
upon which to mark locations of the exposures. Based upon research already reviewed in
this section regarding participants’ difficulty finding their location on a map, the absence
of comment raises the issue that these participants might have been informed of their
location. The participants did not need to develop a three-dimensional model on their
own; they were shown examples. Nor did they have to transfer that model to a map. They
only had to decide which scale model represented what they had seen in the field. They
had all of this accommodation and support, yet they had difficulty completing the
reference argument. But is that a surprise?
From the perspective of embodied cognition, the procedure in Kastens, Agrawal,
& Liben (2009) removes or minimizes many of the constraints that are normally imposed
on the participant who is trying to infer a large-scale structure based on a set of
observations. Without the “representational bottleneck” that is normally an aspect of this
task, the variation in performance can be considered in a different context. Kastens,
Agrawal, & Liben (2009) emphasize that success depended upon the student attending to
all or most of the five attributes of the reference argument (concave/convex,
elongate/circular, deep/shallow, closed/open, and asymmetric/symmetric). Only one
student, a science major, had valid arguments for all five attributes; this student selected
one of two acceptable scale models. Four other students, three science majors and one
non-science major, had valid arguments for four of the attributes; all four of those
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students also selected one of the correct scale models. The success rate changes, however,
for students who developed valid arguments for only three of the attributes; only three out
of seven students who had this approach inferred one of the correct models. What
accounts for this change? Why is there a rather sudden difference? Notably, all seven
students are science majors.
One of the key conclusions of their study was that a complete reference argument
for an interpretation of a geologic structure depends upon valid arguments using an array
of observations. Thus, even with so many factors being controlled, field-based geologic
problems are complex, uncertain, and dependent upon the background education and
experiences of the individual.
2.2.3.6 Section summary
In the summary of the previous sub-section, I speculated that performance in
reading topographic maps may not change substantially with extended experience. The
ability to self-locate position on a map may be different. Some of the participants in
Liben, Myers, & Kastens (2008) were notably unsuccessful, others were fine. Thus, while
ability to interpret topography on a map may not be a constraint on developing expertise
in geologic mapping, ability to identify location on a map may be. This brings me to a
discussion on the connection between research features in this literature review and
research on spatial skills in the geosciences.
In a review paper, Kastens and Ishikawa (2006) summarize many ways in which
spatial skills are prevalent throughout the geosciences, among those skills being the using
and making of maps. Moreover, they argue that “learning geosciences and becoming a
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professional geoscientist require extensive high-level spatial thinking” (p.53). Their
summary prompts me to consider and be explicit as to why this literature review has not
included more studies beyond Liben et al. (2008) that explore how ability in spatial
thinking may influence expertise in geologic mapping. I turn to the choice of embodied
cognition as a theoretical framework.
One of the claims by Wilson (2002) about embodied cognition is that we off-load
cognitive work onto the environment. For instance, when giving directions we turn
ourselves and our listener to face the target destination. This and other examples from
Wilson suggest that some elements of embodied cognition are also reflections of ability
in spatial thinking. In a sense then, I am looking at the manifestation of spatial skills by
looking at the process of geologic mapping from the perspective of embodied cognition.
Another theme to emerge out of the previous sub-section was the difference in
how novices and experts construct and use logical and causal models. Logical models
tend to be similar for novices and experts. But causal models for novices are typically
less sophisticated than causal models for experts. In Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben (2009), a
central observation is that students have substantial difficulty connecting observations
with inferences. On the other hand, there were some students that were successful. Thus,
I see that the results in Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben (2009) introduce some new questions
about novices’ ability in problem solving. When novices succeed in solving an illstructured problem is that because they have also succeeded in developing a causal
mental model? How do the thought processes of novices who are successful in solving an
ill-structured problem differ from novices who struggle? In addition, how does the
approach of successful novices’ compare with the approach of experts?
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Lastly, Spiers & Maguire (2008) identified a series of gaps within wayfinding
literature that are relevant for geologic mapping: few studies have investigated how
individuals perceive their surroundings on a second-by-second basis; few studies have
tried to make a quantitative sequence analysis of types of thoughts during a wayfinding
task; and also missing is an effort to use verbal reports to refine cognitive models of
wayfinding. Spiers & Maguire (2008) tackle these gaps for navigation in a familiar
setting. Riggs and colleagues (Riggs, Balliet, et al., 2009; Riggs, Lieder, et al., 2009)
make some claims regarding individual mental state or strategies during geologic
mapping. But their data collection and analysis methodology are not suited to answer
questions regarding mental state. Spiers & Maguire (2008) successfully use a
combination of methods to document sequence of thoughts in relations to actions while
navigating. The question emerges, then, what might we learn about geologic mapping
expertise with a similar methodology? This question will be addressed in sub-section 2.3.
2.2.4 Research at the intersection of expertise, problem solving, and
mental models
2.2.4.1 Introduction
Finally, the question exists as to how these different areas of expertise, problem
solving, and mental models combine. How do experts and novices vary in their approach
to building and using mental models to solve problems? A series of studies from the sport
of orienteering offer an example.
Eccles and colleagues completed a series of studies investigating expert cognition
in the sport of competitive orienteering (Eccles et al., 2002a; Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew,
2006; Eccles, 2006, 2008). In their suite of studies, they illustrate how experts develop
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adaptive strategies to cope with constraints imposed on the cognitive processes needed to
complete an orienteering race. There are certain similarities between orienteering and
making a geologic map. Both involve people navigating around a fixed field area armed
with a map and compass (albeit different types of compasses). Moreover, geologists and
orienteers9 and similarly embedded within the environment they are trying to interpret
and navigate. An important difference, however is that in orienteering, the participants
are competing in a race. Though the goals of the two populations are different, the
research on cognition of orienteers serves as a useful comparison before the final critique
of the literature review.
The studies of Eccles and colleagues are juxtaposed with the one empirical study
that exists in the literature on the nature of geologic mapping expertise. The sub-section
concludes with a comparison of adaptations to constraints to cognition in orienteering
with adaptations to constraints to cognition in geologic mapping
2.2.4.2Orienteering
Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2002) summarize the main features of an orienteering
race. The goal of the race is to navigate through an unfamiliar field area, visiting specific
locations -- called controls -- in a certain order, and then to get to the finish line as fast as
possible. The course is divided into small units, referred to as legs, with a control at the
end of each leg. Typically in an orienteering course there are 25 controls more or less
spread out across a distance of roughly 15 kilometers. Shortly before beginning the race
the participants receive a topographic map of the area with the location of each control
This is the term used in the literature to identify someone who competes in orienteering races
(Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew, 2002; Eccles et al., 2006).
9
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marked (Eccles et al. 2006). Most races occur in forested areas. Overall, orienteering is a
“highly cognitive and highly physical” endeavor (Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew, 2002, p.
68).
The research questions in Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2002) focus on cognition
of expert orienteers by identifying the constraints of the task and adaptations the experts
use to deal with those constraints. During a race, an orienteer must decide upon a route
taking into account distance, amount of ascent, runability, and any possible obstacles.
Simultaneously, the participant must be mindful of his or her location both in threedimensional reality as well as on the two-dimensional map. With this in mind, the authors
motivate their research study by proposing that “an understanding of the cognitive
processes that underlie expert level of performance in this complex task would be of
interest to sport scientists” (Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew, 2002, p. 69). Furthermore,
previous researchers on expertise have concluded that an expert excels in his or her
domain by developing adaptations to constraints specific to the task. Consequently,
“these adaptations reduce the processing demands on limited-capacity, basic visual, and
neural systems (Charness, 1988)” (Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew, 2002, p. 69).
The authors position this study within the tradition of constructivist grounded
theory which acknowledges that interpretation of the data can be influenced by the
researchers. Appropriately, Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2002) go on to explain that they
had limited knowledge of orienteering prior to beginning the project. Instead, their prior
area of research focused on the dominant information-processing conceptual framework.
Although they actually mention this framework a couple of times, they offer no
explanation of how this does or does not relate to analysis of orienteering. Consistent
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with the constructivist grounded theory approach, the researcher who had primary
responsibility for data collection and analysis did not participate in the literature review
until after completing the data analysis.
The participants in this study are members of the British Orienteering squad.
Assuming that an expert has 10 years of deliberate practice in a domain – which is a
common assumption in the literature (de Groot, 1965; Simon & Chase, 1973) – all
members of the team fit this definition. The squad includes nine men and eight women
with an average of 16.9 years of experience in orienteering. They were originally
recruited by mail and then contacted by telephone to set a day, time, and location for an
interview. The interviews lasted anywhere from 37 to 105 minutes.
Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2002) remind the reader that a “predefined data
collection procedure is inappropriate in grounded theory” (p. 71). When interviews are
part of a grounded theory study, the usual practice is to complete analysis of the early
interviews before conducting later interviews. However, due to logistic constraints on the
researchers and participants, that was not possible. Instead, researchers conducted
interviews with participants, making audio recordings and taking notes during the
meetings, writing journal reflections afterwards, and revising the list of interview issues
and questions as needed. Originally the researchers had 10 interview issues to address
with related questions. For example, regarding the map, the interviewer asked the
following questions:
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Please describe to me how you decide what information to use from the map
in any given leg [.]
What do you first look for on the map when faced with a leg?
How is the map of use during navigation? (p. 73).

It is unfortunate that the authors do not provide more details about the issues and
questions of the interviews. Without that information, it is difficult to assess to what
extent the resulting themes are a product of the pre-determined issues introduced in the
interview or a result of issues that emerged out of the dialogue.
The researcher responsible for data collection and analysis also made a concerted
and specific effort to attend to issues regarding “the trusthworthiness criteria in
qualitative research (Lincoln and Guba, 1985): The researcher was engaged for a
prolonged period of 9 months, persistently observed the participants, triangulated the
data, engaged in peer debriefing, searched for negative cases, retained one participant’s
data for referential adequacy, used process and termination member checks, and provided
an audit trail and reflective journal” (p. 74). Data was transcribed and analyzed using the
computer program QSR NUD*IST 4.
Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2002) identified eight different themes in the experts’
answers and explanations: performance time, attentional limitations, anticipation,
planning, simplification, environmental complexity, position within the leg, and attack
point. The authors explain the meaning of each theme, how the themes are related, and
support the description with several example quotes. The primary constraints on the
participants come from attentional limitations, position within leg, and environmental
complexity. The primary adaptations participants make are techniques identified as
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anticipation and simplification. Each of the different themes will now be reviewed in
detail.
Success in orienteering is determined by performance time. It is the primary
concern that filters into all other themes.
Participant 3: “One of the mistakes people make [in orienteering] is that they try
and rectify a mistake, they try and catch up for it. You can’t, time is lost” (pp.74).
An orienteer has to divide his attention between three separate objects, 1) the map, 2) the
environment, and 3) his or her body traveling in space and time. Running through forests
without making reference to his or her location on the map, an orienteer may get lost or
miss the control. If the orienteer spends too much time referring to and studying the map
and landscape, he or she will inevitably slow down and lose valuable time. The challenge
is to find a balance:
Participant 13: “All the information you’re trying to get from the map,… it’s
always got to be balanced against how fast you’re running… The faster you’re
running… the less you want to look at detail on the map. It becomes a matter of
judging how much you trade off… the amount of detail you’re looking for and
how much you’re running”
(pp. 76).
To minimize the strain of dividing attention between multiple directions,
orienteers have developed a strategy to anticipate and visualize what is ahead.
Participant 14: “It’s a vision of what the terrain’s going to look like when I get
there. It’s not where I am, it’s where I am going to be” (pp. 76).
Participant 18: “You look up at the map and typically you’ll visualize a static
picture of what’s coming up next, a little sort of tableau of ‘on your left a largish
hill shaped like a banana, on your right two small knolls… [and] a sort of spur
sticking out’” (pp. 77).
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The benefit of this strategy is that it lessens the need to refer back to the map. This allows
the orienteer to keep running as fast as possible. A key component of anticipation is the
conscious effort of planning.
Planning in orienteering is separate from anticipation in that it relates to overall
strategy for a leg instead of just visualizing the upcoming topography.
Participant 4: “It’s a big advantage to have a plan, to know what to expect. You
have to have a plan for the whole [upcoming] leg … which will say I’m going to
pick up on that, that, that, and then when I get to this point I’m going to start
‘fine” orienteering to find the control” (pp. 77).
The orienteer will usually plan ahead when there is less need to attend to the landscape,
either for particular upcoming features or for particular obstacles or unevenness on the
path.
Another adaptation strategy is a process of simplification. This involves reducing
the elements of the landscape ahead to a selection of key and distinguishable features.
Participant 9: “When you’re running at top speed… you’re not able to take in all
the detail on the map so you have to simplify it… If you took in more detail…
you’d have to be slower… to look at the map longer to take it in… If you only
have to notice one thing then [you can] run to that… quicker” (pp. 79).
Thus, simplification also facilitates anticipation because by reducing the map to fewer
details, the participant can think farther ahead (articulated by Participant 4, p. 79).
The themes of environmental complexity and the orienteer’s position within the
leg are two constraints that effect both simplification and anticipation. If the terrain is
physically difficult to traverse or if the topography is uniform in the sense that there are
no key features then the participant is forced to slow down. They then focus on more
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immediate details of the map and landscape because it is not possible either to simplify
the map or to hold a picture of the upcoming features in anticipation:
Participant 10: “These sand dunes, … if you … lost where you were on the map at
any one time… you were lucky to find your way again, so you had to keep in
contact [with the map] all the time. So then… [it] was really hard to remember the
whole leg, you had to keep checking. Every time you went over a dune you had to
check which one you were on” (pp. 80).
The participant also needs to pay attention to the map and landscape in more detail when
he or she approaches the end of the leg and is closing in on the control.
Participant 3: “[Near the control] you’ve got to start taking in all the small
information… you’ve got 50 meters of intense reading [of] the map” (pp. 81).
The last theme, use of attack point, is an adaptive strategy which helps limit any
time lost by focusing on details of the map close to the control.
Participant 11: “An attack point could be … something as obvious as a track
junction or a wall junction… It’s a feature that couldn’t possibly be anything else
in the vicinity… nothing else within 500 meters that could possibly be that… It’s
the sort of feature you can absolutely peg [run] it to because you know you cannot
miss it… and ideally it is close enough to the control that you minimize the time
when you’re going slowly and carefully into the control” (pp. 81-82).
The use of an attack point is thus another use of the simplification strategy, but
particularly done close to the completion of the leg.
At the outset of the article, Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2002) established that the
purpose of their study was to develop a model for expert cognition of orienteering based
on the stated experiences and knowledge of the elite members of the community. The
overall model is an intricate and interrelated set of constraints and adaptations that
experts use to offset the impact of those constraints. As developed and presented in the
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article, the elements of the model are well-supported with illustrative example quotes
from the participants. The authors acknowledge that they can make no claims regarding
how experts acquire these skills or how the skills develop over the expertise spectrum.
Indeed, the test of this model and how it applies to novices and other experts is the
subject of the next review.
Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2002) develop their model for expert cognition in
orienteers based on interview data with experts in the domain. To test the model,
however, they collect data capturing the process of orienteering in action. To do this,
Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006) use a head-mounted video camera to capture a visual
and audio record of an orienteer going through a race. Expert orienteers reported using a
series of adaptations that enabled them to meet the demand of the task in the most
efficient and effective way possible (Eccles et al., 2002b). Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew
(2006) describe that this approach of the expert orienteers is consistent with that of
experts in other domains who develop coping strategies for the constraints that are
imposed by the need to attend to multiple variables (e.g. the map, the environment, and
the body running). Moreover, this skill is something that individuals with less expertise
lack. Therefore, Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006) state the following hypotheses for this
study:




…that [attention] control might be reflected in differences between more and less
experienced orienteers in the allocation of visual attention
… that more experienced orienteers would spend more time attending to the map
while moving (in contrast to [being] stationary)
…[that more experienced orienteers would spend] less time overall attending to
the map and less time stationary than the less experienced orienteers (pp. 79).
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A total of 40 participants took part in this study, 20 with a minimum of three
years of experience in orienteering, and 20 with a rudimentary familiarity of the sport but
no direct personal experience. Each group had 15 men and 5 women. The ages ranged
from 16 to 51 years, with an average of 29.9 years; Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006)
calculated a t-test (t38 = 1.94; P = .06) to ensure that there was not a statistical difference
in the age distributions of the two groups. The authors also developed a relative metric of
fitness (time to run 1 km on orienteer-like-course terrain) to ensure that physical fitness
was not a compounding factor in performance. Among the participants of the two groups,
there was no statistical difference in fitness of the two groups (t38 = 2.00; P = .053).
Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006) note that the small number of mostexperienced orienteers limits the statistical power of the analyses. To address this, they
construct the study to have a repeated-measures design. The participants completed three
different 2 km courses with 10 controls on each course. The use of multiple courses
increases the statistical power of the analyses.
During each course run, the participants wore a head-mounted video camera with
attached microphone. They needed to state aloud to what they were directing their
attention. They could say just a single word or short phrases such as “map” or “looking
for bridge.” The participants could also select a word of their own if the ones suggested
by the researcher seemed awkward (e.g., “ground” instead of “travel”). The simple
statements were used to minimize the impact of recording the audio log on the
participants’ performance in the task. It is probable, however, that it did slow them down
a little -- but that is one of the limitations of any think-aloud protocol method (Ericsson,
2006).
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The analyses started with coding the audio recordings to determine what the
participant was focusing on over the course of each run. The video recording was used as
a second data source to confirm the coding. For example, when the participant was
looking down at the map, the video frame would catch the top of the paper. This would
reinforce the statement of “map” in the audio recording.
The authors established validity in two ways. First they performed a membercheck by showing the video and accompanying analysis to 10 of the participants within
10 days of testing. Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006) report that “all 10 participants
responded that the coding was good” (p. 81). The turn-around time is impressive given
that each participant video is roughly two hours long.
Second, two of the authors coded the same video and compared their analyses.
They obtained a Cohen’s kappa of .64 for the direction of attention and .84 for whether
the person was moving or stationary. Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006) refer to the
standards for evaluating whether an obtained Cohen’s kappa is acceptable. The value for
direction of attention falls within the “substantial” agreement category (.61 to .80). Their
result for moving or stationary falls within the “almost perfect” category (.81 to 1).
Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006) do not emphasize this, but the results are further
understood by recognizing that they coded the video in fractions of a second. Thus, the
very fine scale unit of analysis is likely to result in small differences in the start of timing,
contributing to a mismatch that results in decrease of Cohen’s kappa.
For the statistical analysis of the data, the authors appropriately use a mixedmodel analysis of covariance. The different experience groups were the between-subjects
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factors; the different courses were the within-subject factors. Age and fitness were
covariates. The within-subjects factor is not reported here; the use of the repeatedmeasures approach was to increase the statistical power for the between-subjects analyses
but was not of particular theoretical interest. The authors identified 13 different
dependent variables related to measures of attention, measures of movement, as well as
“the percentage of total course time spent attending to the environment, travel and ’other‘
[e.g., tying shoe laces]” (p. 81). To account for the possible introduction of error by
running multiple analyses at alpha .05, Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006) also calculated
the Bonferroni adjustment that yielded an F-ratio significance level of .004. Furthermore,
they observed some heterogeneity and skewed variances in some of the data; they tried to
adjust these by transforming the data using arc-sine, natural log, and square root.
However, they also explain that, while they did not find any statistical difference been the
unadjusted means and adjusted means data, the adjusted means are really not meaningful
and so are not discussed further.
Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006) provide the means and adjusted means data for
the experienced orienteers and inexperienced orienteers on all of the 13 parameters of
interest. They also report the standard deviations for each mean, though they do not draw
attention to these data in the discussion. They include a plot that compares the coding of
visual attention of one experienced to one inexperienced orienteer, as well as the codes
for moving (or stationary).
In discussion of the results comparing the performance of the two groups, the
authors provide the raw data as well as the data as percentages. This is relevant because
the experienced orienteers were faster than the inexperienced orienteers. The mean time
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to complete the three courses was 38.08 minutes for the inexperienced group versus
21.95 minutes for the experienced group. This difference in time filters into all the other
data. Thus, focusing on the mean times can be somewhat misleading. For example, the
mean time that the experienced group looked at the map was 410 seconds. The mean time
that the inexperienced group looked at the map was 739 seconds. But in comparison to
the mean total time, both groups looked at the map approximately 31% of the time.
Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006) do not emphasize this but, while the mean times are
informative, the percentages are really more appropriate for comparison. For example, for
the times when the experienced orienteer looked at the map, they report that 73.14% of
that time he or she was also moving. By comparison, the less experienced orienteer
looked at the map while on the move 38.09% of the time.
As hypothesized, the inexperienced group stops for longer periods (mean stop
length of 661 seconds or 31.6% of total time) than the experienced group (171 seconds or
14.33% of the total time). The experienced group also made fewer total stops (mean stop
rate of 1.29 times per minute) than the inexperienced group (mean stop time of 1.67 times
per minute). The experienced group also had shorter stops (mean time of 5.49 seconds)
than the inexperienced group (mean time of 9.86 seconds).
The two groups are similar to each other in terms of the percentage of time paying
attention to the environment, 48.15% for the experienced group and 43.45% for the
inexperienced group. However, the experienced orienteers spend a greater fraction of
time attending to travel (12.59%) than to other details 8.17%; for the inexperienced
group, the fractions are and 9.71% and 14.98%, respectively.
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Lastly, Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006) report results of a series of correlation
calculations done using Pearson’s product-moment correlation to investigate if there was
a relationship between performance time and time spent on the map. They found no
correlations for the inexperienced group. However, for the experienced group, an
“average of 45% of the variability in performance time was related to time spent moving
while attending to the map as a percentage of time spent attending to the map (mean r2 of
three courses = .45).
In conclusion, Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006) review the three hypotheses
introduced at the beginning of the article. First, they proposed that the more experienced
orienteers would be able to spend more time looking at the map while on the move than
the less experienced group. The data reported in the results section supports their claim
that the results confirm this hypothesis. Second, Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006)
thought that the experienced orienteers would spend less time looking at the map than
those with less experience. While there was a difference in the absolute amount of time
each group spent, in this instance, the percentage-of-time data do not support a claim of
difference between the groups.Third, Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006) supposed that
the less experienced orienteers would stop more often and for longer periods of time.
Again, the data reported in the results section support their claim that the results confirm
this hypothesis.
Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006) also acknowledge a possible limitation of the
methodological approach in this study. The video cameras and audio recording cannot
account for whether and to what extent the orienteers may use peripheral vision during
the process of running the course. Although the authors do not focus on the reported
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standard deviations, I would propose that the implications of this limitation emphasize
the importance of considering that data. In other words, the mean values may be more
appropriately described as approximations. Admittedly, however, the decision to focus on
the means is understandable from the perspective of transforming those means to
percentages.
Considering the earlier work of Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2002a) along with
Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew (2006), an overriding theme of experts’ success is the
development of strategies that help them minimize the constraints of the task. For
example, experts have the ability to look at the map for one control point while
simultaneously running to a different control point (Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew, 2006).
This skill appears to be especially valuable for minimizing time in an orienteering race.
In Eccles (2006), he builds upon his and his collaborators previous research
(Eccles et al., 2002b, 2006) with an investigation of experts’ strategies for using their
navigational equipment. Orienteers typically carry several items with them during a race.
Of course they use a map of the course; the map has the positions of the controls marked
with a red circle. They also carry a compass of some kind, either a thumb compass that is
attached to the individual’s thumb or a base plate compass as often used by hikers;
between the two kinds, the former is more common. Lastly, they also have a small piece
of paper called the control description card; it includes additional information about each
control along the course. The goal of this study is “to determine whether expert orienteers
adapt their navigational equipment to reduce cognitive workload during orienteering
performance” (p. 1105).
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Eccles (2006) relates this research to the idea of embodied cognition as described
by Wilson (2002), however he stops short of referring to embodied cognition explicitly or
to calling it the theoretical framework. He proposes that experts use their equipment such
as their map and compass to locate externally some of the information needed to
complete the task. In this way, they lessen the cognitive load by sharing, so to speak, the
cognitive load with the equipment. As presented, positioning this study in terms of
embodied cognition seems entirely justified. It is puzzling though as to why Eccles is
vague and does not use the phrases embodied cognition or theoretical framework. I would
surmise that a possible explanation could be that for the journal in which this article is
published and the audience for whom the article is written, details and jargon related to
qualitative research detail may not be appropriate or necessary. However, I would argue
that even without being direct, the intent is clear.
This study includes samples of two different populations. First, there are 15 expert
orienteers, six men and nine women. Among these active competitors, the mean age is
28.3 (range of 21 to 39) and the mean number of years of experience in the sport is 17.3
years (range of 6 to 24). Second, there are six coaches, all men. Among the coaches, the
mean age is 44.7 (range of 32 to 64) and the mean number of years of experience in
coaching is 14 years (range of 5 to 22); the coaches also all have years of experiences as
competitors. The coaches were recruited to participate by direct contact whereas the
active competitors were recruited by way of asking coaches to announce the opportunity
to participate in the study to teams.
The author made contact with the participants in three phases. First, he collected
an introduction and demographic survey. Second, he conducted semi-structured phone
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interviews. The main question he asked of the active competitors was: “Can you tell me
what navigational equipment you carry and how you arrange it for use when
orienteering?” and asked an appropriately-modified version of the same question for the
coaches. Third, he did some additional follow-up interviews to ask for more specifics
regarding the benefits of particular strategies for the carrying or the use of a particular
equipment item.
Eccles (2006) reports taking notes throughout the data collection phases. He
discussed interpretations and alternative explanations with peers with experience in
similar expertise research but impartial with respect to this project. He also returned to
two of the participants – though he does not specific which ones – as member checks on
the results of the study. As far as the process of analysis, interviews were transcribed and
each comment regarding navigational equipment was isolated as a unit of data for coding.
The data was then examined for evidence related to intentional arrangement of equipment
as well as evidence related to effect of the equipment arrangement on cognitive load.
The experts’ general strategy for arrangement of navigational equipment was
consistent among the participants in the study. Thirteen of the 15 active competitors
explained that they hold the map and compass in the same hand; the other two
participants described holding the map in one hand and the compass in the other. They
also all attach the control description card to their sleeve.
Orienteers have to contend with several challenges in order to look at and read
their map while on the move. The maps are highly detailed and between the topographic
symbols and the control symbols are rather packed with information. It can be difficult to
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tell one line apart from another. This is especially true when the person is running over
rough terrain and the map their hand is shaking as they run. In response to these
constraints, orienteers have developed two specific adaptations that reduce the need to
search visually the map each time they look at it. They fold and refold the map
throughout the race. They also hold the map so as to mark their point of interest with their
thumb.
Orienteer 15: “There’s a lot of [map] folding and refolding… That, in itself,
makes focusing on exactly what you’re doing there and then much easier than
[when you’re using] a large map” (pp. 1109).
Coach 1: “If you spent ten seconds looking for where you were on the map you
might even have to stop running, stand still…[and] hold the map still, whereas if
you know that when you pick up the map and [you can] look at the end of your
thumb [to locate the pertinent area]… you don’t waste any time” (pp. 1109).
Therefore, reducing the need to scan over the map reduces the likely decrease in running
speed when looking down at the map and away from the surroundings.
The practice of wearing the control card on the sleeve is done to enable easily
looking back and forth between the map and card without needing to adjust either.
Orienteer 14: “The advantage of having [the control description card] on your arm
is that it’s easy to check. I have my map in my left hand and my descriptions
around my left wrist, so when looking down [while running] I can check both at
once” (pp. 1110).
Coach 5: “[Orienteers attach the control description card to a sleeve] so they can
look at it while running. [With this arrangement], you can hold your forearm up to
your eyes and look at it without… well, I’m sure you do slow down a little bit, but
not too much. It is the same as with folding maps” (pp. 1110).
Thus the physical arrangement of the card is also meant to reduce demands on the
individual’s attention during a race.
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While the course map is always given out very close to the start of the race, the
control card is sometimes available ahead of time. In such instances, ten of the
competitors reported making annotations on the card to highlight notable characteristics
of different controls.
Orienteer 7: “In some competitions, the [control] descriptions get mailed out the
week prior… so you get a chance to play around with the card. Sometimes I
colour some descriptions on the card in fluorescent pen… to highlight relevant
information. For example, at a control where drinking water is provided… there’s
going to be a trail of cups on the ground [left by other competitors that]
sometimes make it easier to find the control. I’ll draw a blue square around the
control description so that when I glance down and count on control number 4
[when competing], I’ll know there’s going to be water there…” (pp. 1110-1111).
Annotations, then, are used as a mnemonic device that may help the orienteer locate
controls faster during the race.
Participants also purposefully orient the map in their hands to align with their
current position and direction.
Orienteer 3: “If the map is oriented, then [when] you’re looking straight ahead on
the map, that’s what you should see straight ahead of you...if it’s not, then in your
head you have to shift what you see on the map to match the ground and that’s a
lot harder to do…” (pp. 1111).
This strategy reduces the need for mental rotation and allows the participant to exert their
mental effort on other tasks (such as those strategies described in Eccles et al., (2002)).
Eccles (2006) concludes that the overall effect of the different strategies for
arranging navigational equipment is to reduce the cognitive workload of the task, in
particular by reducing the demands on the competitor’s attention. This conclusion is
plausible and well supported with the illustrative quotes included in the text.
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Notably, however, I think Eccles (2006) misses an opportunity in his discussion
of these strategies. At the outset of the article he refers – again not explicitly – to
embodied cognition and the concept of storing information externally in the environment
as an example of one facet of embodied cognition. But in the conclusion of the article he
only vaguely alludes to this idea. For example, in referring to the physical rotation of the
map he states, “The rotational step in the transformation process is not actually
eliminated; it is simply undertaken in the real world so as to avoid having to undertake
the task mentally” (p. 1112). Based on his data, I would argue there is a stronger case to
be made that orienteers’ strategies for arranging and manipulating navigational
equipment are sound examples of this facet of embodied cognition. Indeed, map rotation
is an example given by Wilson (2002). Although, I posit that even without making a
more assertive argument, Eccles (2006) presents a complete and convincing account of
the navigational equipment used in orienteering and the adaptive strategies that experts
use to get the best advantage possible from each item.
The grounded theory of expert cognition of orienteering (Eccles et al. 2002)
teases out the constraints of the task and the various adaptations experts have developed
in response to those constraints. As an example of embodied cognition, the overriding
and controlling factor of the model of expert cognition in orienteering is that “cognition is
time pressured” (Wilson, 2002, p. 627). As Wilson (2002) explains, “when situations
demand fast and continuously evolving responses, there may simply not be time to build
up a full-blown mental model of the environment from which to derive a plan of action”
(p. 628). Time, therefore, imposes a “representational bottleneck” (Wilson, 2002) on
cognition. Often the response of someone faced with a challenging cognitive or
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perceptuo-motor problem involves “stepping back, observing, assessing, planning, and
only then taking action” (p.628). One of the expert orienteers in Eccles et al. (2002) made
the following observation about novices:
“If you look at a novice orienteer that’s exactly what they do, they run a hundred
yards, they stop, they work out the next hundred yards. Whereas I guess, the
progression to being a much better orienteer is to begin to turn that into a cycle…
so the ultimate thing is where it’s one continual ninety minute smooth flow of
information but… it’s something you have to work on I guess” (As quoted in
Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew, 2006), pp. 85).
Thus our picture of the difference between novice and expert orienteers may reasonably
be cast as the difference between individuals who need to be more purposeful and
systematic in dealing with the “representational bottleneck” of time and those who have
strategies for lessening the impact of the restriction on performance in the task.
2.2.4.3 Geologic mapping
In Petcovic, Libarkin, & Baker (2009), the main purpose of their article is to
present, by way of an example, a methodology for investigating cognition and behavior
during field mapping. In their study, qualitative and quantitative data are collected and
analyzed independently; this approach enables them to use the technique of both data and
method triangulation.
The authors explain how their proposed methodology fits within the larger
tradition of expertise research. Four common categories of experimental studies are
recall, perceiving, categorization, and verbal reporting (Chi, 2006a). Of these, verbal
reporting and perceiving are most naturally suited to studies designed around authentic
tasks. The process of verbal reporting does, as it sounds, involve the participant speaking

174

aloud his or her thoughts related to performing a particular task. While there are several
types of verbal reports, think-aloud protocols are particularly common in expertise
studies (Ericsson, 2006c). Petcovic, Libarkin, & Baker (2009) do not delve into much
detail about think-aloud protocols as data, though there is some history of concern
regarding the validity of the technique for capturing thoughts (Ericsson, 2006c). In
general, though, the data are commonly now accepted as a reasonable means by which to
elicit expert thinking (Ericsson, 2002).
In perceiving tasks, the interest is in how a participant perceives or responds to an
artifact or to the surrounding environment. Data such as a participant’s verbal report,
field notes, or drawings may all bear some reflection of the participant’s perception.
The participants in this study included three volunteers and four student
participants. They all completed a background experience survey. This instrument has
questions on the number of undergraduate and graduate geology courses taken; the
number and level of degrees held in geology; the amount, duration and purpose of prior
field experience; and the total years, if any, of professional mapping experience. Two of
the authors reviewed the data and then developed and agreed upon a relative ranking of
the different participants’ relative level of expertise. In the end, the participants fell into
one group of five novices and another group of two experts. Of the three volunteer
participants, two were experts and one was a novice.
The original plan for data collection was that three participants would complete
two different geologic mapping tasks at two different locations near Marquette,
Michigan. Data to be collected from these participants included the following: a
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background survey to assess relative level of experience in geology; the participants’
field map and notes; the participants’ GPS track of movement while mapping; a thinkaloud protocol recorded while mapping; a set of photographs taken by the participants
during mapping; and a semi-structured interview after the participants completed the
mapping task. The original set of three participants was expanded to a total of seven with
the addition of four undergraduate geology students. The students were attending a
university field course and had to complete the mapping project as part of the curriculum
in any event. In the case of the four students, the researchers collected the background
survey data, their field notes and maps, and their GPS tracks. Petcovic, Libarkin, & Baker
(2009) acknowledge that the different treatments have had an impact on the outcome of
the study. However, they also reiterate that the main purpose of their report is to lay out
all the elements and implementation of the methodology. The results of the example
study are meant to be treated as preliminary.
The participants’ geologic maps were scanned and digitized in ArcGIS. Analysis
of the maps involved determining the percentage of area mapped as a specific lithologic
unit, the number of mapped units, and the average number of mapped polygons per
lithologic unit. The GPS tracks were also imported into ArcGIS. Analysis of the tracks
involved calculating the total time spent mapping, the total distance covered, average
speed, as well as a kernel density map showing areas in which participants spent more
time. For both the maps and the tracks, the different parameters reported here are the ones
described as being the most useful for the analysis. Hence they are not random measures,
but specific metrics of interest for evaluating performance.
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The think-aloud protocols and interview data were transcribed and scrutinized for
emergent themes. One author reviewed all transcripts and identified a series of
generalizations, ultimately creating four overall themes. A second author reviewed the
transcripts to establish agreement in coding.
The seven participants’ maps varied in terms of features shown as well as
complexity of those features. To the extent that comparison was possible—in some cases
the degree of difference in rock units mapped made comparison impossible—the total
percentage of different lithologic units was similar for three of the students as was the
total percentage of units similar for the two experts. At one mapping location, three of the
novices made more complex maps than the two experts. The other two novices, one of
whom was the volunteer novice, had little experience mapping and made relatively
simple maps.
From analysis of the tracks, the authors found that the participants moved at
varying speeds in comparison to each other and in comparison to themselves at different
points on their tracks. One novice finished in just over an hour, whereas the other
students needed between 4.5 and 5.5 hours. By contrast, the two experts completed the
tasks in 3.5 to 4 hours.
The authors identify four main themes in the transcripts of the Think-Aloud
protocols and interviews. These are comments pertaining to 1) navigation and spatial
awareness (Where am I?), 2) identification of features (What am I looking at?), 3)
synthesis and model testing (What does it all mean?), and 4) metacognition (How am I
doing?). Comments that were identified within the first theme refer to finding one’s
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position on the map and to relating the two-dimensional map to three-dimensional reality
and vice versa:
“Novice N2: I guess what I am doing now is just trying to take an overview of
what the area looks like, get familiar with it since I don’t know anything about it.
…just looking at the structures, the topography, and exposures” (pp.323).
“Expert E7: … I think the first thing I might do, as far as improving my efficiency
would be to walk up at the high point… and have a look over the map area”
(pp.323).
For the second theme, participants made specific statements about identification
of rock types, features such as joints or bedding, and structural features such as faults or
folds.
“Expert E6: I’m going to call this a dolomite; it’s definitely soft enough to be
readily scratched with a rock hammer; it does not react to acid; it’s purple…” (pp.
323).
Comments about making an interpretation of observations, such as coming up with an
idea for the sequence of rock deformation, fit within the third theme.
“Novice N2: This appears to be an intrusive rock type… Then there’s faulting…
This area contains a series of fractures and faults” (pp.324).
Lastly, explicit remarks related to making a strategy of action for the task as well as
comments related to distractions from the task are examples of statements in theme four.
“Expert E6: My general game plan here is to just start at one end and approach
this pretty linearly, just keep walking to the north, take strike and dips, take
lithologic descriptions, and see what I see as I work my way just along the face
linearly” (pp.324).
Petcovic, Libarkin, & Baker (2009) begin the discussion by reviewing different
components of the methodology and addressing how they would approach each
component if they were to repeat the methodology with a second study. For subject
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recruitment and selection, they would standardize the procedure so that the treatment was
the same for all participants. They preferred the GPS tracks that were recorded at the
automatic setting rather than a coarser time unit like 1 minute (as they also tried). The
think-aloud protocols do seem helpful for interpreting the navigation data; however, to
have the transcripts be more useful, they need to be time-stamped to enable a direct
comparison between statements and GPS position. The post-mapping interview was an
effective way to review maps and get clarification on lines, colors, and symbols on the
maps. The authors also found good agreement between interviews and Think-Aloud
protocols. They note, however, that the protocols capture more fine-scale detail of
thoughts than emerged in the interviews.
From analysis of the geologic maps, the participants that created the most
complex maps were not the experts, but rather relative intermediates. Furthermore,
between the two experts, the difference in structural complexity of their two maps may be
the result of one expert having more prior mapping experience than the other.
Petcovic, Libarkin, & Baker (2009) identified several categories of movement in
the GPS tracks. Some of the participants spent more time in the middle of the field area
while others walked more around the perimeter. Some mapped quickly and then stayed
still, presumably sitting to work and write up notes. Still others made more backtracking
loops, apparently at random.
As far as the Think-Aloud and interview data, some differences emerged between
the three participants. For the novice, neither the think-aloud nor the interview transcript
included any comments to suggest that the participant had a mental model of the structure
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of the field area. The experts, by contrast, did speak about interpretations of their
observations. The experts also explained how they tested their models.
Also, all three participants made comments on their degree of certainty on aspects
of their maps. Recall in sub-section 2.2.1, I discussed on some other studies within the
geosciences regarding certainty and uncertainty in geological interpretations (Bond et al.,
2007; Polson & Curtis, 2010). However, in those cases, the intent of the studies was to
quantify or examine the effect of uncertainty in the solution on the interpretations.
Interestingly, expressions or evaluations of certainty in observations and interpretations
were also part of the Think-Aloud data of the historians (Wineburg, 1991, 1998).
The interpretations and conclusions in this article are well-supported with quotes
from the think-aloud protocols and interviews. The authors repeatedly emphasize that the
sample size is small and that it would not be appropriate to make generalizations from
these results. Instead, the results of this project, in particular the observations about
differences in comments between the novice and the experts, are useful hypotheses upon
which to build and test further.
Although there are only three sets of participant data from which to draw,
Petcovic, Libarkin, & Baker (2009) do propose a preliminary list of characteristics of
novice and expert map makers. The novice apparently struggled: to identify location on
the map; to alternate between the map and landscape; to identify rocks and rock features;
to ignore distractions to the task at hand; and to create a mental model for the geometry
of the rock units in the map areas.
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The experts were seemingly more able to develop and test mental models; to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of their models and their maps; and to modify their strategy
based on new observations or new interpretations. Consequently, Petcovic, Libarkin, &
Baker (2009) propose that “metacognitive aspects (e.g. planning strategy, monitoring,
performance, revising strategy, staying on task, and evaluating the final product) or
perhaps play a previously unrecognized but vital role in field mapping performance” (p.
326-327).
2.2.4.4 Section summary
Within this literature review, the studies on orienteering stand apart from the
others as far as content. I propose, however, that the model of expert cognition in
orienteering is a helpful illustration of the way constraints and adaptations influence how
individuals approach highly contextual problems. Figure 2.2 summarizes the model.
Notably, time is positioned at the top and is the factor that constrains all other elements of
the model.
Several studies in this literature review emphasize the range of possible
constraints on geologists’ ability to solve a field-mapping problem; we can consider those
constraints in terms of how they relate to the primary components of situated cognition:
mind, body, and environment.
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Figure 2.2. Visual representation of theory of expert cognition in orienteering

Constraints related to the mind include prior content knowledge, prior knowledge
of field mapping as a task, uncertainty in availability, quality, and interpretation of data,
understanding of complex systems, and ability to construct complete and correct mental
models (Bond et al., 2007; Hmelo-Silver et al., 2007; Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004;
Kastens et al., 2009; Petcovic et al., 2009; Polson & Curtis, 2010). A primary constraint
on the body is the physical effort necessary for field mapping (Petcovic, Libarkin, &
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Baker, 2009; Riggs, Balliet, et al., 2009; Riggs, Lieder, et al., 2009). The constraints of
the environment broadly include tools or resources such as a map (Chang et al., 1985;
Eccles et al., 2002a, 2002b)or an aerial photo as well as the actual field area to be mapped
(Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben, 2009; Liben, Myers, & Kastens, 2008).
Within the model of expert cognition in orienteering, the strategy of planning
while moving is one of the adaptations experts have developed to circumvent some of the
constraints of the task (Eccles et al., 2002b). Indeed, the orienteering studies were
explicitly designed to identify constraints and adaptations of the task. From this literature
review, I would suggest that there are several candidate strategies that may serve the role
of adaptations to circumvent the processing constraints of field mapping. For example,
schema development appears to assist with reading and interpreting maps (Chang et al.,
1985). Navigational strategies seem to be another likely category of adaptations (Riggs,
Balliet, et al., 2009; Riggs, Lieder, et al., 2009). Use of multiple techniques for
interpreting diagrams is one way to compensate for the constraint of uncertainty in
geologic data, especially spatial or visual data (Bond et al., 2007).
In Spiers and Maguire (2008), taxi drivers’ protocols reflected periods of
“coasting time” while wayfinding. Orienteers also commented on variations in the
cognition demands throughout the course of a race; in their case, however, “coasting
time” manifested more as times when the environment required less attention and so they
could direct more attention to their maps (Eccles et al., 2002b). Thus although the two
different populations, taxi drivers and orienteers, used the “coasting time” differently,
both noted variation in cognitive demands during wayfinding. The taxi drivers being
situated within a setting with which they were highly familiar, London, but not always
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certain of the conditions of the setting (e.g. traffic jams, changes in road access, etc.). The
orienteers being situated within a context with which they were highly familiar,
competitive orienteering races, but not always being certain of the setting (e.g. racing on
an unfamiliar course). This would suggest that “coasting time” may be a general
characteristic of navigating. How do geologists make use of the time? Do the look around
with curiosity like the taxi drivers? Or do they make use of the time like the orienteers?
Does their use of that time depend on level of expertise? Most particularly, does their use
of that time have an influence on their success in the mapping task?

2.3 Review of methodologies
2.3.1 Introduction
The literature reviewed in the preceding sections has been organized based on the
broad domains of research in expertise, problem solving, and mental models. The
methodologies in those studies can be divided into three broad groups (Table 2.1). First,
there are empirical studies using laboratory-based techniques. Second, there are studies
tracking participants’ attention during a task, both in a laboratory or in an outdoor setting.
Third, there are studies tracking participants’ movement outdoors and relating those
movements to problem solving. The goal of this sub-section is to review these different
methodologies and examine their benefits and limitations.
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Table 2.1
Summary of studies in literature review by methodology

Studies
Chase & Simon (1973): Investigate memory
and perception of chess pieces and chess
boards
Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser (1981): Identify
differences in understanding of physics
problems
Wineburg (1998): Compare interpretations of
historical documents
Polson & Curtis (2010): Test for influence of
peers on interpreting seismic diagram
Jacobson (2001): Compare understanding of
complex systems
Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer (2004): Compare
understanding of aquarium ecosystem
Chang et al. (1985): Compare differences in
reading of topographic maps
Liben, Myers, & Kastens (2008): Compare
ability to locate self on map
Spiers & Maguire (2008): Observe taxi cab
drivers
Riggs, Balliet, & Lieder (2009); Riggs,
Lieder, & Balliet (2009): Track
undergraduate geology students in the field
while they are making a bedrock geologic
map
Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben (2009): Compare
interpretation of artificial outcrops
Eccles (2006); Eccles, Walsh, & Ingledew,
(2002): Develop grounded theory of expert
cognition in orienteering and description of
use of equipment
Eccles et al. (2006): Track orienteers with
head cameras
Petcovic, Libarkin, & Baker (2009): Track
geologists while they are making a bedrock
geologic map

Using
Laboratorybased
Techniques

Tracking
Participants’
Attention

X

X

Tracking
Participants’
Movements &
Thinking
Outdoors

X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
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Inspection of the table reveals that not only is there is overlap with multiple
studies appearing in more than one group, but also there are also studies included in the
literature review not listed in any group. The overlap should not be a surprise. It is
common for a single study to use multiple methods to support conclusions via
triangulation of different data sets. With respect to the absences, there are a few studies
that do not readily fit within these categories: Bond et al. (2007), critiqued in sub-section
2.2.1 and Mckenna, Quinn, Donnelly, & Cooper, (2008), critiqued in sub-section 2.2.2.
Bond et al. (2007) stands out as a survey study of geologists’ interpretations of seismic
profiles with 412 participants. All other studies included in this literature review have n
totals significantly lower than that; the next two largest studies are 44 participants (Chang
et al., 1985) and 40 participants (Eccles et al., 2006). In comparison to Bond et al.,
Mckenna, Quinn, Donnelly, & Cooper, (2008) is even more distinct. The unit of analysis
is a map, not individuals, and the conclusions related to comparison of different maps,
not to different individuals. Thus, while both studies serve a purpose in this literature
review, it seems inappropriate to shoehorn them into one of these summative groupings.
A general observation across all studies has to do with the problems posed to the
participants. Chi (2006) comments that expertise studies may be based upon either
intrinsic problems—those that are identifiably part of expert practice in the domain—or
contrived problems—those that relate to the domain but are not part of expert practice.
Intrinsic tasks may be more representative of the skills and knowledge in a domain. But
studies based upon them would likely only yield the rather predictable result that experts
perform better than novices. A contrived task has the advantage that it would be
accessible to both novices and experts. The concern, however, is that if the task is too
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contrived it may not bear much connection to expertise in the domain. In a sense, all of
the studies in this literature review fall into the contrived task category. The studies
regarding interpretation of the seismic profile (Bond et al., 2007; Polson & Curtis, 2010)
are close to being similar to expert practice; however, both had elements of contrived
because the source diagram was either synthetic (Bond et al., 2007) or given possible
interpretations (Polson & Curtis, 2010). The orienteers wearing the head-mounted video
camera running through the different courses is another example of a more intrinsic task
(Eccles et al., 2006); there, too, though the study was artificial in that the participants
were not actually competing.
The remainder of this sub-section will now go into more detail on the three
different groups of methodologies. Evident within Table 6.1, empirical studies using
laboratory-based techniques dominate the literature. Notable within the other two groups
is the influence of new technology on research design.
2.3.2 Using laboratory‐based techniques
Chi (2006) proposes that laboratory-based studies of expertise can be divided into
four sub-groups: recall, perceiving, categorization, and verbal reports. Table 2.2 divides
the laboratory-based studies into these respective sub-groups. As before, overlap is
possible and expected.
Recall studies are used as a way to indicate what knowledge experts and novices
store in memory (Chi, 2006b). The underlying assumption is that performance in memory
tasks is a proxy for expertise. A plausible origin of this assumption goes back to the
pioneering work of de Groot (1965, 1966). In that work, experts had similar memory to
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novices when trying to recall random configurations of chess pieces. De Groot (1965,
1966) interpreted this result to indicate that experts do not necessarily have superior
memory to novices. Instead, expertise enables experts to remember certain things
differently. Thus, a natural progression from this is to query experts’ memory for
domain-specific details.
Table 2.2
Summary of laboratory-based studies by sub-groupings
Studies
(Chase & Simon, 1973)

Recall

Perceiving

X

X

(Chi et al., 1981)
(Wineburg, 1998)

Categorization

Verbal Reports

X

X
X

(Polson & Curtis, 2010)

X

X

(Jacobson, 2001)

X

(Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer, 2004)

X

(Chang et al., 1985)

X

X

(Liben et al., 2008)

X

(Spiers & Maguire, 2008)

X

(Riggs, Balliet, et al., 2009; Riggs,
Lieder, et al., 2009)

X
X

(Kastens et al., 2009)

X

(Eccles et al., 2002b; Eccles,
2006)

X
X

(Eccles et al., 2006)

X

(Petcovic et al., 2009)

X
X

For example, in Chase & Simon (1973), there were two main research questions
regarding recall. First, how many chess pieces could players remember after seeing a
board for 5 seconds? Second, what were those recalled pieces? The study was designed
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with a built-in test of the memory task with the perception task. Some years later, in a
study on expertise in reading topographic maps, Chang, Lenzen, & Antes (1985) tried to
mimic the efforts of Chase & Simon (1973). Chang, Lenzen, & Antes (1985) also used a
perception task, collecting gaze fixations with an eye-tracking device; unfortunately,
though the tasks were targeting different research questions. In Chase & Simon (1973),
the different tasks were targeting the same research question. Thus, the use of the
memory task in Chang, Lenzen, & Antes (1985) is less convincing. Furthermore, it
emphasizes that memory tasks are most effective when paired with another task
addressing the same question. In Chapter 1, I made the comment that a common theme in
expertise studies is the question of how an expert sees problems, decisions, or concepts.
A more apt word than sees is perceives. For example, what is visible on a map is up to
the map maker. What is understood about the map is up to the person reading it.
Perceiving studies, therefore, aim to distinguish differences in how experts and novices
understand what they see (Chi, 2006b).
The perception task in Chase & Simon (1973) focused on tracking which pieces
players put down on the board, when, and in what order. The more experienced chess
player perceived larger chunks of pieces with identifiable chess relations than the novice.
Notably, there is no specific data to indicate that the expert was cognizant of the chess
relations. However, it is equally important to note that Chase and Simon make no such
claims. They limit the interpretations of the perception task to those that can be
contrasted with the memory task.
In Bond et al.( 2007) as well as Polson & Curtis (2010), the perception tasks were
of a different ilk. In those studies, the participant had to come up with an interpretation of
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the seismic profile. In Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben (2009), the students had to come up
with an interpretation of the artificial outcrops. An interesting parallel between Bond et
al.( 2007) and Kastens, Agrawal, & Liben, (2009) is that the participants were more
successful in the task the more arguments they used to support their interpretation. This
suggests that their mental models of the source material (i.e. the diagram or the outcrops)
were more fully supported. In other words, the successful interpretations were based on
more complete causal models. However, this conjecture on my part hinges on the fact
that the perception tasks in these respective studies were also coupled with verbal reports
from participants on their thinking.
Categorizing studies are a way to identify how experts and novices structure their
knowledge (Chi, 2006b). In Chi et al. (1981), the participants were asked to sort problems
into groups by whatever categories they wanted to use. The novices tended to sort
problems by the initial conditions of the problem (e.g. lumping together all problems with
inclined planes or frictional surfaces). The experts tended to sort problems by their
underlying principles (e.g. problems related to Newton’s Second Law). Notably, this
study design does not necessarily include having participants solve the problems of
interest. Rather this method targets an individual’s mental model—both logical and
causal— of the content embedded within the problem.
In recall, perceiving, and categorizing studies, there are clear expectations that
both novices and experts could complete the tasks at hand. By contrast, there is concern
on this point for verbal report studies:
One of the most widely used and simplest methods of gathering data on
exceptional performance is to interview the experts themselves. But are experts
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always capable of describing their thoughts, their behaviors, and their strategies in
a manner that would allow less-skilled individuals to understand how the experts
do what they do, and perhaps also understand how they might reach expert level
through appropriate training? To date, there has been considerable controversy
over the extent to which experts are capable of explaining the nature and structure
of their exceptional performance (Ericsson, 2006, pp. 223).
Over time, however, researchers have developed different methods in response to this
potential limitation of the participants’ ability to express their thoughts. Verbal report
studies include interviews, explanations, and think-aloud protocols (Chi, 2006b). These
different methods vary in terms of what questions are asked, how the questions are asked,
and when the questions are asked. As a result, the methods also differ in terms of
interpretations and conclusions. The following discussion explains these differences in
more detail.
Interviews are ubiquitous throughout qualitative research with well-established
procedures for data collection and analysis (Creswell, 2007), and there are several studies
in this literature review built upon interview data. For example, in Jacobson (2001) and
Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer (2004), participants responded to questions meant to draw out
their mental models of different complex systems. Eccles et al. (2002) conducted
interviews with participants to ask about skills and strategies necessary for competing in
orienteering races; the authors then used the responses to build a grounded theory of
expert cognition in orienteering. Common to these uses of interviews are interview
probes targeting certain areas of knowledge, skills or experiences. The interview design
affords the opportunity to the research to ask follow-up questions to flush out responses
as needed. In studies like Jacobson (2001) and Hmelo-silver & Pfeffer (2004), the interest
then may be in the things that do get said along with the things that do not. In a study like
Eccles et al. (2002), the researcher engages in constant comparative analysis and
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continues with data collection until no more new things get said. In either case, the
researcher is able to offset the possible limits of an expert’s ability to explain fully their
thinking.
In this literature review, Chi et al. (1981) is an example of an explanation verbal
report study. The participants gave explanations for why they categorized physics
problems as they did. Explanation studies, therefore, are aimed at documenting an
individual’s structure of thoughts regarding a problem or decision (Chi, 1997, 2006b). In
explanation studies, participants are specifically asked to reflect and interpret their
thoughts. Participants can even end up learning from explaining their thoughts in this
manner. Data analysis of explanations involves segmenting and coding transcripts. Chi
(1997) emphasizes the idea of transforming subjective, “messy” data like verbalizations
into objective quantitative data that can be tested. Validation of these types of
verbalizations is based on hypothesis testing with statistical analysis or “by some
qualitative analysis of the structure and its correspondence to some other measure” (Chi,
1997, p. 278).
By comparison, Wineburg (1998) is an example of a think-aloud study. The
historians expressed their thoughts aloud while making their interpretation of the
documents regarding Abraham Lincoln. A so-called think-aloud protocol is a
participant’s sequence of thoughts related to a task. The intent is to capture the process.
The intent is not to have the participant reflect or interpret their thoughts (Chi, 1997;
Ericsson, 2006c; Van Someren, Barnard, & Sandberg, 1994). Similar to explanation
studies, data analysis in think-aloud studies will also involve segmenting and coding of
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transcripts. However, the practices for validating think-aloud protocols differ depending
on the author describing the method. This topic bears some consideration.
While Ericsson (2006) credits Watson (1920) as being the first to design a study
in which the participant was asked to think aloud, the work of Ericsson & Simon (1980)
and later publications (Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Ericsson, 2002) that are particularly
associated with the think-aloud methodology. In a recent review article, Ericsson (2006)
offers the following comments regarding validity of think-aloud protocols:
The main purpose of instruction participants to give verbal reports on their
thinking is to gain new information beyond what is available with more traditional
measures of performance. If, on the other hand, verbal reports are the only source
for some specific information about thinking, how can the accuracy of that
information be validated? The standard approach for evaluating methodology is to
apply the method in situations where other converging evidence is available and
where the method’s data can distinguish alternative models of task performance
and disconfirm all by one reasonable alternative (p. 228).
Task analysis specifies the range of alternative procedures that people
could reasonably use, in light of their prior knowledge of facts and procedures, to
generate correct answers to a task. …The most compelling evidence for the
validity of the verbal reports comes from the use of task analysis to predict a
priori a set of alternative sequences of concurrently verbalized thoughts that is
associated with the generation of the correct answer to the presented problem (p.
229).
As I read this, Ericsson is offering that a priori models of thought are useful when verbal
reports are the sole source of data regarding an individual’s thought process during a
particular task. It does not seem to me that he is suggesting that the main purpose of
think-aloud protocols is to test those a priori models.
However, this is precisely what Chi (1997) contends in her comparison of
explanation studies with think-aloud studies: “Thus, the goal of protocol analysis is
mainly to test a model, rather than to uncover what the subject is actually doing” (p.277).
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Nearly a decade later, in the same volume of the Ericsson (2006) article, Chi’s (2006)
tone has changed slightly:
Typically, think-aloud protocols are analyzed in the context of the cognitive task,
which requires a cognitive task analysis in order to know the functional problem
states that are to be used to categorize individual statements. The goal of protocol
analysis then is to identify which sequence of states a particular participant went
through, and perhaps a computational model is built to simulate those steps and
the solution procedures (p. 177).
The more recent comment seems more flexible: granting that task analysis may be typical
in think-aloud studies but is not required, nor for that matter is the generation of
computational models. I perceive that the primary source of tension is over researcher’s
intent. In explanation studies, the focus is on eliciting how experts and novices structure
their knowledge in a particular domain and relating that to how they would approach
solving different problems or making decisions. In think-aloud studies, the focus is on
eliciting the thoughts of experts and novices that occur when solving a problem or
making decision. In the end, neither method seems to have particular superiority over the
other in terms of validity.
Returning to the studies included in this literature review, Wineburg (1998) is an
example of a think-aloud study in which there were no other data sources beyond the
verbal reports. Wineburg refers to a previous study on historians interpretations of
documents related to the Battle of Lexington (Wineburg, 1991); from that data, Wineburg
constructed a so-called Event Model that reflected the way in which historians tended to
build and refine their interpretation upon review of each subsequent document. Wineburg
(1998) makes no explicit reference to the model as part of the data analysis in the later
study of historians interpreting documents related to Lincoln’s views on slavery. He does,
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however, compare the two historians approach by charting the sequence in which they
review the articles and notes differences in their processes. In essence, he appears to use
the model to help steer the data analysis rather than use the new data to test the model. In
Petcovic et al. (2009), the think-aloud verbal data is one of several data sources capturing
expert-novice differences in making a geologic map. Indeed, a primary purpose of the
article is to establish a mixed-methods approach to study of geologists working in the
field. There was no need to build an a priori model of thought processes because there
was enough data with which to compare the verbal reports.
2.3.3 Tracking participants’ attention
A recurring component of some of the laboratory-based perception studies was
the collection of data to track where and when the experts and novices were directing
their attention during a task (Chang et al., 1985; Chase & Simon, 1973; Eccles et al.,
2006; Spiers & Maguire, 2008). Notably, overtime there has been a progression in not
only the technology used to record this data from video cameras to head-mounted video
cameras or computer-mounted eye-trackers, but also the context from indoors to outdoor
settings. This section summarizes the different methods used for collecting gaze data and
how the limitations of that data have also changed with time.
In Chase and Simon (1973), the perception task involved having the participants
copying the configuration of chess pieces on one board onto a second board using a
different set of chess pieces. The researchers video-taped the participants, noting head
movements and perceivable glances as break or chunks in the participants’ memory of
the pieces. Chase and Simon acknowledged that it was impossible to know to what extent
peripheral vision may or may not have influenced the outcome of the perception task.
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Nonetheless, even with the advent of more sophisticated eye-tracking devices, these
results have stood up over time.
Eccles et al. (2002) developed a grounded theory of expert cognition in
orienteering based on interview data. Eccles et al. (2006) then sought to test their theory
by having expert and novice orienteers wear head-mounted video cameras while running
an orienteering race course. Participants had to narrate the video by saying whether they
were directing their attention to the “map”, “environment”, “travel”, or “other”. Experts
were found to spend less time focused on the map than the novices. The moreexperienced competitors were also able to look at the map while on the run more than the
less-experienced competitors. The researchers noted that the video data itself could be
used to code where participants were directing their attention: “for example when the
participant attended to the map, the top of the map was visible on the film, and it was
clear from the film that the head was titled downward and was still” (p. 81). Also, the
limited number codes (i.e. “map”, “environment”, “travel”, or “other”) meant “it was
possible to capture a mutually exclusive and exhaustive pattern of where visual attention
was allocated and whether the participant was moving or stationary” (p.81). As far as a
limitation of the methodology, however, the researchers acknowledged that the narrating
the video could have slowed down the participants who were trying to complete the task
at race-type speeds.
Spiers & Maguire (2008) tracked the eye gaze of the taxi-cab drivers as they
navigated through the streets of a virtual London. As mentioned in the critique, the
researchers only achieved accurate calibrations of the eye-tracker with nine of the twenty
participants. Another limitation of the study was that the virtual reality was confined to a
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single desk-top screen. Hence the process did not capture the influence of either
peripheral or binocular vision. On the other hand, Spiers and Maguire introduced the
retrospective think-aloud as a way to test the validity of the eye-tracking data. Overall,
the combined data sets captured the sequence of thoughts of the drivers and how those
thoughts related to where they looked over the duration of each task. Moreover, as
another testament to the validity of the design, the experience was compelling enough to
the participants to trigger emotions such as anger at road closures or anxiety about near
accidents.
In summary, technology has clearly added new possibilities for researchers
interested in collecting data on where and when participants are directing their attention
during tasks. In addition, it seems reasonable to assume that as technology continues to
improve some of the limitations evident in these studies will be further minimized.
2.3.4 Tracking participants’ movements outdoors
A critique of laboratory-based studies is that they may not capture certain
elements of expert performance as would occur in the real world (Shalin, Geddes,
Betram, Szczephowski, & DuBois, 1997; Ward, Williams, & Hancock, 2006). Moreover,
methods that focus on verbal reports without additional strategies that look at use of
equipment, gestures, sketches or notes may be similarly limited in their representation of
expertise in certain domains (Chi, 1997).Thus what makes this third and final group of
studies different from the others is the studies— Petcovic et al., 2009; Riggs, Balliet, et
al., 2009; Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet, 2009—all involve data collected far from the
controlled setting of the laboratory. Instead, the participants, all geologists, are outdoors.
The data in the studies include not just their final products of the task, a geologic map,
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but also their notebooks, end-of-day interviews, and their GPS tracks of their movements
in the field10. This focus here is particularly on the analysis of the GPS tracks as a record
of geologists’ performance in the field.
Riggs, Balliet, et al. (2009) and Riggs, Lieder, et al. (2009) used and analyzed the
GPS data somewhat differently than Petcovic et al. (2009). Riggs and colleagues
transformed the GPS data into polygons. Then they interpreted the sequence and shape of
the polygons to imply students’ efficiency and effectiveness in the field. Petcovic et al.
(2009) converted the GPS data into single tracks for each individual. Then they described
the differences and similarities in the tracks. The key differences, therefore, is that the
latter group does not infer mental states from the tracks.
Riggs, Balliet, et al. (2009) and Riggs, Lieder, et al. (2009) also argued that they
were able to link the GPS polygons with entries for different station numbers in the
student notebooks. But even this method is somewhat flawed. They researchers noted
examples when station numbers appear out of order or perhaps are mis-located on the
map. Given the work of Liben et al. (2008) on undergraduate students’ ability to locate
their position on a map, it would seem necessary to demonstrate that geology students are
able to locate their position consistently for this data to be reliable—indeed, this may be a
potential future area of research as no such data exist in the literature.
In sum, GPS tracks are valuable records of geologists’ movements in the field.
Riggs and colleagues have made some ambitious attempts to construe meaning out of the

10

This list summarizes the data that was collected by both groups. Petcovic et al. (2009) also collected
think‐aloud protocols from three participants, but Riggs and colleagues (2009a,b) did not collect any
similar data.

198

data that do not yet seem warranted. But use and analysis of GPS tracks are clearly an
area for future development and research.
2.3.5 Section summary
A dominant portion of studies included in this literature review use laboratorybased techniques. Of those, there are four sub-groups: recall, perceiving, categorizing,
and verbal reports. Verbal reports are especially common and are often associated with
strategies related to one of the other sub-groups. Verbal reports include interviews,
explanations, and think-aloud protocols. The last two have distinct purposes.
Explanations are useful when the researcher wants to know about how experts and
novices structure their knowledge. Think-aloud protocols are useful when the researcher
wants to know the thought processes of experts and novices. Technology such as eyetrackers, head-mounted video cameras, and GPS units are empowering researchers with
resources that can enable them to extend expertise studies in new directions outside of the
laboratory. These may be may be particularly useful advances for the study of expertise
in geologic mapping out in the real world.

2.4 Summary of literature
2.4.1 Lessons learned: Observations and questions from the literature
This literature review is a construction of ideas combined to formulate an
understanding of what is known and what are some of the questions that remain regarding
expertise in geologic mapping. This review is based upon areas of overlap between the
domains of research on expertise and problem solving, expertise and mental models,
problem solving and mental models, and all three domains combined. The purpose now is
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to synthesize the preceding critiques, observations, and questions into an overall
summary of this literature review.
I have identified four main themes: 1) Expert–novice differences in problem
solving relate to expert–novice differences in building causal mental models. 2) Expertise
can be a source of bias in certain problem-solving tasks, depending upon the nature of the
problem and the purpose of the solution. 3) Expertise in geologic mapping is comprised
of both “everyday skills” and domain-specific skills. 4) A study of expertise in geologic
mapping would benefit from a methodological approach that captures the way thoughts
and actions are juxtaposed. I will explain each of them in turn. First, though, I want to
return to the topic of problem type or structure introduced at the outset of this review.
The reader may reasonably question why problem structure is not mentioned within any
of the above themes, nor does it occur as a theme of its own. I argue in the following
paragraphs that the language of problem structure is a vocabulary that extends through all
four themes.
Problems can be broken down into three essential components: statement,
solution, and process (Reitman, 1969). Think of these components as being measured
along three orthogonal axes. If we put well-structured-ness at the origin, then it is
uncertainty that increases along each axis. For the problem statement, uncertainty comes
from the level of detail provided. Does the statement include everything the individual
needs to solve the problem? Or is there missing information or details that need to be
determined? For the solution, the uncertainty comes from whether the result is
unambiguous or contestable. Is there an expected outcome that is demonstrably correct?
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For the process, are the steps pre-determined? Or are the strategies and methods to solve
the problem up to the individual?
While uncertainty varies along all three axes, I suggest that there are other factors
that influence each of the axes separately. First, the purpose or broader context of the
problem statement may be a factor in how an individual proceeds to interpret the question
or task. Contrast the examples of geologists interpreting the seismic image (Bond et al.,
2007; Polson & Curtis, 2010) with the competitive orienteers navigating a particular race
course (Eccles et al., 2002b, 2006; Eccles, 2006). Both problem statements are openended and not well-constrained. But the purposes are very different. In the normal
professional practice of the former example, the interpretation of a seismic image can
have economic and financial impact when the question is whether to drill for likely
natural resource deposits in one location or another. In the normal practice of the latter
example, however, the strategies for approaching the course can impact how fast one is
able to complete the race and whether that will be fast enough to win the race.
In terms of the solution, Reitman (1969) offered the view that for ill-structured
problems the acceptability of the solution is determined by an external community. The
implication of this is that for a well-structured problem, there is no or little need for the
external community to provide feedback. The correctness and completeness of the
solution is self-evident. Consider the physics problems posed to the participants in Chi et
al. (1981). Those are problems with precise numerical answers. For the more illstructured problems, the solution is more ambiguous, open to interpretation. Notably, in
Kastens et al. (2009), the authors had intended for the artificial outcrops to represent a
symmetric basin. But in the process of conducting the study and getting responses from
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the experts, the author’s expected solution was replaced in favor of an asymmetric basin.
In other words, the community dictated that the answer was open to interpretation.
The process of solving a well-structured problem involves less behavioral control
than the process of solving an ill-structured problem. In the section on expertise and
mental models, there was a discussion of a graph by Rouse and Morris (1986) with
behavioral control as one of the axes. At the time, I made the argument that behavioral
control is something that, like uncertainty, varies with structure of a problem. I gave the
example of assembling a bicycle by using an instruction manual as a well-structured
problem with limited behavioral control. In other words, an instruction manual leaves
little flexibility for the process of solving the problem. I noted that the expert historians in
Wineburg (1998) took different reading paths through the documents related to Lincoln,
but ultimately ended up with similar conclusions. The historians had the freedom to exert
their own strategies on the process. Additionally, in Riggs et al. (2009a, 2009b) and in
Petcovic (2009), GPS tracks showed the movement of geologists as they navigated
through a field area while making a geologic map. Again, the problem did not constrain
them to a particular course of action. Nor, for that matter, did following the same or
similar paths mean that participants came to the same final solution.
We can now amplify the visual framework of the three axes to reflect these
additional ideas (Figure 2.3). With this image in mind, I now want to consider the four
different themes.
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Process
Process (Structure) =
Uncertainty + Behavioral control

Solution

Well‐
Structured

Solution (Structure) =
Uncertainty + Community
response

Statement
Statement (Structure) =
Uncertainty + Purpose

Figure 2.3. Visualizing the three components a problem: statement, process, and solution
It is convenient to begin our discussion with the second theme: Expertise can be a
source of bias in certain problem-solving tasks, depending upon the nature of the problem
and the purpose of the solution. Consider the example of the historians with
specializations in different areas tasked with interpreting documents and paintings related
to the Battle of Lexington during the American Revolutionary War (Wineburg, 1991).
For some of the historians, the question tapped into their particular area of specialization.
For others, it did not. Regardless of their specializations, however, Wineburg found
patterns in the heuristics used by the historians to solve the problem. I particularly liked
Wineburg’s description of these heuristics as a “compass” to guide the problem-solving
process. In this sense, the historians’ prior knowledge was not so much a source of bias in
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their interpretations. Rather, it was the source of training upon which they could draw to
reach a solution.
But Wineburg also notes that that the nature of the question made a difference for
whether the historians with specializations outside of American history were able to
answer the question. As written, the problem statement constrained the participants to
develop their solution based on the materials provided. It did not preclude the use of prior
knowledge; but it also did not require it. In this sense the problem statement for this study
would fall closer to the well-structured end of the axis. However, Wineburg posits that
had the question required the participants interpret the documents and relate them “to the
broader socio-cultural milieu of the 18th century” (p. 84), the historians without expertise
in that period of American history would likely not have been able to answer the question
satisfactorily. Thus, the absence of prior knowledge could have been a limitation had the
purpose of the problem statement required a different type of synthesis.
Contrast this example with the geologists with different specializations
interpreting a seismic profile (Bond et al., 2007). There is an interesting coincidence of
terminology between their study and Wineburg’s (1991). Bond et al. identify and
interpret several types of bias, including confirmation bias, as present within their study
participants’ reasoning. Wineburg also refers to confirmation, but not in the sense of bias
but as a heuristic approach to the problem. Wineburg noted that historians were quick to
seek out the source or author of the text before reading it. Bond et al. comment that
“many participants asked “where in the world?” the section was from. Participants were
effectively asking for confirmation [emphasis in original], provided by such context, for
their interpretations” (Bond et al., 2007, p. 10). Wineburg and Bond et al. have thus
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clearly a similar approach to solving ill-structured problems. But why is it considered a
bias in one case and not the other?
I can offer a possible answer in the case of the hobbyists tending to the fish tanks
(Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004) and the fishermen fishing in the Irish lake (Mckenna et
al., 2008). The hobbyists and fishermen are held accountable, albeit in different ways, for
the quality of their mental models. The hobbyists are responsible for the health of their
fish. The fishermen are responsible for the livelihood of their family and community. In
essence, Bond et al. are making a similar argument for the geologists interpreting seismic
images: there are potential consequences of confirmation bias in that context. By
comparison, the historians are not wrestling with a problem for which the consequences
of one interpretation or decision over another poses any harm.
How does this theme apply to geologic maps and expertise in geologic mapping?
In Petcovic et al. (2009), the two expert geologists made different structural
interpretations of the same area. The authors noted that the geologists’ interpretations
may have been biased by their professional backgrounds. It is important to remember that
geologic mapping is not just an academic exercise. It represents a form of communication
to a larger community. Geologic maps are needed and used by those in governments and
in resource exploration. Thus, understanding bias is important for the credibility of the
geologists and the maps that they produce.
To summarize this theme, it is the problem statement that is especially important
in determining when “expertise can be a source of bias in certain problem-solving tasks.”
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For it is at that point that the individual can learn the initial constraints—and thus where
the problem lies on the statement axis—as well as the purpose of the problem.
Now consider the first theme: Expert–novice differences in problem solving relate
to expert–novice differences in building causal mental models. This theme aims to
connect the findings from the section on expertise and mental models with the section on
expertise and problem solving. In the former, we noted that novices and experts can
construct similar logical mental models of complex systems (Hmelo-Silver et al., 2007;
Hmelo-Silver & Pfeffer, 2004; Jacobson & Wilensky, 2006). The experts, however, were
more successful at building causal mental models. How do these findings relate to those
from the section on expertise and problem solving? Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser (1981)
demonstrated that undergraduate students in physics based how they would try to solve
problems on the superficial features in the problem statement (e.g. lumping together all
problems with inclined plane). By contrast, the physics graduate students based their
approach to solving the problems on understanding the underlying principles. Another
way of describing these differences is that the novices lacked the causal mental models of
the problem that the experts had.
But the problems in Chi et al. (1981) fall on the well-structured ends of the
statement and solution axes. The statements included specific details and the solutions
had clear, testable results. It is the process of solving the problem that is more illstructured. So we must ask, is this theme evident in problems that lie further away from
the origin?
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In Wineburg (1991), both the students and the historians perceived contradictions
between the documents and the paintings related to the Battle of Lexington. All experts
agreed that none of the paintings was a perfect representation of the Battle of Lexington;
each one was compromise. Unlike the historians, however, the students did not
incorporate that view into their interpretations. The novices built a logical mental model
of the event, but were not able to understand the significance of the conflicts between the
constituent elements. Thus, we see another example of how “expert–novice differences in
problem solving relate to expert–novice differences in building causal mental models.”
In addition to the concept of problem structure, another key outcome of this
literature review for me is the introduction of the terms logical and causal mental models.
They provide the means to connect observations from research on problem solving with
research on mental models. In addition, these terms provide a new way of describing a
geologic map as a mental model. The geologist’s depiction of the types and distribution
of rock units at the surface represent a logical mental model of the area. The geologist’s
interpretation of the three-dimensional structural geology and explanation for how the
rocks came to be as they are represent a causal mental model of the area. In Petcovic et
al. (2009), the experts developed and tested their interpretations, or causal mental models,
of the field areas, but while the novice made observations, she was not willing to commit
to any interpretations of her own. As Petcovic et al. note, though, more data is needed to
determine whether this theme exists in geologic mapping on a broader scale.
In order to move on to the third theme that expertise in geologic mapping is
comprised of both “everyday skills” and domain-specific skills, we want to recall the
example of learning to drive a car. Here I want to take a moment to divert to an idea
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mentioned back in Chapter 1. I am not the first to make a connection between geologic
field work and embodied cognition. Raab & Frodeman (2002) integrate the idea of
embodied cognition into their phenomenology about being a geologist. They emphasize
that as a discipline, the study of geology does not align well with laboratory-based
sciences. In particular, they argue that “the hermeneutic character of geology (e.g. the
theory-ladenness of perceptual judgments, and the role of intuition and creative
imagination) are everyday experiences for the practicing geologist” (p. 70). In brief, their
position is that because of the nature of the science, geologists acquire an automatic
ability to use their knowledge to interpret what they find in the natural environment—e.g.
rock exposures at the land surface. In addition, geologists acquire the necessary
knowledge to make those interpretations by being repeatedly immersed in the field:
A rock specimen is not absolutely “hard” but is hard compared to our experience
of the hardness of other rocks, my skin, or a tree. Likewise, the suggested
temporal dynamics of geological processes can only be understood with reference
to time spans in the world: one day, a year, a lifetime. Considerations on the
scientific method of geology have to be grounded in a phenomenology of those
body-related procedures (pp.73).
I agree with their emphasis on the importance of physical experiences. Where I hesitate,
however, is on the significance they assign to geologists acquiring an automatic ability to
make interpretations.
As part of their discussion, Raab & Frodeman (2002) compare the expert
geologist’s automatic responses while doing field work with an expert car driver’s
automatic response while driving a car. I would argue that geologic field work, overall, is
not an everyday skill. Geologists, but not car drivers, continue to develop expertise over
time with practice and new experiences. Thus, while discipline-specific automaticity is a
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common characteristic of expertise (Chi, 2006a; Ericsson, 2006a), making a general
comparison between expertise in geologic field work—in which I would include geologic
mapping—to expertise in an everyday skill seems inappropriate.
That said, I would argue that there are everyday skills, or less domain-specific
skills or behaviors, embedded within the task of geologic mapping. First, Liben, Myers,
& Kastens (2008) demonstrated that adults can have considerable difficulties with
locating their position on map. What about geologists in the field? Riggs, Balliet, &
Lieder (2009) and Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009) noted that some of their student
participants had difficulty locating themselves on maps when out in the field working on
a geologic mapping task. How does the challenge of connecting one’s position in space to
one’s position on a paper map impact performance in making a geologic map? Orienteers
have specific strategies to help them keep track of their location on their race maps.
Could similar strategies be useful for geology students?
Second, Spiers & Maguire (2008) also demonstrated that navigating even in
familiar settings can trigger emotions such as anger, frustration, and anxiety. Petcovic,
Libarkin, & Baker (2009) reported that one of the novices in their study also expressed
some of those emotions. Do students need help learning how to deal with these emotions
when in the field mapping?
Third, Petcovic, Libarkin, & Baker (2009) as well as Riggs, Balliet, & Lieder
(2009) and Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009), found that navigation patterns vary in terms
of speed over the course of a day mapping. Presumably, some of these tracks reflect
times when the geologist was walking from one outcrop of rock to another. How do

209

geologists use that “in-between time?” The taxi drivers in Spiers & Maguire (2008)
would use easier stretches of the route to look around or just “coast.” By contrast,
orienteers use easier segments of a course to double-check their map and update their
mental model of what is ahead (Eccles et al., 2002b, 2006) . Do expert geologists have a
similar approach to the in-between time as the expert orienteers? Is this a skill that should
be included as part of a geology student’s training in field mapping?
I would propose, however, that there are other studies in this literature review that
highlight some of the more domain-specific skills or tasks that go into geologic mapping.
In particular, there are some further insights from embodied cognition on the task of
geologic mapping.
Let me now refer back to two claims of embodied cognition as articulated by
Wilson (2002). The first of these is that cognition is time pressured. One of my critiques
of Riggs, Balliet, & Lieder (2009) and Riggs, Lieder, & Balliet (2009) use of Naturalistic
Decision Making (NDM) as a theoretical framework had to do with their assumption
about the influence of time pressure on geologic mapping. In typical NDM research, time
pressure involves having to make life and death decisions in a short amount of time
(Lipshitz, Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001b). In my critiques of those studies, I argued that
it is just not reasonable to suggest that the stakes are that high for students working on a
geologic map. However, in embodied cognition, there is also the idea that cognition is
time pressured. But the claim makes no connection to high stake decisions. Thus, instead
of making an assumption about the influence of time pressure on geologic mapping, I
suggest this is an open question: How does time pressure influence geologists when they
are out mapping in the field? Other questions to add to this would be, what time-use
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strategies do expert and novice geologists use in the field over the course of a day? How
do those strategies influence success?
A second claim by Wilson I wish to address is that we off-load cognitive work
onto the environment. Orienteers do this (Eccles et al., 2002b, 2006; Eccles, 2008). In
orienteering, off-loading involves strategic organization and use of equipment. This even
includes the competitor’s thumb to hold location on the map. In particular, this strategic
off-loading is one thing that distinguishes the experts from the novices. Geologists carry
multiple pieces of equipment and supplies into the field. But to date we have no specific
data that demonstrates how expert and novice geologists differ in their strategies to offload cognition. This, therefore, is another open question related to embodied cognition of
geologists in the field.
As mentioned earlier, I agree with Raab and Frodeman (2002) on the importance
of physical experience in geologic field work. Essentially the purpose of this theme
(Theme 3) is to emphasize the many components of the geologic mapping that I have
identified through the process of constructing this literature review. Admittedly, the
visual framework of problem structure is not as prominent within this theme. Instead, I
would propose that some of these tasks are smaller problems—also varying from well- to
ill-structured—that need to be constrained within the larger goal of making a geologic
map. Thus, Theme 3 helps us understand some of the challenges of geologic mapping at a
finer scale level than previously discussed.
It is now time to look at the fourth theme: A study of expertise in geologic
mapping would benefit from a methodological approach that captures the way thoughts
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and actions are juxtaposed. The trio of studies related to orienteering by Eccles and
colleagues (Eccles et al., 2002b, 2006; Eccles, 2006) is particularly illustrative for this
final theme. The purpose of Eccles et al. (2002b) was to establish a grounded theory for
cognition in orienteering. Their study goes beyond a task analysis to develop a picture of
the different constraints and adaptations that go into competing in an orienteering race.
They test their theory by devising a way to see cognition in action (Eccles et al., 2006).
They have competitors with varying levels of expertise wear a head-mounted camera and
narrate where they are directing their attention to as they complete an orienteering race.
This study also served to develop ways to characterize the differences between experts
and novices by analyzing how they use their time and where they focus their attention
while on the course. These differences were explored further when Eccles (2006)
inquired about how experts used and organized equipment during a race. What I find
particularly compelling about this series of studies is the ways in which the
methodologies capture the dynamic nature of cognition for a field-based task.
What has the literature review helped me understand about the dynamic nature of
cognition during geologic mapping? To put this another way, what have I learned about
how uncertainty varies along the process axis for solving a geologic mapping problem?
Using three think-aloud audio logs, Petcovic, Libarkin, & Baker (2009) identified four
categories of questions that geologists consider while mapping: Location: Where am I?;
Content: What am I looking at?; Context: What does it all mean?; and Process: How am I
doing?. From analysis of GPS tracks, we know that geologists’ navigation patterns can
vary in terms of speed over the course of a day mapping. But as yet, these two data sets
have not been directly linked to each other. Nor do we know how they might combine to
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reflect the geologist’s process of constraining the uncertainty in geologic mapping.
Beyond the examples from orienteering, further argument for considering methodologies
that capture thoughts and actions comes from embodied cognition. In this literature
review, framing expertise in geologic mapping with embodied cognition brings in to
focus an important point. The mental processes involved in geologic mapping rely upon
connections and interactions between the mind, the body, and the environment (M.
Anderson, 2003; Robbins & Aydede, 2009; Wilson, 2002). Thus, in order to form an
understanding of expertise in geologic mapping, it is necessary to use methods that
capture the embodied nature of the task.
2.4.2 Questions for future research
The goal of the literature review was to build an understanding of what we know
about expertise in geologic mapping. I suggest the following questions related to
expertise in geologic mapping remain unresolved and open to future research:


How do experts constrain an ill-structured problem like geologic mapping?



What strategies can we teach to novices that would prepare them to transform a
geologic mapping problem statement into a complete geologic map?



How does discipline bias positively or negatively affect either the process of
geologic mapping or what geologic map someone produces?



How do novices and experts differ in their ability to construct not only a geologic
map but also a causal model to explain their map?



What is the spectrum of thoughts that geologists entertain on a moment-bymoment basis during mapping?
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How do the thought processes of a novice who is successful in solving a mapping
problem differ from a novice who struggles? In addition, how does a successful
novice’s approach compare with that of an expert’s?



How does the challenge of negotiating between one’s position in space and one’s
position on a piece of paper impact performance in making a geologic map?



Could the strategies that orienteers use to help them keep track of their location on
their race maps be helpful for geology students?



Do students need help learning how to deal with emotions when in the field
mapping?



How do aspects of embodied cognition manifest during mapping?”



How do expert geologists use the time between stops at rock exposures?



Are geologists more similar to the taxi cab drivers who “coast” (Spiers &
Maguire, 2008) or the orienteers who “work” (Eccles et al., 2002b, 2006)?
Is this a skill that should be included as part of a geology student’s training in
field mapping?
With respect to methodology, Spiers & Maguire (2008) and Eccles et al. (2006)

have already used to good effect a combination of verbal reports and gaze tracking to
track cognition while participants navigated through different settings. What might we
learn about geologic mapping expertise with a similar methodology?
Finally, with respect to claims of embodied cognition, I would suggest these
additional questions for further research:
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How does time pressure influence geologists when they are out mapping in the
field?



What sort of time-use strategies do expert and novice geologists use in the field
over the course of a day? How do those strategies influence success?

2.5 Previous research
2.5.1 Introduction
I have completed two precursor studies whose results contribute to the four
themes described above and add new insights into the list of emergent research questions.
Both studies are embedded within a larger empirical investigation of how cognitive skills
vary across ability in geologic problem-solving and across geologic expertise (Baker,
Petcovic, Wisniewska, & Libarkin, 2012; Hambrick et al., 2011; Libarkin, Baker,
Hambrick, & Petcovic, 2011; Petcovic et al., 2011). In brief, this multi-year project
recruited a range of participants, from novice to expert, to come to Montana to complete
a suite of lab and field tasks. The field task involved making a bedrock geologic map of
an area roughly a half mile wide and a mile long, with about 200 meters of elevation
change. The participants received an aerial photo, a topographic map, a field notebook in
which to record their notes, and a GPS unit to track their movements (but not for them to
use to locate their position in the field). Both of precursor studies focus on a sub-set of
participants that were asked to complete different additional tasks.
The following sections summarize each study. Ultimately, the findings from the
literature review and the outcomes from these two studies are combined to identify the
overarching research questions for this dissertation.
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2.5.2 Getting the inside track: Head-mounted cameras give new perspective
on process of bedrock mapping (Callahan et al., 2010)
In the first year of the larger investigation, three geologists were asked to wear a
head-mounted video camera in addition to a GPS unit as they went about the task of a
making a geologic map. This project is motivated in part by previous studies using GPS
tracks to document differences in navigation strategies of geologists while mapping
(Petcovic et al., 2009; Riggs, Balliet, et al., 2009; Riggs, Lieder, et al., 2009). These
observed navigation strategies are one source of data with which we can try and
understand differences in performance on a bedrock mapping task. But a GPS track
cannot tell us what the geologist is seeing and doing at each point. For instance, we do
not know how or when the geologists are taking measurements (e.g. strike and dip),
looking at samples, recording notes, or identifying and marking location on a map. Thus,
I developed this study to use a head-mounted camera to get the geologist’s perspective on
some of the activities involved in geologic mapping.
Three participants were asked to wear a head-mounted camera for the first 30
minutes of their time spent in the field mapping. They were not asked to speak aloud,
although there was an audio recorder attached to the camera that captured some voluntary
comments made by two of the participants. The three participants are a novice (female),
an intermediate (male), and an expert (male). All three had less than five years in their
career as professional geoscientists. The expert actually makes geologic maps as part of
his regular duties while the intermediate had graduate-level research experience that
included bedrock geologic mapping; the novice, on the other hand, was a current
graduate student with field-based research experience but not in bedrock geologic
mapping. All three had had a multi-week field camp as undergraduate students.
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The data analysis for this project occurred in three stages. The first stage was to
identify the section of GPS track for each subject that corresponds to the 30 minutes of
video recording time. The second stage was to use a Matlab program11 that I developed
specifically for this study to assign time-stamped codes (in the form of a number) for
specific activities or actions. The videos were coded using three different emergent
themes: collecting (taking strike and dip, breaking rock with hammer or testing rock with
HCl, looking at hand sample of rock); recording (writing in field notebook, writing or
marking on the topographic map or aerial photo); and referencing (referring to
topographic map or aerial photo, referring to field notebook). The times for which there
was no applicable code, or when none of the above actions were visible, was also
determined. The third stage focused on areas where the tracks of the three participants
overlapped for some portion of time.
The first stage of the data analysis focused on GPS tracks. Where did the
participants go in the first 30 minutes? See Figure 2.4 for the track of points recording the
movement of the novice, who went by the pseudonym 3dhp.

Figure 2.4. GPS track for first 30 minutes that participant 3dhp (novice) was in the field

11

Matlab is a software programming package.
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In Figure 2.5, I compare the different uses of time for each participant. I also
made qualitative observations of actions during the first 30 minutes. Amongst the three
participants there were variations in their actions such as the number of strike and dip
measurement when they were stopped at outcrops of rock, their use of a Brunton
compass, their use of a hammer to break apart fresh hand samples of rock, and their use
of HCl to test for type of rock. These actions were repeatedly evident in the video of the
expert and intermediate and less frequent in the video of the novice. I also observed that
the intermediate and novice spent a portion of time organizing their field equipment. By
contrast, the expert spent little time getting himself organized, but accessed his supplies
with ease.
70%

Percent of Total
Time of Video

60%
50%

3dhp (Novice)
Tommy
(Intermediate)

40%
30%
20%
10%
0%

Collecting

Recording

Referencing

No Applicable Code

Figure 2.5. Comparison of total time spent on different categories of actions in the first
30 minutes of mapping task

The track for 3dhp overlapped with both Tommy’s (the intermediate) and Elko’s
(the expert), but the tracks for Tommy and Elko did not overlap with each other. For this
discussion, I will focus on just on the area of overlap between 3dhp and Elko (Figure
2.6). In comparing their tracks, Elko and 3dhp had the same average rate of speed and
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spent close to the same amount of time in the area. But Elko walked somewhat more, an
additional 100 ft that 3dhp did not. Evident too is that they used their time differently.
3dhp spent more than 30% of her time referring to her map. Elko, by comparison, spent a
small portion of time on many different tasks.
In summary, the videos capture the time spent on, as well as the sequence of, data
collection during mapping. There were some noticeable differences in how the three
participants interacted with the field area. There was a greater diversity in the actions of
the expert and the intermediate compared to the novice. However, without audio
narrative, there are also large amounts of time for each participant with no applicable
action code. This result argues for a revised methodology in which think-aloud audio log
data would be incorporated into the video record to gain more insight into times with no
applicable action code. In addition, the limited amount of time covered and limited
number of participants needs to be expanded to determine whether patterns in actions
exist at multiple outcrops and over the longer course of day.
With respect to the themes discussed in the previous section, the results from this
study reinforces fourth theme that “a study of expertise in geologic mapping would
benefit from a methodological approach that captures the way thoughts and actions are
juxtaposed.” By itself, the video data clearly captures only part of the story; the audio
record is needed as well. The video data also documents aspects of the physical
experience discussed as part of Theme 3 (expertise in geologic mapping is comprised of
both “everyday skills” and domain-specific skills). For that matter, I think that an
implication of this study is the need to incorporate a sense of personal organization or
personal space as one of the component skills that can impact the process of mapping.
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Time in Area
Distance Covered
Average Speed

3dhp
9 min 40 sec
85.6 m (281 ft )
8.8 m/min

Elko
11 min
94.5 m (310 ft)
8.8 m/min

Percent of Time in Area

70.0%
60.0%

3dhp (Novice)
Elko (Expert)

50.0%
40.0%
30.0%
20.0%
10.0%
0.0%

Figure 2.6. Comparison of time use in same area by 3dhp (novice, purple) and Elko
(expert, blue)

220

2.5.3 Geologists’ thought processes associated with success and struggle in geologic
mapping (Callahan and Petcovic, in revision)
For this second study, eight geologists were asked to record think-aloud audio
logs as they completed a geologic mapping problem in the field. Previous analysis of
concurrent think-aloud audio logs recorded by geologists as they went about the task of
constructing a geologic map documented distinctions in the expressed thoughts of a
novice and two experts (Petcovic et al., 2009). In particular, the audio logs highlight the
former’s struggles with procedural and declarative knowledge and the latter’s prominent
number of metacognitive statements. The eight participants in this study represented the
spectrum from novice to expert in geologic mapping (Table 2.3). Their success in the
task—as defined by the quality of their maps—varied from low to high. It is worth noting
that success was not restricted to only those with more expertise; some novices and
intermediates also created highly successful maps. Consequently, this study aims to
answer the following research question: How do novices and experts differ in their ability
to construct not only a geologic map but also a causal model to explain their map?
The participants completed the same tasks and received the same materials as the
previously discussed other three participants that wore the head-mounted video camera.
The singular difference was that those three were asked to wear the head-mounted
camera for the first 30 minutes of mapping; the participants in this study were asked to
think aloud their thoughts related to mapping for the entire duration of their time in the
field.
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Table 2.3
Demographic data for participants that recorded audio logs

Participant
Pseudonym
2K
Frances
Flaco
Skip
Veronika
Ann
Allanite
Spot

Status
Professional
(State Geologist)
Professional
(Academic)
Graduate
Student
Professional
(State Geologist)
Professional
(Consulting)
Graduate
Student
Undergraduate
Student
Undergraduate
Student

Age Gender

General
Geology
Expertise

Geologic
Mapping
Expertise

Overall
Map
Score12

48

M

7.5 (E)

8.8 (E)

0.88

36

F

9 (E)

3.8 (I)

0.71

34

M

2.5 (I)

1.5 (I)

0.85

43

M

7.5 (E)

1.5 (I)

0.53

30

F

3.3 (I)

1.3 (I)

0.29

29

F

2.5 (I)

0.8 (N)

0.76

21

M

1.5 (N)

0.5 (N)

0.54

22

F

1.5 (N)

0.5 (N)

0.84

Petcovic et al. (2009) identified a set of themes and codes from analysis of the
three think-aloud audio of participants who were similarly engaged in a mapping task.
Those themes included statements related to navigation strategies (Where am I?), to
procedural knowledge (What am I looking at?), to synthesis and model testing (What
does it all mean?), and to metacognition (How am I doing?). Of these four themes, in this
study we focus on the codes related to synthesis and model testing, which we refer to
here more broadly as reasoning.

12

Amongst geologists familiar with the field area mapped by the participants, there is a consensus
understanding of the geology (i.e. an “answer key”). This consensus map was the basis for scoring the
maps of all sixty‐seven participants. The procedure for scoring is described in the next chapter. In brief,
though, the score is based on two separate measures: the accuracy of the placement of geologic units
relative to the answer key and the interpretation of the structural geology.
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Coding proceeded in three steps. The first step in the analysis was to modify the
previous coding scheme for use in this study. We selected at random one of the audio
logs to be coded independently by both authors. Upon reviewing the coding of that initial
transcript, we refined the scheme. The second step was to establish reliability of the
coding scheme. Working independently, the authors coded another two audio logs,
producing all together three pairs of coded transcripts. We estimated inter-coder
reliability following a method recommended by van Someren et al. (1994). For each
transcript, we totaled the number of disagreements, subtracted that from the total number
of applied codes, and divided the difference by the total number of applied codes to arrive
at a percentage. After coding three transcripts, our inter-coder agreement was 90%. In the
third step, the first author coded the remaining five audio logs independently. Coding was
checked by the second author, and any disagreements were resolved via discussion. The
inter-coder agreement stayed above 87% for the remaining five audio logs.
We acknowledge that a limitation of this method of analysis is that the coding was
completed by non-blind reviewers. Both authors were familiar with the relative levels of
expertise of the participants as well as their success in the mapping task. However, we
note that the coding scheme that we adopted and modified for this study in no way
attempts to code for expertise or correctness of statements.
For the purposes of this summary, I will limit myself to results from the novices
Allanite and Spot. In the following paragraphs, I am going to look at the sequence of
expressed thoughts related to reasoning and model development recorded in their audio
logs.
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Allanite
During the walk-through introduction to the stratigraphy, Allanite makes the
following entry between his notes for Unit 3 (Paleozoic dolostone) and Unit 4
(Precambrian gneiss): “There is a discomformity between rock type 3 + rock type 4
(other layers exist between elsewhere).” Participants received the following information
about the relationship between Unit 3 and Unit 4:
We are about to drive to the last rock type you will see later today. Remember, along the drive to
those additional rocks, we will pass a lot of rocks that will not appear in the mapping area but that
exist stratigraphically between the oldest rocks we see on the walk through, Rock type #3, and the
additional outcrop Rock type #4.

The script never refers to the contact as a discomformity. Thus, this is Allanite’s
interpretation of the script as he enters the field area.
Allanite’s initial entries are largely descriptions of his observations at different
outcrops (e.g., initial entry in Table 2.4). Such entries are coded as instances of
procedural or declarative knowledge and are common throughout his transcript.
Allanite’s first example of spoken reasoning occurs at the 0:39 mark (elapsed time in the
field) when he compares his observation of a Unit 3 outcrop to the information provided
during the walk through. In addition to relating his observations to those during the walk
through, Allanite’s reasoning statements for the first half of his day consist of making and
testing inferences about composition of underlying bedrock. For example, at the 0:47
mark he supports his identification of Unit 3 with the description from the script that the
unit is a ridge-former. At the 2:17 and 2:19 marks, respectively, he predicts and then
infers the presence of rock Unit 2, a unit composed of shale, because shale is a valley-
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forming unit. Absent in these early entries is an indication of his understanding of the
underlying structure of the area.
Table 2.4
Reasoning and model development for Allanite
Elapsed
Time in
Field
Initial

0:39

Statements
At outcrop #1. Just started. It’s in outcrop rock type #1. It is limestone and
it fizzes vigorously so it is definitely calcitic and it’s very steeply dipping.
And I have not yet measured strike and dip, but I’m about to.
I’m at outcrop 4, which is on the ridge south of the mapping area that’s
marked as a pronounced ridge on the topo map. It is rock type 3; lumpy,
massive dolomite.... Also, although this is very weathered outcrop, the
sugary weathering pattern that we observed this morning is not quite as
evident here.

0:47

Walking further down this ridge to the southeast, it’s a lot more of the
dolomite. So it seems to make up this entire ridge, which makes sense,
since we are told its cliff forming.

2:17

I think I’ll find some outcrops since it’s the valley floor. I guess I’m
assuming that I’ll see some rock type 2 somewhere, but I don’t have any
observations to base that on other than what we were told earlier.

2:19

3:06

3:17
5:06
5:34
5:57
6:36

I looked in at a couple of places and there are not even any rocks
outcropping along the side of the stream, which would suggest that the
rock-type down here is the easily-weathered shale.
Moving up hill, it seems like the basement rock is moving to a more
northerly strike. I’m trying to think of what kind of structure this might be
with the oldest rock unit up on this ridge and then the next ridge over to
the west having this second oldest [unit]. Wondering if it’s a syncline has
been eroded away.
I hope I come across a contact soon because it’s definitely complicated by
the fact that I don’t know what unit 4 looked like when the others were
laid down.
Just left spot 28, where the bedding planes and rock unit 1 seem to swing
around pretty quickly to the west and also seemed to be folded on a pretty
small scale.
I just made it over to spot 29, which is pretty close to 27 and 28, and the
first new outcrop that I saw was more a rock type four. So I’m wondering
if there’s some sort of faulting going on here.
So from here, sort of walk out toward the point of the south end of the
map… and then I’ll probably head in and see if I can make sense of this.
Just measured outcrop 34, which is a very nice outcrop of rock type 4.
Now I’m going to head in and shower before I try to make some sense of
my data.
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Allanite’s first instance of synthesis occurs at the 3:06 mark when he speculates
that there may be an eroded syncline in the map area. He links his hypothesis to his
observations about which units are exposed along ridge lines. He makes no further
mention of a syncline in the transcript. In his field notebook there is a sketch that shows
all four units in a syncline. Ultimately, the idea of the syncline is apparently dropped in
favor of another explanation he develops later on. The sketch does, however, suggest that
he has made no changes to his concept of the discomformity between the Precambrian
and Paleozoic units by this point in the day. The next entry at the 3:17 mark refers to the
deposition of the sedimentary units on the basement gneiss. This adds further support to
the interpretation that he still conceives of the Unit 4 and Unit 3 contact as a
discomformity.
After the comment at the 3:17 mark, there is a gap in reasoning statements until
the 5:06 mark when he describes Unit 1 as having local folding. His next entry, however,
clarifies that he is not reconsidering the idea of a syncline. Instead, he has developed a
new hypothesis involving normal faults which he sketches out in his field notebook. In
this sketch, Unit 1 has a slight bend to it which is possibly meant to represent “local
folds.” There is, however, a problem in that the down-going arrow on the left block
contradicts the sense of motion implied by the off-set units. He makes no comments in
the audio log or in the field notebook addressing this inconsistency.
Toward the end of his log (marks at 5:57 and 6:36), Allanite expresses a need to
consider his data further before coming to final conclusions. These statements imply that
he is leaving the field area with a collection of ideas but has yet to put them together.
Following his notes at his last outcrop, he writes out the following summary:
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I never found a contact with a carbonate and RT4, so I have no idea about orientation of RT4
when RT1-3 were deposited. We know from [the walk through] that there is some type of
uncomformity. There are clearly folds in the carbonates that are presumably superimposed on RT4
as well. This is most apparent in RT1 (the youngest), since it was easy to measure. It found
measuring RT3 almost impossible, and I could only infer the existence of RT2. RT1 may be
overturned at the top. Overall, I think the folds are local and the dominant structure is faulting with
lows eroded into units and with erosion marking RT2 were it is on top. RT3 seems most erosionresistant.

The exact time of this written summary is unknown. However, given his stated interest in
returning to the field station, we conjecture that he wrote this note after leaving the field.
In sum, comparing Allanite’s expression of ideas in the audio log and his
notebook with his performance on the map, we see that he marked the boundary between
the Precambrian gneiss and Paleozoic sedimentary units with a normal fault, as done in
his sketch. He drew a second normal fault on the map, as done in the sketch in his field
notebook, but then crossed it out. Although he drew the Paleozoic units in repeating
layers, he wrote a note in the margin of the map: “I realize this is stratigraphically
inconsistent.” This annotation indicates that perhaps he did realize that his sketch was
somewhat problematic after all.
Spot
Spot opens her audio log with a hypothesis that the contact between Unit 4 and
Unit 3 is a fault (Table 2.5). Like Allanite, she also wrote a comment in her field
notebook during the walk through: “Lots of rocks b/w [rock type 4] (RT4) + our rocks 1–
3; will not see in map area).” She also made a small sketch. A short time after her initial
entry (no time stamp provided), she explicitly relates her plan of movement to the
observed strike of the units; that navigation pattern will mean she crosses all the units.
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Table 2.5
Reasoning and model development for Spot
Elapsed
Time in
Field

Initial

No Time
Stamp

1:26

2:24

3:00

3:32

5:05

5:13

Statements
And I am about to start mapping. And from the initial walkthrough I am
guessing that we will see those three sedimentary units and Rock Type 4,
which was the gneiss. And because we drove through a bunch of
sedimentary units which are between the gneiss and the other three, I am
guessing that I might be seeing some kind of fault in this area. But I guess
I will see. So I am going to start mapping.
I am heading south, and I think my plan of attack for the - today is going
to be to zigzag across this hill, because I really don’t want to walk back up
it. And I think I should hit all the units because they seem to be striking
east-west, and I should be crossing through them if I am going north and
south. So there you go.
All right, so I have just done measuring some strikes and dips a little bit
south of the launch area. And this outcrop and the one immediately by the
launch area have opposite dips. … I’m thinking there might be a fold here,
possibly. I don’t know. This unit seems to be a lot thicker than it was on at the walkthrough. So that would make sense as to why I am seeing more
of it, or maybe it [is] really is just thicker. I don’t know. But I am going to
keep walking south and find out.
And I just found a north-dipping outcrop where I was expecting one to dip
south. So maybe there are multiple folds in this area, or maybe I screwed
something up. Hopefully I will find some more outcrops later so that I can
make sure of - make sure that the dips that I am getting are real and I’m
not just messing this up.
And while I was eating lunch I did some brainstorming, and I think we are
mapping a thrust fault that caused a syncline. So I think the thrust fault
runs, you know, again roughly east-west, which is the direction of most of
the layers are visible - the direction of strike of most of the layers. And
that’s what brought the gneiss up. And it also caused a syncline, which the fold axis is roughly east-west. And I am going to keep mapping that.
So I can see a gneiss outcrop to the north of me. And I am currently
standing in, you know, a whole bunch of limestone talus. So I am
guessing that the contact is somewhere around here, and I will keep that in
mind as I keep mapping.
So once again, I am on the south side of the field area. And I just took a
look at my map and all of the notes that I have been taking on the aerial
photo. And it looks like we might be dealing with a plunging fold the way
that Unit 3 wraps around the mountain where 2 is at and where I am going
to go get some water next. But - yeah, it really does look like it could be a
plunging fold.
And I was thinking this fold meant - might not be plunging, but we might
be seeing a cross section of it because of the topography. So I don’t know
if it really is plunging and that’s why I am seeing these v-shapes on the
aerial photo or if, again, that’s just because of topography because we are
in a valley. So I will think about that.
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Spot first introduces the idea of a fold at the 1:26 mark; she explicitly links her
interpretation of the geologic structure to her observations of change in dip direction and
unit thickness. An hour later (at the 2:24 mark), she reports a measurement which
surprises her based on her existing idea about a single fold, and she proposes that there
may be multiple folds.
After her lunch stop at the 3:00 mark, she ties together many of her observations
over the last three hours. She proposes that the Paleozoic units are folded in a syncline
caused by a thrust fault that brought up the Precambrian gneiss. She also made a series of
sketches and notes in her field notebook; we suspect these were likely done before she
recorded the entry in her audio log, though she does not say so directly. Her sketches
include the possibility of a syncline–anticline pair—possibly to account for the data point
that did not fit with the others—though she does not mention it. Close to the sketches, she
also wrote out the following comments: “RT-2 looked thick @ walkthrough. But, it’s
mostly shale. Could have been sheared during folding. Heavily-brecciated RT-1 is closer
to gneiss—supports fault idea.”
Prior to lunch, Spot had identified Unit 4 next to Unit 1, but did not speak about
the nature of the contact until the lunch break entry (at the 3:00 mark). After her lunch
stop, she spends some time focused on identifying the location of the contact between
Unit 4 and Unit 1 (e.g., at the 3:32 mark). She expresses no revisions of her idea of a
thrust fault for the remainder of the log.
At the 5:05 mark, she questions whether the fold could be plunging as a way to
explain the shape of the rock units on the map. Alternatively, she also proposes that the
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shape of the rock units may be due to seeing a cross section of the fold through the
topography. It is at this point that she makes a comment about seeing V-shapes on the
aerial photo and wonders whether that pattern supports the plunging syncline model or
cross-section through topography model. Her comment regarding the V-shapes is
referring to the fact that trees appear aligned along ridges that coincide with different
units in the plunging syncline. There are no further large-scale synthesis entries in the
transcript nor are there any entries in her field notebook that document her ideas of the
structure as she leaves the map area.
Spot’s final map documents how she resolved the different alternative models that
she generated while in the field. She apparently concluded that the patterns on her map
were attributed to a plunging fold and not to a change in topography. She also mapped a
single fold, abandoning the idea of an additional partial anticline. Although she used the
symbol for a plunge, she left off the symbol for syncline. In fact, the word syncline does
not appear anywhere on her map; her legend has only the word fold. She also leaves off
the term thrust fault. Instead, she labels the fault symbol in the legend with “teeth on
hanging wall”, with the teeth symbols drawn on the Precambrian unit.
The audio logs of Allanite and Spot document instances of reasoning in which
each novice came to some understanding of the underlying geology of the map area.
From inspection of the reasoning statements in the audio logs of Allanite and Spot, as
well as the logs of the others, the patterns in the spoken thoughts are linked more highly
to success than to expertise. From our analysis, we see success associated with synthesis
of observation into a working hypothesis (or hypotheses) that explain the underlying
structural geology. The structural geology explanation is developed, tested, and revised
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over the course of the day. The explanations take into account how certain geologic
processes would affect the rock units. In comparison, we find struggle coincides with
being unable to construct an interpretation of the structural geology that explains how
rocks came to be as they are. We also see struggle occurring where the focus is more on
procedural and declarative knowledge than on other types of expressed thoughts.
These patterns of spoken thoughts tie in well with first theme identified in the
literature review: Expert–novice differences in problem solving relate to expert–novice
differences in building causal mental models. In fact, these results help add nuance to this
theme. Allanite is a good example of someone who was able to build a logical mental
model, able to document his observations of the rock units, but unable to come up with a
causal model that could account for how those rocks came to be in the configuration that
he mapped. Spot developed not only a logical mental model of the field area, but a causal
mental model as well. We emphasize that both of these novices were at least as
successful as some of the geologists who have many more years of experience. Thus, in
summary, a key finding in this study is that those who succeed in solving the mapping
problem developed both logical and causal mental models whereas those who struggled
developed only logical mental models; their causal mental models were either absent or
incomplete.
There are several questions that remain after the completion of this second study.
While the participants were in the field for many hours, the longest audio log recording
lasted no longer than 38 minutes. Thus, there is a question as to what data about their
thought processes is missing in the intervening time. The analysis of these audio logs
centered on reasoning and model development. This study did not explicitly consider
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patterns in statements expressing uncertainty relative to expertise and to success in the
task (i.e. to the process and solution axes).

2.6 Research question
In this literature review expertise in geologic mapping as a field of research was
positioned at the intersection of three broad domains: expertise, problem solving, and
mental models. A key concept to emerge out of this review was the idea that problems
vary along a spectrum from well-structured to ill-structured (Reitman, 1965; Simon,
1973). Geologic mapping is an ill-structured problem. Furthermore, while some of the
seminal studies of expert-novice differences in problem solving have tended to focus on
well-structured problems (e.g. physics problems in Chi et al. (1981)), other studies have
explored how experts and novices approach the solving of more ill-structured problems
(e.g. historical interpretation in Wineburg (1991, 1998)).
From the literature review, we know that geologic mapping involves a fairly
stable set of epistemic actions such as testing samples of rock with hydrochloric acid to
detect the presence of carbonate or measuring the orientation of an outcrop to obtain
structural information about the rock unit (Riggs et al.,2009a, 2009b; Petcovic et al.,
2009). In addition, think-aloud transcripts of geologists recorded while mapping include a
fairly stable set of expressed thoughts related to procedural and declarative knowledge,
navigation, reasoning and model development, and metacognition (Callahan & Petcovic,
in revision; Petcovic et al., 2009). We know, too, that mapping involves the generation of
both internal and external representations of the underlying geology in the form, for the
former, of a three-dimensional mental model with that model then expressed, for the
latter, as a two-dimensional map (Kastens et al.; Riggs et al., 2009a, 2009b; Petcovic et
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al, 2009). Mapping also requires connecting a map to the space it represents while being
physically embedded within that space as well as finding one’s present location in threedimensional space on the two-dimensional representation. Such tasks can be difficult for
some even in more familiar settings like a college campus (Liben et al.; Riggs et al.,
2009a, 2009b; Petcovic et al., 2009).
It is the details of the process, wherein the geologist—whether an expert or a
novice—combines these actions and thoughts to solve a geologic mapping problem,
however, that remains unknown. Thus, I propose the following overarching research
question for my dissertation: How do geologists of different levels of expertise constrain
and solve the ill-structured problem of making a geologic map?
In the following chapter, this question is examined in the context of embodied
cognition as a theoretical framework. It is out of that discussion that a series of secondary
questions as well as the methodology to pursue this question are identified and explained
in detail.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Both precursor studies discussed in the previous chapter were part of a larger
investigation of how cognitive factors such as geologic content knowledge, visuospatial
ability, and working memory capacity vary across ability in geologic problem-solving
and across geologic expertise (Baker et al., 2012; Hambrick et al., 2011; Libarkin et al.,
2011; Petcovic et al., 2011). The mixed-methods research design for that larger multiyear investigation was developed and built upon an earlier pilot study (Petcovic et al.,
2009) completed prior to my arrival at Western Michigan University. Think-aloud audio
logs were part of that pilot study and also part of the original design for the larger
investigation. Collection of data from a head-mounted video camera, as done in the
precursor study described in the previous chapter (Callahan et al., 2010), was not.
Instead, that data was collected in the first year of the larger study to explore what
potential, if any, there was for video to provide additional insights into the overall
research questions. It became my task to pursue this question.
Based upon analysis of that exploratory data (Callahan et al., 2010), there was a
change in the way data was collected in the second year of the larger investigation. Eight
geologists were again asked to think aloud while they worked to solve a geologic
mapping problem in the field. However, instead of using hand-held digital recording
devices, the geologists recorded their visible actions and expressed thoughts using a
head-mounted video camera with an attached microphone. This dissertation project is
focused upon these video log data. Whereas these data are part of that larger
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investigation, it is the themes that emerged out of the literature review, the additional
insights from the two precursor studies, and the theoretical framework of embodied
cognition that guide the research questions and design for my study.
The video logs are a rich data set that could be used to answer an array of research
questions. Furthermore, the overarching research question stated at the end of Chapter 2
could be examined from several different perspectives. Embodied cognition as a
theoretical framework, however, steers the research design toward a focus on the process
of geologic mapping as reflected in the video logs. Let us look again at the overarching
research question: How do geologists of different levels of expertise constrain and solve
the ill-structured problem of making a geologic map? In the previous chapter, the
literature review was organized around the idea that expertise in geologic mapping as a
field of research lies at the intersection of three broad domains: expertise, problem
solving, and mental models. Notably, cognition in orienteering as a field of research was
similarly positioned within that intersection. The research questions and the design of
those studies on orienteering are useful examples for how to begin teasing apart the
overarching question of this study into a set of secondary questions that focus on the
process of geologic mapping.
Recall that Eccles and colleagues (Eccles et al., 2002b, 2006; Eccles, 2006)
developed a theory of cognition during orienteering which identified a series of
constraints and adaptations specific to the task. The theory served as the basis for a trio
of hypotheses that predicted that participants with extensive experience with these
adaptations (i.e. experts) would use their time during a race differently than those
participants with less experience (i.e. novices). To test these hypotheses, Eccles et al.,
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(2006) had expert and novice participants wear head-mounted video cameras during a
race and articulate where they were directing their attention as they ran through the
course. The video data documented that experts were able to spend more time looking at
the map while on the move than the novices; conversely, novices had to slow down to the
point of stopping more often than the experts. The differences were associated in part
with a series of adaptive strategies involving the use of equipment to help minimize
cognitive load of the task and maximize performance (Eccles, 2006). Apparent in their
results is the potential of using the head-mounted cameras to compare not only use of
equipment associated with the task but also use of time during the task.
There is, however, a conspicuous difference between the amount of time in an
orienteering race and the amount of time in a geologic mapping task. In Eccles et al.
(2006), the participants completed each race in less than an hour. For the geologic
mapping task in this study, participants spent from 5–8 hours in the field. Thus, while the
results of the orienteering studies raise the prospect of secondary questions related to time
use as a relevant line of investigation, the contrasting amounts of times necessitate
focusing on a different body of literature in order to determine the substance of those
questions: embodied or situated cognition.
Embodied or situated cognition broadly involves the study of cognitive activity in
terms of connections and interactions between the mind, the body, and the environment
(M. Anderson, 2003; Robbins & Aydede, 2009; Wilson, 2002). Kirsh (2009) outlines
what he terms a situational approach to problem solving that centers on “how much the
machinery of inference, computation, and representation is embedded in the social,
cultural, and material aspects of situations” (p. 265). He contrasts the situational
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approach with the classical approach to problem solving—referring particularly to
Newell & Simon (1972)—by way of the example problem of navigating in a shopping
mall. The example is explained as follows:
…imagine yourself in a shopping mall, standing in front of a wall map, trying to find
a path from your current location to a specific store. Which is harder: figuring out
where you are relative to the map, assuming the map does not have an icon with a
“You are here” label, or finding a path from a to b on the map? For most of us finding
the path is the easy part. … It is harder to figure out where you are and then translate
the path you found back into action in the world (Kirsh, 2009, p. 269).
He summarizes that the process of finding the path from a to b on the map is analogous to
what the classical approach to problem solving identifies as the search phase: a person
must first develop an understanding of both the problem statement and the intended goal
before searching for the way to connect the two. By contrast, he refers to what he
identifies as the harder part of the problem solving—locating one’s position on the map
as well as executing the identified course of action—as the process of registration: a
person will constantly go back and forth between an understanding of the problem in the
abstract and the actions needed to solve the problem in the real world.
In discussing the registration phase, Kirsh (2009) also explains the importance of
another aspect of problem solving that is not featured within the classical approach:
framing. In essence, framing is the process by which a person determines what
information, tasks, etc. are relevant or irrelevant for a particular problem. He does not
explicitly include the idea of framing within the shopping mall example, but it could be
easily incorporated. For instance, suppose that a person, starting at a particular location in
the mall, would prefer not to walk up and down stairs and yet the desired store is on a
different level; the location of the nearest elevator or escalator would be a relevant piece
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of information in determining a route. Suppose that someone else, starting at the same
point, has the same destination in mind but is willing to walk up or down stairs as needed;
the location of the nearest elevator or escalator would not be relevant.
The ideas of framing and registration provide a new perspective on time use. In
the orienteering studies, the differences in how the experts and novices used their time
can be understood in terms of the registration process; the participants were making
connections between their location, their intended control point, and how they would get
from one to the other. Moreover, adaptations the experts used—as discussed in Eccles
(2006)—can be related to the process of framing. For instance, folding the map in certain
ways or using a thumb to provide a quick visual check for a location can easily be
conceived as strategies that minimize distractions by irrelevant information.
Turning to the video logs, it is now possible to outline a series of secondary
questions:
1. How do geologists mentally and physically situate themselves at the outset of
solving a geologic mapping task? Another way to word this question is to ask
how geologists go about the task of framing and registering a geologic mapping
problem.
2. How do geologists’ epistemic actions and expressed thoughts at the beginning of
a task compare with their actions at a later time in the task – for example, when
they are in a geologically significant portion of the field area? This question is
targeting the same idea as the first question: the framing and registration of an illstructured problem. A key component of the situational approach to problem
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solving is the iterative nature of the processes involved, including framing and
registration. Thus, this question is an intentional comparison to see how framing
and registration may differ, or not, from the beginning of the task to some point
later in the task.
3. How do geologists’ use of time, as reflected in their epistemic actions and
expressed thoughts, vary over the duration of the mapping task and through
space? More than the first two questions, this one directs attention at the entire
day of mapping and not just segments of the day.
None of the preceding questions feature any particular category of expressed
thoughts in the video logs but implicitly concern themselves with all categories. A key
outcome from the literature review was the construct of visualizing problems as three
dimensional, with the three axes labeled as problem statement, process, and solution.
Well-structured problems, with no or minimal uncertainty associated with any of the
three dimensions, lie at the origin. The further out along each axis, thus, the greater is the
uncertainty in that dimension. In the two prior studies of geologic mapping that utilized
think-aloud audio logs, participants were noted as expressing or evaluating certainty in
their observations or interpretations (Callahan & Petcovic, in revision; Petcovic,
Libarkin, & Baker, 2009). Thus, remembering that the intent is to investigate the
overarching question by focusing on the process of geologic mapping, the following
secondary question is added to the earlier three in order to concentrate especially on the
importance of uncertainty in solving ill-structured problems.
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4. How and in what manner do geologists evaluate or express their uncertainty in
the processes of and interpretations involved in solving a geologic mapping
problem?
Finally, the overarching research question also channels attention to the idea of
expertise in solving a geologic problem. Moreover, although not explicitly stated, the
idea of expertise is arguably associated with performance as well. As emphasized in the
literature review, experts and novices perform differently when tasked with solving the
same problems. Indeed, while multiple questions could be pursued regarding expertise,
performance, and the process of solving a geologic mapping problem, the final two
questions for this study limit the scope to a comparison of expertise, performance, and
expressions of certainty.
5. How does use of time and expressions of certainty while mapping relate to
expertise?
6. How does use of time and expressions of certainty while mapping relate to
success in the task?
The video logs offer an in situ perspective on these questions. Analyses of the
video logs comprise the methods for this study. Methods of analysis, however, are
distinct from overall methodology (Feig, 2011). In this study, the video logs will be
treated as different cases and analyzed as part of two different kinds of case studies. The
case-study methodology, therefore, governs the decisions for how and in what ways the
methods of analysis are applied.
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3.1 Research design and methodology
Yin (2009) proposes that a case-study methodology is best suited to projects with
how- or why-type research questions, where a researcher lacks control over events or
behaviors of participants and where there is the potential to observe the events as they
unfold but with no or minimal influence of the researcher (i.e. that the events are
“contemporary” with the events of the research study). In this study, the overarching and
secondary research questions are all how-type questions. While the circumstances of the
larger study of which the video log data are a part were controlled in multiple ways, as
researchers we had no control over participants’ actions once they began the field task.
The video logs, the GPS tracks, and the products produced during mapping all related to
the events that occurred during field work. Thus, in terms of the three criteria proposed
by Yin (2009), the case study methodology is arguably appropriate to apply to this
project.
Additionally, Yin (2009) distinguishes two major dichotomies in types of case
studies. First, there is the distinction between a single case study and a multiple case
studies. Second, there is a difference between a case study with a single unit of analysis
and a case study with multiple units of analysis. With respect to the first dichotomy, the
focus here is on multiple case studies; each participant that recorded a video log is a
separate case. With respect to the second dichotomy, the research questions vary in terms
of which are best suited to a single unit of analysis approach and which are best suited to
multiple units of analysis approach.
Consider again the six secondary research questions. As the second question
makes a direct comparison between the participants’ initial time in the field with their
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time in a geologically-significant portion of the field area, it seems justified to group the
first two questions together. Combined, they constitute a case study with multiple cases
and multiple units of analysis in each case. The third question refers to the geologists’ use
of time over the course of the day. Analyzing the full duration of all eight logs was not
theoretically or logistically feasible; partial analysis of all logs revealed that some logs
would be more meaningful than others and some logs were not as complete as others
(either due to the low frequency of a participant’s expressed thoughts or problems
hearing expressed thoughts due to wind interference). Thus, a subset of four video logs
were chosen for a full-day analysis. The fourth question necessitates looking at the data
in fine detail, going down to the scale of actions and expressed thoughts at particular
outcrops. Theoretically it made sense to limit the analyses to the subset of logs that were
chosen for a full-day analysis so that events could be put in context and understood in
terms of the participant’s entire day. Consequently, this question is grouped together with
the third question into a case study with multiple cases and a single unit of analysis in
each case. The final two questions are relevant for both the case study with the multiple
units of analysis and the case study with a single unit of analysis (Figure 3.1; see also
section 3.6.2 for further discussion on the selection of these units of analysis).
Another question related to the design of a case-study research project is its
purpose (Yin, 2009). Is the study exploratory and establishing a baseline of knowledge in
a particular area of inquiry? If so, then it is an exploratory-design case study. Is the intent
to explain the outcome of a particular series of events or actions? Alternatively, is the
intent to explain the cause of a series of events or actions? Projects such as these would
be explanatory. Or is the study descriptive? In the present study, the aim is to use the
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video logs to develop a detailed description of the geologists’ actions and thoughts in the
field while mapping. The video log data cannot explain why they had certain thoughts or
acted in certain ways. Rather, where the intent of the precursor study was exploratory, the
intent of this study is descriptive.

Figure 3.1. Distribution of secondary research questions into the two case studies

Lastly, it is reasonable to acknowledge that typically within the research design
for a case study—whether there is one case or multiple cases, whether there is a single
unit of analysis or multiple units of analysis—there is an emphasis on using multiple
sources of evidence (Creswell, 2007; Yin, 2009). This is primarily for establishing
construct validity whereby multiple data sets are analyzed together either to explore,
explain, or describe a particular topic of interest. In this study, the focus is mostly on a
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single data set: the video logs. However, there is another equally rich data set with which
these video log data will be related: the GPS tracks of the participants.
The video logs are time-stamped, which allows for their coded data to be joined
with the GPS data that tracked geologists’ movement in the field during mapping. Indeed,
a particular strength of this project is that the tracks provide a spatial and temporal
context for analyses of the expressed thoughts and visible actions within the video logs.
This is significant because it means that the results and interpretations of this study can
be compared to the already-completed substantial analyses of the GPS tracks and
geologic maps for all of the participants (Baker et al., 2012). Thus, instead of
demonstrating construct validity by using a convergence of data, this study addresses
construct validity by using a non-convergent model (see also section 3.6.2 for further
discussion of validity).

3.2 Overview of the project
Data collection occurred in August over two consecutive years (2009 and 2010) at
a residential field station and nearby field area in the Rocky Mountains, Montana, USA.
A total of 67 participants (46% female) took part in the overall study. Participants ranged
in age from 20 to 68 years (mean age 36.4 years). Participants were grouped into cohorts
of 9–11 individuals, and each cohort spent a total of two days at the field site. Upon
arrival at the field station, participants first completed a suite of cognitive tests. Mapping
took place on the second day. The data set for each participant includes the following
artifacts: a series of cognitive tests; a questionnaire on education and training in the
geosciences; a geologic map (and any draft maps) produced by each participant; a field
notebook used by the participant while working on the mapping task; GPS track data that
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show how the participant moved around the field site; and an approximately 30- to 45minute semi-structured interview at the end of the mapping task. In 2009, eight of the
participants (2-3 per cohort) recorded think-aloud audio logs using a hand-held digital
audio recorder. In 2010, we replaced the audio recorders with head-mounted video
cameras and microphones and asked eight of the participants (2 per cohort) to record
think-aloud video logs.

3.3 Participant recruitment, sampling, and informed consent
Potential subjects applied to participate in this project via a website. The website
included general details about what would be expected of a subject chosen to be part of
the study as well as information on the compensation and support (e.g. stipend, travel and
lodging expenses). The application included questions about demographics (e.g. age,
race, and gender), education (e.g. Bachelor’s, Master’s, and PhD course work and
research experience), and professional work (e.g. nature of work, time in field).
Recruitment occurred through listservs for geologists and by word-of-mouth.
Each year, we received over 100 submissions before closing down the application site.
Applicants from outside of the United States were excluded from consideration because
the budget did not allow for international travel. In addition, it was determined that the
mapping exercise in this study would use a location that is part of the curriculum of a
geologic field methods course at Indiana University. For this reason, we included a
question asking if the applicant had attended the field camp run by Indiana University
and, if so, when. We had only one applicant who had to be excluded because she had
participated in the Indiana program within the past five years, supposing that someone
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who had been there that recently may recall too much about the field area. We did not
exclude anyone else based on familiarity with the location.
All of the submitted applications were compiled into a large database to be
reviewed by research team members. We developed a scoring rubric that allotted points
for education and professional experiences; the scoring enabled comparison of applicants
along the novice–expert continuum. We selected participants based on several criteria.
Our first priority was to choose participants who would represent a range of geologic
experience. After that, we focused especially on creating groups of subjects of the same
gender and age range with the main variable between them being level of experience. Our
object was to address known gender and age biases in some of the planned cognitive
tests. Also, when possible, we selected subjects from across the country so as to avoid
weighting the data sets with participants from any particular region.
The process to recruit participants who would record video logs happened in
tandem with selection of participants from the general applicant pool. We included a
question on the application form to learn who would be willing to record a video log as
part of their participation in the project. Based on those responses, I identified eight
accepted applicants (two per cohort) to record video logs. As with the overall study, the
goal was to have participants with a range of experience in geologic mapping while also
making an effort to maintain a balance in gender. Ultimately, three of the eight video logs
were recorded by women.
Once accepted into the study, all participants, including those who completed
video logs, signed the informed consent document and returned it by mail prior to the
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start of the study. All work for this dissertation was approved under Human Subjects
Institutional Review Board (HSIRB) protocols 09-03-16 (covering data collection and
initial analysis) and 12-03-06 (covering continued data analysis). See Appendix A for
informed consent document and HSIRB approvals.

3.4 Instrumentation and data sources
3.4.1 Think‐aloud video logs
A V.I.O. POV 1.5 digital helmet camera with attached microphone was used to
record the video logs. The camera was mounted on a Niteize headlamp strap and the
recording device was worn at the belt (Figure 3.2)13. The strap is a commerciallyavailable product meant to be used with a Mag-lite flashlight and to be worn when one
needs a headlamp; the arrangement worked well because the camera has the same
diameter as the Mag-light flashlight). The camera was intentionally angled somewhat
downward so that when the participant looked down the entire column of space in front
of the person’s body was visible to the camera.
Participants who recorded a video log had to be trained so they could use the
equipment without my direct assistance in the field. They had to be comfortable putting
on and taking off the camera as well as starting and stopping the recording. This was
essential so that they could take the equipment off when they needed privacy during the
5-8 hour mapping task. I met with each participant twice. The initial meeting was after
they had completed the first day’s cognitive tests. On the second morning, I met with

13

The camera was mounted onto the headlamp strap using two portions of different mounts included
with the camera. Additional smaller screws also had to be purchased to complete the assembly.
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each participant again to review the equipment. I also helped the participant put on the
equipment for the start of the day.

Figure 3.2. Photo of head-mounted camera as worn by participants who recorded video
logs (note that the man pictured is not an actual participant)
The equipment also had to be individually prepared for each person (i.e. attaching
the camera in the correct position on the strap that would be worn around the individual’s
head while in the field). These preparations also took place during the training. I followed
the same protocol script for each training (Appendix B). The trainings also involved
natural conversations between me and the participants as I responded to their questions.
3.4.2 GPS tracks
A Garmin eTrex Legend HCx Global Positioning System (GPS) unit attached to a
participant’s belt or backpack recorded the subject’s physical location every 10 seconds
during the mapping task. However, for one of the participants who recorded a video log,
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known by pseudonym as Tank, the GPS unit was inadvertently set to record data points
based on distance traveled from his previously-recorded location and not based on regular
time intervals. In practice, this amounted to intervals on the order of tens of seconds
when he was moving. When he was stationary or barely moving, the interval between
data points could be on the order of minutes. His tracking data was modified during data
analysis so that the data could still be used; this modification is explained in the subsection on data analysis (3.6).
Data recorded by the GPS devices provide an independent record of the actual
track taken by the subject and the amount of time spent at different locations during field
mapping. GPS data files were cleaned in Excel, uploaded into ArcGIS 9.3, and converted
to shapefiles. Track variables such as distance covered, time in the field, path
intersections, and speed were calculated for each participant; tracks were overlaid onto
participant maps as well as on to the consensus geologic map of the area in order to
determine variables such as time spent on geologic contacts. Additional details about the
track analysis are available in Baker et al. (2012).
3.4.3 Secondary data sources
The primary data sets for this project are the video logs and the GPS tracks.
However, other data sets are included as secondary sources. Examples are artifacts such
as the pen/pencil and paper maps produced by participants during the field mapping task
and the field notes they recorded. Each subject was provided with a field notebook as
well as a base aerial photo and topographic map on which to produce the geologic map.
Another secondary source is the post-mapping interview. During that interview,
participants were asked to comment on the experience of wearing the camera and to
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consider if and how it impacted their performance in the field. These comments were
important when considering rival interpretations of the data.
3.4.4 Expertise measures
In this study, we determined each participant’s position along the spectrum from
novice to expert using the Domain Experience Questionnaire (DEQ) (Baker et al., 2012).
The DEQ transforms the education and experiences of a participant into quantifiable
metrics of expertise. For each participant, we determined a general geology expertise
score (DEQ-G) as well as a geologic mapping expertise score (DEQ-Gm) (Figure 3.3).
The number of visible symbols is less than the total number of participants because there
are multiple instances of two or more participants having the same expertise scores. For
DEQ-G, the cut-off between novice and intermediate is 2; the cut-off between
intermediate and expert is 5. For DEQ-Gm, the cut-off between novice and intermediate
is 1; the cut-off between intermediate and expert is 5. Cut-offs are natural breaks in the
data that correspond to experiential variables (for example, undergraduate vs. graduate
student). This distinction is most relevant for experts: a geologist with years of training
and experience may or may not have extensive practice in geologic mapping. The DEQ is
designed so that someone who is a novice in general geology could not be an expert in
geologic mapping (thus there can be no data points in the upper left portion of the grid,
but points in the lower right are not ruled out). We should note, too, that all participants
were required to have completed a field methods course or field camp by the time they
participated in the study.
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DEQ‐Gm: Geologic Mapping Expertise
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DEQ‐G: General Geology Expertise
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All participants in study (open squares, n = 67), those who recorded video logs (red
triangles, n = 8), and those who recorded audio logs (black dots, n = 8).
Figure 3.3. General and mapping expertise scores
3.4.5 Scoring of maps
While geologic mapping as a problem-solving task in professional practice is
typically ill-structured and lacking a known solution, in this case a consensus map does
exist. The consensus map was created by a member of our research team working with
two geologists familiar with the local area and was approved by those geologists (see
Baker et al., 2012). The map area includes four major rock types identified to the
participants simply as Units 1, 2, 3, and 4. The first three are a conformable sequence of
Paleozoic sedimentary units. From youngest to oldest: Unit 1 is a limestone; Unit 2 is a
shale with a medial limestone ridge; and Unit 3 is a dolostone. Unit 4 is a Precambrian
garnet-biotite gneiss. The three sedimentary Paleozoic units form a plunging syncline
with one limb of the fold cut by a reverse fault that brought up the Precambrian unit.
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The maps of all sixty-seven participants were scored based on two separate
measures: accuracy and interpretation of the structural geology. First, the participants’
maps were scanned and digitized. The accuracy scores were based upon a pixel-by-pixel
comparison that yielded the percentage of 1 meter sized areas that correctly identified
rock units of the participant’s map relative to the consensus map. Second, the structural
interpretation score was based upon a rubric intended to quantify the accuracy of each
map for the different elements of the regional geology (e.g., presence or absence of
symbols for fold and fault, types of fold and fault, plunge direction). The inter-rater
agreement from two independent scoring of the maps was 95.5 percent (15 disagreements
out of 335 elements scored). The overall map score, reported as a decimal out of 1.0, is

DEQ‐Gm: Geologic Mapping Expertise

the mean of the accuracy and structural interpretation scores.
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All participants in the study (open squares, n = 67); the participants who recorded video
logs (red triangles, n = 8), and the participants who recorded audio logs
(black dots, n = 8).
Figure 3.4. Mapping expertise scores and map rank
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Of the sixty-seven participants, those with more expertise in geologic mapping
tended to be more successful in the mapping task (i.e. they had higher map score) than
participants with less mapping expertise (Figure 3.4). However, there was also a
contingent of participants with less expertise in geologic mapping who were also
successful in producing high-scoring maps. Among the participants who recorded video
logs, there was a range in overall map score from 0.33 to 0.88 (Table 3.1).
Table 3.1
Demographic data for participants who recorded video logs

Status

Age

Gender

General
Geology
Expertise

Fiamme

Professional
(Academic)

55

M

8.75 (E)

7.25 (E)

0.88

Gidget

Professional
(Academic)

51

F

9.75 (E)

9 (E)

0.82

Pairique

Professional

28

F

4.5 (I)

1.25 (I)

0.78

Dingo

Graduate Student

25

F

3 (I)

0.75 (N)

0.73

Tank

Professional
(Academic)

52

M

9.75 (E)

8.5 (E)

0.52

Salvador

Undergraduate
Student

21

M

1.25 (N)

0.25 (N)

0.50

Samson

Graduate Student

50

M

6 (E)

2.25 (I)

0.33

Undergraduate
Student

36

M

0.5 (N)

1.25 (I)

0.33

Participant
Pseudonym

Boca
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Geologic
Mapping
Expertise

Overall
Map
Score

3.5 Data collection
3.5.1 Data collection for all participants
Data collection procedures for the large cross-sectional study are summarized
here and described elsewhere (see Hambrick et al. 2011; Baker et al. 2012). The mapping
task was designed to simulate a typical, undergraduate-level geological problem-solving
situation, in which students have several hours to map an area for which the geology is
already relatively well understood. On the morning of the mapping exercise, participants
were guided to four locations outside the map area and provided with a brief, scripted
introduction to both the rock types and the local stratigraphy that would occur in the map
area. After this walk-through introduction, the participants were taken several miles to a
starting point from which to enter the mapping area. One by one the participants were
given identical scripted instructions and supplies before starting the mapping task on their
own; each participant received a topographic map, two copies of an aerial photograph
map, and a field notebook. The GPS unit was used only to track participant movement
during mapping; it was not used by participants to aid their mapping task.
The area to be mapped was roughly a half mile wide and a mile long, with about
200 meters of elevation change. The participants then had the rest of the day to navigate
through the designated field area, make observations of the rocks they found, and
complete their geologic bedrock map. When they returned to the field station they were
interviewed by one or two members of the research team. The interviews, approximately
30 to 45 minutes long, followed a semi-structured protocol to review the participants’
maps, to discuss their prior experiences mapping, and to ask clarifying questions about
their maps.
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3.5.2 Data collection for participants who recorded video logs
Prior to meeting with each participant who was to record a video log, I set up the
camera with batteries, a memory card, and device settings that would be sufficient for
recording two hours of video during the walk-through introduction to the stratigraphy
(see Appendix B for the complete data-collection protocol). Participants made a video
record of their actions at all four locations of the walk-through introduction to the
stratigraphy; however, they were not asked to speak during the walk-through introduction
due to their proximity to other participants in the study. They returned the equipment to
me for the period between the end of the walk-through and the start of the mapping task.
During that time, I changed the batteries, memory card, and device settings to those
needed for recording up to 8 to 9 hours of video.
Participants also had to carry a walkie-talkie with them during the mapping task.
This was done for two reasons. First, it provided a means for them to contact me in the
field station should they have any questions regarding the equipment during the day.
Second, while the camera had the capability of recording up to 8 or 9 hours of video at
one time, the individual video files could not exceed approximately 2.5 hours of
recording time. Consequently, I had to contact the participants to ask them to stop and
start the recording device every 2-2.5 hours. The stop-and-start process would create a
new file on the memory card. My taking responsibility for this task removed the added
burden of keeping track of time from the participants.
Participants recorded their thoughts by speaking aloud into a microphone
mounted into the cable connecting the camera on the head strap with the recording device
on a belt. In a typical think-aloud protocol, a researcher would be seated near the
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participant and could prompt her/him to speak if s/he had been silent for a considerable
amount of time (Ericsson & Simon, 1993). This was not logistically reasonable
considering the outdoor setting as well as the prolonged nature of the task. The intent for
the mapping task was to be as naturalistic as possible. Having a researcher follow a
participant around all day seemed too obtrusive and potentially distracting, perhaps not
only for the participant being followed but also possibly for the other participants. Thus,
accepting that—without a researcher present to prompt continued thinking aloud—there
could be prolong periods of silence, a deliberate and informed choice was made to accept
that risk for the sake of minimizing impact on the participant. Each participant was given
a slip of paper that included instructions on how to operate the audio recorder, a prompt
to announce the time for each entry, and the direction to “think out loud; record all
thoughts relevant to the mapping process.”

3.6 Data analysis
As noted earlier, a distinction exists between the overall methodology of this
study and the methods used in the study (Feig, 2011). The selection of the case study
methodology is based upon the research objective to describe how geologists solve an illstructured, field-based problem such as making a geologic map. The methodology guides
the design of the comparisons between the cases. It does not, however, dictate specific
methods of analysis. Those depend more upon the type of data, in this case the video
logs. In this study, the analytic steps and decisions for how to work with the video logs
comprise the methods used in the study. Thus, this section first details the methods of
analysis followed by a description of how those methods were applied to specific case
studies.
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3.6.1 Methods of analysis
A primary concern in the development of the methods of data analysis for this
study was to join the qualitative coding of the video logs with the quantitative GPS
tracks. Certainly there are numerous software options available for coding video or
transcriptions, but there is no single program that could be used to code the video or
transcriptions and create output files that could be joined to the GPS tracks. A secondary
concern was that the program chosen should support the iterative nature of qualitative
coding. In the precursor study (Callahan et al., 2010), the Matlab program developed to
code the videos for visible actions was designed to generate output that could be linked to
the GPS track. However, the program was not built to allow for iterative coding easily; in
essence, once one started a video and coded an instance of a visible action in a certain
way, there was no easy way to make a change besides starting all over again. While this
approach worked well enough for three 30-minute clips of video, the constraints of that
program would have been highly inefficient and problematic for the volume of video
used in this study. Consequently, two software programs were used for the coding of the
videos, and I wrote a new series of Matlab programs to join the outputs from those
programs with the GPS tracks.
Figure 3.5 summarizes the stages (shown as arrows) and products (shown as
boxes) of the methods of analysis for a single video clip. Each stage will be discussed in
turn in subsequent subsections that are labeled within each arrow. Regardless of the
intended purpose of the video clip with respect to the type of case study, the process
always began with data preparation (Section 3.6.1.1). This included the creation and
transcription of the clip. After that, the video logs were essentially treated as two separate
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data sets. First, video clips were coded for visible actions using InqScribe (Section
3.6.1.2). Second, transcripts were coded for types of expressed thoughts using MaxQDA
(Section 3.6.1.3). The output data sets were saved as text files then processed through a
series of Matlab programs that ultimately joined the coded data to the GPS tracks
(Section 3.6.1.4). Once the data were joined to the GPS tracks, it was possible to
visualize the data using ArcGIS, Excel, and Matlab, the specific decisions for the
visualizations being governed by the research questions (Section 3.6.2).
3.6.1.1 Data preparation
Each participant recorded multiple video files over the course of the day. These
videos were downloaded from the POV camera memory card and saved as electronic
files. Before the data was downloaded, properties of the video file included information
about the precise clock start and stop time (in hours and minutes) of each file. Once each
file was downloaded, however, the clock times were no longer preserved; instead, the
files were in elapsed time (in hours and minutes). For this reason, the clock times were
noted for future use before downloading each video file.
Data preparation of a video file began by first preparing a segment of a GPS track.
Take, for instance, a participant’s first hour in the field. It was not necessary to create
separate files for the segments of the GPS tracks. Instead, all that was needed was the
particular index number of the first and last GPS point in the segment of interest. Using
the Excel data tables for the GPS track, the index number could then be related to
particular clock start and stop times. Then, using the start and stop clock times for the raw
video files, it was possible to identify the approximate elapsed start and stop times that
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corresponded to a track segment of interest. I used Windows Live Movie Maker to create
a clipped segment from the raw video file.

The stages or actions are shown as arrows with the output from those stages shown as
boxes. The output of the final stage is the visualization of the data, but it is not shown
because it varies based on the purpose of the clip.
Figure 3.5. Flow chart for method of analysis of a single video clip
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This process was intended only as an approximate synchronization of the video
logs with the GPS tracks. At issue, the start and stop times for the video log files are
known to a precision of hours and minutes; the start and stop times for the GPS tracks are
known to the precision of hours, minutes, and seconds. The GPS units were programmed
to collect a coordinate point every ten seconds. As a consequence, six possible GPS
points could correspond with the start of a given video file. A later sequence of steps in
the data analysis procedure specifically and systematically addresses this problem of
synchronizing the video data with the GPS track; it will be described in detail in section
3.6.1.4.
Finally, I transcribed each video clip using a software program called Inqscribe
(http://www.inqscribe.com/). Each time-stamped transcript file was exported and saved
as a rich-text document and loaded into MaxQDA for qualitative coding of the expressed
thoughts. Time stamps in the transcripts were primarily, though not always, based on
natural breaks in a participant’s speech. If a participant happened to make a series of
sentences that lasted several tens of seconds, then the text was divided into smaller
chunks by inserting a time stamp between sentences; this was done to prevent any single
time stamp from having a particularly long passage of text associated with it. Within
MaxQDA, the software program automatically used the time stamps to segment the
transcript into separate numbered paragraphs. Once the creation of the video clips and the
transcriptions was complete, the clips were ready for analysis.
3.6.1.2 Coding of video logs for visible actions
The coding of visible actions for the present study built upon the coding of visible
actions in the precursor study (Callahan et al., 2010). A general summary of the coding
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scheme is included in Table 3.2; the final coding scheme is included in Appendix C.
Overall, the coding scheme was defined into two major themes: Collecting Data and
Recording Data. There was also a theme designated as Other which was used for noting
other actions (e.g. water breaks, adjusting or organizing equipment).
Table 3.2
General summary of coding scheme for visible actions in video logs
Theme

Code
Breaking or scratching rock with hammer

Collecting Data

Inspecting rock
Measuring orientation
Testing with HCl

Recording Data

Writing in notebook
Writing on topographic map or aerial photograph

Other

The process of coding a video clip for visible actions began by loading the video
clip into an InqScribe file. This software program provides the user with the capability of
creating a series of short phrases and associating those phrases with a particular key
stroke (e.g. “Measuring Orientation”). There was no limit on the number of phrases that
could be entered. Coding a video clip involved watching the video and hitting the
appropriate key for each instance of an action. The program automatically inserted a
time-stamp each time a key was hit. Furthermore, because it was possible to save the file
as a delimited text file, it was also possible to annotate entries using a comma (e.g.
“Measuring Orientation, Strike and dip” or “Measuring Orientation, Azimuth”). Thus, the
output was both a tab- and a comma-delimited text file. No limit was encountered in

261

terms of the length of a video clip that could be loaded into the program; clip lengths
varied from approximately two minutes to more than two hours.
Coding of visible actions was done on a per occurrence basis. What does this
mean? For example, if a participant stood at one point on the outcrop, wrote notes on the
map, and then continued walking, that would count as one instance of the code writing on
the map. By contrast, if a participant stood at one point on the outcrop and wrote notes on
the map, then walked to another location, and then resumed writing on the map, that
would count as two instances of writing on the map. Thus, if there are multiple instances
of a single code in a small period of time, that means that the participant started with one
action, completed a second type of action, and then returned to the original action.
This approach for coding was implemented based on several factors. In this
dissertation project, unlike the precursor study, I did not attempt to code the length of
time per action. Instead, I coded instances of visible actions, marking times when visible
actions took place. Several reasons guided this change in coding. First, with respect to
actions related to data collection such as measuring strike and dip or testing a rock
surface with HCl, the length of time spent on those actions is typically brief, usually
varying from less than a minute to a matter of seconds, respectively. The significance of
the length of time spent on these actions seemed of questionable importance in
comparison to the occurrence of the actions. A second reason to abandon coding the
length of time for each action was that, while it is possible to devise a coding scheme that
defines the start and stop of each action, those decisions ultimately seemed arbitrary.
Third, one of the notable results from the precursor study was that a much larger
percentage of time had no applicable code relative to the percentage of time with visible
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actions. Consequently, noting relative amounts of time of actions related to collecting
data, recording data, or referencing data was not a particularly discriminatory means for
describing differences in how the participants used their time in the field. By contrast, a
coding scheme that identified instances of visible actions was useful for answering
questions such as what data participants did collect and how often they collected it, but
such a scheme could also answer those questions without requiring one to labor over the
exact times the actions started and ended.
Another difference between the coding scheme in the precursor study and this
present study relates to referencing the topographic map or aerial photo supplied to each
participant. In the earlier study, the videos were coded for times when the participants
were seen to be referring to those maps, seemingly looking at the map without writing on
it. For this study, no similar code for referencing the map was included in the final coding
scheme, though there was an attempt to do so. In the previous study, there were no verbal
reports to narrate the thoughts that coincided with those intervals. However, the
expressed thoughts in this study demonstrated that even when the maps appeared to be
within view of the participants, those time intervals did not always coincide with thoughts
related to the map. Furthermore, even expressed thoughts related to the map varied
greatly; these included comments such as noting the location of either oneself or the
location of certain landscape features, comments relating to the scale or distance on the
map and in space, or comments related to the locale’s geology. Finally, there was also the
challenge that a couple of the participants’ used clipboards to carry their maps while
others placed their maps inside metal or plastic cases or map-boards. While the
participants who carried their maps inside a case or map-board had to make an explicit
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action to bring their map into view, the participants who carried it on their clipboard did
not. This meant that the maps on the clipboards could be visible to the camera, and
potentially the participant, when the participant had merely put the clipboard down in
order to attend to something else.
Ultimately, the decision to forgo coding instances of referencing the map seemed
justified due the fact that if participants expressed their thoughts while inspecting the map
then coding of the verbal reports would account for that time and capture the different
nature of those thoughts. The participants’ interactions with the map would, therefore,
still be reflected in a final data set that combined both sources of coding. For the intervals
when the participants simply appeared to looking at the map but did not express their
thoughts, the potential to over-interpret the action was too great, and so it was deemed
better not to code that time at all.
Inter-coder reliability of the coding scheme was established through a series of
steps. Two coders—myself and an undergraduate research assistant—independently
coded one participant’s video log for the segment of his track that coincided with going
through the area that included the nose of the syncline. The initial coding was done using
essentially the same coding scheme as used in the precursor study. For that initial coding,
most visible actions were coded for the instance of action rather than the duration of the
action. The exception was that we initially attempted to record when the participants
seemed to start referring to the map and when they stopped; as explained above, however,
that code was eventually removed from the coding scheme. We met to compare the
results, discuss problems with the coding scheme, resolve differences, and refine the
definitions of the codes. This sequence continued for an additional six of the video logs
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that coincided with the participants’ tracks through the nose of the fold. At that point, the
coding scheme was stabilized and no further revisions were made. The last step was that
we both coded independently the first half hour of four of the video logs. Using the same
calculation as done for inter-coder reliability of the coding scheme for the audio logs
(Callahan and Petcovic, in revision)—total number of disagreements subtracted from the
total number of applied codes and then divided by the total number of applied codes—our
inter-coder agreement was between 80-90%. In sum, the second coder reviewed 18% of
the total number of hours used in this study (6 hours out of 32.5). I coded the remaining
hours of the video logs independently.
Validity of this coding scheme is addressed by comparing the emergent list of
codes developed in this study with an emergent list of codes generated by different
authors in a separate study. In Maltese, Balliet, & Riggs (2013), three students in a
geologic field mapping course were asked to wear a mobile eye-tracking device for 45-60
minutes of an independent mapping exercise. Analysis focused on the students’ visible
actions as captured by the scene camera of the mobile eye-tracking device. Table 3.3
compares the two coding schemes. There are several points of overlap for the two coding
schemes: the Collecting Data theme in this study aligns with the Outcrop code in their
study; and the Recording Data theme in this study aligns with the Notes and Mapping
codes in their study. Maltese et al. (2013) included two codes that were not included in
coding scheme for visible actions: Location; Moving and Searching. These codes are
questionable, however, given that the students in the Maltese et al. (2013) study were not
thinking aloud during their mapping exercise. Indeed, it seems appropriate to question
how it was possible to identify objectively when the participant was trying to locate an
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outcrop without explicit verbal evidence to support that interpretation. Nonetheless, the
emergent coding schemes of the two studies are similar, thus supporting the validity of
the coding scheme used here.
Table 3.3
Comparison of coding scheme in Maltese et al (2013) with coding scheme in this study
Coding scheme of Maltese et al (2013)
Code Name
Description

Outcrop

Notes

Mapping

Location
Moving and
searching

Coding scheme in this study
Theme
Code
Breaking or
scratching rock with
hammer
Inspecting rock
Collecting Data
Measuring
orientation
Testing with HCl

Student is working at
an outcrop taking
samples,
measurements, or just
looking at the rock
Student in writing
notes or referring to
field book
Student is working on
mapping drawing
contacts, looking at
aerial photos, or just
looking at map (not
clearly locating)
Student trying to find
themselves on the map
or in threedimensional space
Student actively
moving and searching
for outcrops

Writing in notebook
Recording Data

Writing on
topographic map or
aerial photograph

3.6.1.3 Coding of expressed thoughts
The coding scheme for expressed thoughts is similar to the coding scheme used
for the analysis of the audio logs (Callahan and Petcovic, in revision). A general
summary of the coding scheme is included in Table 3.4; the final coding scheme is
included in Appendix D. Overall, the coding scheme was defined into four major themes:
Procedural and Declarative Knowledge, Reasoning and Model Development, Spatial
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Referencing, and Metacognition. There was also a theme designated as Other which was
used for noting other actions (e.g. selecting colored pencils or referring to time—either
noting elapsed time or in association with planning a strategy). Within each theme there
were a series of explicitly defined codes.
Table 3.4
General summary of coding scheme for expressed thoughts in video logs
Theme
Procedural and Declarative
Knowledge

Reasoning and Model
Development

Spatial Referencing

Metacognition

Code
Taking and recording measurements
Identification of rock types from hand sample
Identification of structural/rock features at the hand sample or
outcrop scale
Identification of contacts between rock types at the outcrop
scale
Inferring presence (or absence) of features at outcrop or local
scale
Relating observations to observations of rock units at walk
through
Synthesizing observations into large-scale mental models
Testing mental models against additional observations:
 predicting or proposing tests;
 confirming or disconfirming tests
Revising mental model in light of new observations
Noting location
Relating to space
Noting features
Inspecting landscape
Noting distractions from task at hand
Evaluating or noting certainty of observations or conclusions:
 in location;
 in observations;
 in interpretations;
 in relevance of observations or interpretations
Explicit indicators of planning or mapping strategies

Other

The transcripts were coded using the software program MaxQDA. Notably, it was
possible to watch the video file alongside the transcript; the program was capable of
reading and converting the time stamps within the transcripts to points of time in the
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video file. This meant it was possible to click on a specific line of text in the transcript,
and the software would advance the video directly to that moment in the video clip. The
nature of the verbal reporting dictated that the visual information in the video was
necessary to understand, and therefore encode, the expressed thoughts. The software also
allowed the user to make revisions to the transcript during coding—for instance, in order
to fix occasional words that were left out or to insert statements that had previously been
inaudible but were intelligible upon a second hearing (possibly because a different
software program had been used initially). After the coding was complete, the revised
transcript and the coding of the transcript were exported as separate tab-delimited text
documents.
Coding of transcripts differed from the coding of the visible actions. Recall that
for the latter, a code was applied per occurrence (i.e. instance) of a visible action. For the
transcripts, codes were applied per paragraph (i.e. time stamp). In other words, if the
expressed thoughts associated with a particular time stamp were a recognizable instance
of a code (and recognizable without the context of the expressed thoughts in the
preceding and following time stamps), then the code was applied. There was no attempt
to identify the thought as a single instance or occurrence. The rationale for treating the
coding was the following. While an action may not have a clear start and stop time, there
is a clear action that takes place. Thoughts, however, are less clearly distinct events.
Moreover, developing a coding scheme that specifically identified thoughts as single
events—to be in parallel with single actions—seemed likely to be fraught with difficulty,
without clear methods of establishing validity of that coding scheme, and then ultimately
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with unclear significance. Instead, the method of coding identified which time stamps
included which codes.
The primary difference between the coding scheme used in Callahan and Petcovic
(in revision) and the coding scheme used in this dissertation project was the introduction
in this study of a series of sub-codes related to expressions and evaluations of certainty.
In the analysis of the audio logs, there was just a single code related to certainty. In this
study, the secondary research questions necessitated expanding the code with multiple
sub-codes. The new codes were defined a priori, designed to be in parallel with codes in
other categories (e.g. a sub-code for expressions or evaluations of certainty in
identification of rock type parallels the sub-code for identification of rock type).
Moreover, prior experience of coding the audio logs, as well as the findings in Petcovic et
al. (2009), supported the construction of these a priori codes because in both of those
data sets, participants’ expressed thoughts related to evaluating certainty included
reflections on their certainty in their observations as well as their interpretations.
Another difference between the two coding schemes was the inclusion in this
study of several new emergent sub-codes. Multiple video logs included statements related
to the distance between points, the scale of the map relative to the scale of the landscape,
or compass direction. These statements were similarly coded using a new sub-code
entitled Relating to Space. Being able to see and hear the participants also meant it was
possible to distinguish when they were trying to locate their position and when they were
trying to locate the position of a landscape feature, outcrop, or rock unit in the field.
These latter instances were coded as Noting Features. Lastly, idiosyncratic to Tank, was
the use of binoculars to view the landscape. None of the existing codes could be suitably
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applied to the verbalizations that were concurrent to those moments of time. On the other
hand, it seemed necessary to capture those moments as a form of interacting with the
landscape. Thus, a new sub-code entitled Inspecting Landscape was applied with the
definition being precise to involve the use binoculars. These new sub-codes were added
to the code entitled Navigation, which previously had only one sub-code. Based on the
addition of the new sub-codes, the Navigation code was renamed Spatial Referencing.
As inter-coder reliability of the coding scheme was previously done for the audio
log study, that process was not repeated here. Dr. Petcovic and I did meet to review and
check my coding of the first hour of Dingo’s video log. Additionally, I brought sections
of different video logs for which I had questions to Dr. Petcovic in order to discuss and
resolve how best to apply the coding scheme.
3.6.1.4 Joining the coding of a video with its GPS track
Several steps are necessary to join the coding data from the video logs with the
corresponding GPS track. The output files from the coding of visible actions and
expressed thoughts indicate instances of actions or types of statements (i.e. code) over the
duration of a particular video clip. In order to join these data with the GPS track, the data
had to be transformed into a tab-delimited file with the presence or absence of each
action or type of statement indicated for each 10-second increment of the video clip.
These transformations are completed using two different Matlab programs, one
for the visible actions (Appendix E) and one for the transcript and list of coded segments
(Appendix F). Figures 3.6a-3.6c show examples of a segment of original data and the
transformed data created by the Matlab programs. Both programs treat the original time270

stamped data in the same fashion. In essence, both programs work by comparing each
time stamp against an array of time stamps that increase in 10-second increments, with
the maximum increment determined by the total length of the particular video clip. If a
time stamp for the action occurs after one increment and before the next, then the action
is assigned the second increment as a new time stamp. For any 10-second increment
without any instance of an action or type of statement, Matlab assigns either a zero or the
word ‘Null’ to that increment. The outputs from the two Matlab programs are designed to
end up with the same number of rows. This is required for the data to be successfully
joined to the GPS track data.
Once the data are transformed, the next step determines where the video clip
begins relative to the GPS track data. As indicated earlier, the start time of the video is
known to a precision of hours and minutes versus the times of the GPS tracks that are
known to a precision of hours, minutes, and seconds. In order to find the best possible
synchronization between the data sets, a procedure was devised that makes use of the
speed data that is part of each GPS data point.
The procedure involves an additional step in the analysis where I coded the video
for movement. Using Inqscribe, I watched each video and identified when the person
appeared to be walking and when the person appeared to be standing still. I used a simple
binary coding scheme: 0 for stationary; 1 for walking. As with the coding of visible
actions, the output file created is a time-stamped list of zeros and ones. Also, as with the
coding of visible actions, the data needed to be transformed (Appendix G).
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After coding the videos for movement, a comparable data set was needed from the
GPS track. Following a convention from Baker et al. (2012) whereby slow segments
were defined by speeds less than 10 meters per minute, the Matlab program converts the
GPS speed data into a series of zeros or ones based on how fast the person was moving.
The program assigns a zero for speeds less than or equal to 0.32 mph and assigns a one
for all speeds greater than 0.32 mph.
Figure 3.7 illustrates an example of how these two data sets are compared and
synchronized (Appendix H). The black represents where each interval has 1 for
movement; the white represents where the interval has a 0 for stationary (or barely
moving). The movement data from the video is held constant (on the left side of the red
line) and compared against different equal-sized segments of the GPS track (on the right
side of the red line). Within the Matlab program, this comparison is done mathematically
using mod 2 additions (i.e. 0+0 =0; 1+1=0; 0+1=1). Each binary movement value from
the video is added to the corresponding binary speed data from the GPS track for the full
length of the data sets. The mod 2 additions are summed together. The sum measures
how asynchronous the data sets are; the lower the sum the better the synchronization. The
Matlab program calculates anywhere from six to twelve possible synchronizations and
displays the results on a command window. The user is prompted to identify the best
possible result by selecting the alignment with the lowest sum. The Matlab program then
stores the user’s input to define the minimum and maximum limits of the GPS track that
coincide with the video clip. The last step in the program loads all the previously
transformed data and joins them to the GPS track data.
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Finally, there was a need to write a few alternative versions of the primary Matlab
programs used in this study. First, a second Matlab program was written that can be used
to transform no more than 15 minutes of movement data (Appendix G). It became clear
that for video clips that ran longer than 15 minutes, it was unnecessary to synchronize the
entire length of the video clip; the first 15 minutes sufficed (Appendix H). However, for
clips shorter than 15 minutes, calibrations were still done for the full duration of the video
clip. Second, due to the problem with Tank’s GPS unit, an additional program was
needed to transform Tank’s original GPS track data into an interpolated track with 10second increments between data points (Appendix I). The interpolated track was then
used to synchronize the video data with the GPS data (Appendix I). Third, a small
anomaly was discovered in the GPS track data for Salvador. One of the fields in his data
set was not labeled in the same way as in the data sets for other video log participants. In
order to be able to compare across participants, the fields needed to match. The simplest
remedy for this problem was to add an additional step in the synchronization program
that would rename the field (Appendix J).
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3.6a). Coding of visible actions in InqScribe transformed into time-stamped list of visible
actions for every 10 second increment (1 = presence of code; 0 = absence of code).
Figure 3.6. Sample of data from Dingo’s video log that coincides with her track through
the nose of the fold
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3.6b) Segment of transcript divided into corresponding 10 second increments
(“Null” inserted when interval has no statement).
Figure 3.6.—continued
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3.6c) List of coding for time-stamped lines of transcript transformed into time-stamped
list of codes for every 10 second increment (1 = presence of code; 0 = absence of code).
Note that the starting and ending time stamp numbers correspond to the time stamp
number in Figure 3.6b.
Figure 3.6.—continued
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In each pair of tests, the movement data from the video clip is on the left side of the red
line and the GPS data is on the right. With each test, the GPS data is shifted one data
point upward relative to the movement data from the video clip. The best fit between the
data is the middle. This particular series of synchronizations compares 93 points and the
best-fit synchronization is different on only 7 of the 93 points.
Figure 3.7. Schematic illustration of the process in Matlab to synchronize the GPS data
points with the video logs
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3.6.2 Application of methods to case studies
The preceding section detailed the stages of analysis for each video clip. The
objective here is to explain how those methods were applied to the two case studies: 1)
the multi-case, multiple units of analysis design; and 2) the multi-case, single unit of
analysis design. Before describing the design of the case studies in detail, however, there
are important implications to consider related to the methodological decisions that went
into transforming instances of coded actions and expressed thoughts into data associated
with individual GPS points. In particular, this is necessary because counts of instances of
codes and the spatial distribution of those instances are the main data presented in both
case studies.
As discussed earlier, the coding of visible actions differed somewhat from the
coding of expressed thoughts. However, as also just explained, the Matlab programs
process the outputs—the time-stamped list of codes—in a similar fashion so that for each
GPS point there is either an instance or not of each code of every theme, be it a visible
action or expressed thought. Consider, however, the implications of the earlier difference
on this transformation. Suppose you are interested in seeing all instances of Gidget’s
writing in her notebook. It would be possible to select from her entire GPS track all
points for which there was an instance of writing in her notebook and then plot those
points on a map of the field area. Each point on the resultant map would reflect a new
occurrence of that action. Consequently, a single instance does not convey brevity of an
action, simply the lack of repetition.
Contrast this with the scenario in which the interest is to see all instances of
Gidget expressing a thought coded as synthesis. Again, it would be possible to select
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from her entire GPS track all points for which there was an instance of that code and then
plot those points on a map of the field area. However, this map could reasonably be
expected to appear somewhat different. Not only might the absolute count of points be
different but so too would be the spatial distribution. Expressions of thought related to
synthesis may have extended over multiple time stamps. In the process of joining those
time stamps to GPS points, a sequence of GPS points might each have been assigned an
instance of that code. Consequently, the map would then appear to have clusters of points
for which there was an instance of the synthesis code.
Thus, it is important to anticipate that these methodological decisions will
manifest not only as differences in the absolute counts of codes over time but also as
differences in the spatial distribution of codes. Moreover, these methodological decisions
form the basis for which data are appropriate to combine on a single map or graph and
what are not. It is appropriate to compare instances of expressed thoughts to other
instances of expressed thoughts, but it is less reasonable to plot instances of expressed
thoughts and visible actions on the same map or graph.
Finally, it is necessary to acknowledge another limitation of the methodological
decisions that went into the construction of the Matlab programs. Time stamps of visible
actions and time stamps within the transcript are at irregular intervals. The Matlab
programs were explicitly designed to take this into account. If two time stamps fall within
the same ten-second interval of time, all data associated with those two time stamps are
combined into the same ten-second interval. In the unlikely (and rare) event, that three
time stamps fell within the same ten-second interval, the third time-stamp was shifted
forward to the following ten-second increment. The consequence was that a single GPS
279

point might end up having multiple instances of code. This was an unavoidable artifact of
the coding process. As will be shown in the following chapter, the impact of this
limitation on the total counts of codes is minimal and does not significantly alter the story
that emerges from the data.
3.6.2.1. Multi-case, multiple units of analysis designed case study: Comparing the first
hour and the track through the nose of the fold
In the multi-case, multiple units of analysis case study, two segments of track
were identified for each participant. One unit of analysis was defined by the participants
first hour in the field. From the analysis of the head-camera data in year one, thirty
minutes was seen to be relatively limited, especially for the novices, in terms of seeing
the participants get into the task. Sixty minutes was selected with the hope that it would
afford enough time to provide a better picture of how the participants situated themselves
and started their work on the problem in earnest. Additionally, from inspection of the
eight tracks, all but two of the participants traveled up to the highest elevation in the field
area in the first hour. There they would have encountered the Precambrian rock adjacent
to the youngest Paleozoic rock. Thus, the first hour also had the potential of including a
record of how participants grappled with that aspect of the mapping problem.
The second unit of analysis chosen was the segments of the participants’ tracks
through the nose of the fold. The nose of the fold is another geologically-significant
region of the field area and an area where all eight participants spent time (Baker et al.,
2012). The area includes outcrops with the rock units dipping in opposite directions and
even bending around from one limb of the fold to the other. The segments were identified
by visual inspection in ArcGIS with the intent of beginning the segment some distance
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before the participant reached the main area at the nose of the fold and ending the
segment some distance after they left the area.
The analysis of the video logs for these two segments of the tracks involved
generating maps that showed the spatial distribution of different visible actions and types
of expressed thoughts (e.g. testing rock with HCl, measuring orientation of the rock units,
verbally identifying types of rocks or structural features of the rock units, and verbal
reporting of reasoning and model development). In order to compare the instances of
visible actions and expressed thoughts across participants and at different times in the day
(i.e. the first hour and while in the nose of the fold), the rate of instances per five minutes
were also calculated. These rates were helpful in normalizing across the different times
and spaces involved in the two units of analysis.
With respect to establishing validity of analysis, following recommendations of
Yin (2009), internal validity was addressed through the development and discussion of
rival explanations of the data. External validity was addressed through relating the results
and interpretations to the larger body of literature discussed in Chapter Two. As
explained earlier, the prior analysis of the GPS tracks and geologic maps was contrasted
with the conclusions from the video logs to establish construct validity.
3.6.2.2 Multi-case, single unit of analysis designed case study: Comparing four video
logs over the full day
The four participants selected for a full-day analysis of the videos included
Gidget, Tank, Dingo, and Salvador. Gidget and Tank are both identified as experts in
terms of mapping expertise as well as general geologic expertise. Dingo and Salvador are
both novices in terms of mapping expertise. Dingo, a graduate student, is identified as an
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intermediate in general geologic expertise, while Salvador, an undergraduate student, is a
novice in general geologic expertise. The quartet also makes an interesting comparison
because Gidget and Dingo both identified that there was a syncline in the field area
whereas Tank and Salvador did not. Thus, they represent multiple pairs of opposites: two
experts, two novices, two producers of more successful maps, and two producers of less
successful maps.
Moreover, it is worth noting that other considerations factored into the selection
of these four individuals. Analysis of the video logs for the multiple cases, multiple units
of analysis case study preceded the selection of these four video logs for a full-day
analysis. This was important for developing a sense of the data in each video log. Was the
audio compromised due to wind interference? Was the participant audible? Was the
participant attentive to continue thinking aloud at regular intervals or was the participant
silent for long durations of the video? By reviewing all eight video logs before selecting a
sub-set, it was possible to take the answers to these questions into consideration. For
instance, Fiamme, an expert, often spoke softly and was silent for extended periods of
time. Thus, while theoretically it might have been informative to complete an analysis of
Fiamme’s full day, there was a potential that the effort of analysis may have yielded little
in the way of benefit because of missing data—in the form of either inaudible statements
or extended silence. Boca, a novice, spoke clearly and at fairly regular intervals.
Apparent, however, in the video segments for his first hour and at the nose of the fold,
was that fact that he struggled greatly in the task. Theoretically Boca’s video log may
sufficiently have been informative to complete an analysis of his full day. Pragmatically,

282

however, it was unclear that that analysis would have meaningful results if was he was
fundamentally unsure of how to complete the task.
Spatial analysis of the video logs for the full day focuses on comparing
distribution of instances of visible actions and expressed thoughts. For example, instances
of procedural and declarative knowledge were contrasted with instances of reasoning and
model development. Also, maps were made with quotes from the transcripts alongside
maps showing instances of expressed thoughts at particular stops. The quotes were
selected to highlight different examples of patterns that emerged across the video logs in
participants’ expressions of certainty.
Results from the full-day analysis are also examined for temporal patterns. A
particular challenge for this study is that the videos are coded on the scale of seconds and
minutes, but the total GPS track extends over multiple hours. To investigate, on the scale
of the whole day, how visible actions and expressed thoughts varied, plots were made
showing cumulative counts of themes or codes versus time. These images illustrate
variations in the rate of these actions and thoughts over the course of the day.
The methods for establishing validity of analysis—be it internal, external, or
construct—are similar to those outlined earlier: internal validity is addressed through the
development and discussion of rival explanations of the data; external validity is
addressed through relating the results and interpretations to the larger body of literature
discussed in Chapter Two; and construct validity is addressed by comparing results of the
analysis with the prior analysis of the GPS tracks and geologic maps.
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3.7 The researcher
I come to the research on the nature of geologic expertise with a Bachelor’s
degree and a Master’s degree in Geology. Over the course of my educational experiences,
I have been on numerous field trips and have also been a student at a five-week field
methods course during which I performed similar tasks to the mapping project in our
study. My own research experiences in geology, however, have not included conducting
the type of mapping done by participants in this project. Thus, while I have familiarity
with the task involved, I do not have significant personal experience or preference for
strategies in making geologic maps.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
This chapter has three sections. Section 4.1 describes the results from analysis of
all eight participants’ first hour in the field. Section 4.2 details results from analysis of all
eight participants’ track through and time spent around the nose of the fold. These two
sections comprise the multiple-case, multiple units of analysis case study. Section 4.3
reports the results from analysis of four participants’ full days in the field, which
collectively represent the multiple-case, single unit of analysis case study.
Before beginning, however, it is necessary to establish a description of the field
area sufficient for readers to understand the navigation patterns and activities of the
participants. In particular, because geographic directions are disguised, key topographic
or geologic features and elevations will be used instead to describe the field area (Figure
4.1).

4.1 Situating the problem: A multiple‐case, multiple units of analysis
case study
In the previous chapter, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrated how the eight participants
who recorded video logs compared with the larger study population in terms of their
levels of general expertise, mapping expertise, and success in the task (i.e. map score). To
frame a description of participants’ use of time in their first hour in the field, it is
informative to note how these eight participants compare to the larger study population in
terms of GPS track characteristics and statistics.

285

Bold numbers printed in white refer to the four rock types as described to the participants: Unit 1,
Limestone; Unit 2, Shale; Unit 3, Dolostone; and Unit 4, Gneiss. Arrows point in direction of
increasing elevation.

Figure 4.1. Field area mapped in study
At the outset of the mapping task, most of the eight participants, except Gidget
and Fiamme, stopped at the outcrop that is close to the launch point (approximately 30
meter distant) and then headed uphill to the highest elevation of the map area, walking
parallel to the map boundary (Figure 4.2). For her part, Gidget initially elected to head
slightly downhill to stop at an outcrop approximately 50 meters from the launch point;
then she, like the others, went uphill to the corner with the highest elevation. By contrast,
Fiamme, after stopping at the first outcrop close to the launch point, proceeded downhill
going parallel to the field boundary. This dichotomous approach—either going uphill or
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downhill—was seen across all the participants; no one entered the field area and then
walked on a perpendicular path away from the launch point. Indeed, of the total 67
participants in the study, roughly half went uphill upon entering the field area and half
went downhill.
Table 4.1 contains descriptive statistics for three GPS field track variables for the
eight participants who recorded video logs juxtaposed with comparable results for all the
participants in the larger study. The distance traveled in the first hour by each of the eight
participants is within one standard deviation of the mean for all participants. This
suggests that, at least in terms of distance covered, the eight participants are
representative of the larger-study population. Putting the length of the first hour of track
into the larger context of the total distance walked and total time in the field, most of the
eight participants also fall within plus or minus one standard deviation away from the
mean; Dingo and Salvador are exceptions. For them, the total time in the field is more
than one standard deviation above the mean. Moreover, the distance the two of them
walked in the first hour is less than 10% of the total distance they walked. For them, the
first hour reflects a smaller percentage of their total distance covered and total time in the
field. However, while interesting to note, the differences are small enough that their
overall importance is likely to be minor.
Within the first hour, participants’ expressed thoughts covered the range of codes
from procedural and declarative knowledge (e.g. “What type of rock am I looking at?”),
spatial referencing (e.g. “Where am I?”), reasoning and model development (“What does
it mean?”), and evaluations of certainty (“How certain am I?”). Additionally, they made
stops at multiple outcrops at which their visible actions included collecting and recording
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data. In the following sub-sections, these codes will be described in more detail and will
be visualized on maps for the purpose of answering the secondary research questions:
How do geologists situate themselves at the outset of solving a geologic mapping task?
How does use of time while mapping or statements evaluating or expressing certainty
relate to expertise and relate to success in the task?
Table 4.1
Descriptive statistics of the GPS tracks for the eight participants who recorded video logs
compared to statistics of the GPS tracks for the participants in the larger study
Distance walked
in first hour as
Distance
percent of total
walked in first
Total time in
Total distance
distance
hour
field, in hours
walked in miles
Min (n = 66)
0.1
3.2
1.6
—
Max (n = 66)
1.3
8.9
9.5
—
Mean (n = 66)
0.57
5.9
4.57
—
Std. Dev. (n = 66)
0.21
1.3
1.12
—
Fiamme (E)
0.57
7.15
5.03
11%
Gidget (E)
0.46
6.16
3.86
12%
Tank (E)
0.48
4.77
3.74
13%
Pairique (I)
0.47
4.83
4.03
12%
Samson (I)
0.67
4.78
3.97
17%
Boca (N)
0.5
5.16
3.90
13%
Dingo (N)
0.45
7.33
5.48
8%
Salvador (N)
0.43
7.9
5.45
8%
Descriptive statistics in Baker et al. (2012) excluded Tank’s track due to the previously-discussed
different settings of his GPS unit.

4.1.1 Overview of expressed thoughts by major codes
To get an overview of the participants’ use of time, as reflected in their expressed
thoughts, a natural place to begin is with inspection of the five major themes applied to
their statements: Procedural and Declarative Knowledge, Spatial Referencing, Reasoning
and Model Development, Metacognition, and Other. Figure 4.2 provides a separate map
for each participant. Each map also shows the participant’s GPS track. For each GPS
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point, if one of the five themes was applied to the expressed thought that coincides with
the point, then there is a color-coded pie chart on or near that point. If there is more than
one theme applied to a particular point, then the pie chart is sub-divided into pieces.
Large groups of pie charts with tie-lines connecting them to a series of tightly-packed
points typically mean that the participant was stationary or barely moving for an extended
amount of time. The results reflect the sum number of instances of the codes as well as
the rare instances when the theme was used without a code; those instances generally
occurred if the participant’s language conveyed something related to one of the themes
but lacked enough specificity to identify an appropriate code.
Visually, the data on the maps for Fiamme (an expert) stands out, dominated by
green (Procedural and Declarative Knowledge). By comparison, the other maps appear
to have a higher proportion of blue (Metacognition) with varying mixes of the other
colors. Several details emerge out of this overview of the participants’ first hour in the
field. Noticeable as well are the instances that were coded as Other. Examples of Other
statements include such things as the participants describing their selection of colored
pencils for different rock units on their map or describing how they were going to
organize and record their notes. These expressed thoughts were not off-topic. Instead,
they reflected how the participants were getting themselves organized mentally and
physically for the mapping task. Generally, though, these maps raise two obvious and
related questions. First, how do the actual number of or proportion of instances of these
sub-codes compare? Second, does the number of instances of sub-codes relate to the
amount that each participant spoke over the first hour?
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Figure 4.2. Maps show instances of when five different themes applied to expressed thoughts:
procedural and declarative knowledge (PDK; green); reasoning and model development (RMD;
magenta); spatial referencing (SpRef; yellow); metacognition (Metacog; blue); and other (Other;
black). The GPS track for each participant is plotted above the pie charts. If more than one code
was applied to the expressed thoughts for a particular GPS point, the pie chart is sub-divided.
However, if the same code was applied to the expressed thoughts for a particular GPS point, for
example because of the use of multiple sub-codes, the duplication is not apparent.
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Figure 4.2.—continued
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Figure 4.2.—continued
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Figure 4.2.—continued

293

With respect to the first question, Table 4.2 summarizes the total number of
instances as well as percentages of the five themes for each participant. Fiamme has the
lowest total instances of themes among the eight participants, whereas Tank (another
expert) has the highest total instances and nearly doubles the amount of Fiamme’s. The
variation across the eight participants suggests that it is percentages that are best suited
for distinguishing similarities and differences in their expressed thoughts. Three aspects
of the data in this table stand out. First, with respect to Procedural and Declarative
Knowledge, Gidget and Tank, the other two experts besides Fiamme, have similar
proportions of statements, 15% and 13%, respectively. Among the intermediates and
novices, the proportions of statements related to Procedural and Declarative Knowledge
vary from roughly a quarter to a third. Second, the proportions of such Reasoning and
Model Development codes are lower for those with more experience (Gidget and Tank)
than for those with less experience (Boca, Dingo, and Salvador). Third for
Metacognition, Fiamme is the only participant not to have at least a third of his expressed
thoughts coded as related to theme.
Continuing to consider the results related to Metacognition, recall that the theme
encompasses three codes: noting distractions, evaluating or expressing certainty, and
planning. Table 4.3 shows the number and proportion of instances of the different
Metacognition codes. All eight participants made comments pertaining to each of the
three codes. An underlying question within this project is how and to what extent wearing
the camera may have influenced the participant’s performance in the task or in the nature
of the comments. Indeed, what is unclear in some of the statements regarding
distractions—and even sometimes with statements related to planning—is whether the
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participants are simply making comments for the sake of saying something out loud,
knowing that is what is expect of them. For instance, some of the noted distractions
include comments about the weather, how they felt about being outdoors, the cows—or
the evidence of the cows—that were in the field area, and comments which were either
explicitly or implicitly related to the presence of the camera. At other times, several of
the participants explicitly address the viewer of their video logs.
Table 4.2
Total count and percent of instances of each theme for each participant

Name
Fiamme (E)
Gidget (E)
Tank (E)
Pairique (I)
Samson (I)
Boca (N)
Dingo (N)
Salvador (N)

Procedural
and
Declarative
Knowledge
78
55%
34
15%
38
13%
52
30%
49
24%
64
34%
59
24%
52
24%

Reasoning
and Model
Development
12
8%
61
26%
44
15%
33
19%
17
8%
19
10%
19
8%
19
9%

Spatial
Referencing
16
11%
14
6%
42
14%
12
7%
17
8%
24
13%
40
16%
36
17%

Metacognition
32
23%
86
37%
144
49%
55
32%
97
48%
67
36%
118
48%
73
34%

Other
4 3%
38 16%
28 9%
22 13%
22 11%
14 7%
11 4%
35 16%

Total
142
233
296
174
202
188
247
215

The letters within the parentheses next to each name indicates the participant’s level of
mapping expertise: (E) expert; (I) intermediate; and (N) novice.

Thus, in subsequent sections of this chapter attention will be focused on results
related to evaluating or expressing certainty and will not explore in detail results related
to noting distractions or planning. In part this is motivated by the secondary research
questions. But another factor in the decision not to look at the data related to distractions
or planning in detail is due to the concern over whether the comments are reflecting the
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process of solving a mapping problem or reflecting the awareness of being in a study on
solving a mapping problem.
Table 4.3
Total count of instances for Metacognition in first hour

Name
Fiamme (E)
Gidget (E)
Tank (E)
Pairique (I)
Samson (I)
Boca (N)
Dingo (N)
Salvador (N)

Noting
Distractions
9
28%
28
33%
56
39%
13
24%
47
48%
24
36%
46
39%
11
15%

Evaluating or
Expressing
Certainty
7
22%
40
47%
64
44%
36
65%
36
37%
25
37%
55
47%
36
49%

Planning
16 50%
18 21%
24 17%
6
11%
14 14%
18 27%
17 14%
26 36%

Total
32
86
144
55
97
67
118
73

Turning now to the second question regarding the length of each participant’s
transcript in the first hour, Table 4.4 summarizes the word count for each participant’s
transcript. But what does this tell us? Tank and Dingo, for example, both have transcripts
of about the same length, but Tank has more expressed ideas (more code instances).
Gidget talks less than Dingo (a shorter transcript) but appears to pack in more
information, as their total code counts are similar. Fiamme simply seems not to talk
much; he has the shortest transcript and the lowest number of codes. Thus, it appears to
depend on the participants as to whether or not the amount that they say is a limitation of
their data. A long passage of text might have a single idea, or it might be packed with
multiple ideas. It is the instance of a code that counts.
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Table 4.4
Summary of each participant’s transcript over the first hour in terms of total word count
Name
Fiamme
Gidget
Tank
Pairique
Samson
Boca
Dingo
Salvador

Word Count
1257
2684
3967
2181
1833
1417
3092
2287

In the following sub-sections, codes for four of the themes included in this
overview analysis—Procedural and Declarative Knowledge, Spatial Referencing,
Reasoning and Model Development, and Metacognition—are explored separately to see
how participants’ expressed thoughts vary in more detail. Additionally, this overview has
featured only data from expressed thoughts and not included results for Collecting and
Recording Data. There is some redundancy between the coding of expressed thoughts for
procedural and declarative knowledge and the coding of visible actions due to a sub-code
of the former, taking and recording measurements. Some of the visible action codes
duplicate many of those instances and thus inaccurately inflate those counts within the
overview. That said, the instances of collecting and recording data do provide a different
perspective on the first hour. It is the results for these visible actions to which we next
turn our attention.
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4.1.2 Collecting and recording data
The visible actions coded in the video logs include four types of Collecting Data
and two types of Recording Data (see Appendix C for details of the coding scheme).
Collecting Data involved: 1) breaking a piece of rock or a corner of an outcrop to get a
fresh surface or, alternatively, using the hammer to scratch the rock; 2) inspecting a hand
sample of a rock or outcrop; 3) putting a small amount of hydrochloric acid on the rock;
or 4) measuring the orientation of bedding, foliation, or the trend of a ridge. The
Collecting Data codes required close contact between the person and the rock. For
example, simply standing over a rock outcrop—whether speaking or not—did not count
as an instance of inspecting a rock. If the participant did not actually touch the rock, the
participant had to have put his or her face very close to the rock, an act which was visible
to the camera by the rock filling almost the entire field of view. Recording Data
involved: 1) writing in the notebook; or 2) writing on the front or back of the aerial
photograph map or the topographic map.
Although the following was mentioned in Chapter 3, it is important to emphasize
again that the coding of visible actions does not reflect the length of time spent on that
particular action. Recall that if there are multiple instances of a single code in a small
period of time, then that means that the participant had to have started with one action,
completed a second type of action, and then returned to the original action.
Table 4.5 includes the counts of collecting and recording data for each participant.
Boca is notably different due to his high number of instances of breaking/scratching
rocks and inspecting rocks, with more than 20 counts for each sub-code. No other
participant has a sub-code with more than 20 counts. The other seven participants are
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fairly similar to each other in terms of number of instances of data collection—though
Fiamme and Pairique do have a high number of instances of inspecting rocks, with 15
and 20 respectively. Another noticeable difference between the participants comes from
inspecting the counts of recording data. The participants with the top four map scores—
Fiamme, Gidget, Pairique, and Dingo—have a higher average number of instances of
recording data than the participants with the bottom four map scores—Tank, Salvador,
Samson, and Boca.
Table 4.5
Total count of instances for Collecting and Recording Data in first hour
Collecting Data
Name
Fiamme (E)
Gidget (E)
Tank (E)
Pairique (I)
Samson (I)
Boca (N)
Dingo (N)
Salvador (N)

Breaking/S
cratching
Rocks
9
2
8
6
3
22
1
0

Inspecting
Rocks
15
3
4
20
3
26
5
8

Measuring
Orientation
7
3
4
6
4
0
8
3

Recording Data
Testing
with
HCl
5
0
3
2
4
9
1
0

Writing in
Notebook
15
11
0
15
4
2
10
10

Writing
on Map
7
13
8
11
9
13
17
7

To put these results in context, it helps to look at the instances of the sub-codes on the
maps (Figure 4.3). As with Figure 4.2, in Figure 4.5 each participant has an individual
map; unlike Figure 4.2, however, the symbols are not a constant size. The symbol size
depends on the number of instances of the codes for the point. These maps visually
juxtapose instances of collecting data and instances of recording data. Furthermore, by
relating instances of sub-codes to the participants’ GPS track, it is possible to compare
the participants’ visible actions over space and time.
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Boca has notably higher counts for Collecting Data than the other eight
participants. On the map, these data appear as a fairly continuous string of collecting
events, with somewhat lower numbers of recording events, along his GPS track. Fiamme
and Pairique also appear to have a fairly steady series of collecting and recording events
along their respective GPS tracks. In contrast, instances of collecting and recording as
completed by Gidget, Dingo, Tank, and Salvador occur in more distinct clusters, with the
intervening stretches of GPS track having few or no such events. Samson’s instances of
collecting and recording data are a blend of the two patterns. On the one hand, there is a
cluster of points at the beginning of his hour and at the end of his path over the hour.
There is also a stretch of his track in the highest-elevation corner with a sequence of
events along his path.
Another observation is that these results may reflect differences in the paths that
the participants followed through the field. The maps for Gidget, Pairique, Dingo, Tank,
Salvador, and Samson have similar stretches of GPS tracks uphill from the launch point
with little or no instances of collecting or recording data. Recall, however, that this code
requires that the participant make physical contact with the rocks, whether a hand sample
or outcrop. Therefore, the general absence of events indicates only that the participants
made limited or no physical contact with rocks; it does not reflect an absence of thought
about the rocks. By comparison, Boca does have more instances of collecting data from
breaking, inspecting, and testing rock along that stretch; so in his case, there was some
kind of physical contact with the rocks. Fiamme, Pairique, and Samson also travel
downhill from the launch point in the first hour. Along the portions of their tracks that
overlap geographically, there are more instances of collecting and recording data. Again,
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this pattern can be understood by noting that there are more outcrops downhill from the
launch point than there are uphill before the contact between Unit 1 and
Unit 4.
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Figure 4.3. Maps show instances of Collecting and Recording Data: breaking rock with a hammer
or scratching surface of rock (Break; yellow); inspecting a hand sample of a rock or outcrop
(Inspect; orange); measuring orientation (StkeDip; pink); testing a hand sample or outcrop of rock
with HCl (TestHCl; blue); writing in notebook (WritNb; white); and writing on the aerial
photographs or the topographic map (WritMap; black). The GPS track for each participant is
plotted above the pie charts. If more than one code was applied for a particular GPS point, the pie
chart is sub-divided. The number next to the pie chart symbol indicates the number of instances
of code that size symbol represents. Note that the scale is different for collecting data set versus
the recording data set.
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Figure 4.3.—continued

303

Figure 4.3.—continued
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Figure 4.3.—continued
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4.1.3 Procedural and declarative knowledge
In the overview maps, expressed thoughts related to the theme of Procedural and
Declarative Knowledge dominated most of the participants’ transcripts (see Appendix D
for details of coding scheme). Now it is time to look at the substance of those statements
in more detail. The individual codes within this theme include: 1) identification of rock
type; 2) identification of structural features; 3) identification of contacts between rock
types; and 4) taking and recording measurements. Unlike the codes for Collecting Data,
these codes did not require that the participants make close contact with hand samples or
outcrops of rock. However, instances of these sub-codes are restricted in that they are
limited to observations at the hand- sample or outcrop scale. In other words, these subcodes were not used for instances when the participant was referring to the map alone;
such large-scale expressed thoughts are included in the sub-codes for reasoning and
model development.
In terms of counts of the codes, Fiamme, Gidget, Tank, and Salvador have similar
ratios of rock identification to structural feature identification (Table 4.6); they all have
roughly twice as many instances of the former as the latter. Dingo and Pairique have
roughly the same number of instances of identification of rock with identification of
structural features. Neither Fiamme nor Pairique has instances of identification of
contacts; notably they were the two participants who did not travel up to the highest
corner and cross the contact between Unit 1 and Unit 4.
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Table 4.6
Total count of number of instances for Procedural and Declarative Knowledge in first
hour

Name
Fiamme (E)
Gidget (E)
Tank (E)
Pairique (I)
Samson (I)
Boca (N)
Dingo (N)
Salvador (N)

Identifying
Rocks
39 38%
19 45%
19 29%
27 40%
41 82%
62 97%
23 34%
24 38%

Identifying
Rock
Features
18
18%
8
19%
11
17%
21
31%
6
12%
0
0%
22
32%
11
17%

Identifying
Contacts
0
0%
1
2%
8
12%
0
0%
1
2%
2
3%
3
4%
2
3%

Taking and
Recording
Measurements
45
44%
14
33%
28
42%
20
29%
2
4%
0
0%
20
29%
27
42%

Total
102
42
66
68
50
64
68
64

Figure 4.4 illustrates the instances of these sub-codes. For the most part, instances
of expressed thoughts related to identification of rock types were coupled with instances
of identification of thoughts related to identification of structural features. The
implication is that when participants noted rock type, they also noted structural features,
especially the orientation of the bedding of the rock units. Additionally, it was previously
noted that for Gidget, Pairique, Dingo, Tank, Salvador, and Samson, there were few
instances of visible actions of collecting or recording data on the slope uphill from the
launch point. Thus the data in this section illustrate that all of them—Gidget, Pairique,
Dingo, Tank, Salvador, and Samson—were in fact identifying samples as they walked,
they were just not picking up rocks or stopping at outcrops; note that this appears to be
especially the case for Dingo and Samson.
Visually, the maps for Samson and Boca stand out for having few or no red dots,
representing a lack of instances of identifying structural features. Furthermore, in
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Samson’s case, the only such instances are restricted to the area near the launch point.
Comparing these results with results for the visible actions of measuring orientation,
Boca has no such events in the first hour while Samson has two near the launch point:
one at the highest corner, and another downhill from the launch point (Figure 4.4). Given
that the sub-code identifying structural features is mostly used when participants
measured orientation, Boca’s lack of identifying structural features is not surprising.
When Samson was in the highest corner, he explicitly says in the video log that he was
not sure he remembered how to measure strike and dip: “[00:36:24] I'll get down to that
other location to do a strike and dip. If I can figure it out again. … Been so long since I've
done it. Embarrassed that I'm unsure, but I'm unsure nonetheless.” Boca also asked
during training on the video equipment whether it was possible to measure strike and dip
with a regular compass. The implication of Boca’s question was that he, too, might not
have remembered how to use the Brunton compass for measuring orientation of rock
units. Thus, the low counts of both measuring orientation as well as identifying structural
features may well have been due to Samson and Boca’s uncertainty in how to make the
measurements correctly.
Also visible on the maps is that all instances of identification of contacts were
restricted to the highest corner of the map area, which coincides with the contact between
Unit 1, the limestone, and Unit 4, the gneiss. Indeed, participants also crossed contacts
when they went downhill and yet made no explicit identification of those contacts. One
likely factor in this difference is that Unit 4 is a metamorphic rock whereas the other
three units are different types of sedimentary rocks; gneiss is much more visibly distinct
from limestone than limestone, shale, and dolostone are distinct from each other. Thus,
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the explicit identification of contacts may be attributable to the differences in lithology in
different parts of the field area.
Another factor in this result may be how the sub-codes were defined in the coding
scheme. Evident also on the maps is that participants identified rock types as they crossed
contacts while walking downhill from the launch point. But, as defined, neither the subcode for the identification of rocks nor the identification of contacts captures whether
their comments were in fact noting changes in lithology or how they interpreted those
changes in lithology. What these results document is that participants’ expressed thoughts
did not explicitly identify limestone/shale/dolostone contacts as they travelled downhill
from the launch point. What these results imply is that identifying contacts may not
always be an explicitly expressed thought. In other words, the coding scheme did not
capture instances when they switched from identifying one lithology to another lithology
without their specifically articulating that there was a change in lithology.
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Figure 4.4. Maps show instances of Procedural and Declarative Knowledge: identification of rock
types (IDRock, blue); identification of contacts (IDCon, green); and identification of rock
features (IDStruc, peach); and taking and recording measurements (TakRec, red). The number
next to the pie chart symbol indicates the number of instances of code that size symbol represents.
The GPS track for each participant is plotted above the pie charts. If more than one code was
applied for a particular GPS point, the pie chart is sub-divided. The number next to the pie chart
symbol indicates the number of instances of code that size symbol represents.
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Figure 4.4.—continued
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Figure 4.4.—continued
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4.1.4 Reasoning and model development
The following is a brief summary of the definitions for codes of the Reasoning
and Model Development theme (see Appendix D for details of coding scheme). There are
six codes: inferring, relating, synthesizing, predicting, confirming, and revising. The
inferring sub-code was applied to statements that infer rock type, contact, or feature by
reasoning from indirect evidence (e.g., soil, vegetation pattern, topography, secondary
alteration, float, regional stratigraphy, etc.). The relating sub-code was used whenever the
participant made reference to the scripted information that participants received about
each rock type during the walk-through introduction to the stratigraphy prior to mapping.
Instances of the synthesizing sub-code were mainly statements focused on distinguishing
large-scale rock structures beyond what was directly visible in the participant’s
immediate surroundings. The predicting sub-code occurred when a participant made a
prediction about what he or she would find at a different location or proposed a test of a
working model with additional data; the confirming sub-code occurred when a participant
referred to an observation that supported a previous prediction or idea. Lastly, the
revising sub-code was applied when participants gave alternative explanations of their
observations or expressed a need to change an explanation.
Whether inspecting the counts of these sub-codes (Table 4.7) or inspecting the
maps (Figure 4.5), Gidget’s expressions of reasoning and model development stand out
among the eight, especially for the number and location of instances of synthesis.
Previously the point was emphasized that visible actions were coded as events. By
contrast, in the coding of a transcript, if a prolonged passage of expressed thoughts was
coded as synthesis, for example, then multiple GPS points—in other words, multiple
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units of time—would also be identified as synthesis. On the maps, such passages of
coded text transform into blossom-like clusters of pie charts around a central point. There
are two such blossoms on Gidget’s map. The first occurred downhill from the launch
point, and the second occurred at the highest corner; the first included mostly synthesis,
prediction, and confirming while the second is comprised almost entirely of synthesis,
with a single instance of inferring, predicting, and confirming. Additionally, there was a
further sequence of instances of inferring and synthesis in the interim. We can see then
that her expressed thoughts, as related to Reasoning and Model Development, were fairly
continuous across the first hour, with two extended periods of time when she was
especially engaged in synthesis.
Table 4.7

Salvador(N)

Total

Dingo (N)

Revising

Boca (N)

Confirming

Samson (I)

Predicting

Pairique (I)

Synthesis

Tank (E)

Relating

Gidget (E)

Inferring

Fiamme (E)

Name

Total count of instances for Reasoning and Model Development in first hour

0
0%
3
23%
7
54%
3
23%
0
0%
0
0%
13

11
16%
2
3%
38
57%
12
18%
4
6%
0
0%
67

13
24%
13
24%
16
30%
11
20%
0
0%
1
2%
54

4
9%
8
18%
12
27%
18
41%
0
0%
2
5%
44

4
24%
2
12%
5
29%
5
29%
1
6%
0
0%
17

1
5%
2
11%
8
42%
1
5%
2
11%
5
26%
19

7
33%
1
5%
6
29%
6
29%
1
5%
0
0%
21

1
4%
5
19%
10
38%
8
31%
0
0%
2
8%
26
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Characteristics of Gidget’s map do appear on the other seven maps. On Pairique’s
map, there is a cluster of synthesis, predicting, and confirming instances toward the end
of her first hour; this cluster is similar in character and geographic location to Gidget’s
cluster downhill from the launch point. Salvador, too, has a cluster of synthesis,
predicting, and confirming toward the end of his first hour, but in his case it occurs in the
highest corner of the field area. In Tank’s case, while there are a somewhat similar
number of instances of reasoning and model development as Gidget, the composition of
expressed thoughts differs; on his map, there are more instances of relating than appear
on hers. Fiamme has a small cluster of synthesis, relating, and predicting at the end of his
hour; but prior to that cluster, there are hardly any instances of these sub-codes at all.
Interestingly, Fiamme’s first instance of relating and synthesis occurred where
Gidget stopped first and had multiple instances of synthesis, predicting, and confirming.
Thus, it might not have been the outcrop that prompted Gidget’s extended sequence of
thoughts related to Reasoning and Model Development. Instead, the implication is that
Gidget and Fiamme were approaching the task in notably different ways: Gidget used the
first stop to develop some early synthesis and tests of her ideas; Fiamme elected to
postpone doing any prolonged amount of synthesis or testing until he had seen more of
the field area over the span of the first hour in the field.
The maps of Dingo and Samson are similar in their relative numbers of different
codes, but also in the distribution of those instances over time. Their instances of
synthesis and predicting are more isolated, not in larger clusters, and occurred somewhat
continuously over the course of the hour. Boca’s expressed thoughts are spatially quite
unlike those of the other seven participants whereby instances of sub-codes cluster
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together rather than occurring as multiple sub-codes within different clusters. Boca’s
expressed thoughts did include multiple instances of relating, synthesis, testing
(combining both predicting and confirming), and revising.
Ultimately, the message from the maps of these codes seems unclear. Gidget’s
data appear as one end of a spectrum with Boca’s on the other. The data for Pairique,
Salvador, Tank, and Fiamme all bear similarities with Gidget’s data, yet are also
distinctly different from hers and from each other’s; furthermore, among those five there
are no unifying similarities in terms of GPS track, expertise, or success in the task.
Samson and Dingo are another odd pair in terms of lack of similar GPS track, expertise,
and success in the task. Thus, it is possible that the coding scheme is not defined in such a
way as to enable teasing apart similarities (or dissimilarities) in the participants’
expressed thoughts in relation to reasoning and model development. A caveat, however,
is that these results are going to be contrasted later with comparable results for the
participants’ expressed thoughts when they are in the nose of the fold.
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Figure 4.5. Maps show instances of Reasoning and Model Development: inferring (Infer, lightest
shade of red); relating (Relat, medium shade of red); synthesizing (Synth, darkest shade of red);
predicting (Pred, lightest shade of blue); confirming (Confr, medium shade of blue); and revising
(Revis, darkest shade of blue). The GPS track for each participant is plotted above the pie charts.
If more than one code was applied for a particular GPS point, the pie chart is sub-divided. The
number next to the pie chart symbol indicates the number of instances of code that size symbol
represents. Note that the scale is different for inferring/relating/synthesizing data set versus the
testing/revising data set.
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Figure 4.5.—continued
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Figure 4.5.—continued
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Figure 4.5.—continued
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4.1.5 Spatial referencing
The video logs captured three different ways in which the participants referred to
their surroundings. The sub-codes of Spatial Referencing include: 1) noting one’s
location in three-dimensional space and on the two-dimensional map; 2) noting the
location of a landscape feature (natural or man-made) in three-dimensional space and on
the two-dimensional map without reference to one’s own location; and 3) relating to
space via comparing distance on the map (i.e. the scale) with distance on the ground (e.g.
pacing), by noting contour lines on the map and noting steepness of topography, or by
noting geographic direction on the map and in space.
Table 4.8 shows that the three experts (Fiamme, Gidget, and Tank) have similar
counts of expressed thoughts related to each of the spatial referencing sub-codes; this
similarity is present even though they take different paths through the field in the first
hour. They have nearly identical numbers of instances noting location of features and
relating to space; they vary, however, in the number of times they each noted their own
location. There is an additional important and notable caveat to the similarity of the
experts’ expressed thoughts related to spatial referencing. As mentioned in the previous
chapter, a visible action entirely idiosyncratic to Tank was the use of binoculars. The
statements that coincided with those binocular moments were assigned this general code
of Spatial Referencing and a sub-code of inspecting the landscape. Because this sub-code
was exclusive to him, however, it was not included in Table 4.8. This absence accounts
for the difference between the 42 instances of spatial referencing seen in the overview
and the 21 instances of spatial referencing seen here.
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The intermediates (Pairique and Samson) also happen to have similar counts of
the sub-codes of Spatial Referencing. Not only did they note their location the same
number of times, neither of them made any statements that were coded as relating to
space. They differed, however, in that Pairique had no instances of noting the location of
features while Samson did.
Table 4.8
Total count of instances of Spatial Referencing in first hour
Name
Fiamme (E)
Gidget (E)
Tank (E)
Pairique (I)
Samson (I)
Boca (N)
Dingo (N)
Salvador (N)

Noting
Location
9
56%
5
33%
12
57%
12
100%
12
71%
19
79%
13
33%
21
54%

Relating to
Space
5
31%
8
53%
8
38%
0
0%
0
0%
3
13%
25
63%
11
28%

Noting Features
2
13%
2
13%
1
5%
0
0%
5
29%
2
8%
2
5%
7
18%

Total
16
15
21
12
17
24
40
39

The intermediates (Pairique and Samson) also happen to have similar counts of
the codes of Spatial Referencing. Not only did they note their location the same number
of times, neither of them made any statements that were coded as relating to space. They
differed, however, in that Pairique also had no instances of noting the location of features
while Samson did.
This leaves the novices: Dingo, Salvador, and Boca have the first, second, and
third highest sum total of the sub-codes, respectively. Dingo had the single highest
number of instances of relating to space, while Salvador had the single highest number of
instances of noting his location. All three of them headed uphill from the launch point

323

(Figure 4.6). Salvador and Boca have more instances of noting location after they reach
the highest corner. In Dingo’s case, the high number of instances of relating to space
occurred at the beginning of her hour. These differences will be described in more detail
in the following sub-section, which looks at sub-codes of evaluating certainty.
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Figure 4.6. Maps show instances of Spatial Referencing: noting one’s own location (NBLoc,
green); relating to space (ReSpace, yellow); and noting location of a landscape feature (NBFea,
red). The GPS track for each participant is plotted above the pie charts. If more than one code
was applied for a particular GPS point, the pie chart is sub-divided. The number next to the pie
chart symbol indicates the number of instances of code that size symbol represents. Note that the
scale is different for collecting data set versus the recording data set.
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Figure 4.6.—continued
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Figure 4.6.—continued
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Figure 4.6.—continued
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4.1.6 Evaluating certainty
The evaluating certainty code is one code within the theme of Metacognition, and
it broadly reflects the participants’ self-assessments of how they are doing in the task.
Importantly, this code did not attempt to define statements as either certain or uncertain;
such a dichotomy was simply not possible based on the nature of their expressed
thoughts. Instead, this code is intended to capture the fact that expressions of certainty
vary. The sub-codes divide the participants’ self-assessments into four categories, with all
of them including a mention of a level of certainty (e.g. sure, unsure, guess) in their
observations or conclusions.
The four sub-codes include evaluating or expressing certainty in: 1) location
(whether it was their own location, the location of a stop point, or the location of a
feature) or their relating to space; 2) their field observations related to identifying rock
type, or identifying structural features of the rocks, or identifying contacts between rock
types; 3) their interpretations of their observations, their contact placements, or their
understanding of the underlying geologic structure of the field area; and 4) the relevance
or relative importance of their observations or interpretations. To provide some further
exposition of these sub-codes, Table 4.9 includes examples of the different types together
with illustrative quotations. Notably, there is an intended parallel structure between the
first three sub-codes and the codes for Spatial Referencing, Procedural and Declarative
Knowledge, and Reasoning and Model Development, respectively. The fourth sub-code
lacks any parallel with a sub-code of any other code, but it is instead more generally
meant to capture participants’ expressions that involved evaluating what data was
important to collect and whether they had collected that data correctly (or appropriately).
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In this final suite of comparisons of sub-codes, the story that emerges is that these
eight individuals varied greatly in the quantity (Table 4.10) and in the spatial distribution
(Figure 4.7) of their expressed thoughts related to these four sub-codes. Among the three
experts, Fiamme made hardly any expressions of certainty in the course of the hour, with
only a couple of comments related to any of the Evaluating Certainty sub-codes. Gidget
evaluated her interpretations and the relevance of her observations and interpretations.
Similar to Gidget, Tank made few comments related to evaluating certainty in location or
relating to space; unlike Gidget, though, he divided his remaining comments more
equally between certainty in observation, interpretations, and relevance of observations
and interpretations.
These Evaluating Certainty sub-code results augment previously noted individual
differences in the data for Samson and Dingo. In Samson’s case, there are a larger
number of instances of evaluating certainty in the relevance of his observations or
interpretations in the highest corner of the field area. This result is understood to be due
in part to his confusion over measuring strike and dip. The earlier-cited quote (section
4.1.3) occurred when he was in this corner of the field area attempting to measure the
orientation of foliation in the gneiss.
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Table 4.9
Examples of different types of expressed thoughts and sample quotations of evaluating
certainty sub-codes
Evaluating or
Expressing
Level of
Certainty in:
Location or
Relating to
Space


o

o

o


Observations
o

o

o
Interpretations


o

o

o

o

Relevance or
Importance


o

o

Different Types of Expressed Thoughts and Sample Quotations
Locating self or feature on topographic map or aerial photo and in space
Boca: “I'm guessing I'm somewhere in here.”
Relating to distance, contour lines, or geographic direction on topographic
map or aerial photo and in space
Salvador: “My problem is just not knowing how far I've walked.”
Identification of Contact at the Outcrop Scale
Tank: “I'm not gonna call that a contact at this point, that’d be a little too
cheeky. I don't mind putting a dotted line for a contact, but that strikes me
as absurd.”
Identification of Structural Rock Features at the Hand-sample or Outcrop
Scale
Gidget: “This is a shallower dip, though. I don't think there's any two ways
about it.”
Identification of Rock Types
Fiamme: “Yeah, this is definitely, we are definitely in Unit 3, the lowest
section here, sugary texture.”
Large or map-scale mental model (General Interpretations)
Dingo: “Oh, very fizzy, very fizzy. We'll assume that little rocks in the
ground are what's below the ground and not just rolled down the hill,
hopefully.”
Contact Placement
Tank: “Let's put this contact down. I'm dashing this puppy cause I don't
actually see it.”
Underlying Structure
Pairique: “So at this point, it certainly looks like a syncline.”
Confidence in quality of measurement
Dingo: “I can't have measured this right or I'm just looking at things
wrong.”
Method for recording data
Samson: “May as well confess to being slightly out of memory with the
use of the Brunton.”
Confidence in using rock for measurement or observation (e.g. in place or
not)
Pairique: “So it's probably just float and I'm going to leave it alone.”
Confidence in strategy (e.g. whether it is necessary to go to certain
location or make a certain observation)
Gidget: “I really haven't checked the mineralogy. But it doesn't matter
here cause I know we only have one metamorphic unit.”
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Table 4.10
Total count of instances of evaluating certainty in first hour
Name
Fiamme (E)
Gidget (E)
Tank (E)
Pairique (I)
Samson (I)
Boca (N)
Dingo (N)
Salvador (N)

Location
2 33%
3
8%
2
4%
1
3%
3
8%
5 23%
20 32%
9 25%

Observations
3
50%
5
14%
20
38%
22
61%
6
17%
9
41%
20
32%
15
42%

Interpretations
1
17%
14
38%
14
27%
3
8%
5
14%
2
9%
6
10%
7
19%

Relevance
0
0%
15
41%
16
31%
10
28%
22
61%
6
27%
17
27%
5
14%

Total
6
37
52
36
36
22
63
36

Dingo was previously noted to have a high number of instances of relating to
space near the launch point. Now it appears that those instances were coupled with
multiple instances of evaluating certainty. Given the anomalous nature of these events, it
is interesting to investigate the corresponding transcript to understand what these
instances represent. Indeed, Dingo became severely “disoriented” (her word) when, based
on what is visible in the video, she is facing south while she thinks she is facing north:
“Don't naturally have a feel for north and south. And sorta get a little thrown off
when I first start in the field, figuring out which way feels like which. … Well. So
I guess I'm gonna go with what my Brunton says and not rely too much on…
(inaudible). Just not gonna rely too much on the drawing of the fence on the map
… I'm facing north. … So, I'm a little thrown off and I'm a little disoriented
starting out. Hopefully, I'll be recognizing more features as I keep going. So, I'm
just gonna assume north is up, the y-axis as shown on the paper. I'm gonna map it
based off how many degrees from that, based on what I measure with my Brunton
and not worry about the marking on the map on the, how the fence is drawn on
the map. [16:53-19:28]”
She eventually gets herself correctly oriented; “Ok. So, I'm gonna go stand by this fence
and see if this really is north-south. It's just in my mind that it feels like it's not [23:21].
Ok, yeah, this is north-south [23:55].” These passages are useful for understanding the
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large clusters of spatial referencing, instances as well as evaluations of certainty in
location instances at the start of Dingo’s hour in the field.
Finally, with respect to the other three participants—Pairique, Salvador, and
Boca—all three of them vary quite distinctly from each other and from the other five.
Boca had few instances of evaluating certainty. Salvador mostly made expressions related
to the certainty of his observations or interpretations; however, as he worked his way
downhill away from the highest corner, those expressions shifted to evaluating certainty
in location or relating to space. Pairique, by comparison, mostly expressed levels of
certainty in observations or relevance of observations or interpretations. In particular, she
repeatedly questioned whether or not a rock was a piece of float and whether the sample
was appropriate to use for making an observation. Thus, somewhat like the results for
Reasoning and Model Development and Spatial Referencing, expressed thoughts related
to Evaluating Certainty in the first hour were highly individualized. Again, though, these
results are yet to be compared to the results for participants’ expressed thoughts during
the track through the nose of the fold.
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Figure 4.7. Maps show instances of evaluating or expressing certainty: location or space (ECLoc,
blue); observations (ECObs, yellow); interpretations (ECInt, purple); and relevance (ECPro, red).
The GPS track for each participant is plotted above the pie charts. If more than one code was
applied for a particular GPS point, the pie chart is sub-divided. The number next to the pie chart
symbol indicates the number of instances of code that size symbol represents.
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Figure 4.7.—continued
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Figure 4.7.—continued
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Figure 4.7.—continued
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4.1.7 Summary for the first hour
In summary, the participants mentally and physically situated themselves at the
outset of solving this geologic mapping task by primarily, though by no means
exclusively, focusing on outcrop scale observations and interpretations. Instances of
Procedural and Declarative Knowledge and Metacognition constitute half or more of
participants’ expressed thoughts in the first hour (e.g. Reasoning and Model
Development, Spatial Referencing, and Other). Within Procedural and Declarative
Knowledge, expressed thoughts are focused primarily on identification of rocks and
identification of structural features. Although participants cross multiple contacts, they do
not identify most of them explicitly; the exception appears to be the contact between Unit
1 and Unit 4 in the highest corner of the field area. The instances of Other also reflect the
fact that participants spent a not insignificant amount of their attention on getting
organized and preparing for the task at hand. Additionally, lack of instances of Collecting
Data does not necessarily imply lack of instances of thoughts about the rocks. On the
slope going uphill from the launch point to the highest corner of the field area,
participants tended to have less direct contact with rocks although they were expressing
thoughts about the rocks. This implies that they were looking and making observations as
they went but they did not need to stop and pick up many samples of rock.
With respect to the participants’ success in the task (i.e. map score) and
participants’ expressed thoughts or visible actions, no particular patterns emerged in
terms of the instances of expressed thoughts. In terms of visible actions, though,
participants who had higher map scores tended to have more instances of Recording Data
than the participants who had lower map scores. From the perspective of embodied
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cognition, recording notes and making sketchesand such would be examples of offloading their data rather than trying to maintain all their thoughts regarding the field area
in their head. Could this pattern appear in results from another location in the field area or
over longer time scales? In terms of looking at participants’ expertise in geologic
mapping and participants’ expressed thoughts or visible actions, there were no particular
patterns that emerged with respect to visible actions. This pattern, too, will be tested in
later results.
Lastly, the participants’ expressed thoughts as related to the theme of Reasoning
and Model Development or expressed thoughts as related to the codes of evaluations of
certainty in the first hour appear highly individualized with no clear patterns either in
terms of success or of expertise. Now the question is how those compare at a later time in
the mapping process.

4.2 Exploring the fold: A multiple‐case, multiple units of analysis case
study
Toward the end of Tank’s first hour in the field, he reflected on what he had seen
thus far and made the following comment: “I just don't see anything that's particularly
anomalous here; course, I've been doing this close to half an hour. Kind of classic ‘what
is going on?’ phase.” In this section, the focus shifts from looking at that initial “what is
going on?” phase to a time later in the mapping day when participants encounter a
critical geological area.
Recall that the field area to be mapped in this study included three Paleozoic units
in a plunging syncline (Figure 4.1). The rock units bend around from one limb of the
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fold to the other in a nearly complete and well-exposed outcrop located at the low
elevation end of the field area. All eight participants spent time in this area, but not all of
them correctly identified the area as the nose of the syncline. Four of the participants who
recorded video logs correctly identified the syncline; the other four did not (Table 4.11).
Consequently, the nose of the syncline makes an interesting and an obvious choice as a
means to answer the secondary research questions: How do geologists’ epistemic actions
and expressed thoughts at the beginning of a task compare with their actions at a later
time in the task—for example, when they are in a geologically significant portion of the
field area? How does use of time while mapping or statements evaluating or expressing
certainty relate to expertise and relate to success in the task?
This section includes data similar to that presented for the participants’ first hour
in the field. In this case, the data are spatially, rather than temporally, constrained. The
spatial constraint is approximate. Figure 4.8 shows the tracks of all eight participants; the
points in white denote the portions of the tracks that were isolated for analysis in this
section. This was done by visual inspection. Participants arrived in the area coming from
different directions and left the area going in different directions. The general intent was
to limit the selected track segments to the portions where they overlapped. While the
tracks are not of equal length, they generally overlap in terms of the area covered.
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Table 4.11
Summary of participants’ geologic map as described in post-mapping interview14

Name

Summary description* with emphasis on participants’ geologic interpretation
of the relationship between the three Paleozoic units which are in a plunging
syncline (Figure 4.1)

Fiamme (E)

Three Paleozoic units in a plunging syncline with one limb cut by two parallel
faults (implied to be thrust faults); one of the faults brings the Precambrian unit
in contact with the Paleozoic units; the other fault truncates the three Paleozoic
units, repeating part of the syncline

Gidget (E)

Three Paleozoic units in syncline with several minor faults cutting nose and
one limb; one limb is cut by a thrust fault that brings Precambrian unit in
contact with the Paleozoic units; a strike slip fault comes off the thrust in one
corner of the map area

Tank (E)

A “layer cake” of three steeply dipping Paleozoic units in stratigraphic order;
Paleozoic units are offset by a right-lateral transform fault; a vertical fault puts
the Precambrian unit up-section of the Paleozoic units

Pairique (I)

Three Paleozoic units in plunging syncline with one limb cut by fault that
brings Precambrian unit in contact with the Paleozoic units

Samson (I)

An anticline has been cut by a series of thrust sheets, resulting in three
repeated sections of partial anticline; the three Paleozoic units were thrust over
the Precambrian

Boca (N)

No coherent overall model –description includes which rock units are where,
but explanation for the location of the rock units is vague, involving
deposition of Paleozoic units, tectonic activity (folding, faulting, and uplift)
and weathering; contact between Precambrian and Paleozoic units identified as
not conformable

Dingo (N)

Three Paleozoic units in a syncline with a fault (of unspecified type) that
brings Precambrian unit in contact with the Paleozoic units; small faults occur
in Unit 1

Salvador (N)

A “layer cake” of three steeply dipping Paleozoic units in stratigraphic order;
a thrust/reverse fault brings the Precambrian unit in contact with Unit 1. The
fault wraps around and cuts off the end Paleozoic units at the lowest elevation
end of the field area

* Summary excludes geographic orientation of the structure in order to preserve the anonymity
of the location

14

Note that these summaries are derived from the participants’ explanation of their maps during the postmapping interview. One of the findings from the larger study is that participants were able to articulate
more complete, and sometimes correct, understanding of the geology than what they drew on their map.
This was also the case for some of the participants who recorded video logs. Thus, these summaries do not
necessarily reflect the mapping score reported in the previous chapter. In other words, some participants
mental models merited a higher score than was possible to assign based on the map alone.
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GPS points in white indicate the extent of the track identified as the portion the
participant traversed in the area around the nose of the fold. The geologic rock unit
contacts are underneath the tracks in red.
Figure 4.8. GPS tracks around the nose of the fold for all eight participants who recorded
video logs

All eight participants arrived in the area of the nose of the fold sometime after
having been in the field for three hours. Table 4.12 summarizes time that had elapsed
from when the participants entered the field area to when they arrived in the nose; the
table also includes the distance and elapsed time of the video-log segments used for
analysis in this section. The data for time, however, need to be taken as approximate for
some of the participants. As it happened, one of the members of the research team was
seated in this region of the field area with a supply of water for the participants to use to
refill their water bottles. Several of the eight participants stopped, not just to refill their
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bottles but also to have short conversations with the researcher. These informal
conversations were about topics such as the weather or what the researcher was reading;
participants did not discuss with the researcher their ideas about the geology of the field
area. Those stops were on the order of a few minutes but generally less than five; those
who stopped included Gidget, Tank, Salvador, Samson, and Boca. Samson also stopped
his recording for 24 minutes while at the water stop. The coding of the GPS track
excluded the portion of Samson’s track that occurred during that 24 minute interval.
Table 4.12
Summary of time in the area of the nose of the fold
Elapsed Time at
Distance (ft) Covered in
Arrival in Area
Video Segments for the Elapsed Time for the
Name
(Hours:Minutes)
Area
Area (minutes)
3:46
3530
80.7
Fiamme (E)
4:19
2292
35.8
Gidget (E)
3:45
2764
45.5
Tank (E)
3:04
2755
39.5
Pairique (I)
3:08
1797
17.0
Samson (I)
3:09
1840
22.2
Boca (N)
5:00
2516
42.7
Dingo (N)
4:47
2861
38.2
Salvador (N)
Data for distance covered and elapsed time in area based on the time spent in the nose of
the fold as recorded by the video logs.

The average duration of the video logs in the area of the fold was around 40
minutes, but there was a large variation. Fiamme’s video log in this part of the field area
is almost four times as long as either Samson’s or Boca’s video log in the area.
Additionally, Salvador had a somewhat different path through the field area. It is
Salvador’s track that is the lone track to cross the nose of the fold perpendicularly; most
of the others follow contact lines—again, whether they explicitly acknowledged the
contacts or not—and traveled toward the farthest downhill point of the nose before
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turning around and going uphill again. All the paths, however, cross from one side of the
fold axis to the other.
The different amounts of time spent in the area limit how much importance can be
ascribed to the counts of themes or codes. This is true for comparisons across participants
as well as comparisons for the same participant. In other words, it is necessary to
acknowledge not only was Fiamme’s video log in the area longer than anyone else’s, but
it was also longer than an hour.
To facilitate more appropriate comparisons of the data, counts of codes (or
themes) for expressed thoughts or counts of codes for visible actions were converted into
rates of code (or theme) per five minutes. The selection of five minutes was somewhat
arbitrary; a rate based on counts per minute commonly yielded values less than one, for
which it was difficult to develop an intuitive understanding of the significance of the
results. Rates of counts per five minutes were calculated for each code for each
participant’s time in the nose of the fold as well as each participant’s first hour in the
field. In the following sections, instead of reporting the calculated rates, the differences
between the rates are reported. The rate of the code (or theme) from the nose of the fold
was subtracted from the rate of the code for the first hour. See Appendix K for the
calculated rates for each code.
4.2.1 Overview
Table 4.13 and Figure 4.9 show the number of instances and locations of the five
major themes for each of the participants’ expressed thoughts during their time in the
nose of the fold, respectively. All of the five themes are still evident within the
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participants’ expressed thoughts at this later time and place of the mapping task.
Spatially, though, none of the “blossoms” observed in the first hour are visible here. This
may be due to geography as well as the particular display of data shown here. The tracks
of several of the participants form a tight V-shape, as they consciously (or explicitly
articulated) or not followed from one limb of the fold to the other.
Table 4.13
Total count of number of instances of each theme in expressed thoughts for participants
during their time in the nose of the fold

Name
Fiamme (E)
Gidget (E)
Tank (E)
Pairique (I)
Samson (I)
Boca (N)
Dingo (N)
Salvador (N)

Procedural
and
Declarative
Knowledge
77
15
20
38
6
4
25
39

Reasoning
and Model
Spatial
Development Referencing Metacognition
50
38
56
34
4
71
38
8
73
18
6
28
17
2
31
6
18
42
29
19
23
26
15
69

Other
4
2
4
0
5
1
6
8

Total
225
126
143
90
61
71
102
157

Table 4.14 shows the difference in rates of the themes per five minutes from the
first hour with rates for the nose of the fold. For the most part, the differences are
positive, indicating the rates were higher during the first hour. This makes sense from the
perspective that fatigue may have meant that they were saying less later in the day
relative to earlier. However, there were exceptions. Fiamme, Dingo, and Salvador all
have higher rates of reasoning and model development during their time in the nose of
the fold in comparison to their first hour. Fiamme, in particular, has a higher rate of
instances of the theme. By comparison, Salvador’s, and to some extent Dingo’s negative
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differences are so small, they might be taken as being comparable to no change; indeed,
Samson’s might as well, but his happened to fall on the slightly positive side rather than
negative.
Table 4.14

Gidget (E)

Tank (E)

Pairique (I)

Samson (I)

Boca (N)

Dingo (N)

Salvador (N)

Procedural and
Declarative
Knowledge
Reasoning and
Model
Development
Spatial
Referencing
Metacognition
Other

Fiamme (E)

Difference in rates per five minutes for each theme between first hour and during the time
in the nose of the fold

1.73

1.90

1.93

1.98

3.71

5.09

3.37

1.92

-2.10

2.98

1.31

1.63

0.36

1.21

-0.21

-0.03

-1.02

0.92

3.00

0.63

1.29

0.88

2.16

2.07

-0.80
0.09

2.77
3.04

7.48
2.09

2.85
1.83

6.16
1.52

2.98
1.10

8.41
0.54

1.81
2.42
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Figure 4.9. Maps show instances of five themes in expressed thoughts during
participants’ time in the nose of the fold: procedural and declarative knowledge (PDK;
green); reasoning and model development (RMD; magenta); spatial referencing (SpRef;
blue); evaluating certainty (EvalCrt; yellow); and other (Other; black). The GPS track for
each participant is plotted above the pie charts. If more than one code was applied to the
expressed thoughts for a particular GPS point, the pie chart is sub-divided. The number
next to the pie chart symbol indicates the number of instances of code that size symbol
represents.
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Figure 4.9—continued
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Figure 4.9—continued
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Figure 4.9—continued
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4.2.2 Collecting and recording data
There are no particular patterns in the types and distribution of visible action
instances of Collecting and Recording Data based on expertise. The experts vary from
one to another, as do the intermediates, as do the novices. With respect to map score, in
the first hour, one observation was that the participants who had higher map scores
(Fiamme, Gidget, Pairique, and Dingo) all had more instances of recording data than
those who had lower map scores (Tank, Salvador, Samson, and Boca). In the nose of the
fold, Fiamme, Pairique, and Dingo do have more instances of data collection than Tank,
Salvador, Samson, and Boca (Table 4.15; Figure 4.10). Gidget, however, does not. In
addition, Gidget also does less data collection in this area of the field. These differences
that Gidget exhibits will be revisited in the upcoming sections, where her thoughts and
actions will distinguish her time in the fold from those of the other participants.
Table 4.15
Total count of number of visible action instances of Collecting and Recording Data for
participants during their time in the nose of the fold
Collecting Data
Name
Fiamme (E)
Gidget (E)
Tank (E)
Pairique (I)
Samson (I)
Boca (N)
Dingo (N)
Salvador (N)

Breaking/
Scratching
Rocks
6
0
6
0
1
2
8
10

Inspecting
Rocks
9
3
7
0
0
0
13
3

Measuring
Orientation
12
2
1
8
0
0
5
2
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Recording Data
Testing
with
HCl
5
2
4
0
0
1
3
0

Writing in
Notebook
6
1
0
12
0
0
6
3

Writing
on Map
9
3
6
7
2
5
10
6

Fiamme, Gidget, Pairique, and Dingo all have multiple instances of measuring
orientation and they all mapped a syncline. Tank and Salvador also have one and two
instances, respectively, and yet neither of them mapped a syncline. Measuring orientation
would understandably yield data that would be helpful if the participant’s mental model
involved a syncline. The question of what Tank and Salvador measured in the nose of the
fold and how they interpreted those measurements is a subject to be addressed later in
this chapter. Samson and Boca have no instances of measuring orientation, and neither
mapped a syncline. However, as noted previously, this may be due to their avowed
difficulty with remembering how to measure orientation of bedding.
Looking at the differences in rates of Collecting and Recording Data in Table
4.16, it is noticeable that all but three of the differences between -1 and 0 (cells shaded
red) or 0 and 1 (cells shaded blue). This suggests participants’ time use at outcrops within
the first hour were similar with their time use at outcrops during their time in the nose of
the fold. This result will be explored further in the analysis of the full day for the four
participants selected for the multiple cases, single unit of analysis case study.
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Table 4.16

Gidget (E)

Tank (E)

Pairique (I)

Samson (I)

Boca (N)

Dingo (N)

Salvador (N)

Breaking/Scratching
Rocks
Inspecting Rocks
Measuring
Orientation
Testing with HCl
Writing in
Notebook
Writing on Map

Fiamme (E)

Difference in rates per five minutes for Collecting and Recording Data during first hour
and during the time in the nose of the fold

0.4

0.2

0.3

0.5

0.2

1.7

-0.4

-0.6

0.7

0.1

-0.1

1.7

0.3

2.2

-0.4

0.5

-0.2

0.1

0.3

0.0

0.3

0.0

0.4

0.1

0.1

-0.1

0.0

0.2

0.3

0.7

-0.1

0.0

0.9

0.9

0.0

0.5

0.3

0.2

0.5

0.6

0.0

0.9

0.3

0.5

0.6

0.8

0.8

0.2
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Figure 4.10. Maps show instances of participants Collecting and Recording Data in the
nose of the fold: breaking rock with a hammer or scratching surface of rock (Break;
yellow); inspecting a hand sample of a rock or outcrop (Inspect; orange); measuring
orientation (StkeDip; pink); testing a hand sample or outcrop of rock with HCl (TestHCl;
blue); writing in notebook (WritNb; white); and writing on the aerial photographs or the
topographic map (WritMap; black). The GPS track for each participant is plotted above
the pie charts. If more than one code was applied for a particular GPS point, the pie chart
is sub-divided. The number next to the pie chart symbol indicates the number of instances
of code that size symbol represents. Note that the scale is different for collecting data set
versus the recording data set.
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Figure 4.10.—continued
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Figure 4.10.—continued
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Figure 4.10.—continued
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4.2.3 Procedural and declarative knowledge
The total counts of Procedural and Declarative Knowledge data sub-codes vary
among the eight participants (Table 4.17 and Table 4.18). For most of the participants,
the rate of identifying rock decreased; the differences in rates from the first hour to the
rates from the nose of the fold were positive. By comparison, the rates were more similar
for the identifying rock features, with differences close to zero for all participants.
Among the four participants who mapped a syncline, there are instances of
identifying rock features (e.g. bedding); such observations would be expected in this area
where the bedding changes around the nose of the fold. However, there is a slight
peculiarity about Gidget and Salvador’s data. Gidget’s instances of identifying rock or
structural features are similar in number and distribution to the instances for Tank, and to
a lesser extent Samson and Boca—three participants who did not map a syncline. That is,
Gidget does not resemble the others who did map a syncline. By comparison, Salvador,
although he did not map a syncline, actually resembles the others who did. His relative
proportions of identifying rock type and identifying structural features are similar to those
for Fiamme, Pairique, and Dingo; the four of them express more thoughts on the
structural features of the rocks rather than on the identification of the rocks. Thus, it is not
only Gidget who emerges as a somewhat unusual case, but Salvador does as well.
Consequently, Salvador’s differences will also be revisited in upcoming sections.
Figure 4.16 shows the instances of Procedural and Declarative Knowledge
relative to the actual geologic contacts between the units as well as the contacts that each
participant drew in the area. Among the eight participants, Dingo is the only one to have
an instance of identifying a contact between rock units in the nose of the fold (Table 4.15
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and Figure 4.11). These results—in this case, the absence of instances—illustrate that the
participants were not explicitly articulating that they were standing on contacts, despite
the fact that many of their tracks coincided with the actual contacts between the rock
units as well as with where they drew contacts between the units. Notice that in Table
4.19, the differences in rates for identifying contacts were close to zero; for these data,
however, that was because there were relatively few instances of identifying contacts
then as well.
Table 4.17
Total count of number of instances of Procedural and Declarative Knowledge codes for
participants during their time in the nose of the fold

Name
Fiamme(E)
Gidget (E)
Tank (E)
Pairique (I)
Samson (I)
Boca (N)
Dingo (N)
Salvador (N)

Identifying
Rocks
23
7
14
10
3
4
9
9

Identifying
Contacts
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0

Identifying
Rock
Features
39
3
5
22
3
0
15
23

Taking and
Recording
Measurements
42
11
2
15
0
0
11
23

Importantly, these results provide no information as to whether or not participants
were discussing contacts at a larger or map-scale level. Absence of the identification of
contacts sub-code is not necessarily an indication either way. Thus, a reasonable
argument could be made that the coding scheme is faulty if it is not capturing broad-scale
expressed thoughts explicitly related to the contacts between the rock units. Alternatively,
a counter argument is that the definitions for the sub-codes in Procedural and
Declarative Knowledge were perfectly adequate as formulated. The intent of these sub359

codes was to document expressed thoughts that were focused on the hand-sample or
outcrop scale. In this sense, then, the absence of the code indicates that participants were
not mapping contacts in this part of the field area by trying to identify where one rock
unit ended and another began.
Table 4.18

Gidget (E)

Tank (E)

Pairique (I)

Samson (I)

Boca (N)

Dingo (N)

Salvador
(N)

Identifying
Rocks
Identifying
Contacts
Identifying
Rock Features
Taking and
Recording
Measurements

Fiamme (E)

Difference in rates per five minutes for Procedural and Declarative Knowledge during
first hour and during the time in the nose of the fold

1.8

1.1

0.7

1.6

3.2

4.9

1.4

1.4

0.0

0.1

0.7

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.2

0.2

-0.9

0.5

0.6

0.4

0.3

0.0

0.9

-0.5

1.1

0.5

2.2

0.7

0.2

0.0

1.0

0.8
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Figure 4.11. Maps show instances of participants’ expressed thoughts related to
Procedural and Declarative Knowledge in the nose of the fold: identification of rock
types (IDRock, blue); identification of contacts (IDCon, yellow); and identification of
structural features (IDStruc, red). The number next to the pie chart symbol indicates the
number of instances of code that size symbol represents. The GPS track for each
participant is plotted above the pie charts. If more than one code was applied for a
particular GPS point, the pie chart is sub-divided. The number next to the pie chart
symbol indicates the number of instances of code that size symbol represents.
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Figure 4.11.—continued
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Figure 4.11.—continued
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Figure 4.11.—continued
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4.2.4 Reasoning and model development
In the first hour, Fiamme’s few instances of the Reasoning and Model
Development sub-codes stood in contrast to the larger number of instances expressed by
the other experts Gidget and Tank. Their sub-code results, along with the general
individuality of the results for the first hour, raised the question of whether the definitions
of the sub-codes were too coarse to distinguish similarities between participants. When
taken as a whole, the results for the nose of the fold do differ from the results for the first
hour. Whereas before there were eight individual participants, there are now two
contrasting data sets: a more heterogeneous one for the first hour and a more homogenous
one for the nose of the fold.
The expressed thoughts of most of the participants are remarkable in two ways:
they have a similar number of instances of prediction and a general absence of comments
relating their observations to observations from the walk-through. This pattern extends
across expertise level as well as map score, although Boca is an exception with no
instances of prediction in the nose of the fold. By comparison, in the first hour, all of the
participants had multiple counts of relating their observations and the variance in the
number of instances of predictions was greater. These results indicate that for all of the
participants there was some shift in types of expressed thoughts over time.
The sub-codes of Reasoning and Model Development illustrate variations in the
significance of the nose of the fold for the participants (Table 4.19 and Figure 4.12). For
Gidget, the sub-code with the highest count is confirming. Gidget has the highest number
of instances of confirming among the eight participants. She is the only participant with
more instances of confirming than revising, and she has one of the lowest counts of
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synthesis. This observation is reinforced by the negative difference in her rate of
confirming during her first hour with her rate of confirming during her time in the nose of
the fold (Table 4.20). These results add up to a picture that Gidget is not using her in time
in this area of the field to develop her model, nor does she have many instances of
needing to revise it. Rather, she is refining and confirming an existing model. This helps
to frame Gidget’s results in previous sub-sections with the low number of instances of
sub-codes for Collecting and Recording Data as well as Procedural and Declarative
Knowledge.
Salvador, by comparison, was primarily engaged in testing (via predicting and
confirming) and revising his large-scale thoughts, with little additional new synthesis.
This observation, too, is reinforced with a negative difference between in his rate of
revising during his first hour relative to his rate of revising during his time in the nose of
the fold (Table 4.20). For the others, their thoughts are distributed across multiple subcodes—synthesis, predicting, confirming, revising—suggesting that their large-scale
thoughts about the area were being both developed and refined in the area. Indeed, many
of the participants have a negative difference between their rates of confirming and
revising during their first hour with the rates of confirming and revising during their time
in the nose of the fold.
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Table 4.19
Total count of number of instances of Reasoning and Model Development codes for
participants during their time in the nose of the fold
Name
Fiamme (E)
Gidget (E)
Tank (E)
Pairique (I)
Samson (I)
Boca (N)
Dingo (N)
Salvador(N)

Inferring
3
3
1
1
0
0
5
0

Relating
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0

Synthesis
25
4
14
7
8
5
12
1

Predicting
11
7
11
8
6
0
7
5

Confirming
0
14
4
3
3
3
5
5

Revising
16
8
11
1
4
1
6
16

Table 4.20

Gidget (E)

Tank (E)

Pairique (I)

Samson (I)

Boca (N)

Dingo (N)

Salvador (N)

Inferring
Relating
Synthesis
Predicting
Confirming
Revising

Fiamme (E)

Difference in rates per five minutes for codes of Reasoning and Model Development
during first hour and during the time in the nose of the fold

-0.2
0.3
-1.0
-0.4
0.0
-1.0

0.7
0.2
2.9
0.6
-0.5
-0.5

1.0
1.0
0.5
0.2
-0.2
-0.6

0.3
0.7
0.6
1.0
-0.2
0.1

0.3
0.1
-0.1
0.0
-0.1
-0.2

0.1
0.2
0.4
0.1
0.0
0.4

0.3
0.1
-0.2
0.1
-0.2
-0.4

0.1
0.4
0.8
0.4
-0.3
-0.8
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Figure 4.12. Maps show instances of Reasoning and Model Development in participants’
expressed thoughts in the nose of the fold: inferring (Infer, lightest shade of red); relating
(Relat, medium shade of red); synthesizing (Synth, darkest shade of red); predicting
(Pred, lightest shade of blue); confirming (Conf, medium shade of blue); and revising
(Revis, darkest shade of blue). The GPS track for each participant is plotted above the
pie charts. If more than one code was applied for a particular GPS point, the pie chart is
sub-divided. The number next to the pie chart symbol indicates the number of instances
of code that size symbol represents. Note that the scale is different for
inferring/relating/synthesizing data set versus the testing/revising data set.
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Figure 4.12—continued
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Figure 4.12—continued
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Figure 4.12—continued
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4.2.5 Spatial referencing
Participants continued to note their own location as well as the location of
features on the landscape when they were in the nose of the fold (Table 4.21 and Figure
4.13). Absent, however, were many instances of the sub-code relating to space. This
contrasts with the multiple instances of relating to space in the first hour. In particular,
there is no further evidence of Dingo’s striking difficulty at the beginning of the task;
there is a large positive difference in her rate of relating space in the first hour relative to
her rate of relating to space during her time in the nose of the fold (Table 4.22). For all of
the participants, an interpretation of this difference is that they had less need to refer to
distance or contours so explicitly after they had been in the field for several hours. It was
perhaps the case that by that time in the day they were comfortable relating distance or
contours on the map with distance and topography in space.
Table 4.21
Total count of number of instances of Spatial Referencing codes for participants during
their time in the nose of the fold
Name
Fiamme (E)
Gidget (E)
Pairique (I)
Dingo (N)
Tank (E)
Salvador (N)
Samson (I)
Boca (N)

Noting Location

Relating to Space

Noting Features

17
2
6
6
5
12
2
9

2
0
0
0
0
1
0
4

30
2
0
13
3
2
0
5

An interpretation related to this is that participants may have had less need to
relate to space because it was easier to locate their position in the nose of the fold than it
was to locate their position in the upper elevation portion of the field area. This
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possibility will be explored further in the next section with the addition of the
participants’ expressed thoughts related to certainty in location and relating to space.
Table 4.22

Gidget (E)

Tank (E)

Pairique (I)

Samson (I)

Boca (N)

Dingo (N)

Salvador (N)

Noting Location
Relating to Space
Noting Features

Fiamme (E)

Difference in rates per five minutes for codes of Spatial Referencing during first hour and
during the time in the nose of the fold

-0.3
0.3
-1.7

0.3
0.7
0.0

0.6
0.7
0.1

0.6
0.0
-0.8

0.7
0.0
0.2

0.8
0.2
0.0

1.0
2.1
0.2

1.2
0.7
0.3

Another observation from the first hour was that the experts and the intermediates
were fairly similar in their instances of the Spatial Referencing sub-codes, and generally
expressed fewer thoughts about location or space than did the novices. Note, too, that
Tank’s total number of instances of Spatial Referencing (Figure 4.9 and Table 4.21)
matches the sum of the instances of noting location and noting features; he made no use
of his binoculars while in the nose of the fold. Moreover, each novice was quite different
from the other two. Although the absolute number of instances of the sub-codes is
markedly lower for most of the participants, the results for the nose of the fold are
generally consistent with the results for the first hour: experts and intermediates, as a
combined group, have fewer instances of noting location (both their own and of
landscape features) than do the novices. Fiamme is an exception. He has high number of
instances of noting location (again, both his own and of landscape features) during his
time in the field. The significance of this difference is not immediately clear. The result is
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likely particular to him; it is simply a reflection that as part of his other expressed
thoughts, he made numerous references to location.

Figure 4.13. Maps show instances of Spatial Referencing during participants’ time in the
nose of the fold: noting one’s own location (NBLoc, green); relating to space (ReSpace,
yellow); and noting location of a landscape feature (NBFea, red). The GPS track for each
participant is plotted above the pie charts. If more than one code was applied for a
particular GPS point, the pie chart is sub-divided. The number next to the pie chart
symbol indicates the number of instances of code that size symbol represents. Note that
the scale is different for collecting data set versus the recording data set.
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Figure 4.13.—continued
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Figure 4.13.—continued
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Figure 4.13.—continued
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4.2.6 Evaluating certainty
Of the eight, Boca and Dingo (two novices) are the only participants to evaluate
certainty in location while in the nose of the fold (Table 4.23 and Figure 4.14). Previously
the question was raised as to whether it was more difficult to locate one’s position in the
upper half of the field area than it was to do so in the area around the nose of the fold.
Difficulty in locating position may be due to individual factors such as experience
reading and interpreting aerial photos or topographic maps, or to external factors such as
resolution of the aerial photo or the contour interval of the topographic map. Another
challenge could be visibility within the field area. This latter possibility is actually
something that can be tested in the area, whereas the other possibilities are less
constrainable.
Table 4.23
Total count of number of instances of Evaluating or Expressing Certainty sub-codes
during participants’ time in the nose of the fold
Name
Fiamme (E)
Gidget (E)
Tank (E)
Pairique (I)
Samson (I)
Boca (N)
Dingo (N)
Salvador (N)

Location
0
0
0
0
0
4
1
0

Observations
6
3
1
6
0
0
1
15

Interpretations
6
11
7
2
1
0
6
2

Relevance
3
1
0
1
0
0
0
1

In order to see whether variations in visibility may inform an understanding of the
instances of evaluating certainty in location or relating to space, two “viewshed” maps
were made. These maps are based on topography and vegetation and show which regions
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are visible and which are not, for a given point in the field area (Figure 4.15).These
viewsheds illustrate that at different points that participants traversed in the first hour, the
visibility of the whole field area varied greatly, from good to poor15. By contrast, the nose
of the fold afforded a fairly good view of large portions of the field area. Thus the
viewshed maps support the supposition that variations in expressions of certainty in
location may be related to variations in visibility. Again, though, visibility was almost
certainly not likely to be the only factor in participants’ expressions of certainty in their
location or relating to space.
There is a temporal possibility to be considered here in addition to the spatial
possibilities. Many of the participants commented in the interviews that they needed to
orient themselves to the field area and get a “feel” for the size and orientation at the start
of the task. Indeed, this possibility is also reinforced with results Table 4.24 in the
previous section; the general positive difference between the rate of relating to space in
the first hour relative to the rate of relating to space in the second hour speaks to this
sense of getting a “feel” for the area.
Overall, while participants were in the nose of the fold, they made few statements
in which they evaluated certainty in their location, observations, interpretations, or
relevance of observations and interpretations (Table 4.24 and Figure 4.14). The
differences in rates of the Evaluating Certainty codes in the nose of the fold relative to the
first hour were almost uniformly lower for all but Fiamme (Table 4.24). The last of these
four sub-codes, certainty in relevance of observations or interpretations, had been one of
15

In figure 4.15c, visibility is non-existent from the ridge. Based on the view of the area as seen in the
video logs, the actual visibility depends greatly on the participant’s position on the ridge. Once one gets
further onto the slope, the visibility is not nearly as poor as shown in the viewshed.
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the prominent sub-codes for all but Fiamme and Boca in the first hour; it all but
disappears in participants’ expressed thoughts in the nose of the fold.
Alternatively, as was raised with the sub-code for identification of contacts, the
definitions of these sub-codes may not be capturing how and to what extent the
participants were expressing certainty. These two possibilities aside, the decrease in the
number of instances may reflect a real decrease in these expressed thoughts. These
alternatives will be explored further in the remaining sections of this chapter.
Table 4.24

Gidget (E)

Tank (E)

Pairique (I)

Samson (I)

Boca (N)

Dingo (N)

Salvador (N)

Location
Observations
Interpretations
Relevance

Fiamme (E)

Difference in rates per five minutes for codes of Evaluating Certainty during first hour
and during the time in the nose of the fold

0.2
-0.1
-0.3
-0.2

0.3
0.2
0.5
1.2

0.2
1.6
0.7
1.3

0.1
1.5
0.1
0.8

0.3
0.5
0.4
1.8

0.2
0.8
0.2
0.5

1.6
1.6
0.1
1.4

0.8
0.3
0.5
0.4
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Figure 4.14. Maps show instances of Evaluating or Expressing Certainty codes during
participants’ time in the nose of the fold: location or space (ECLoc, blue); observations
(ECObs, yellow); interpretations (ECInt, purple); and relevance (ECPro, red). The GPS
track for each participant is plotted above the pie charts. If more than one code was
applied for a particular GPS point, the pie chart is sub-divided. The number next to the
pie chart symbol indicates the number of instances of code that size symbol represents.
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Figure 4.14.—continued
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Figure 4.14.--continued
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Figure 4.14.--continued
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a)

b)

c)

d)

The small circled dot denotes the point of view used for calculating regions that are not
visible and regions that are visible.
Figure 4.15. Viewshed maps for different locations in the field area
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4.2.7 Summary for the nose of the fold and comparison with results for the
first hour
All of the participants who recorded video logs spent time in the area around the
nose of the syncline (“the fold”), whether they expressed that they knew it as the nose of
a syncline or not. The proportionally high instances of Reasoning and Model
Development sub-codes indicate that regardless of expertise or success, participants were
engaged in large-scale thinking when in the area. The nature of those thoughts—as
represented by the different sub-codes—reflects that the area had different meaning for
different participants. For Gidget, the area afforded the opportunity to confirm and revise
her model. For most of the others, their expressed thoughts convey that not only were
they constructing, or possibly adding to, their models via synthesis, but they were also
refining their models via predicting, confirming, and revising. Salvador, somewhat
differently, was mostly testing, by making predictions and confirmations, and revising his
existing model, with little additional new synthesis of his observations and
interpretations.
Certainly, some of the differences between the results for the nose of the fold and
the first hour can likely be attributed to the difference between the duration of the video
logs in the nose of the fold and the first hour. Those limitations notwithstanding, there are
some similarities and differences between the participants’ expressed thoughts and visible
actions for the first hour and for the nose of the fold.
Similar to the first hour, instances of the identification of contacts sub-code of
Procedural and Declarative Knowledge are also essentially missing in the nose of the
fold; there is only one instance across all eight video logs. Again, this result indicates that
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if the participants were identifying contacts, they were doing so at the large- or map-scale
level rather than at the level of finding the contacts beneath their feet. In fact, this is
unsurprising result given that there were no exposed contacts in the area, so of course
participants could not note them at outcrop scale. Consequently, contacts between units
had to be inferred from change in lithology.
In terms of Spatial Referencing, instances of the relating to space sub-code,
which had also been common in the first hour, become rare in the nose of the fold.
Indeed, all of the sub-codes for Spatial Referencing decrease in the nose of the fold. This
may be due, in part, to good visibility in the nose of the fold. But it also may be due to the
participants’ increased comfort with the size and scale of the field area.
Instances of participants’ Evaluating Certainty decreased notably from the first
hour to the nose of the fold. In particular, the instances of evaluating relevance of
observations or interpretations were frequent in the first hour but rare in the nose of the
fold. This suggests that part of the first hour involved the participants establishing a sense
of what observations were needed and how to make them. Once they had made those
decisions, they no longer needed to consider explicitly those questions because they had
instinctively identified observations and interpretations that were relevant and those that
were not.
Finally, there were two additional interpretations from the first hour to be tested
with the results from the nose of the fold. First, participants with high map scores had
more instances of recording data in the first hour than those with low map scores. In the
nose of the fold, the participants with low map scores still had few instances of recording
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data. Among those with high map scores, Fiamme, Pairique, and Dingo had higher counts
of recording data. Gidget, however, did not. As noted previously, though, Gidget’s
expressed thoughts indicate that she was using her time in the nose of the fold differently
than the other successful map makers. In particular, she also had relatively few counts of
collecting data. She had less new data to off-load onto her map or into her notebook.
Again, the coding scheme does not capture the length of data recording events, simply the
number of them. Thus, in general, the difference in recording data events by map scores
does appear consistent from the first hour to the nose of the fold.
Second, there was the observation that the experts and intermediates had fewer
instances of Spatial Referencing in the first hour than the novices. For the nose of the
fold, the results are generally consistent with the results for the first hour. Fiamme,
however, is an exception. Indeed, he has the highest number of instances Spatial
Referencing among all eight participants in the nose of the fold. The implication of
Fiamme’s high counts of Spatial Referencing is unclear, and it may simply be an
indication of his particular approach to mapping at that point of the day. The observed
differences may be the result of several possible factors including (but perhaps not
limited to) a participant’s experience interpreting aerial photos or topographic maps,
resolution of the aerial photo making certain features difficult to distinguish, the contour
interval of the topographic map not giving enough detail, or possibly variation in
visibility in different locations in the field area.
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4.3 Charting the whole day: A multiple case, single unit of analysis case
study
This section focuses on the expressed thought and visible actions of Gidget,
Dingo, Tank, and Salvador over the full duration of the mapping task. The quartet
represents a mix of the eight participants who recorded video logs. Two are experts:
Gidget and Tank. Two are novices: Dingo and Salvador. Two produced fairly accurate,
high-scoring maps with correct interpretations of the underlying geologic structure:
Gidget and Dingo. Two were less accurate and had lower scoring maps with incorrect
interpretations: Tank and Salvador. The intent is to use their complete video logs to
answer the following secondary research questions: How do geologists’ use of time, as
reflected in their epistemic actions and expressed thoughts, vary over the duration of the
mapping task and through space? How and in what manner do geologists evaluate or
express their uncertainty in solving a geologic mapping problem? How does use of time
and expressions of certainty while mapping relate to expertise? How does use of time and
expressions of certainty while mapping relate to success in the task?
Figure 4.16 shows four separate maps, one each for Gidget, Dingo, Tank, and
Salvador. In these maps, the data are the same as plotted in the overview figures in
sections 4.1 and 4.2, with two exceptions. Now, however, the pie charts are now a fixed
size and do not reflect the numbers of codes. The data also overlap. This is intentional.
Consider the following.
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Figure 4.16. Maps shows instances of expressed thoughts over whole day: Procedural
and Declarative Knowledge (PDK, green), Reasoning and Model Development (RMD,
magenta), Spatial References (SpRef, yellow), Metacognition (Metacog, blue), and Other
(black).

Salvador’s video log is roughly 7.5 hours long. This worked out to be a total of
2712 GPS points. Out of those, 1021 have data for at least one of the five major overview
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themes: Procedural and Declarative Knowledge, Reasoning and Model Development,
Spatial Referencing, Metacognition, and Other. Figure 4.16 makes it clear that, should
any perceptible variations exist in a participant’s expressed thoughts over the duration of
the day, then a different means of visualizing the data is needed. One approach is to look
at these data as a function of time. In particular, comparing the cumulative counts of
expressed thoughts for different themes provides a picture of how these expressed
thoughts ebbed and flowed over the course of the day. This approach is particularly wellsuited to address the research questions related to use of time, how time use varies during
the task and through space, and how time use varies with success and expertise.
A second approach is to look at the data at a micro-level, the level of the
participants’ expressed thoughts at particular moments in time. From this vantage, the
coding of the participants’ expressed thoughts is put in context. Each instance of a code
represents an expressed thought that was consistent with the code’s definition. For
example, an instance of the sub-code evaluating certainty in observation does not, by
itself, describe how or why the certainty of the observation was being expressed. Such
understanding must come from the substance of the expressed thoughts. Moreover, as
will be considered later, the content of the expressed thoughts—in particular, the
instances of evaluating certainty—offer valuable insights for the secondary research
questions focused on uncertainty in geologic mapping. To begin, though, we examine
how rates of expressed thoughts vary over the course of the day.
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4.3.1 Overview of expressions of thought over the day
Figure 4.17 shows four plots of the cumulative count of instances of the five
themes Procedural and Declarative Knowledge, Reasoning and Model Development,
Spatial Referencing, Metacognition, and Other plotted as a function of time for the four
video logs. The x-axis shows percentage of total time of the video log. This was
determined by calculating the elapsed time for every GPS point after the participant
entered the field area. These elapsed times were then converted into percentages based on
the final elapsed time for the entire video log. Using the percentage of total time of video
log enables comparison across the four participants’ video logs, which are not all the
same length of time. The y-axis in Figure 4.17 shows the cumulative count of instances
of each theme over time. For the benefit of putting the data presented in the previous
sections into context, Table 4.25 summarizes the percentage of total time of the video log
that is represented by the first hour and the nose of the fold. The plots of cumulative
counts allow that earlier data to be seen in the context of the full day.
Table 4.25
Summary of the full duration of four video logs, percent of video log represented by the
first hour and the nose of the fold

Name
Gidget
Dingo
Tank
Salvador

Duration of Video Log
(Hours:Minutes)
5:35
7:23
5:33
7:39

Percent of Video Log
Represented by
First Hour
0 – 18%
0 – 14%
0 – 18%
0 – 13%
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Percent of Video Log
Represented by
Nose of the Fold
77 – 88%
68 – 77%
68 – 81%
63 – 71%
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a). Gidget (E)
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Figure 4.17. Cumulative count of themes versus percentage of total time of video log:
Procedural and Declarative Knowledge (PDK), Reasoning and Model Development
(RMD), Spatial References (SpRef), Metacognition (Metacog), and Other.
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Figure 4.17.—continued
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In the previous sections, a general observation from the results for the first hour
and for the nose of the fold was that there were fewer instances of codes (or sub-codes) at
the later time interval. These graphs confirm that for most codes there was a decrease in
instances after the first hour. For all four participants, the rate of increase in the
cumulative counts does tend to decrease toward the latter half of the day—visible when
the lines on the graph are flat.
A striking outcome from these plots is the dominance of the Metacognition
theme, for all four participants. However, there is good reason to be cautious in assigning
too much significance to these results. The theme is comprised of three codes: Evaluating
Certainty, Noting Distractions, and Planning. As mentioned earlier, an important
consideration in interpreting results for the counts of the Metacognition theme is the
possible influence of the assignment to think aloud. In particular, the participants may
have been more apt to note distractions simply because they felt the need to continue
speaking. Thus, it seems possible that there is some noise in these signals. A later section
on the counts of Evaluating Certainty sub-codes will look through this noise and explore
participants’ reflection on their progress in the task in more detail.
Setting aside the observation of the counts of Metacognition over the course of
the day, there are noticeable differences in these plots in terms of codes are at the top of
the graphs and which are at the bottom after the initial hour or so? For Dingo, Procedural
and Declarative Knowledge has the highest total counts, Reasoning and Model
Development, Evaluating Certainty, and Spatial Referencing having similar values in the
middle, while Other has the lowest. For Salvador, Procedural and Declarative
Knowledge and Spatial Referencing have highest total counts, while Reasoning and
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Model Development and Other are nearly identical in their lowest values. Notable,
though, there are some differences in terms of pairing of codes and relative positions of
codes in the middle: Procedural and Declarative Knowledge occurs at the top of the
graphs while Other occurs at the bottom for both Dingo and Salvador.
The graphs for Gidget and Tank differ somewhat. For Gidget, Reasoning and
Model Development has the highest total counts, again setting aside counts of
Metacognition; Procedural and Declarative Knowledge, Spatial Referencing, and Other
have lower total counts by the end of the day. For Tank, Reasoning and Model
Development and Procedural and Declarative Knowledge are fairly similar and have
higher total counts than Spatial Referencing and Other. As with the novices, though,
there are some differences in terms of pairing of codes and relative positions of codes in
the middle of the graphs: Reasoning and Model Development occurs at the top of the
graph while Other once again occurs at the bottom of the graph for both Gidget and
Tank.
These results reinforce the previous observation that Procedural and Declarative
Knowledge is a dominant component of the participants’ expressed thoughts over the
course of the day. Furthermore, instances of Other expressed thoughts appear to become
less frequent over the course of the day, with few additional instances after the initial
hour.
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4.3.2 Collecting and recording data over the day
Figure 4.18 shows the instances of Collecting and Recording Data over the
duration of the video logs for all four participants. Since the data set is somewhat smaller
than it was for the overview figures, spatial differences are more readily distinguishable.
The novices, Salvador and Dingo, appear to have collected and recorded data at
fairly consistently over the course of their respective tracks. Dingo, though, recorded data
in some instances without collecting additional data. Gidget, an expert, appears to have
collected more data in the upper half of the field area than in the lower half; her data
collection in the nose of the fold occurs at relatively isolated events on her GPS track. In
addition, Gidget’s instances of recording data were not always coupled with stops of
collecting data. Tank, the other expert, also seems to have collected data fairly regularly
until he reached the area near the nose of the fold, but thereafter in not so many locations.
Like Gidget, though, he seems to have instances of recording data without collecting
data. To investigate these data further, the cumulative counts of codes are plotted in
Figure 4.19 as a function of percentage of total time of the video log.
These four plots indicate some physical differences in the participants’
experiences in the field. The visible actions codes reflect direct contact with rock samples
or outcrops. The novices simply appear to do that a lot more than the experts. Notice, for
instance, Salvador’s cumulative counts of inspecting rock (near 70) versus Gidget’s or
Tank’s cumulative counts of inspect rock (approximately (around 10).
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Figure 4.18. Map shows instances of Collecting and Recording Data over whole day:
breaking rock with a hammer or scratching surface of rock (Break; yellow); inspecting a
hand sample of a rock or outcrop (Inspect; orange); measuring orientation (StkeDip;
pink); testing a hand sample or outcrop of rock with HCl (TestHCl; blue); writing in
notebook (WritNb; white); and writing on the aerial photographs or the topographic map
(WritMap; black). The GPS track for each participant is plotted above the pie charts.
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Also for Salvador, the amounts of the different actions vary from each other; he
has relatively few instances of testing the rocks with HCl or measuring orientation in
comparison to instances of inspecting or breaking rocks. This implies that he was not
consistent in what type of data he collected at each stop, focusing instead on certain
actions over others. By contrast, for the other three participants, instances of the different
actions tend to increase at more similar rates. This suggest that they were more consistent
in their data collection routines at stops—including the possibility of doing relatively
little.
A final note is that Tank was unique among those who recorded video logs in that
he made no notes in his field notebook once he started the mapping task; this was not
uncommon amongst all 67 participants in the study, however. Many other participants
made no further notes in the field notebook after the end of the walk-through introduction
to the stratigraphy.
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Figure 4.19. Cumulative instances of themes versus percentage of total time of video log:
hammering or scratching rock (break); inspecting rock (inspect); measuring orientation
(measure); testing a rock surface with HCl (testing HCl); writing in notebook (WNb); and
writing on map (WMap).
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Figure 4.19.—continued
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4.3.3 Evaluating certainty over the day
All four participants expressed thoughts that related to the four Evaluating
Certainty sub-codes over the course of their day in the field (Figure 4.20). Spatially, the
data appear fairly well distributed over space; however, overlap of the data also makes
that somewhat difficult to discern. Thus, once again the cumulative counts of sub-codes
are used to identify variations in participants’ expressed thoughts.
Comparing the four participants, the two novices have noticeably similar results
for the four sub-codes (Figure 4.21). For them, cumulative counts are highest for
evaluating certainty in location or space as well as certainty in observations. Cumulative
counts are lowest for evaluating certainty in interpretations and certainty in relevance of
observations or interpretations. By contrast, there is more crossing of curves for Tank and
Gidget. For both, though, the cumulative count for certainty in interpretations is at or near
the top of the chart. The implication is that the experts actively evaluate their models
more consistently over the duration of the task than the novices do. On the other hand, a
similarity across all four participants is that the number of instances of certainty in
relevance of observations or interpretations tends to increase up to roughly 30% of
elapsed time and then has few additional instances. This supports a previous
interpretation that these thoughts become less necessary for the participants over the
duration of the mapping task.
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Figure 4.20. Maps show instances of evaluating or expressing certainty over whole day:
location or space (ECLoc, blue); observations (ECObs, yellow); interpretations (ECInt,
purple); and relevance (ECPro, red). The GPS track for each participant is plotted above
the pie charts.
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Figure 4.21, Cumulative count of Evaluating Certainty sub-codes versus percentage of
total time of video log: location or space (EvalCert_Location); observations
(Evalcert_Observations); interpretations (EvalCert_Intepretations); and relevance
(EvalCert_Process).
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Figure 4.21.— continued
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4.3.4 Expressed thoughts in context
The previous sub-sections show the distribution of expressed thoughts over time,
and to a slightly lesser extent, space. In this final sub-section, the focus shifts to looking
at instances of expressed thoughts at particular moments in time, at particular points on
the map. The secondary research questions target attention on moments that illustrate
patterns in participants’ expressed thoughts, especially those in which they are evaluating
certainty. Among these, there are several informative moments of the video logs in which
the participants made observations that conflicted with their prior observations or
interpretations. These moments are especially interesting not only for the participants’
initial recognition—as expressed through their uncertainty— of the conflicting
observations, but also for the participants’ proceeding expressions of certainty as they
grapple with the implications of the conflict.
There were two main types of such moments. First, there were moments when the
participants encountered unexpected orientation of rock units. Second, there were
moments when the participants encountered unexpected rock types. The following
discussion provides examples from the videos logs of Salvador, Tank, and Dingo. Gidget
does not have any explicit examples of encounters with the unexpected; there is a more
general example, which will be described at the end.
The first example is in Salvador’s video log (Figure 4.22). From the launch point,
Salvador traveled uphill to the highest corner of the field area. After that, he turned
around and walked back down hill, until he reached Unit 3. He followed Unit 3 some
distance further downhill before he crossed back through the field area again. Although
he did not express that he recognized it as such, he reached the opposite limb of the fold
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and walked along the contact between Unit 2 and Unit 3; recall that Salvador’s final
model of the field area consisted of the Units 1, 2,and 3 in a “layer cake” configuration.
Prior to reaching the point marked Site 1 (Figure 4.22), he had observed only that the
rock units were dipping steeply toward the middle of the field area. When he reached
Site 1, he recognized that the units were dipping in the opposite direction. His immediate
reaction was to suspect that he was in error, “Is it possible I’m seeing this wrong?
Something’s gotta be wrong here.” But then he introduced another idea by wondering if
there could be something different about the geology, “It could be twisted here…in this
spot.”
He proceeded to Site 2, and in the process he crossed the fold axis again. If he
was aware of doing so, he never explicitly confirmed it. At the second site he again found
the rocks dipping in toward the middle of the field area, “I believe it is properly dipping.”
The new observation, however, did not resolve the previous conflict, “that shale [Unit 2]
dipping the opposite direction, that is wacky.” He continued on, again unknowingly
crossing the fold axis, and found rocks dipping in the same direction as Site 1. This time,
however, he did not question the certainty of his observation. Instead, he resolved the
conflict by way of a geologic explanation that allowed both observations to coexist.
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Prior to reaching the green dot in the
nose of the fold, Salvador had observed
rocks dipping steeply toward the middle
of the fold (although he did not recognize
that the units were forming a fold).

Site 1): At the green dot, he commented:
“That is weird. Is it really doing that? Is it
possible I’m seeing this wrong? Something’s
gotta be wrong here. Cause over there, it was
clearly dipping that way. Now it’s dipping
here. It could be twisted here… in this spot.”

Site 2): At the second location of green
dots, he said, “I believe it is properly
dipping … So herein lies a problem: that
shale dipping the opposite direction, that
is wacky.”

Site 3): At the third location, he commented,
“What the? Must be dipping like this and
switch like this... [gestures for beds to
change dip from one direction to another]
...and then back. … Dipping in odd direction
is very odd."

Figure 4.22. Example from Salvador’s video log showing moment of conflict in observation due
to unexpected rock orientation
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There is a similar instance of conflict due to unexpected orientation of rock units
in Tank’s video log as well. Tank’s final model of the field area was similar to
Salvador’s: Units 1, 2, and 3 were in a “layer cake” configuration. Tank took a path
through the field area that was similar to Salvador’s: he traveled uphill to the highest
corner, turned around and walked downhill toward Unit 3, roughly followed Unit 2
downhill, finally reaching the nose of the fold. Prior to reaching the point marked Site 1
(Figure 4.23), he had noted only that the rock units were dipping steeply toward the
middle of the field area. At that site, however, he recognized that the unit had the
opposite dip direction. Instead of expressing uncertainty in his observation, he expressed
uncertainty in his interpretation. Ultimately though, he too, settled on a geologic
interpretation that allowed for both observations to coexist without introducing a conflict
in the model.
There is also an example of the second type of conflict, conflict due to an
unexpected rock unit, in Tank’s video log. After he left the point labeled Site 1 (Figure
4.23), Tank traveled further around the limb of the fold, roughly following the contact
between Unit 2 and 3. Again, he did not recognize that he was walking along the limb of
the fold. Before he arrived at Site 2 (Figure 4.24), he had the idea that the rock units were
in layers, going from Unit 3 at the lowest elevation, Unit 2 in the middle, and Unit 1
adjacent to Unit 4. As he walked uphill again, he was expecting to find Unit 1. Instead, at
Site 2, he found Unit 3. Again, he did not express uncertainty in his observation. Instead,
he questioned whether the rock was “in place.” In the coding scheme, this is an instance
of the sub-code: expressing certainty in the relevance of an observation. If the rock is not
in place, then it may not represent the rock units in the area, and thus the observation can
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be discarded as irrelevant. He continued uphill to Sites 3 and 4, and at both he referred to
his previous unexpected observation of Unit 3 and continued to question whether the rock
observed at Site 2 was indeed in place. Thus, he again resolved the conflict in his
observations by using a geologic explanation, not one that allowed both observations to
coexist, but one that allowed him to throw out the conflicting observation for the sake of
preserving the others.

Prior to reaching the green dot in the nose
of the fold, Tank had observed rocks
dipping steeply toward the middle of the
fold (although he did not recognize that the
units were forming a fold).

Site 1): “What's the sense here? Oh great.
… Ok, well maybe there is another fault.
… it is almost too radical to think of this as
being overturned. But then again, you
know, stuff uphill is only 80 degrees ...
And, so it doesn't take much rotation to
kick it over to here.”

Figure 4.23. Example from Tank’s (E) video log showing moment of conflict in observation due
to unexpected rock orientation
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Site 2): “Getting a little bothered by
finding so much RT3-like material
around…And I suppose I could always
say that it’s not in place… Gees. It's big,
though. … Well, it'd have to roll a long
ways. Let me just put this in as a, as a
outcrop...”

Site 3): “This strange puppy down here,
which could be just not in place.”

Site 4): “I am not completely convinced
that that one block of RT3 is in place.”

Figure 4.24. Example from Tank’s (E) video log showing moment of conflict in observation due
to unexpected rock unit
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In Dingo’s video log, the example of conflict due to unexpected rock type is of a
somewhat different character than the example in Tank’s. Dingo identified Unit 1 at an
outcrop near the launch point. She then traveled uphill and identified the contact between
Unit 1 and Unit 4. She followed Unit 4 downhill a little ways before turning to go back
into the middle of the field area. At Site 1, she expected to find Unit 1 (Figure 4.25).
However, she felt that her observations were not all consistent with Unit 1. Some of her
observations suggested Unit 3. Acknowledging some remaining uncertainty, she
continued on. She walked back uphill toward the launch point and then downhill toward
Unit 3. At Site 2, she found, and correctly identified, Unit 3. She resolved the potential
conflict in her observations by finding more rocks in order to have more information
upon which to base her interpretation.
In Gidget’s video log, there are no explicit examples of either type of conflict:
conflict due to unexpected orientation or conflict due to unexpected rock type. A
somewhat vague example occurred at Site 1 (Figure 4.26). Unfortunately, Gidget never
clarifies what she is referring to at this point. Thus, it is unknown what the possible
conflict was and how she did or did not resolve it. While the absence of explicit moments
could be due to the fact that she simply did not articulate them, she may also not have had
many moments of conflict in the first place. As discussed in the results from the first
hour, Gidget had extended periods of Reasoning and Model Development in that time.
Indeed, she expressed a hypothesis about the field area as she left the launch point and
walked to the first outcrop, “I'm gonna look at this aerial photo again. The ridges are
distinctively curved. Suspect we have a folding event [00:07:57, UHC1].”
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Site 1): “Well we've definitely got a
carbonate here, but it doesn't have that
golden-bedded weathering that Rock Type 1
has. I'm wondering if maybe this is the
[Unit 3] dolomite … So I want to check a
fresh surface cause with dolomite, [it] fizzes
pretty well on some of the weathered
surfaces. I would say this is a limestone,
well, it is pretty fizzy. … Oh, kind of has
that rotten egg smell. Well, let's try and look
at more of the outcrop. I'm thinking
dolomite right now. … Which I mean still
fits in with my thinking so far, except that I
never, I mean walking from the launch point
was definitely the limestone. And then I
started seeing cobbles that didn't look they
had as much bedding … so I could have just
missed the shale entirely. …Yeah, this is
looking more and more like the dolomite to
me. … But I'm not really sure how we are
getting to from the limestone to the
dolomite. I'm not even 100% sure that this
is the dolomite. But I'll try and work that
out.”
Site 2): “… So I think, I wasn't sure if it
was dolomite or the limestone, uh, it
definitely had better bedding than this but
not those nice, nice gold bands that it had
(inaudible). But it is starting to make more
sense to me that blue extends all the way
down there and then this is dolomite. Well,
the rock I was looking at before definitely
reacted more vigorously than this one. So
I'm leaning towards the fact that was
probably limestone. But not as obvious as
the stuff at the top.”

Figure 4.25. Example from Dingo’s (N) video log showing moment of conflict in observation due
to unexpected rock unit

Thus, although she could not realize it at the time, Gidget did in fact have the
correct model very early on in her day. There are later instances in the video log where
she reflected on her observations and noted that she should be happy because her
413

hypotheses about the field area were turning to be consistent with her observations: “I
believe your hypothesis panned out here. You should be elated [1:15:02, UHC2]”. What
remained was to refine the model. At Site 2, she gestured uphill in the direction she was
about to walk and questioned, “what happens to the fold thataway.”

Site 1): “… Well, this doesn’t fit.”

Site 2): “The question is, what
happens to the fold thataway.”

Figure 4.26. Example from Gidget’s (E) video log showing less explicit moments of conflict
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4.3.5 Summary
Gidget, Dingo, Tank, and Salvador provide four different views of the process of
solving a geologic mapping problem. With results from their video logs, it is possible to
consider the remaining secondary research questions:


How do geologists’ use of time, as reflected in their epistemic actions and expressed
thoughts, vary over the duration of the mapping task and through space?



How and in what manner do geologists evaluate or express their uncertainty in
solving a geologic mapping problem?



How does use of time while either mapping or making statements that evaluate or
express certainty relate to expertise?



How does use of time while either mapping or making statements that evaluate or
express certainty relate to success?

In the following paragraphs, each question will be discussed in turn.
How do geologists’ use of time, as reflected in their epistemic actions and
expressed thoughts, vary over the duration of the mapping task and through space? The
results add to the picture that has already been formed from the results for the first hour
and for the nose of the fold. Both novices, Dingo and Salvador, accumulated high counts
of Procedural and Declarative Knowledge over the course of the day. The two experts
also had high numbers of Procedural and Declarative Knowledge, but these were also
coupled with similar high numbers of Reasoning and Model Development.
As for epistemic actions, Salvador’s video log offered a slightly different view on
a day of mapping than the other four. For him, he had a high rate of instances of
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inspecting rock over the course of the day, a moderate number of instances of breaking or
scratching rocks with his hammer, and fewer numbers of instances for measuring
orientation or testing the rocks with HCl. By comparison, for the other three, the rates of
collecting different types of data appeared to increase more in tandem. This is not to say
that they all had high numbers of these instances; indeed, the two novices did have more
instances of collecting data than the two experts. Rather, the other three participants seem
to be consistently obtaining multiple types of data throughout the day.
How and in what manner do geologists evaluate or express their uncertainty in
solving a geologic mapping problem? Common, also, to all the participants is that
expressions or evaluations of certainty persist throughout the day. Again, while the
prominence of the sub-codes differed somewhat by expertise level, instances of the subcodes were fairly evenly distributed over space and time on the participants’ GPS tracks.
In the circumstance when the participants made observations that conflicted with
prior observations or interpretations, responses to the uncertainty imposed by the new
data varied. One response was to question whether the new observation was an error. A
second response was to develop a geologic interpretation that allowed for new and prior
observations to coexist. A third response was to develop a geologic interpretation that
allowed for discarding the conflicting observation and preserving the pre-existing
observations. A fourth response was to suspend uncertainty until further observations
could be made that would help resolve the possible conflict.
How does use of time while either mapping or making statements that evaluate or
express certainty relate to expertise? The experts tended to have more instances of
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Collecting Data in the first half of their day, while they were at the high elevation end of
the field area. After that, the instances were more dispersed. For the novices, data
collection occurred more uniformly over the whole day so much so that they had
noticeably higher total counts of collecting data than the experts.
Lastly, after the initial quarter of the video logs, the novices had similar low
counts of evaluating certainty in interpretations and high counts of evaluating certainty in
location or space as well as evaluating certainty in observations. By contrast, the experts
had higher counts for evaluating certainty in both interpretations and observations.
Consistently, then, what emerges is the image of the novice geologists focusing on
collecting data, making interpretations, and recording data for the sake of constructing a
model over the course of the day. The experts appear to collect most of what data they
need during the first half of the day; formulation and evaluation of their model continues
through the whole day.
How does use of time while either mapping or making statements that evaluate or
express certainty relate to success? In this descriptive study, it is important to emphasize
that the intent was never to try to explain why Gidget and Dingo made more accurate
maps than Tank and Salvador. Rather, the question was whether viewing the data from
their video logs at the level of the codes for expressed thoughts and visible actions would
distinguish the first two participants from the latter two. It did not. However, looking at
the data at video logs at the level of the quotes may indicate something about a
relationship between statements evaluating certainty and success in the task. Tank and
Salvador, two who did not identify the fold in the area and who produced lower scoring
maps, had notable moments wherein they made new observations that directly conflicted
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with prior observations and interpretations. Both of them invoked geologic interpretations
to resolve their conflicts and preserve their unbeknownst-to-them incorrect models. By
contrast, similar explicit examples are absent in Gidget’s video log, she being one who
did identify the fold very early in the task and produced a high scoring map. These
examples are limited, though, in scope. Further work—in particular a more detailed
examination of the video logs at a finer level—is needed to explore whether the way
participants respond to conflict in observations is related to success in the task.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, STRENGTHS, IMPLICATIONS, AND
FUTURE WORK
5.1 Introduction
This chapter is divided into five sections. The overarching research questions is
addressed in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2, the conclusions from the video logs are
compared with the conclusions from analysis of the GPS tracks of all participants in the
overall study as reported in Baker et al. (2012). In Section 5.3, the conclusions from the
video logs are also compared to the four major themes identified in the literature review
from Chapter 2. Limitations and strengths of the study are discussed in Section 5.4.
Finally, implications and ideas for future work are addressed in Section 5.5.

5.2 Answering the questions: Considering how the results inform the
overarching research question
The overarching research questions for this dissertation project are is follows:
How do geologists of different levels of expertise constrain and solve the ill-structured
problem of making a geologic map? Before considering how results from the video logs
inform this question, it is valuable to revisit the idea of what makes a problem ill
structured and how uncertainty is part of geologic mapping.
In Chapter 2, problems were conceived as three dimensional, with the three axes
are labeled as the problem statement, the process, and the solution. Uncertainty can vary
along all three dimensions. Well-structured problems lie at the origin. The further away
from the origin, the more ill-structured the problem. A problem statement of a well-
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structured problem includes all the necessary information to solve the problem; problem
statements of an ill-structured problem lack most of the information necessary to solve
the problem, sometimes referred to as “information-lean”(Kirsh, 2009). Well-structured
problems also have a single, verifiable solution while the acceptability of a solution to illstructured problem is determined by a community. Indeed, it is possible that an illstructured problem could have more than one solution: what may be acceptable to some
may not be acceptable to others. Finally, in a well-structured problem, there are predetermined steps for solving the problem. But in an ill-structured problem, the process is
left entirely up to the individual; with such problems, one has complete or nearly
complete behavioral control over what steps to do, what order to do them in, and how to
complete them.
In the overall study of which this dissertation is part, the geologic mapping
problem posed to the participants was defined by scripted information that provided
certain details about the rocks that would be encountered in the field area. The
participants could not independently verify their individual solutions as they worked, as
is typical of an ill-structured problem. Nevertheless, the solution for the particular
mapping problem was considered to be known among the researchers because of a
consensus map generated by those with detailed knowledge of the field site16. Thus, both
the problem statement and the solution for this particular task were constrained in certain
ways to make them somewhat less ill-structured. The process, however, was
unconstrained. It was up to the participants to decide how to go about making their maps.

16

Notably, the fact that the “answer key” is actually a consensus map developed via consultation of
multiple geologists is another indication of how geologic maps are indeed solutions to ill‐structured
problems.
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It is this component of the mapping problem upon which the overarching research
question for this dissertation is focused.
By definition, if a geologic mapping problem is an example of an ill-structured
problem, then thoughts and actions that go into the mapping process could reasonably be
expected to have some amount of uncertainty associated them. Broadly speaking, this
would mean that there could be uncertainty in what steps to take, how to take them, when
to take them, and how to interpret what the meaning of each step might be. To apply
these ideas to geologic mapping more specifically, it is expected that the process would
involve uncertainty in what measurements or observations to collect at outcrops, how to
make certain measurements, where to go to make measurements, how to determine the
quality of the measurements taken (e.g. “good” versus “bad” data) and how to interpret
those measurements. Thus, the purpose of the overarching research question is not to
determine if uncertainties exist in the process. Rather, the purpose is to describe how
participants responded to the uncertainties in the process. This was achieved using a
descriptive case study approach, through which the mapping process was investigated as
a sequence of thoughts and actions over time. These included—as applicable—expressed
thoughts related to certainty or uncertainty in the process. With these points in mind, it is
possible to now review what the video logs have revealed about expertise in solving a
geologic mapping problem.
The following description draws from the analysis of the first hour, the nose of
the fold, and the full day. Where differences existed between experts and novices, the
intermediates tended to resemble the experts more than the novices. Thus, the discussion
is based mostly upon the three experts and the three novices.
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In the early part of the day, the experts had distinct moments where they
expressed thoughts concentrated on reasoning and model development. Experts also
began evaluating the certainty of their interpretations early and then continued to do so
through the day. A substantial portion of the first half of the day, however, entailed
expressed thoughts and visible actions related to collecting data, identifying rocks,
identifying structural features in the rocks, and recording those observations. While
instances of collecting data were coupled with instances of recording data, there were
instances of recording data that appeared disconnected from any corresponding instance
of collecting data. Experts and intermediates made few spatial references in the first half
of the day. However, later in the day, the instances of spatial referencing did increase
somewhat for one of the experts (Fiamme in the nose of the fold as compared to the first
hour).
For the novices, data collection, identifying rocks, identifying structural features
in the rocks, and recording those observations occurred uniformly throughout the day.
Most instances of recording data appeared to coincide with instances of collecting data.
The novices had relatively few early moments of reasoning and model development or
evaluating the certainty of their interpretations; instead, instances of those codes
increased over the course of the day. This suggests that they are making their structural
interpretations in the field from the data. Notably, novices focused on evaluating their
observations or sense of location (whether their own or of a landscape feature) rather than
their interpretations.
There were also some similarities between experts and novices. In particular,
several codes that were apparent in the first hour disappeared or decreased noticeably
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later in the nose of the fold for all participants. These included instances of relating
observations to observations from the walk-through and instances of relating to space.
The instances of the Other expressed thoughts also decreased; common early in the day,
it later became rare. The implication is that geologic mapping involves an initial period
where the participants are getting their bearings in the field area, both in terms of the rock
units and the space as a whole. However, after that “what is going on?” phase, as Tank
put it, the distinction between the experts and the novices become more prominent.
Instances of Evaluating Certainty in the video log transcripts were distinguished
by four different sub-codes; these were instances when the participants were expressing
certainty in: location (their own or of a landscape feature), observations, interpretations,
and relevance or importance of observations or interpretations. Evident in the maps for
Gidget, Tank, Salvador, and Dingo, that show instances of the four sub-codes is that
Evaluating Certainty persists throughout the day; however, it is important to
acknowledge that the rate of these codes do decrease with time. It is not a code that goes
away over time. There is, however, variation in the frequency of the sub-codes over the
course of the day.
Over course of the full day, Dingo and Salvador had similar low counts of
evaluating certainty in interpretations and high counts of evaluating certainty in location
or space as well as evaluating certainty in observations. By contrast, Gidget and Tank had
higher counts for evaluating certainty in both interpretations and observations. Thus,
these results convey a notable difference between the experts and novices: the two
experts began consciously evaluating their interpretations early in the day and then
continued to do so for the duration of their video logs; the two novices were slower to
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express thoughts specific to evaluating their interpretations and did so at lower rates than
the experts. Instead, the two novices tended to focus their evaluations of certainty on
their observations or their sense of location (whether their own or of a feature in the
landscape).
A notable similarity across the participants—seen not just in the analysis of the
full day, but also in the comparison of the first hour with the nose of the fold—is the
decrease in the instances of evaluating certainty of the relevance of observations or
interpretations. This code is intended to capture instances when the participants are
expressing doubt or confidence in their measurements (e.g. Did they measure bedding
correctly? Did they remember how to determine strike and dip?), when they are
expressing doubt or confidence in whether they should record a particular observation
(e.g. Is the rock in place or not?) or when they express doubt or confidence in their
mapping strategy (e.g. Do they need to go to a certain region of the field area? Do they
need to note certain features of the rock?). Should they answer any of these questions in
the negative, the implication is that the observation or corresponding interpretation might
be (at worst) wrong or (less severely) irrelevant. The general decrease in the instances of
the sub-code, therefore, suggests that some of these personal debates regarding what
might be called the techniques of mapping tended to wane over the course of the day.
Once the participants settled into the task, they had less need to address these questions
so explicitly.
Finally, from looking at instances when participants made observations that
conflicted with prior observations, several interesting examples of expressing certainty
emerged. Responses to unexpected observations included questioning if the observation
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was an error, developing a geologic interpretation that allowed the prior and new
observations to coexist, developing a geologic interpretation that allowed for discarding
the new conflicting observation, and suspending uncertainty until further observations
could inform a decision on how to resolve the conflict. Notable among the four full-day
case studies is that there is an absence of such moments of conflict in Gidget’s video log,
the expert who produced a high scoring map. While absence of results—especially when
the results are expressed thoughts—is a tenuous basis for interpretation, it is striking that
there are no explicit examples of such moments in Gidget’s video log. The potential is
that there were not likely to be any such moments because she had a good (although she
could not know at the time just how good) understanding of the underlying geology.
Perhaps, though, she had some sense of certainty, as there were moments when she
explicitly reflected on the fact that her original hypotheses were being confirmed by her
subsequent observations. Gidget aside, the moments of conflict bring forward different
responses to conflicts in field observations. Further study is needed to explore the
consequences of these responses for model development, especially when the conflicts
are due to the fact that the new observations were actually indicating genuine flaws in
prior observations and interpretations.

5.3 Testing the results: Comparing the analysis of the video log with the
analysis of the GPS tracks
As discussed in Chapter 3, a method for establishing construct validity for these
case studies is the use of multiple sources of evidence. In this section, the conclusions
from the video logs are contrasted with the conclusions from the already-completed
substantial analysis of the GPS tracks and geologic maps for all of the participants (Baker
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et al., 2012). Thus, the approach taken here to address construct validity is using a nonconvergent, rather than a convergent, comparison of data (Yin, 2009).
In Baker et al. (2012), the purpose was to determine if any spatial patterns existed
in the movement of the geologists during mapping. The study used data from both years
of data collection (n = 66); due to the problem with settings of Tank’s GPS unit, his data
was excluded from their analysis. Statistical analysis tested for relationships between
general and geologically-related track variables (e.g. total distance of participant track or
time spent on geologic contacts) and other participant variables (e.g. expertise, structural
accuracy of map, and unit accuracy of map). Spatial sequencing analysis examined
participants’ track through the field area (as divided into thirty-three sub-regions).
Table 5.1 summarizes the main conclusions in Baker et al. (2012) and compares
them with conclusions from analysis of the video logs. Arguably, the interpretation from
the GPS tracks that the experts were developing ideas about the underlying structure
early on is consistent with the observation in the video logs that experts had concentrated
moments of Reasoning and Model Development within the first hour. Moreover, experts’
higher rates of Data Collection early on would also be consistent with longer tracks in the
sub-region near the launch point.
Baker et al. (2012) also infer that the experts were consciously evaluating their
progress, checking their ideas about location of rock units and planning traverses based
on their structural interpretation. The results from the videos logs that indicate the
experts were evaluating the certainty of their interpretations early seem reasonably
consistent with that inference. A difference, however, is the conclusion related to contact
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crossings. As noted in the results for the first hour and for the nose of the fold, there were
few instances of participants explicitly identifying contacts beneath their feet. However,
those results do not preclude the possibility that they were identifying contacts. What the
results may mean is that the experts were identifying contacts at a larger scale rather than
at the outcrop scale. Thus, the interpretation as to the motive for the contact crosses may
still be valid, but the coding scheme of the expressed thoughts would need to be redefined
in order to test that more specifically.
The result that the novices and experts were equally likely to produce maps with
accurate placement of rock units could be consistent with the interpretation that for both
groups a substantial portion of the day involved collecting data, identifying rocks,
identifying structural features in the rocks, and recording those observations. However, it
also seems as if the experts and novices might have had different purposes in their
instances of collecting data and identifying rocks. If the experts had a structural
interpretation developed early on, then the instances of collecting data and identifying
rocks would likely have been more for the purpose of confirming a model. By
comparison, for the novices, collecting data and identifying rocks would have been more
in service of developing a model. This interpretation is also not directly testable with the
current coding scheme for expressed thoughts. Redefining, however, the codes might not
be as effective as looking at specific transcripts to see how this interpretation might be
borne out.
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Table 5.1
Comparison of analysis of participants’ tracks and maps (Baker et al., 2012) with
analysis of video logs (this study)
Analysis of Expert and Novice Tracks
(Baker et al., 2012)
 Experts formed ideas of underlying
structure early in the day and had
longer tracks in the sub-region near the
launch point
 Experts with more sophisticated
structural interpretations moved quickly
and made repeated traverses across
contacts to confirm proposed location
of rock units
 Experts were evaluating their progress
by consciously crossing their own path
when stopped at outcrops
 Experts used their structural
interpretation to guide their traverses
and to avoid areas of low visibility
unless vital for map making
 More successful novices had traverses
that covered as much of the field area
as possible and accurately identified the
geologic features that they encountered
 Novices’ traverses were not guided by
their structural interpretation
Analysis Novice and Expert Maps
(Baker et al., 2012)
 Both novices and experts were likely to
produce maps with accurate placement
of rock units
 Experts were more likely to produce
accurate interpretations of the geologic
structure than the novices

Analysis of Video Logs (This Study)


Experts had more instances of
Reasoning and Model Development
early in the day and then maintained a
higher rate of those instances over the
course of the day than the novices



Experts did more of their Data
Collection early in the day, at higher
elevations, and then less frequently for
the remainder of the day



Experts had higher rates of evaluating
certainty in their interpretations than
the novices



Few instances of identifying contacts
were present for either experts or
novices in the first hour or in the nose
of the fold



Novices tended to have more instances
and higher rates of spatial referencing
over the course of the day than the
experts



For both experts and novices, a
substantial portion of the day involved
collecting data, identifying rocks,
identifying structural features in the
rocks, and recording those observations

In summary, the conclusions from the video logs were reached through an entirely
separate method of analysis than the conclusions from the analysis of the GPS tracks and
geologic maps. The overall similarity between the interpretations attests to their validity.
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Nevertheless, certain details do still need further investigation to support the claims more
fully.

5.4 Framing the answers: Considering the results in terms of the
broader literature review
In the literature review in Chapter 2, four main themes were identified: 1)
Expertise can be a source of bias in certain problem-solving tasks, depending upon the
nature of the problem and the purpose of the solution. 2) Expert–novice differences in
problem solving may relate to expert–novice differences in building causal mental
models. 3) Expertise in geologic mapping is comprised of both “everyday skills” and
domain-specific skills. 4) A study of expertise in geologic mapping would benefit from a
methodological approach that captures the way thoughts and actions are juxtaposed. In
this section, the results from the video logs will be related to these themes to identify how
the conclusions are either consistent with or distinct from previous findings.
5.4.1 Expertise can be a source of bias in certain problem‐solving tasks
Admittedly, one of the surprising outcomes of the whole study— across all 67
participants—was Tank’s map. He missed the fold. The other seven participants who
were similarly identified as experts both in general geologic expertise and mapping
expertise did not miss the fold. Several questions naturally follow: What happened? Can
Tank’s error be explained? Could his expertise for some reason have been a source of
bias? Could it even be possible that perhaps his expertise level in geologic mapping was
incorrectly identified? While these questions are interesting, there also is a problem with
them.
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These are questions would be appropriate for an explanatory study, but this
dissertation project is a descriptive study. The analysis used here was able to identify that
when Tank made observations that conflicted with his prior observations, he did not
express uncertainty in his observations. Instead, he expressed uncertainty in his
interpretations, which led him to develop geologic explanations that could resolve the
conflict. It is notable that his explanations allowed him to retain his inaccurate model. But
the analysis reported here does not really empower further extrapolation to say that his
model was a source of bias. Additional data sources would be needed, as would a
different method of analysis, to investigate more thoroughly how bias may have
contributed to Tank’s performance. Arguably, though, Tank remains a fascinating
potential case for an explanatory study into how good observations were discarded for the
sake of preserving a less-good model.
5.4.2 Expert–novices differences in problem solving relate to expert–novice
differences in building causal mental models
In this dissertation project, the analysis has not focused on the substance of the
participants’ mental models, neither their logical mental models nor their causal mental
models. Rather, that was the purview of the precursor project examining the audio logs
from the first year of the overall study. That is not to imply, however, that this project
does not make a contribution to this theme.
Recall how we might define a geologist’s logical mental model and causal mental
model with respect to a geologic map: the logical mental model is represented by the
distribution of rock units; the causal mental model is represented by the geologist’s
interpretation of how those rock units are structurally related to one another. Now
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suppose we assume, for the moment, that expert–novice differences in solving a geologic
mapping problem relate to expert–novice differences in building causal mental models.
Given this assumption, how do the results from the video logs compare with the results
from the literature review?
In Wineburg (1991), students and historians were provided with a series of
historical documents related to the Battle of Lexington and were tasked with identifying
which painting out of three accurately depicted the battle. Wineburg particularly noted
that all of the experts agreed that none of the paintings were a perfect representation of
the battle; to select any one of the paintings required a compromise. By contrast, only one
student noted conflict between the paintings and the reviewed texts. Instead, most of the
students (novices) used the documents to construct a logical mental model that
represented their conception of the battle, and they did not express concern over possible
contradictions between the constituent elements. Ultimately, a take-home message from
the study was that student performance was less related to content knowledge and more
related to the ability to decipher contradictions. But it is worth emphasizing, too, that the
participants were working with the same documents. Consequently, while the solution
was more ill-structured—as demonstrated by the fact that experts understood that the
solution required compromise—the problem statement was somewhat well-structured—
all participants were provided the same materials, in the same order.
By comparison, the geologic mapping problem posed to the participants in this
study was more ill-structured. Moreover, there were moments in the video logs of Dingo,
Salvador, and Tank when they noted conflicts between their new observations and prior
observations. These participants contrast with Gidget, for whom no such explicit
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moments occurred. Setting aside the example of Tank, which as discussed in the previous
sub-section represents a rather unusual case, let us make a comparison between Dingo
and Salvador and the novices in Wineburg (1991).
Dingo and Salvador both expressed uncertainty when they had their moments of
conflict in observations. In the examples given, Dingo’s conflict was due to an
unexpected rock type in an area. Salvador’s conflict was due to an unexpected orientation
of a rock unit. Dingo ultimately resolved her conflict by suspending her uncertainty and
seeking out more rocks—which could also be described as more knowledge. Salvador
resolved his conflict by coming up with a geologic explanation that explained the cause
of the unexpected orientation of the rock units. Although Salvador was not correct in his
causal model, he did have one.
Therefore, the assumption made at the outset of this sub-section seems suspect, as
does applying the interpretation in Wineburg (1991), that novice performance was less
related to content knowledge and more related to deciphering contradictions. Salvador
developed a causal model. He did not develop the correct one, but he may not have had
enough prior knowledge to make the correct one. Incidentally, Salvador had neither an
undergraduate course in Structural Geology nor a multi-week Field Camp prior to his
participation in the study; he had, though, completed courses in
Sedimentology/Stratigraphy as well as a Field Methods course. Dingo, for her part,
responded to the unexpected rock unit by seeking out more information and then, upon
finding Unit 3 elsewhere in the field area, was able to back-infer that she had previously
been looking at Unit 1, even commenting that it made “more sense.” Thus, the examples
of Dingo and Salvador suggest that prior knowledge may be more of a factor in expert–
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novice differences in solving ill-structured problems than expert-novice differences in
constructing causal mental models.
5.4.3 Expertise in geologic mapping is comprised of both “everyday” skills and
domain‐specific skills
In the summary of this theme at the end of the literature, several “everyday” skills
and domain-specific skills were identified. The “everyday” skills included locating one’s
position on a map, dealing with emotions during navigation, and using “in-between”
times. The domain-specific skills included dealing with the time-constraints of field work
and off-loading cognition via notes. Examples of all of these skills do exist in the videos.
However only two of these skills were specifically addressed in the data presented in the
previous chapter: locating one’s position on a map and off-loading cognition via
recording notes.
With respect to the skill of noting location, participants actually had several ways
in which they related to space in the video logs. They noted their own location. They
noted the location of features in the landscape (either natural or man-made). They related
distances on the map to distances in space and contour lines on the map to topography in
space. These three codes comprise the Spatial Referencing theme. Sometime after the
first hour, instances of the relating to space code decreased significantly or disappeared
altogether in the video logs. Furthermore, the number of instances of Spatial Referencing
was fewer for most of the experts and intermediates than for the novices in the first hour
and in the nose of the fold; Fiamme, an exception, had anomalously high counts of
Spatial Referencing in the nose of the fold. While some instances of Spatial Referencing
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may have been related to areas of compromised visibility, it does not appear that variable
alone can account for the differences between the participants.
Instead, it seems possible that relating to space is a notably different skill than
noting one’s location or noting the location of a feature on the landscape. Indeed, it seems
possible that relating to space is an “everyday” skill and that noting location is actually a
more domain-specific, specialized skill. The studies in the literature review may actually
be more consistent with this new interpretation. In Liben, Myers, and Kastens (2008), the
participants, tasked with finding their location on a map of a college campus, had
demonstrable difficulties. Furthermore, the experts in orienteering have specific strategies
to help them keep track of their location (Eccles, 2006). If noting location is something
that requires deliberate practice, then those who have no particular cause to practice that
skill may not develop expertise in it. By comparison, all the participants who recorded
video logs had less need to relate to space after being in the field for a while. Thus,
another question raised by the video logs is whether relating to space is a skill that we
simply develop in our daily lives or one that is domain-specific.
With respect to the domain-specific skill of off-loading cognition onto notes, the
results from the video logs raise questions here, too. The participants who had higher
scoring maps did have a higher number of instances of recording data in the first hour and
in the nose of the fold than did the participants who had lower scoring maps. Were these
instances of recording data important for their success in the task? As noted before with
questions about Tank’s performance, such a question begins to drift from the descriptive
into explanatory. The visible actions were coded for instances of writing in the notebook
or writing on the map. Again, what the participants were recording was not accounted for
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in the coding, though occasionally instances of sketching were noted. In order to be able
to comment reliably as to whether the participants were off-loading, it seems necessary to
have an understanding of different types of recording events. Indeed, what might be
further needed is a study of the materials onto which they were off-loading: the draft
maps and the notebooks. What sorts of notes were recorded? What was sketched?
5.4.4 A study of expertise in geologic mapping would benefit from a
methodological approach that captures the way thoughts and actions are
juxtaposed
Eccles, Walsh, and Ingledew (2002) illustrated how head-mounted video cameras
could be used to great effect to learn about how expert and novice orienteers used their
time when competing in a race. Arguably, the head-mounted cameras in this study have
also provided new insights into how expert and novice geologists use their time—in the
form of their expressed thoughts and visible actions—as they went about the task of
solving a geologic mapping problem. But it seems reasonable to question whether this
study could have been done without the video cameras. What if the study had been based
on simply a continuously running audio recording alone?
It would not have been possible to answer the research questions without the
video record. While the overall impact of the expressed thoughts can reasonably be
argued to dwarf the impact of the visible actions, that does not mean that the video
recording was unnecessary. The nature of the verbal reports meant that it was vital to see
the context in which they were said. Without that context, extremely valuable data would
have been lost. This was particularly evident in the instances when the participant
happened to remove the camera. There were a couple of moments in different video logs
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(e.g. a lunch stop) when the participant took off the camera and placed it on the ground.
All that was available then was the audio recording. While their expressions during those
times could be audible, they were not particularly intelligible.
Thus, a particularly important stage of this study was the development of the
Matlab program that linked the coding of the transcript with the GPS track. This,
incidentally, was not part of the original design of the project, but was implemented when
it was recognized that it was possible to export the coding of the results from MaxQDA
in such a way as to link that data with the GPS track data.

5.5 Defining the Limits: Acknowledging the limitations and strengths of
the study
In this penultimate section, the limitations and strengths of this dissertation
project are considered.
5.5.1 Limitations of the Study
Yin (2009) identifies that a common critique of case studies is the difficulty in
generalizing the results to a wider population. The eight participants who recorded video
logs represent a sample of the 67 total participants in the study in terms of track
characteristics, expertise levels, and success in the task. Certainly, it would not be
appropriate to expect that all experts in geologic mapping in a different study would
perform like Gidget. Instead, Gidget represents an example of an expert with a high
scoring map who developed a hypothesis early in the day and proceeded to confirm and
refine her model for the duration of her time in the field. Indeed even within the video
logs, she differs from Fiamme, another expert who produced a high-scoring map. Thus
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the conclusions from Gidget’s video log are related to broader ideas about how experts
solve ill-structured problems, but do not attempt to make claims about all experts in
geologic mapping.
Common methods for developing trustworthiness in a case study are the use of
multiple sources of data or returning to the participants in the study and consulting with
them as to the interpretations of the data (Yin, 2009; Creswell). In this study, the focus
was on the video logs and on relating them to the GPS tracks. It was not possible to go
back to the participants to review the analysis of the videos with them. The participants’
involvement was restricted to the time they were in Montana. However, comparing the
conclusions from the video logs with conclusions from analysis of the GPS tracks as well
as the interview data was an attempt to minimize the limitation of not including other
data sources as part of this study.
Finally, another limitation of this study is the question of how recording the video
logs may have impacted the participants’ performance in the task. While this question has
no verifiable answer, there is information to address it in the form of participants’
responses to questions about recording the video logs during the post-mapping interviews
(Table 5.2). Participants did comment that the equipment was somewhat bulky or was, at
times, uncomfortable, even to the point of inducing headaches or discomfort, but it was
also not as large or awkward as they expected. They expressed some self-consciousness
about their thoughts being recorded or possibly heard by other participants in the field.
Two of them, Tank and Pairique, commented that they thought that they wrote less in
their notebooks as a result of recording their thoughts verbally instead. Samson thought it
might have slowed him down a bit; this is a common limitation in think-aloud studies
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(Ericsson, 2006). Yet at the same time, Gidget, Dingo, Salvador, and Boca also thought
that the video recording had little impact on what they did in the field.
5.5.2 Strengths of the Study
“There is no such thing as a ‘complete transcript’ that captures the full complexity
of all verbal and nonverbal events. Consider the relation of the transcript to the
actual events by analogy of the relation of a map to the world it represents”
(Derry et al., 2011).
A particular strength of this study, arguably the keystone of it, is that the
methodology that was used connected the coding of transcripts and visible actions in the
video logs with the GPS tracks. Analysis of the participants’ GPS tracks is highly
informative for understanding geologists’ actions during mapping (e.g. Baker et al.,
2012). Moreover, the audio logs were also useful as verbal diaries of the geologic
mapping process. But it was not possible to see how actions were juxtaposed with speech.
This project removed that limitation. Admittedly, as noted by Derry et al. (2011), no map
that shows coding of the video logs can completely convey the complexity of all of the
expressed thoughts or the actions in the field. But if one changes the scale, then the view
can change, and new details can emerge.
Another important strength is simply the video logs themselves. This project was
an experiment in what would happen when eight geologists were asked to wear a headcamera for several hours at a time as they completed a physically and mentally
demanding field-based task. The resulting video logs are rich and detailed, almost
overwhelmingly so, and are impressive documents of the process of solving a geologic
mapping problem.
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Table 5.2
Summary of participants comments in post-mapping interview regarding experience of recording
a video log (bold font added by author for emphasis)
Name

Fiamme

Gidget

Pairique

Dingo

Tank

Comments in Interview on Video Log Experience
CAITLIN: One question we're interested in, is with wearing the video camera, did you feel that
it changed what you did in the field today?
FIAMME: I was a little more self-conscious about what I was doing. Probably some of the
times when I wasn't speaking I was a little confused, especially when I was trying to work out
what was going on in here. …
CAITLIN: … How did you feel about it just physically, the aspect of wearing?
FIAMME: It was okay. Towards the end of the day, and I don't know what. But it was
pushing on some nerve and I was getting a pain in my neck. (LAUGHTER) And I had to
kind of loosen it a little bit and it went away. And I had been out – that was like by around
4:30 or 5 o'clock, so I had been wearing it for six hours by that point. So it's just probably this
is fatigue.
CAITLIN: I have some additional questions for you because you are one of our video-loggers.
How did the equipment feel to you? Were you comfortable with it out in the field today?
GIDGET: I was real comfortable with the band. … bulkiness just drove me crazy. But it was
only when I was crabby in the first place that it was getting to me. …
CAITLIN: Do you think that the video-logging gear made a difference in how you went about
mapping today?
GIDGET: I don't think so. I talk to myself all the time.
HEATHER: Additional questions are about the video logging, since you were one of our
special video loggers. How did the equipment actually feel to you physically? Were you
comfortable working in the field today?
PARIQUE: It was fairly comfortable. The head gear slips a little bit. So you know it kind of
hangs down around the ears and that's a little uncomfortable, but not onerous. Other than
that, it was fine. The wire is somewhat annoying. …There wasn't nearly as big a piece of
equipment as I was envisioning. I really thought there were like a hat assembly.
HEATHER: … Do you think that doing the video logging made a difference to how you
approached mapping today?
PARIQUE: I think it did. I was much more conscious of my thought process than I
usually am. I probably wrote less down in the field notebook than I would have
otherwise. Because I would speak the description of the rock and what I thought it was. And
then I would just write down what it was and the orientation, rather than the justification for
that in the field notebook. It made me a little bit self-conscious about the possibly inane babble
that I was spouting.
JULIE: Yeah, you were a video logger?
JULIE: And so we have a few very quick questions about the video logging. How did the
equipment feel to you? Were you comfortable?
DINGO: Fairly comfortable except it sort pressed down on my ear and gave me a
little bit of a headache. But it was sort of much more smaller and more comfortable than
I thought it would have to be. But it was fine.
JULIE: So do you think that the video logging gear made a difference in how you went
about mapping today?
DINGO: I don't think so.
HEATHER: I had a question related to the video logging as well. Did you think that wearing
the camera had any impact on your mapping today?
TANK: It did, and I'll tell you why. I got very lazy. I just told the camera everything. But
at the same time, it was wonderful for me clarifying things. It was like I was talking to my field
partner. … I didn't have any problems with it at all and it didn't make me feel strange. My
biggest concern was making sure that I was running it correctly. And it was actually good
practicing on the first stop with the on and off, so don't change that.
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Table 5.2.—continued

Salvador

Samson

Boca

CAITLIN: So how did the equipment feel to you? Were you comfortable with the camera on
you?
SALVADOR: Yeah, I forgot it was there after a while. And then even when I took it off, I
found myself talking to myself. So it was fun, I liked it.
CAITLIN: Okay. Do you think the video logging gear made a difference in how you went
about mapping today?
SALVADOR: Only when I encountered someone else, I was a little self-conscious about
… Talking about my stuff when there was someone right next to me. … It only occurred
once or twice and you'll probably be able to tell, my voice drops.
HEATHER: ... So, how did the equipment feel to you? Were you comfortable out in the field
today? Because you've already mentioned that you felt a little burdened with stuff.
SAMSON: Well, I don't know how to answer this without sounding like a whiner, when you
ask if it's comfortable, yes, it was comfortable. In fact, we fixed from the morning and it
became a lot more manageable. But it’s still stuff that you're not used to. And you've got
things dangling from you, and that's weird. … And don't get me wrong, I don't want to
make it sound like it was horrible or anything, but it's just you do have to pay attention to it,
you're mindful of it, let's say that.
HEATHER: Right. And then thinking along those lines, do you think that doing the video
logging, dealing with the gear, did that make a difference in how you approach mapping
today?
SAMSON: I hope not. I hope not. No, I don't think so, but I think that - I don't think it
changed my approach. I think you got - what I would normally do anyway. I mean, I might've
been a little slower doing it, and less effective, because I was - I struggled with my own stuff
too, you know, my own equipment. …
HEATHER: Did the act of talking aloud, did that affect anything today?
SAMSON: No. … No, I kind of liked that. I kind of liked that.
CAITLIN: … how did the equipment feel to you? Were you comfortable?
BOCA: Yeah. I would say maybe something to stop it from sliding along the belt …
Otherwise, the camera was fine. After a while you're totally used to it. You don't
realize that…I mean, in the back of your mind you know it's there, so you know you're
looking at stuff and you're trying to scan and say why you're scanning or what you're
looking at. …
CAITLIN: But the cord did get in the way of…
BOCA: Yeah, the cord sucked. You'll probably see comments on some video as I was
climbing.
CAITLIN: You've raised something, and I want to follow up… You asked me, when we
were starting the video training, what was I looking for, and you said, "Well, I think I have
some ideas." Can you tell me a little bit about that? …
BOCA: Well, I assume the GPS is going to tell you where I went. So you'll have the
information of where I went and how long at different spots. And I think the video log lets
you see what caught my eye, what I focused on, and then what I'm seeing, and then I'm
explaining to you my interpretation of what I'm seeing. So the video is there to log where
I'm looking, what's making me stop, what I'm skipping over. …
CAITLIN: Okay, last question. Do you think the video log gear made a difference in how
you went about the mapping today?
BOCA: No, not really. I don't think I really could have done anything else differently. I
mean I would have done the same walking path. I would have went all the same places. I
would have stopped at the same rocks. I would have skipped over stuff I wanted to skip
over that I thought wasn't going to change anything that was just going to reinforce the
fact that that's limestone. It would have been fun to do a lot of color commentary.
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5.6 Thinking Ahead: Implications of the video logs and the future work
they motivate
Throughout this chapter, there have been multiple references to future studies that
build upon the existing eight video logs of Boca, Fiamme, Samson, Pairique, Gidget,
Tank, Dingo, and Salvador. However, there are multiple independent and new possible
future projects that could be pursued as a result of this project.
Many of the participants in the overall study commented that they missed the
opportunity to talk with a field partner as they worked. Having a field partner or multiple
collaborators is common for students and professionals alike when out in the field
making geologic maps. Broadric et al., (2004) and Broadaric and Gahegan (2007) studied
how a team of geologists developed their geologic maps but did so based on the data that
they produced. From a research perspective, it would be interesting to see how geologists
of different levels of expertise work together to solve a geologic mapping problem. How
might they work together to develop both a logical and causal mental model of a field
area? How do they help each other resolve conflicts when they make unexpected
observations? How do they contribute to each other’s evaluations of certainty? Instead of
one person wearing a head-mounted video camera, a pair of people could share the duties
and provide a new perspective on how geologists work together out in the field.
A wholly different direction to apply this method would be to study problem
solving at a micro-scale. In addition to learning how to make geologic maps, typical
undergraduate geology curriculum requires students to take a petrology course. Such
courses involve students learning how to identify minerals in thin-section. Thin sections
of rock can include samples of chemical and physical changes in minerals which can in
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turn be related to the tectonic history of the region from which the rock came. The
question of how geologists of different levels of expertise solve ill-structured problems in
the small-scale seems a natural extension of this study into how geologists of different
levels of expertise solve ill-structured problems at the large-scale. Furthermore,
microscopes are not used just within geology but across science disciplines. Thus, the
implications of studying problem-solving at the micro-scale would seem to have broader
implications than just for geologists. It is now possible to connect microscopes to
computers and project what is seen on the microscope stage up onto a screen. Using an
eye-tracking device, participants could then be followed in the same way that geologists
were followed in this study as they work to solve a problem. The coding methods applied
here could then be applied to eye tracks.
Finally, based on analysis of the GPS tracks, Baker et al. (2012) argue that an
important instructional implication of the study is that students need to be challenged to
progress from rote knowledge of rock types to deeper understanding of geologic
structures so that they are more capable of developing structural hypotheses. The results
from this study further amplify that recommendation. Early model development may rely
on expertise as a prerequisite. However, what does seem within reach of novices is the
practice of reflecting more on the certainty of their interpretations instead of primarily on
their observations. A natural accompaniment would be further training in the practice of
developing multiple hypotheses because with multiple ideas, they will be more confident
in how to proceed when they make new observations that conflict with their existing
ones. As Gidget says, “certainty, certainty brings confidence.”
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Appendix B. Field Protocol for Collecting Data
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Video Log Protocol
Contents:
1. General Checklist for Researcher
a. Setup Checklist
b. Post Data Collection Checklist
2. Protocol for Initial Training with Participant
3. Protocol for Prior to Departure for the Stratigraphy Walkthrough
4. Protocol at Mapping Task Launch
5. Eight copies of the Video Log Instructions

General Checklist for Researcher

(C1 = Camera 1; C2 = Camera 2)
 Complete set up checklist
 Complete protocol for initial training
with each participant recording a
video log
 Complete protocol for prior to
departure for the stratigraphy
walkthrough with each participant
recording a video log
 Complete protocol for mapping task
launch point with each participant
recording a video log
 Complete post data collection
checklist

Cohort
4
C1 C2
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Cohort
5
C1 C2

Cohort
Cohort 7
6
C1 C2 C1
C2

Setup Checklist
Cohort 4
C1 C2












Assemble gear for each video
logger
o Camera
 Clip attached to cable
o Recording device
o 4 GB memory card
o 8 GB memory card
o 4 AA alkaline batteries
o 4 AA lithium batteries
o Head strap
o Extra hat
o Belt
o Case for recording device
o GPS unit
o Pseudo-Carabineer
o Laminated instruction slip
Modified field notebook for each
participant
o On cover: “CHECK
RECORDING”
o On inside pages: BOLD
NUMBERS
Assemble gear for researcher
o Equipment cases
o This protocol
o Screwdrivers (Phillips and
Flathead)
o Bag of extra screws (with
magnet)
o Scissors
o Pen and pencil
Confirm camera settings for all
users
 Frame Rate: 30
 Video Quality: HIGH
 Recording mode: CLIP
 LCD timeout: NEVER
 Power off timeout: NEVER
Confirm camera time matches
GPS units prior to stratigraphy
walkthrough
Camera Settings for Stratigraphy
Walkthrough:
Video Resolution: 720 x 480
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Cohort 5
C1 C2

Cohort 6
C1 C2

Cohort 7
C1 C2

Setup Checklist (Continued)
Cohort 4
C1 C2



Prepare Head Straps
o
o
o
o
o
o

Thread and attach base for mount
onto head strap
Put recording device inside case
Thread cable onto head strap
Attach camera cable to recording
device
Attach mount onto base assuming
one participant is right handed.
Put camera inside mount [but do not
tighten screws all the way].

460

Cohort 5
C1 C2

Cohort 6
C1 C2

Cohort 7
C1 C2

Post Data Collection Checklist
Cohort 4
C1 C2









17

After stratigraphy walkthrough
o Change batteries from alkaline to
lithium
o Change memory cards from 4 GB to 8
GB
o Change camera settings for mapping
task: Video resolution: 640 x 48017
After returning from map launch save files
from the memory card with the following
format:
Ernie_[date]_videolog_strat
o WRITE DOWN START AND STOP
TIME OF RECORDING PRIOR TO
FILE TRANSFER (see excel file:
videolog_aug2010_startstoptimes.xlsx
)
o Download video from 4GB memory
cards onto Lacie hard drive
o Download video from 4GB memory
cards onto Orange hard drive
After interviews or on down-day save files
from the memory card with the following
format:
Ernie_[date]_videolog_maptask
o WRITE DOWN START AND STOP
TIME OF RECORDING PRIOR TO
FILE TRANSFER
(see excel file:
videolog_aug2010_startstoptimes.xlsx
)
o Download video from 8GB memory
cards onto Lacie hard drive
o Download video from 8GB memory
cards onto Orange hard drive
Clean up
o Wash headbands
o Clear off memory cards
o Remove lithium batteries and install
new alkaline batteries

Changed setting to be 700x480 @ Medium Quality after cohort 4
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Cohort 5
C1 C2

Cohort 6
C1 C2

Cohort 7
C1 C2

Training with Participant: Meet separately with each participant who will record a video
log. Complete training the night before the mapping task. Black text indicates
directions for the researcher alone. Red text is script to be spoken to participant.










I want to begin by explaining again what we are doing here. We would like you to
record a video log tomorrow by wearing this small video camera. We would like you
to think out loud and record all thoughts relevant to the mapping process; here is a
small microphone that will pick up what you say.
The camera is attached to this recording device; here is the power button. You only
need to touch the button briefly. If you hold it down too long, it will power on and then
power off. Try turning on the unit.
To start a recording, push the button above the red “REC” label. You should see a
flashing red light on the upper-left hand corner of the screen. There should also be
beep. Try it.
Push the record button again to stop recording. The red light should turn off and
there should be another beep. Try it.
Tomorrow in the field you should stop the recording when you need a bathroom
break; begin the recording again as soon as you are ready to do so.
We will have you wear the camera by attaching it to this mag lite head strap. You will
be able to fit a hat over this strap if you wish to do so.
We can get the camera attached and positioned on the strap now so it will be ready
for you to put on tomorrow morning.
I’m going to set up the camera so that you’ll wear it over your ear on the same side
that you are handed. Are you right handed or left handed?

Directions for Researcher:
o





Attach the camera onto the strap for the participant (see setup checklist for
specific steps).

Next we want to check to make sure that the camera is positioned correctly. Please
put on the head strap so that the camera is above your [right or left] ear. [When
participant is ready, continue.]
Hold your hand in front of your face so that your fingers are pointed up. Use the
recording device to see if the camera field of view is straight or tilted.

Directions for Researcher:
o





Assist with turning the camera until the field of view is vertical. Put a piece of
electrical tape holding the camera in place onto the mount.

Now I’d like you to take off the strap so that we can tighten the screws holding the
camera in place. [Tighten screws on mount and then hand strap back to participant.]
Now the camera is set up.
Next I’d like to let you practice putting on the equipment. The first step is to put on
the head strap.
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Please stand up and check that when you look down you can see the top of
your shoes with your head in a comfortable downward gaze position. If yes,
leave the strap as it is. If no, try to move the strap so that you can see the top
of your shoes.
Once the camera is set, the next thing to do is to position the cable. You can use this
small clip to fasten the cable to your backpack or shirt to prevent it from moving
around on you. Be sure to leave a little slack in the cable so that it doesn’t pull on
your head.
Next, the microphone should be positioned somewhere toward your shoulder and in
front of you. You can use this clip with a safety pin to guide the cable to stay in front
of you instead of letting it slip behind you.
The last step is to put the case onto the belt and then put on the belt.
Are you comfortable? Do you have any questions?
Tomorrow morning there will be some additional paper and pencil tests before you
leave for the field. You and I will meet immediately after the morning tests to let you
put on your gear. I will also give you more specific directions about when to start and
stop recording.
Okay. We are done for the night. Thank you.

Prior to Departure for the Stratigraphy Walk-Through:
Directions for Researcher:
o












Double-check settings for recording. Make sure video camera and GPS unit have
the same time. Meet separately with each participant who will record a video log.

Let’s start by having you put on the head strap. Leave the belt off for now. When you
are comfortable with the camera on your head, turn on the recording unit and check
the camera position. Can you see you see the top of your shoes? Are your fingers
appear straight?
[When participant is ready, continue.]
Try a test recording. Let me know if you have questions.
[When participant is ready, continue.]
Now go ahead and put on the belt.
We are about to leave for the stratigraphy walk-through. We would like you to begin
the video recording at the first stop and end the video recording after the fourth and
last stop. I will be near-by if you need help or have questions.
Here is your field notebook. We’ve modified it a little bit. On the cover we’ve written
“CHECK RECORDING” to help remind you to turn off and on the recording when you
need bathroom breaks.
We’ve also written bold page numbers to help the camera see what page you are on.
For the stratigraphy walk-through you will be near the other study participants and so
you do not need to speak for the audio recording. However, the audio recording will
be running and will pick up any conversation.
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After the stratigraphy walk-through, please return the camera and recording device to
me so that I can change the memory card and batteries. I will return the camera and
recording device to you before it is your turn to begin the mapping task.

At the Mapping Task Launch:
Directions for Researcher:
o
o
o















Double-check settings for recording. Make sure video camera and GPS unit have
the same time.
Meet separately with each participant who will record a video log after each
participant hears the safety instructions.
Stagger the video loggers so that they are released as soon as they are ready
but not immediately following each other.

Here is your camera and belt back. Put the head strap back on and check the
camera position. Once you are comfortable, put on the belt with the recording device.
You should start the recording now.
We would like you to think out loud and record all thoughts relevant to the mapping
process; here is a summary of your directions. [Hand over slip of paper with
instructions.]
Please remember to stop the recording when you need bathroom breaks. We leave it
to you whether you would be more comfortable taking off the camera and belt or
leaving everything on. It is important to resume the recording as soon as you are
ready to do so.
I recommend periodically checking the recorder to see that the camera is still in a
good position. You may want or need to reposition the head strap during the day.
That is fine. Remember to adjust the strap so that you can comfortably see your feet
when you look down.
Other than bathroom breaks, continue video recording and thinking aloud until you
complete your map. Turn off the recording and camera at the field station when you
are ready to turn in your map. If I am not around, turn in the camera and recording
device when you turn in your map.
If you have a problem or questions during the day regarding the equipment, you can
go to Joe who will have a fixed location in the mapping area. He is familiar with the
equipment and can also contact me via walkie-talkie.
Do you have any questions before you begin?
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Montana Mapping Project – Video Log Instructions
VIDEO LOGGING:
 Think out loud; record all thoughts relevant to the mapping process
 Push button above the red “REC” label to record. You should see a flashing red
light on the upper-left hand corner of the recording device.
 Push button above the red “REC” label to stop recording. The red light should
turn off.
 Stop the recording if you need a bathroom break; begin again as soon as you are
finished.

465

Appendix C. Coding Scheme for Visible Actions
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Collecting Data
 Breaking rock with hammer
o Mark each instance participant uses a hammer to break a single rock sample
or outcrop
 Do NOT mark a new instance if participant breaks the same sample
more than once or the same part of the outcrop more than once
 However, DO mark the instance if the participant stops to look at or
test (with HCl) the sample or outcrop between hammering on it; in
other words, mark an instance if another observable action occurs
between instances of hammering including walking or shifting to new
location
 Do mark a new instance if participant breaks more than one sample or
different part of the outcrop more than once
 Inspecting rock
o Mark each instance participant picks up hand sample, whether a piece of
float or a piece that was broken with hammer
 Do NOT mark instance if participant is only standing over outcrop or
float, even if the participant speaks about the outcrop. Note that if the
participant speaks about the outcrop that will be coded in transcript.
 Do NOT mark instance if participant only touches or moves rock with
hammer
 Mark only ONE instance if participant picks up sample at one point but
looks at the sample at a later point
o Mark each instance participant brings face close to outcrop
o Mark each instance participant holds OR uses any sort of equipment (e.g.
ruler, notebook, etc.) to measure bedding
 Strike and dip
o Mark each instance participant uses a brunton to take a strike and dip
o Mark each instance participant uses a brunton to read an azimuth
o Mark each instance participant uses a brunton to read a dip direction
o If the instant that the participant is measuring strike and dip, azimuth, or dip
direction is somehow unclear, mark the time that the compass is taken out of
its case or appears in view on the video and the time that the compass is put
back in the case or disappears from view
o NOTE: Referring to compass is an “Other” and not counted as an instance of
“Strike and dip”
 Testing with HCl
o Mark each instance participant uses HCl to test a single rock sample or
outcrop
 Do NOT mark a new instance if participant tests the same sample
more than once or the same part of the outcrop more than once
 Do mark a new instance if participant tests more than one sample or
different part of the outcrop more than once
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Recording Data
 Writing in notebook
o Mark each instance that participant makes sketch or records notes in field
notebook or blank piece of paper (i.e. not on aerial photo image or
topographic map)
 Do mark a new instance if participant pauses to do another action or
walks to a new location; do NOT mark a new instance if person simply
takes a step, turns around, or sits down in place
 Do NOT mark a new instance if participant pauses while making same
entry or sketch
 Do mark instance if participant erases on notebook
 Writing on map
o Mark each instance that participant makes note or sketch on aerial photo
image or topographic map
 Do mark a new instance if participant pauses to do another action or
walks to a new location; do NOT mark a new instance if person simply
takes a step, turns around, or sits down in place
 Do mark instance if participant erases on map or aerial photo
 Do NOT mark instance if participant changes pencils or pen
 Do NOT mark a new instance if participant pauses while making same
entry or sketch
Other
 Mark instance for events such as the following:
o Taking photos
o Making adjustment to equipment, supplies, or self (e.g. repacking backpack,
refilling water bottle, removing a layer such as a coat or something, applying
chapstick, or taking a water break)
o Gestures (including pointing at landscape)
o Checking watch
o Distractions or actions not obviously related to the task (e.g. picking up or
pausing to look at vegetation of some form)
o Unusual actions related to task (e.g. checking compass, sniffing hammer)
 Mark instance when participant stops recording for their own purposes (e.g. water
break, bathroom break)
 Do NOT mark instance when participant is simply taking off or putting on backpack at
a stop
 Do NOT mark instance of other when the participant stops video recording for the
purposes of the research study.
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Appendix D. Coding Scheme for Expressed Thoughts
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Procedural and Declarative Knowledge










Taking and recordings measurements at the hand sample or outcrop scale
o Performing tests to determine rock type (e.g. acid, hardness, smell, etc.)
o Taking actual or approximate strike and dip
o Taking actual or approximate lineation or plunge
o Measuring or estimating width or thickness of rock layer
o Noting, measuring, or estimating size of feature
o Taking and recording general field observations such as noticing rock, soil,
vegetation
o All of the above INCLUDES expressions related to actual and intended
actions
Referencing
o Referring or referencing to field notebook for information at previous stop or
walk through
Identification of rock types from hand sample or outcrop
o Description of lithology or stratigraphic unit
o Identification of rock type by lithology or stratigraphic name
o Identification or description of rock texture or properties
Identification of structural/rock features at the hand sample outcrop scale
o Description of feature
o Identification of feature by name (e.g. folds, bedding, faults, fossil
assemblages, odor, alteration etc.)
o Identification of directly observable feature (not inferred)
Identification of contacts between rock types at the outcrop scale
o Explicit description of contact
o Identification of lithological contact

Reasoning and Model Development






Inferring presence (or absence) of features at outcrop or local scale
o Inferring rock type (or unit name), contact, or feature by reasoning from
indirect evidence (e.g. soil, vegetation pattern, topography, secondary
alteration, float, regional stratigraphy, etc.)
Relating observations to observations of rock units at walk through
o Relating rock types or other features observed in the map area to the regional
stratigraphy in the walk through (explicitly)
o Relating rock types or other features observed in the map area to information
provided during the walk through (explicitly)
Synthesizing observations into large-scale mental models
o Distinguishing large-scale rock structure (not directly observable)
o Describing or inferring deformational history
o Describing or inferring regional or stratigraphic history
o Inferring petrogenesis of unit
o Includes amending previous mental model so long as new ideas are not
explicit revisions of earlier ideas.
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Reasoning and Model Development, continued




Testing mental models against additional observations
o Predicting or Proposing Tests
 Predicting features (including rock types, landscape features) that
may be encountered (consistent with model)
 Proposing tests of the model against evidence that could be collected
o Confirming or Disconfirming Tests
 Interpreting actual observation of features consistent (confirming) or
inconsistent (refutation) with model, expected features, or rock type(s)
Revising mental model in light of new observations
o Giving possible alternate explanations of observations
o Expressing an explicit need to change the model to accommodate new data
o Describing a revised model, or how the current model has been revised

Spatial Referencing








Noting Location
o Trying to "locate" oneself on the map and in space
o Explicit mention of a stop and with reference to its location on the map or
location in space
o Relating between his/her position and some landscape feature or rock unit
Relating to Space
o Explicit mention of scale on map, scale bar
o Explicit mention of distance in some unit (e.g. feet or meters) between self
and another location in field or between two points in field (e.g. distance
between launch point and a particular outcrop)
o Use of pace to measure distance
o Explicit mention of size or distance of field area
o Explicit mention of compass direction (e.g. identifying which way is north)
Noting Features
o Identification of landscape feature or rock unit relative to its location or
relative to another feature or rock unit on the map or in space
Inspecting Landscape
o Inspecting landscape using binoculars: This action is only in Tank's video log.
However, his particular style is to do this rather than note location of features
on the map and in space. Thus, this appears to be one of his ways to
reference to space and needs to be reflected as such in the coding of his log.
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Metacognition






Noting distractions from task at hand (“novelty space”)
o Describing vegetative cover, weathering, factors that interfere with rock
identification (or identification of structural features)
o Concern over personal safety or comfort (e.g., food, water, tired)
o Lost/missing item
Revising strategies based on self-evaluations
o Explicit mention of change in strategy or general evaluation of strategy
o Reflection on the success (or not) of a chosen strategy and need to change it.
Evaluating or noting certainty of observations or conclusions: Explicit mention
of levels of certainty (sure, unsure, guess) of observations or conclusions; general
evaluation of conclusions; and explicit mention of level of precision needed or used
o In Location: Explicit mention of levels of certainty (sure, unsure, guess)
related to:
 Locating self on topographic map or aerial photo or in space
 Locating stop on topographic map or aerial photo or in space
 Location feature, either natural (e.g. hill, ridge) or man-made
(e.g. road) on topographic map or aerial photo
o In Observation: Explicit mention of levels of certainty (sure, unsure, guess)
related to field observations (e.g. identifying rock type, structural or rock
feature, or contact between rock types).
 Contact ID: Explicit mention of levels of certainty (sure, unsure,
guess) related to identification of contacts between rock types at the
outcrop scale; Includes expressions or certainty or uncertainty in
description of contact or identification of lithological contact
 Structure ID: Explicit mention of levels of certainty (sure, unsure,
guess) related to identification of structural/rock features at the hand
sample outcrop scale. Includes expressions or certainty or uncertainty
in: description of feature or identification of feature by name (e.g.
folds, bedding, faults, fossil assemblages, odor, alteration etc.);
identification of directly observable feature (not inferred); and
identification of directly observable feature (not inferred)
 Rock ID: Explicit mention of levels of certainty (sure, unsure, guess)
related to identification of rock types from hand sample or outcrop.
Includes expressions or certainty or uncertainty in: description of
lithology or stratigraphic unit; identification of rock type by lithology or
stratigraphic name; identification or description of rock texture or
properties
o In Interpretation: Explicit mention of levels of certainty (sure, unsure, guess)
related to interpretations of observations into large-scale mental model(s).
This code is applied rather than the more specific sub-codes when the
participant makes an expression of certainty in their large or map-scale
mental model without explicitly referring to a specific aspect of their mental
model (e.g. contact placement or underlying structure). An example of a more
general interpretation is an explicit statement about not knowing the rock unit
in their current location or in a particular part of the field area.
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Metacognition, continued








Contact Placement: Explicit mention of levels of certainty (sure,
unsure, guess) related to interpretations of contact placements or
position on a large or map scale.
 Underlying Structure: Explicit mention of levels of certainty (sure,
unsure, guess) related to interpretations of underlying geologic
structure of the field area on a large or map scale.
o In Process: Explicit mention of levels of certainty (sure, unsure, guess)
related to process such as: accuracy or precision of measurement; method
for recording data or symbol; whether it is appropriate to use rock for
measurement (i.e. in place or not); and whether it is necessary to make a
certain observation or take a certain measurement (or to pace a certain
distance)
Explicit indicators of planning or mapping strategies
o Describing overall mapping strategy (including selection of colors for map)
o Describing a plan or action of moving to a particular location
o Describing a plan or action to complete a task that is not related to taking or
recording measurements such as eating lunch or taking a break but could
include such things as: traveling to a particular area in the field; needing to
locate oneself on the map or in space; needing to find a certain type of rock

Other: Any salient information that does not clearly fit within an existing category (e.g.
reflection on the mapping process such as selection of colored pencils for rock units;
reflection on prior knowledge or prior mapping experiences)
o Referring to time or watch
 Explicit reference to time including time of day, amount of time spent in a
certain area, or amount of time left in day
 Explicit reference to watch or GPS unit to tell time
o POV
 Explicit reference to head-mounted camera (including wire or
microphone) or walkie-talkie
o Conversation
 Talking with someone else or camera
 Making commentary for camera or perceived audience of video log
Lose Audio or Visual
o Lost audio due to wind
Camera lens covered either intentionally or unintentionally by participant
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Appendix E. Matlab Program for Transforming
Coding of Visible Actions
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%C. Callahan
%Load the export file from Inqscribe for visible actions in a video clip.
%Convert the data into arrays of 0 and 1 for absence or presence of each
%type of visible action. Also store the annotations to specific actions.
%Path\Filename: ..\Files based on full time sync\Actionfiles\makeactionarr.m
%Created: October 2012; Revised: November 2012; Revised: January 2013 to
%fix possible bug in time data based on end time of video; Revised: March
%2013 to fix possible bug in time data of actions and transcript entries.
clear all
%Open file from Inqscribe; the 'r' denotes permission to edit.
fid = fopen('actionexport.txt','r');
%Read file
a = textscan(fid,'%s %s %s','HeaderLines',1,'delimiter','\t,');
fclose(fid);
%Assign variable to time data
actiontimetag = a{:,1};
%Assign variable to code data
action = a{:,2};
acomm = a{:,3};
%Convert time data from hh:mm:ss into seconds and assign new variable for
%time data
[Y, M, D, H, MN, S] = datevec(actiontimetag);
actiontimetags = H*3600+MN*60+S;
%Initialize the variables for each type of visible action
brkrc = zeros(length(action),1); %Breaking rock sample or outcrop
inspec = zeros(length(action),1); %Inspecting rock sample or outcrop
sdm = zeros(length(action),1); %Taking strike and dip
thcl = zeros(length(action),1); %Testing rock with HCl
wnb = zeros(length(action),1); %Writing in notebook
wmap = zeros(length(action),1); %Writing on map
otherac = zeros(length(action),1); %Other
%For each variable, step through each row of the action array and identify
%whether that row is an instance of that variable. If it is, store a value
%of 1, if not, store a value of 0.
for i = 1:length(action)
brkrc(i) = strcmpi(action(i), 'Breaking rock');
inspec(i) = strcmpi(action(i), 'Inspecting rock');
sdm(i)
= strcmpi(action(i), 'Measuring orientation');
thcl(i) = strcmpi(action(i), 'Testing with HCl');
wnb(i)
= strcmpi(action(i), 'Writing in notebook');
wmap(i) = strcmpi(action(i), 'Writing on map');
otherac(i) = strcmpi(action(i), 'Other');
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end
%Initialize a time array from 0 to the final time in the action array in
%increments of 10 seconds
timearr = (0:10:max(actiontimetags))'; %Time in seconds
%Test for possible error: If the length of the video is divisible by ten
%then the maximum value of the actiontimetags array will end up equal to
%timearr array. This will cause an error in the for loops used to create
%the action arrays. To avert the error, the if loop below adds one second
%to the maximum value of the actiontimetags.
tagtest = max(actiontimetags);
timetest = max(timearr);
j = length(actiontimetags);
if timetest == tagtest
actiontimetags (j) = actiontimetags(j) + 1;
end
%Test for possible error in data: If the next to last time stamp on the
%transcript is greater than the maximum value of the time array, the entry
%and any coding associated with it will be lost. To avert this error,
%compare the next to last time stamp with the final value of the time
%array. If the next to last time stamp is greater than the value of the
%time arrary, reassign the value of the time stamp to be equal to the time
%array.
if actiontimetags(j-1) > max(timearr)
actiontimetags(j-1) = max(timearr);
end
%Initialize new arrays for each type of variable. These arrays will store
%the 1 or 0 for the presence or absence of each variable for the entire
%time array.
brkrc_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
inspec_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
sdm_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
thcl_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
wnb_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
wmap_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
acomm_arr = cell(length(timearr),1);
otherac_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
count = 1;
%For each variable, step through each row of the time array and identify
%whether that row is an instance of that variable. If it is, store a value
%of 1, if not, store a value of 0.
for k = 1:length(timearr)
if timearr(k) < actiontimetags(count);
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brkrc_arr(k) = 0;
inspec_arr(k) = 0;
sdm_arr(k) = 0;
thcl_arr(k) = 0;
wnb_arr(k) = 0;
wmap_arr(k) = 0;
acomm_arr{k} = sprintf('%s ', 'Null');
otherac_arr(k) = 0;
elseif timearr(k) >= actiontimetags(count) && timearr(k) < actiontimetags(count+1);
brkrc_arr(k) = brkrc(count);
inspec_arr(k) = inspec(count);
sdm_arr(k) = sdm(count);
thcl_arr(k) = thcl(count);
wnb_arr(k) = wnb(count);
wmap_arr(k) = wmap(count);
acomm_arr{k} = sprintf('%s ', acomm{count});
otherac_arr(k) = otherac(count);
count = count + 1;
elseif timearr(k) >= actiontimetags(count) && timearr(k) >= actiontimetags(count+1);
brkrc_arr(k) = brkrc(count)+ brkrc(count+1);
inspec_arr(k) = inspec(count) + inspec(count+1);
sdm_arr(k) = sdm(count) + sdm(count+1);
thcl_arr(k) = thcl(count) + thcl(count+1);
wnb_arr(k) = wnb(count) + wnb(count+1);
wmap_arr(k) = wmap(count) + wmap(count+1);
acomm_arr{k} = sprintf('%s ', acomm{count:count+1});
otherac_arr(k) = otherac(count) + otherac(count+1);
count = count + 2;
end
end
datacoll
datarec

= [timearr brkrc_arr inspec_arr sdm_arr thcl_arr otherac_arr];
= [timearr wnb_arr wmap_arr];

timearrcell = num2cell(timearr);
acommentcell = {timearrcell{:}; acomm_arr{:}}';
[nrows,ncols]= size(acommentcell);
filename = 'actioncomments.txt';
fid = fopen(filename, 'w');
for row=1:nrows
fprintf(fid, '%d \t %s\n', acommentcell{row,:});
end
fclose(fid);
%Save action data array to be joined to shapefile
save datacoll.txt datacoll -ASCII
save datarec.txt datarec -ASCII
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Appendix F. Matlab Program for Transforming
Coding of Expressed Thoughts
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%C. Callahans
%This program has two functions:
%1. Load the time-stamped transcript files from Inqscribe and MaxQDA.
%Using the time stamps from the Inqscribe file and the edited text from the
%MaxQDA file, assign the time-stamped lines of text to increments in a cell
%variable that corresponds to increments in the GPS track.
%2. Load the file with assigned codes for each line of text from MaxQDA.
%Assign each instance of coding to increments in a cell variable that
%corresponds to increments in the GPS track.
%Filename:maketextandcodearr.m
%Created: December 2012; Revised January 2013 to fix possible bug in time
%data based on end time of video; Revised: February 2013 to include and
%save edited transcript from MaxQDA. Revised: March 2013 to fix possible bug
%in time data of actions and transcript entries.
clear
%Part 1
%Open transcript file from Inqscribe to obtain the time stamps for the
%transcript; the 'r' denotes permission to edit.
fid = fopen('transcripttimestamps.txt','r');
%Read file
b = textscan(fid,'%s %s','HeaderLines',1,'delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
%Open transcript file from MaxQDA to obtain the edited text of the
%transcript; the 'r' denotes permission to edit.
fid = fopen('transcripttext.txt','r');
%Read file
c = textscan(fid,'%s %s','delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
%Assign cell variable to time data in transcript
talktimetag = b{:,1};
%Assign cell variable to each line of text in transcript
talktext = c{:,2};
%Convert time stamp data from hh:mm:ss into seconds and assign new matrix
%and cell variable for time stamp data
[Y, M, D, H, MN, S] = datevec(talktimetag);
talktimetags = H*3600+MN*60+S;
talktimecell = num2cell(talktimetags);
%Create variables for full time data (from 0:00:00 to maximum time of the
%video clip
timearr = (0:10:max(talktimetags))'; %Time in seconds stored as matrix
timearrcell = num2cell(timearr);
%Time in seconds stored as cell
%Test for possible error: If the length of the video is divisible by ten
%then the maximum value of the actiontimetags array will end up equal to
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%timearr array. This will cause an error in the for loops used to create
%the action arrays. To avert the error, the if loop below adds one second
%to the maximum value of the actiontimetags.
tagtest = max(talktimetags);
timetest = max(timearr);
j = length(talktimetags);
if timetest == tagtest
talktimetags(j) = talktimetags(j) + 1;
end
%Test for possible error in data: If the next to last time stamp on the
%transcript is greater than the maximum value of the time array, the entry
%and any coding associated with it will be lost. To avert this error,
%compare the next to last time stamp with the final value of the time
%array. If the next to last time stamp is greater than the value of the
%time arrary, reassign the value of the time stamp to be equal to the time
%array.
if talktimetags(j-1) > max(timearr)
talktimetags(j-1) = max(timearr);
end
%Create a cell variable that is the same size as the cell for the full time
%data to store each line of text from the transcript.
talk = cell(size(timearrcell));
count = 1;
%For each time stamp of the transcript, step through each row of the time
%array and identify whether the time-stamped line of text should be
%assigned to that increment in the time array. If so, assign the
%time-stamped line of text to the corresponding increment in the empty cell
%variable 'talk'. Note that this is the same loop design used in the
%makeactionarr.m program.
%
for k = 1:length(timearrcell)
if timearrcell{k} < talktimetags(count);
talk{k} = sprintf('%s ', 'Null');
elseif timearrcell{k} >= talktimetags(count) && timearrcell{k} <
talktimetags(count+1);
talk{k} = sprintf('%s ', talktext{count});
count = count + 1;
elseif timearrcell{k} >= talktimetags(count) && timearrcell{k} >=
talktimetags(count+1);
talk{k} = sprintf('%s ', talktext{count:count+1});
count = count + 2;
end
end
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talkcell = {timearrcell{:}; talk{:}}';
[nrows,ncols]= size(talkcell);
filename = 'editedtranscript.txt';
fid = fopen(filename, 'w');
for row=1:nrows
fprintf(fid, '%d \t %s\n', talkcell{row,:});
end
fclose(fid);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Part 2
%Clear index variables
clear count i j k
%Open code file from MaxQDA; the 'r' denotes permission to edit.
fid = fopen('codedsegments.txt', 'r');
%Read the first line as the header row. Read the second line as eleven
%different columns of data. Store most variables as strings, but store the
%numbers indicating the line numbers of each code as double integers.
a = textscan(fid, '%s %s %s %d %d %s %s %s %s %s
%s','HeaderLines',1,'delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
%Assign a cell variable for each instance a code was assigned to the
%transcript.
talkcode = a{:,3};
%Assign cell variable to the index numbers indicating the start and stop of
%use of the code.
codestart = a{:,4};
codestop = a{:,5};
%
%Convert the index numbers indicating the start and stop of each use of a
%code into the corresponding elapsed seconds for that line of text in the
%transcript. The first step is to create an empty variable that will store
%the start and stop times.
codestartsec = zeros(size(talkcode));
codestopsec = zeros(size(talkcode));
%The second step is to search the cell variable with time stamp data in
%seconds and store the corresponding start and stop times in seconds.
for i = 1:length(talkcode);
codestartsec(i) = talktimecell{codestart(i)};
codestopsec(i) = talktimecell{codestop(i)};
end
%Create a cell with the same number of rows as time stamps in the
%transcript and the same number of columns as instances a code was applied.
%Populate the cell with each instance a code was applied for each
%time stamp that the code was applied.
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m = length(talkcode);
n = length(talktext);
talkcodearr = cell(n,m);
for count = 1:length(talkcode)
for i = 1:length(talktext)
if talktimetags(i) < codestartsec(count)
talkcodearr{i,count} = {'Null'};
elseif talktimetags(i) >= codestartsec(count) && talktimetags(i) <=
codestopsec(count)
talkcodearr{i,count} = talkcode{count};
else
talkcodearr{i,count} = {'Null'};
end
end
end
%Create cell variables for each code in the coding scheme with the
%same dimensions as the cell with each instance a code was applied for each
%time stamp that the code was applied. Note that the resulting cells should
%have equal number of rows but not necessarily columns.
%Reasoning and Model Development
rmdall = cell(n,m);
infer = cell(n,m);
relat = cell(n,m);
synth = cell(n,m);
tsting = cell(n,m);
tstpre = cell(n,m);
tstcon = cell(n,m);
revis = cell(n,m);
%Metacognition
distrct = cell(n,m);
uncert = cell(n,m);
plnnig = cell(n,m);
uncert_loc = cell(n,m);
uncert_obs = cell(n,m);
uncert_int = cell(n,m);
uncert_pro = cell(n,m);
%Procedural and Declarative Knowledge
pdk = cell(n,m);
idtrm = cell(n,m);
idrock = cell(n,m);
idcontacts = cell(n,m);
idstruct = cell(n,m);
%Spatial Referencing
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spref = cell(n,m);
nbloc = cell(n,m);
rspac = cell(n,m);
nbfea = cell(n,m);
%Evaluating whether rock in place
evlplc = cell(n,m);
evlinplc = cell(n,m);
evlidflt = cell(n,m);
%Other
other = cell(n,m);
for j = 1:length(talkcode)
for k = 1:length(talktext)
rmdall{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'RMD');
infer{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'RMD\Inferring');
relat{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'RMD\Relating');
synth{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'RMD\Synthesizing');
tsting{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'RMD\Testing');
tstpre{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'RMD\Testing\Predicting');
tstcon{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'RMD\Testing\Confirming');
revis{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'RMD\Revising');
distrct{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Metacognition\Distractions');
uncert{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Metacognition\Certainty');
plnnig{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Metacognition\Planning');
uncert_loc{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Metacognition\Certainty\In_Spatial_Ref');
uncert_obs{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Metacognition\Certainty\In_Observation');
uncert_int{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Metacognition\Certainty\In_Interpretation');
uncert_pro{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Metacognition\Certainty\In_Process');
pdk{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'PDK');
idtrm{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'PDK\Taking or recording measurements');
idrock{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'PDK\Rock_ID');
idcontacts {k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'PDK\Contact_ID');
idstruct {k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'PDK\Structure_ID');
spref{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Spatial_Referencing');
nbloc{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Spatial_Referencing\Noting_Location');
rspac{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Spatial_Referencing\Relating_to_Space');
nbfea{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Spatial_Referencing\Noting_Features');
evlplc{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Metacognition\Eval_Place');
evlinplc{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Metacognition\Eval_Place\In_Place');
evlidflt{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Metacognition\Eval_Place\IDFloat');
other{k,j} = strcmpi(talkcodearr{k,j}, 'Other');
end
end
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%Sum across the cell rows for each code in the coding scheme to create a
%single column matrix for each code in the coding scheme with each
%instance the code was applied. Note the following lines were modified from
%an example at
%http://blogs.mathworks.com/loren/2009/10/21/dealing-with-cells/
rmdtot = sum(reshape([rmdall{:,:}],[],m),2);
infertot = sum(reshape([infer{:,:}],[],m),2);
totrelat = sum(reshape([relat{:,:}],[],m),2);
synthtot = sum(reshape([synth{:,:}],[],m),2);
tstingtot = sum(reshape([tsting{:,:}],[],m),2);
tstpretot = sum(reshape([tstpre{:,:}],[],m),2);
tstcontot = sum(reshape([tstcon{:,:}],[],m),2);
revistot = sum(reshape([revis{:,:}],[],m),2);
totdistrct = sum(reshape([distrct{:,:}],[],m),2);
totuncert = sum(reshape([uncert{:,:}],[],m),2);
plnnigtot = sum(reshape([plnnig{:,:}],[],m),2);
totuncert_loc = sum(reshape([uncert_loc{:,:}],[],m),2);
totuncert_obs = sum(reshape([uncert_obs{:,:}],[],m),2);
totuncert_int = sum(reshape([uncert_int{:,:}],[],m),2);
totuncert_pro = sum(reshape([uncert_pro{:,:}],[],m),2);
pdktot = sum(reshape([pdk{:,:}],[],m),2);
idtrmtot = sum(reshape([idtrm{:,:}],[],m),2);
idrocktot = sum(reshape([idrock{:,:}],[],m),2);
idcontctot = sum(reshape([idcontacts{:,:}],[],m),2);
totstruct = sum(reshape([idstruct{:,:}],[],m),2);
spreftot = sum(reshape([spref{:,:}],[],m),2);
nbloctot = sum(reshape([nbloc{:,:}],[],m),2);
rspactot = sum(reshape([rspac{:,:}],[],m),2);
nbfeatot = sum(reshape([nbfea{:,:}],[],m),2);
evlplctot = sum(reshape([evlplc{:,:}],[],m),2);
evlinplctot = sum(reshape([evlinplc{:,:}],[],m),2);
totevlidflt = sum(reshape([evlidflt{:,:}],[],m),2);
othertot = sum(reshape([other{:,:}],[],m),2);
%Clear index variables
clear count k
count = 1;
%Initialize new arrays for each code in the coding scheme. These arrays
%will store 1 or 0 for the presence or absence of each code for the entire
%time array.
rmd_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
infer_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
relat_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
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synth_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
tsting_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
tstpre_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
tstcon_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
revis_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
distrct_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
uncert_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
plnnig_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
uncert_locarr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
uncert_obsarr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
uncert_intarr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
uncert_proarr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
pdk_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
idtrm_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
idrock_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
idcontact_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
idstruct_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
spref_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
nbloc_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
rspac_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
nbfea_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
evalplc_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
evlinplc_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
evlidflt_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
other_arr = zeros(length(timearr),1);
%For each code, step through each row of the time array and identify
%whether there is an instance of that code. If it is, store a value
%of 1, if not, store a value of 0.
for k = 1:length(timearr)
if timearr(k) < talktimetags(count);
rmd_arr(k) = 0;
infer_arr(k) = 0;
relat_arr(k) = 0;
synth_arr(k) = 0;
tsting_arr(k) = 0;
tstpre_arr(k) = 0;
tstcon_arr(k) = 0;
revis_arr(k) = 0;
distrct_arr(k) = 0;
uncert_arr(k) = 0;
plnnig_arr(k) = 0;
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uncert_locarr(k) = 0;
uncert_obsarr(k) = 0;
uncert_intarr(k) = 0;
uncert_proarr(k) = 0;
pdk_arr(k) = 0;
idtrm_arr(k) = 0;
idrock_arr(k) = 0;
idcontact_arr(k) = 0;
idstruct_arr(k) = 0;
spref_arr(k) = 0;
nbloc_arr(k) = 0;
rspac_arr(k) = 0;
nbfea_arr(k) = 0;
evalplc_arr(k) = 0;
evlinplc_arr(k) = 0;
evlidflt_arr(k) = 0;
other_arr (k) = 0;
elseif timearr(k) >= talktimetags(count) && timearr(k) < talktimetags(count+1);
rmd_arr(k) = rmdtot(count);
infer_arr(k) = infertot(count);
relat_arr(k) = totrelat(count);
synth_arr(k) = synthtot(count);
tsting_arr(k) = tstingtot(count);
tstpre_arr(k) = tstpretot(count);
tstcon_arr(k) = tstcontot(count);
revis_arr(k) = revistot(count);
distrct_arr(k) = totdistrct(count);
uncert_arr(k) = totuncert(count);
plnnig_arr(k) = plnnigtot(count);
uncert_locarr(k) = totuncert_loc(count);
uncert_obsarr(k) = totuncert_obs(count);
uncert_intarr(k) = totuncert_int(count);
uncert_proarr(k) = totuncert_pro(count);
pdk_arr(k) = pdktot(count);
idtrm_arr(k) = idtrmtot(count);
idrock_arr(k) = idrocktot(count);
idcontact_arr(k) = idcontctot(count);
idstruct_arr(k) = totstruct(count);
spref_arr(k) = spreftot(count);
nbloc_arr(k) = nbloctot(count);
rspac_arr(k) = rspactot(count);
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nbfea_arr(k) = nbfeatot(count);
evalplc_arr(k) = evlplctot(count);
evlinplc_arr(k) = evlinplctot(count);
evlidflt_arr(k) = totevlidflt(count);
other_arr (k) = othertot(count);
count = count + 1;
elseif timearr(k) >= talktimetags(count) && timearr(k) >= talktimetags(count+1);
rmd_arr(k) = rmdtot(count) + rmdtot(count+1);
infer_arr(k) = infertot(count) + infertot(count+1);
relat_arr(k) = totrelat(count)+ totrelat(count+1);
synth_arr(k) = synthtot(count) + synthtot(count+1);
tsting_arr(k) = tstingtot(count) + tstingtot(count+1);
tstpre_arr(k) = tstpretot(count) + tstpretot(count+1);
tstcon_arr(k) = tstcontot(count) + tstcontot(count+1);
revis_arr(k) = revistot(count) + revistot(count+1);
distrct_arr(k) = totdistrct(count) + totdistrct(count+1);
uncert_arr(k) = totuncert(count) + totuncert(count+1) ;
plnnig_arr(k) = plnnigtot(count) + plnnigtot(count+1);
uncert_locarr(k) = totuncert_loc(count) + totuncert_loc(count+1);
uncert_obsarr(k) = totuncert_obs(count) + totuncert_obs(count+1);
uncert_intarr(k) = totuncert_int(count) + totuncert_int(count+1);
uncert_proarr(k) = totuncert_pro(count) + totuncert_pro(count+1);
pdk_arr(k) = pdktot(count)+ pdktot(count+1);
idtrm_arr(k) = idtrmtot(count)+ idtrmtot(count+1);
idrock_arr(k) = idrocktot(count)+ idrocktot(count+1);
idcontact_arr(k) = idcontctot(count) + idcontctot(count+1);
idstruct_arr(k) = totstruct(count) + totstruct(count+1);
spref_arr(k) = spreftot(count) + spreftot(count+1);
nbloc_arr(k) = nbloctot(count) + nbloctot(count+1);
rspac_arr(k) = rspactot(count) + rspactot(count+1);
nbfea_arr(k) = nbfeatot(count) + nbfeatot(count+1);
evalplc_arr(k) = evlplctot(count) + evlplctot(count+1);
evlinplc_arr(k) = evlinplctot(count) + evlinplctot(count+1);
evlidflt_arr(k) = totevlidflt(count) + totevlidflt(count+1);
other_arr(k) = othertot(count) + othertot(count+1);
count = count + 2;
end
end
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%Create an array that will store arrays for each code in the coding scheme.
codecat = [timearr rmd_arr pdk_arr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr other_arr];
rmd = [timearr infer_arr relat_arr synth_arr tsting_arr tstpre_arr tstcon_arr revis_arr];
metacog = [timearr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr];
evalcert = [timearr uncert_locarr uncert_obsarr uncert_intarr uncert_proarr];
nav = [timearr spref_arr nbloc_arr rspac_arr nbfea_arr];
declarknow = [timearr idtrm_arr idrock_arr idcontact_arr idstruct_arr];
plceval = [timearr evalplc_arr evlinplc_arr evlidflt_arr];
%Save arrays for each code in the coding scheme to be joined to shapefile.
save codecat.txt codecat -ASCII
save rmd.txt rmd -ASCII
save metacog.txt metacog -ASCII
save evalcert.txt evalcert -ASCII
save nav.txt nav -ASCII
save declarknow.txt declarknow -ASCII
save plceval.txt plceval -ASCII
save otherarr.txt other_arr -ASCII
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Appendix G. Matlab Programs for Transforming
Coding of Movement
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%C. Callahan
%Load the export file from Inqscribe for stationary versus walking.
%Create data array for length of video segment.
%Path\Filename: ..\Files based on full time sync\Actionfiles\createtime_movearr.m
%Created: October 2012; Revised: November 2012; Revised January 2013 to fix
%bug in time data.
clear all
%Open file from lnqscribe; the 'r' denotes permission to edit
fid = fopen('exportmove.txt','r');
%Read file; %s denotes that time data (hh:mm:ss) is a string; %d denotes
%that code number (e.g. 0 or 1) is a floating point number; delimiter = \t
%denotes that the file is tab delimited
a = textscan(fid,'%s %f','HeaderLines',1,'delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
%Assign variable to time data
ttag = a{:,1};
%Assign variable to code data
ucode = a{:,2};
%Convert time data from hh:mm:ss into seconds and assign new variable for
%time data
[Y, M, D, H, MN, S] = datevec(ttag);
ttags = H*3600+MN*60+S;
%Convert time tag array from seconds to minutes for plotting purposes
ttag_mod = ttags/60;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%This next phase of the program will convert the time data (ttags) and code
%numbers from being just points where the codes changed into an array of
%code numbers for every second
%Initialize full time array
tarr_long = (0:1:max(ttags)); %Time in seconds
%Initialize full action code array
uarr_long = zeros(size(tarr_long));
%Test for possible error: If the length of the video is divisible by ten
%then the maximum value of the ttags array will end up equal to
%tarr_long array. This will cause an error in the for loops used to create
%the movement arrays. To avert the error, the if loop below adds one second
%to the maximum value of the ttags.
%NOTE: This test is only necessary for the FULL TIME ARRAY and not the 15
%minute time array.
tagtest

= max(ttags);
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timetest

= max(tarr_long);

j = length(ttags);
if timetest == tagtest
tarr_long (j) = tarr_long(j) + 1;
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Assign the first values in the array = first values in user code array and
%ttag array
tarr_long(1) = ttags(1);
uarr_long(1) = ucode(1);
countnew = 2;
for k = 2:length(tarr_long)
if tarr_long(k) < ttags(countnew)
uarr_long(k) = ucode(countnew-1);
else
uarr_long(k) = ucode(countnew);
countnew = countnew + 1;
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%The next step is to sample from the full time and full action code arrays
%at intervals of every 10 seconds
%Initialize increment for sample arrays
inc = 10; %Time in seconds
%Initialize array for each increment of time.
tarr = (0:inc:max(tarr_long))'; %Time in seconds
%Initialize array for each action code at same increment of time
uarr = zeros(size(tarr));
%Assign first values of increment arrays = full arrays
tarr(1) = tarr_long(1);
uarr(1) = uarr_long(1);
%Initialize index for full arrays
count = 10;
for j = 2:length(tarr)
uarr(j) = uarr_long(count);
count = count + 10;
end
%Use enters name for video log
reply = input('Enter name for video log: ', 's');
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vidname = reply;
subplot(2,1,1); plot (ttag_mod,ucode, 'x-')
title(['Raw movement data for ',(vidname)])
xlabel('Time(min)');
ylabel('Stationary (0) or Moving (1)');
subplot(2,1,2); plot(ttag_mod,ucode,'x-',tarr_long/60,uarr_long,'o', tarr/60, uarr,'.')
title(['Movement data array for ',(vidname)])
xlabel('Time(min)');
ylabel('Stationary (0) or Moving (1)');
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Save movement data array to be used for calibration calculations.
movearr = [tarr uarr];
save movearr.txt movearr -ASCII
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

493

%C. Callahan
%Load the export file from Inqscribe for stationary versus walking.
%Create data array for length of video segment.
%Path\Filename: ..\Files based on 15 minute sync\Actionfiles\createtime_movearr.m
%Created: October 2012; Revised: November 2012; Revised: December 2012 for
%15 minutes
clear all
%Open file from lnqscribe; the 'r' denotes permission to edit
fid = fopen('exportmove.txt','r');
%Read file; %s denotes that time data (hh:mm:ss) is a string; %d denotes
%that code number (e.g. 0 or 1) is a floating point number; delimiter = \t
%denotes that the file is tab delimited
a = textscan(fid,'%s %f','HeaderLines',1,'delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
%Assign variable to time data
ttag = a{:,1};
%Assign variable to code data
ucode = a{:,2};
%Convert time data from hh:mm:ss into seconds and assign new variable for
%time data
[Y, M, D, H, MN, S] = datevec(ttag);
ttags = H*3600+MN*60+S;
%Convert time tag array from seconds to minutes for plotting purposes
ttag_mod = ttags/60;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%This next phase of the program will convert the time data (ttags) and code
%numbers from being just points where the codes changed into an array of
%code numbers for every second
%Initialize full time array
tarr_long = (0:1:900); %Time in seconds
%Initialize full action code array
uarr_long = zeros(size(tarr_long));
%Assign the first values in the array = first values in user code array and
%ttag array
tarr_long(1) = ttags(1);
uarr_long(1) = ucode(1);
countnew = 2;
for k = 2:length(tarr_long)
if tarr_long(k) < ttags(countnew)
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uarr_long(k) = ucode(countnew-1);
else
uarr_long(k) = ucode(countnew);
countnew = countnew + 1;
end
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%The next step is to sample from the full time and full action code arrays
%at intervals of every 10 seconds
%Initialize increment for sample arrays
inc = 10; %Time in seconds
%Initialize array for each increment of time.
tarr = (0:inc:max(tarr_long))'; %Time in seconds
%Initialize array for each action code at same increment of time
uarr = zeros(size(tarr));
%Assign first values of increment arrays = full arrays
tarr(1) = tarr_long(1);
uarr(1) = uarr_long(1);
%Initialize index for full arrays
count = 10;
for j = 2:length(tarr)
uarr(j) = uarr_long(count);
count = count + 10;
end
%Use enters name for video log
reply = input('Enter name for video log: ', 's');
vidname = reply;
subplot(2,1,1); plot (ttag_mod,ucode, 'x-')
title(['Raw movement data for ',(vidname)])
xlabel('Time(min)');
ylabel('Stationary (0) or Moving (1)');
subplot(2,1,2); plot(ttag_mod,ucode,'x-',tarr_long/60,uarr_long,'o', tarr/60, uarr,'.')
title(['Movement data array for ',(vidname)])
xlabel('Time(min)');
ylabel('Stationary (0) or Moving (1)');
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Save movement data array to be used for calibration calculations.
movearr = [tarr uarr];
save movearr.txt movearr -ASCII
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Appendix H. Matlab Programs for Synchronization
of video with GPS Tracks

496

%C. Callahan
%Load movement data from video coding and speed data from GPS track
%shapefile, find best syncronization, and join data (visible actions,
%coded segments, and transcript) to revised shapefile.
%Path\Filename: ..\Files based on full time sync\Syncfiles\syncvideogps.m
%Created: October 2012; Revised: November 2012; Revised: January 2013 to
%include output from coding of transcripts in MaxQDA;
%Revised February 2013; Revised March 2013 to include revised data from
%makeaction.m and to remove risk of error with size of calibration array.
clear all
%Load movement arrays
load ../Actionfiles/movearr.txt
%Recall content of data matrices
%codecat = [timearr rmd_arr pdk_arr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr other_arr];
%datacoll = [timearr brkrc_arr inspec_arr sdm_arr thcl_arr otherac_arr];
%datarec = [timearr wnb_arr wmap_arr];
%rmd
= [timearr infer_arr relat_arr synth_arr tsting_arr tstpre_arr tstcon_arr
revis_arr];
%metacog = [timearr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr];
%evalcert = [timearr uncert_locarr uncert_obsarr uncert_intarr uncert_proarr];
%nav
= [timearr spref_arr nbloc_arr rspac_arr nbfea_arr];
%declarknow = [timearr idtrm_arr idrock_arr idcontact_arr idstruct_arr]
%plceval = [timearr evalplc_arr evlinplc_arr evlidflt_arr];
%otherarr
load ../Actionfiles/codecat.txt
load ../Actionfiles/datacoll.txt
load ../Actionfiles/datarec.txt
load ../Actionfiles/rmd.txt
load ../Actionfiles/metacog.txt
load ../Actionfiles/evalcert.txt
load ../Actionfiles/nav.txt
load ../Actionfiles/declarknow.txt
load ../Actionfiles/plceval.txt plceval -ASCII
load ../Actionfiles/otherarr.txt
fid = fopen('../Actionfiles/editedtranscript.txt','r');
time_transcript = textscan(fid,'%d %s\n','delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
fid = fopen('../Actionfiles/actioncomments.txt','r');
actioncomments = textscan(fid,'%d %s\n','delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
talk = time_transcript{1,2};
acomments = actioncomments{1,2};
%Assign time array
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tarr = movearr(:,1);
%Assign array for coding based of walking versus stationary
movedat = movearr(:,2);
%Load second time array for comparison and test to make sure that time
%arrays match
timearr = datacoll(:,1);
timearr_rmd = rmd(:,1);
checktimearr1 = sum(tarr(:,1)-timearr(:,1));
checktimearr2 = sum(timearr(:,1)-timearr_rmd(:,1));
checktimearr3 = sum(tarr(:,1)-timearr_rmd(:,1));
if checktimearr1 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: tarr-timearr ~= 1');
pause
end
if checktimearr2 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: timearr-timarr_rmd ~= 1');
pause
end
if checktimearr3 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: tarr-timearr_rmd ~= 1');
pause
end
%Load shapefile for track segment
paths = shaperead('name_clip');
%Assign variable for speed from GPS track data
GPSdataspeed = [paths.Speed]';
%Convert GPS track data for speed into binary to compare against video
%coding; for moving, speed >= .372 mph = 1
%for stationary (or barely moving), speed < .372 mph = 0
GPSbinary = zeros(length(GPSdataspeed),1);
count = 1;
for i = 1:length(GPSdataspeed)
if GPSdataspeed(i) >= 0.372
GPSbinary(count) = 1;
count = count + 1;
else
GPSbinary(count) = 0;
count = count + 1;
end
end
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%Clear value of count from previous use and reassign to equal length of the
%movement array from the video clip
clear count
count = length(movedat);
%User inputs minimum index number of GPS speed data to be used for
%calibration calculations.
disp('>>> At the prompt, enter the index number to be used as the start time')
disp('for calibration with the GPS data. If this video clip is a continuation with')
disp('the previous clip, enter the maximum index number of that previous calibration.')
reply = input('Otherwise, enter 1 as the minimum value: ');
%To prevent an error in the calibration calculation, determine the
%differences between the input shapefile, the minimum value entered by the
%user for the calibration, and the length of the input data set for this
%calibration.
diffwithmin = length(GPSbinary) - reply;
diffwithinputdata = diffwithmin - length(talk);
%If the difference is more than twenty, use the minimum value to set the
%values for the calibration array. Otherwise, set the maximum calibration
%value to be twenty.
if diffwithinputdata < 20
%Initialize calibration array
calibarr = (0:1:(diffwithinputdata));
%Initialize variables that will store results from calibration calculations
cstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
else
%Initialize calibration array
calibarr = (0:1:20);
%Initialize variables that will store results from calibration calculations
cstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
end
%Initialize variables that will store the minimum and maximum index values
%of the GPS speed data array to be used for calibration calculations.
minstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
maxstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
minstore(1) = reply;
maxstore(1) = minstore(1)+count-1;
%Use length of the movement array to determine maximum index number of GPS
%speed data to be used for calibration calculations.
for k = 2:length(calibarr)
minstore(k) = minstore(k-1)+1;
maxstore(k) = minstore(k)+ count-1;
end
%Use mod 2 addition to find best calibration between the GPS speed data and
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%the movement data array from the video clip.
for i = 1:length(calibarr)
gpsrev = GPSbinary(minstore(i):maxstore(i));
a = mod(gpsrev + movedat, 2);
c = sum(a);
cstore(i) = c;
end
disp('>>> Calibration results');
disp('First Column = Minimum index value of GPS segement');
disp('Second Column = Maximum index value of GPS segment');
disp('Third Column = Calibration calculation');
disp('Best calibration is typically the smallest calibration calculation');
%Store and output results of calibration calculations
carr = [minstore maxstore cstore]
%User selects best calibration results to redefine shapefile
reply = input('Enter minimum value of the best calibration: ');
umin = reply;
reply = input('Enter maximum value of the best calibration: ');
umax = reply;
[pathsrev] = paths(umin:umax);
gpsbestfit = GPSbinary(umin:umax);
%Use enters name for video log
disp('At prompt, enter name for video log (all one word)');
disp('The name will be used as the filename for the revised shapefile.');
reply = input('Enter name for video log: ', 's');
vidname = reply;
%Plot comparison of GPS speed data and video coding data to illustrate
%extent of match and mismatch for best calibration
plot(tarr/60,gpsbestfit,'x-',tarr/60,movedat,'o')
title(['Calibration of GPS speed data and video movement for ',(vidname)])
xlabel('Time(min)');
ylabel('Stationary or Walking');
%Save the comparison of GPS speed data and video coding data for future
%plotting in excel or other format
gpsviddata = [tarr/60, gpsbestfit, movearr];
save gpsviddata.txt gpsviddata -ASCII
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Recall content of data matrices
%codecat = [timearr rmd_arr pdk_arr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr other_arr];
%datacoll = [timearr brkrc_arr inspec_arr sdm_arr thcl_arr otherac_arr];
%datarec = [timearr wnb_arr wmap_arr];
%rmd
= [timearr infer_arr relat_arr synth_arr tsting_arr tstpre_arr tstcon_arr
revis_arr];
%metacog = [timearr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr];
%evalcert = [timearr uncert_locarr uncert_obsarr uncert_intarr uncert_proarr];
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%nav
= [timearr spref_arr nbloc_arr rspac_arr nbfea_arr];
%declarknow = [timearr idtrm_arr idrock_arr idcontact_arr idstruct_arr]
%plceval = [timearr evalplc_arr evlinplc_arr evlidflt_arr];
%otherarr
%Initialize variables for each type of visible action
brkrc = datacoll(:,2);
inspec = datacoll(:,3);
sdm = datacoll(:,4);
thcl = datacoll(:,5);
othac = datacoll(:,6);
wnb = datarec(:,2);
wmap = datarec(:,3);
rmdall = codecat(:,2);
infer = rmd(:,2);
relat = rmd(:,3);
synth = rmd(:,4);
tsting = rmd(:,5);
tstpre = rmd(:,6);
tstcon = rmd(:,7);
revis = rmd(:,8);
distrct = metacog(:,2);
uncert = metacog(:,3);
plnning = metacog(:,4);
uncert_loc = evalcert(:,2);
uncert_obs = evalcert(:,3);
uncert_int = evalcert(:,4);
uncert_pro = evalcert(:,5);
spref = nav(:,2);
nbloc = nav(:,3);
rspac = nav(:,4);
nbfea = nav(:,5);
pdk = codecat(:,3);
idtrm = declarknow(:,2);
idrock = declarknow(:,3);
idcontact = declarknow(:,4);
idstruct = declarknow(:,5);
evalplac = plceval(:,2);
evlinplc = plceval(:,3);
evlidflt = plceval(:,4);
%Initialize cells for each type of visible action
brkrccell = num2cell(brkrc);
inspeccell = num2cell(inspec);
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sdmcell = num2cell(sdm);
thclcell = num2cell(thcl);
cellothac = num2cell(othac);
wnbcell = num2cell(wnb);
wmapcell = num2cell(wmap);
rmdcell = num2cell(rmdall);
infercell = num2cell(infer);
relatcell = num2cell(relat);
synthcell = num2cell(synth);
tstingcell = num2cell(tsting);
tstprecell = num2cell(tstpre);
tstconcell = num2cell(tstcon);
reviscell = num2cell(revis);
distrctcell = num2cell(distrct);
uncertcell = num2cell(uncert);
plnningcell = num2cell(plnning);
celluncert_loc = num2cell(uncert_loc);
celluncert_obs = num2cell(uncert_obs);
celluncert_int = num2cell(uncert_int);
celluncert_pro = num2cell(uncert_pro);
pdkcell = num2cell(pdk);
idtrmcell = num2cell(idtrm);
idrockcell = num2cell(idrock);
idcontactcell = num2cell(idcontact);
idstructcell = num2cell(idstruct);
sprefcell = num2cell(spref);
nbloccell = num2cell(nbloc);
cellrspac = num2cell(rspac);
nbfeacell = num2cell(nbfea);
cellevalplac = num2cell(evalplac);
cellevlinplc = num2cell(evlinplc);
cellevlidflt = num2cell(evlidflt);
othercell = num2cell(otherarr);
vidnamecell = cell(size(othercell));
for p = 1:length(vidnamecell)
vidnamecell{p} = vidname;
end
%Join the cells for visible actions with the redefined shapefile for the
%track segment
[pathsrev.SegName] = vidnamecell{:};
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[pathsrev.Break] = brkrccell{:};
[pathsrev.Inspect] = inspeccell{:};
[pathsrev.StkeDip] = sdmcell{:};
[pathsrev.TestHCl] = thclcell{:};
[pathsrev.OthrAct] = cellothac{:};
[pathsrev.WritNb] = wnbcell{:};
[pathsrev.WritMap] = wmapcell{:};
[pathsrev.ActNote] = acomments{:};
[pathsrev.RMD] = rmdcell{:};
[pathsrev.Infer] = infercell{:};
[pathsrev.Relat] = relatcell{:};
[pathsrev.Synth] = synthcell{:};
[pathsrev.Test] = tstingcell{:};
[pathsrev.Pred] = tstprecell{:};
[pathsrev.Confr] = tstconcell{:};
[pathsrev.Revis] = reviscell{:};
[pathsrev.Dstract] = distrctcell{:};
[pathsrev.EvalCrt] = uncertcell{:};
[pathsrev.Plan] = plnningcell{:};
[pathsrev.ECLoc] = celluncert_loc{:};
[pathsrev.ECObs] = celluncert_obs{:};
[pathsrev.ECInt] = celluncert_int{:};
[pathsrev.ECPro] = celluncert_pro{:};
[pathsrev.SpRef] = sprefcell{:};
[pathsrev.NBLoc] = nbloccell{:};
[pathsrev.ReSpace] = cellrspac{:};
[pathsrev.NBFea] = nbfeacell{:};
[pathsrev.PDK] = pdkcell{:};
[pathsrev.TakRec] = idtrmcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDRock] = idrockcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDCon] = idcontactcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDStruc] = idstructcell{:};
[pathsrev.EvalPlc] = cellevalplac{:};
[pathsrev.EvInPlc] = cellevlinplc{:};
[pathsrev.EvIdFlt] = cellevlidflt{:};
[pathsrev.Other] = othercell{:};
[pathsrev.Transcrpt] = talk{:};
%Save revised shapefile with joined action data using input from user.
shapewrite(pathsrev, (reply))
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%C. Callahan
%Load movement data from video coding and speed data from GPS track
%shapefile, find best syncronization, and join data (visible actions,
%coded segments, and transcript) to revised shapefile.
%In this file, calibration is based on first 15 minutes ONLY.
%Path:..\Files based on 15 min sync\Actionfiles\
%Filename: syncvideogps_15min.m
%Created: October 2012; Revised: November 2012; Revised: January 2013 to
%include output from coding of transcripts in MaxQDA; Revised February 2013
clear all
%Load movement arrays
load ../Actionfiles/movearr.txt
%Recall content of data matrices
%codecat = [timearr rmd_arr pdk_arr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr other_arr];
%datacoll = [timearr brkrc_arr inspec_arr sdm_arr thcl_arr otherac_arr];
%datarec = [timearr wnb_arr wmap_arr];
%rmd
= [timearr infer_arr relat_arr synth_arr tsting_arr tstpre_arr tstcon_arr
revis_arr];
%metacog = [timearr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr];
%evalcert = [timearr uncert_locarr uncert_obsarr uncert_intarr uncert_proarr];
%nav
= [timearr spref_arr nbloc_arr rspac_arr nbfea_arr];
%declarknow = [timearr idtrm_arr idrock_arr idcontact_arr idstruct_arr]
%plceval = [timearr evalplc_arr evlinplc_arr evlidflt_arr];
%otherarr
load ../Actionfiles/codecat.txt
load ../Actionfiles/datacoll.txt
load ../Actionfiles/datarec.txt
load ../Actionfiles/rmd.txt
load ../Actionfiles/metacog.txt
load ../Actionfiles/evalcert.txt
load ../Actionfiles/nav.txt
load ../Actionfiles/declarknow.txt
load ../Actionfiles/plceval.txt plceval -ASCII
load ../Actionfiles/otherarr.txt
fid = fopen('../Actionfiles/editedtranscript.txt','r');
time_transcript = textscan(fid,'%d %s\n','delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
fid = fopen('../Actionfiles/actioncomments.txt','r');
actioncomments = textscan(fid,'%d %s\n','delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
talk = time_transcript{1,2};
acomments = actioncomments{1,2};
%Assign time array
tarr = movearr(:,1);
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%Assign array for coding based of walking versus stationary
movearr = movearr(:,2);
movedat = movearr((1:91),1);
tarrdat = tarr((1:91),1);
%Load second time array for comparison and test to make sure that time
%arrays match
timearr = datacoll(:,1);
timearr_rmd = rmd(:,1);
checktimearr1 = sum(tarr(1:91)-timearr(1:91));
checktimearr2 = sum(timearr(1:91)-timearr_rmd(1:91));
checktimearr3 = sum(tarr(1:91)-timearr_rmd(1:91));
if checktimearr1 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: tarr-timearr ~= 1');
end
if checktimearr2 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: timearr-timarr_rmd ~= 1');
end
if checktimearr3 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: tarr-timearr_rmd ~= 1');
end
%Load shapefile for track segment
paths = shaperead('name_clip');
%Assign variable for speed from GPS track data
GPSdataspeed = [paths.Speed]';
%Convert GPS track data for speed into binary to compare against video
%coding; for moving, speed >= .372 mph = 1
%for stationary (or barely moving), speed < .372 mph = 0
GPSbinary = zeros(length(GPSdataspeed),1);
count = 1;
for i = 1:length(GPSdataspeed)
if GPSdataspeed(i) >= 0.372
GPSbinary(count) = 1;
count = count + 1;
else
GPSbinary(count) = 0;
count = count + 1;
end
end
%Clear value of count from previous use and reassign to equal length of the
%movement array from the video clip
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clear count
count = length(movedat);
%User inputs minimum index number of GPS speed data to be used for
%calibration calculations.
disp('>>> At the prompt, enter the index number to be used as the start time')
disp('for calibration with the GPS data. If this video clip is a continuation with')
disp('the previous clip, enter the maximum index number of that previous calibration.')
reply = input('Otherwise, enter 1 as the minimum value: ');
%To prevent an error in the calibration calculation, determine the
%differences between the input shapefile, the minimum value entered by the
%user for the calibration, and the length of the input data set for this
%calibration.
diffwithmin = length(GPSbinary) - reply;
diffwithinputdata = diffwithmin - length(talk);
%If the difference is more than twenty, use the minimum value to set the
%values for the calibration array. Otherwise, set the maximum calibration
%value to be twenty.
if diffwithinputdata < 20
%Initialize calibration array
calibarr = (0:1:(diffwithinputdata));
%Initialize variables that will store results from calibration calculations
cstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
else
%Initialize calibration array
calibarr = (0:1:20);
%Initialize variables that will store results from calibration calculations
cstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
end
%Initialize variables that will store the minimum and maximum index values
%of the GPS speed data array to be used for calibration calculations.
minstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
maxstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
minstore(1) = reply;
maxstore(1) = minstore(1)+count-1;
%Use length of the movement array to determine maximum index number of GPS
%speed data to be used for calibration calculations.
for k = 2:length(calibarr)
minstore(k) = minstore(k-1)+1;
maxstore(k) = minstore(k)+ count-1;
end
%Use mod 2 addition to find best calibration between the GPS speed data and
%the movement data array from the video clip.
for i = 1:length(calibarr)
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gpsrev = GPSbinary(minstore(i):maxstore(i));
a = mod(gpsrev + movedat, 2);
c = sum(a);
cstore(i) = c;
end
%Store and output results of calibration calculations
carr = [minstore maxstore cstore]
%User selects best calibration results to redefine shapefile
reply = input('Enter minimum value of the best calibration: ');
umin = reply;
%Identify maximum value from calibration
umax = umin + length(movearr)-1;
%Identify index for entire segment
maxarr = umin + length(datacoll)-1;
%Clip original GPS shapefile based on best calibration
[pathsrev] = paths(umin:maxarr);
gpsbestfit = GPSbinary(umin:umax);
%Prompt user to enter name for video log
disp('At prompt, enter name for video log (all one word)');
disp('The name will be used as the filename for the revised shapefile.');
reply = input('Enter name for video log: ', 's');
vidname = reply;
%Plot comparison of GPS speed data and video coding data to illustrate
%extent of match and mismatch for best calibration
plot(tarr/60,gpsbestfit,'x-',tarrdat/60,movedat,'o')
title(['Calibration of GPS speed data and video movement for ',(vidname)])
xlabel('Time(min)');
ylabel('Stationary or Walking');
%Save the comparison of GPS speed data and video coding data for future
%plotting in excel or other format
gpsviddata = [tarr/60, gpsbestfit, movearr];
save gpsviddata.txt gpsviddata -ASCII
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Recall content of data matrices
%codecat = [timearr rmd_arr pdk_arr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr other_arr];
%datacoll = [timearr brkrc_arr inspec_arr sdm_arr thcl_arr otherac_arr];
%datarec = [timearr wnb_arr wmap_arr];
%rmd
= [timearr infer_arr relat_arr synth_arr tsting_arr tstpre_arr tstcon_arr
revis_arr];
%metacog = [timearr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr];
%evalcert = [timearr uncert_locarr uncert_obsarr uncert_intarr uncert_proarr];
%nav
= [timearr spref_arr nbloc_arr rspac_arr nbfea_arr];
%declarknow = [timearr idtrm_arr idrock_arr idcontact_arr idstruct_arr]
%plceval = [timearr evalplc_arr evlinplc_arr evlidflt_arr];
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%otherarr
%Initialize variables for each type of visible action
brkrc = datacoll(:,2);
inspec = datacoll(:,3);
sdm = datacoll(:,4);
thcl = datacoll(:,5);
othac = datacoll(:,6);
wnb = datarec(:,2);
wmap = datarec(:,3);
rmdall = codecat(:,2);
infer = rmd(:,2);
relat = rmd(:,3);
synth = rmd(:,4);
tsting = rmd(:,5);
tstpre = rmd(:,6);
tstcon = rmd(:,7);
revis = rmd(:,8);
distrct = metacog(:,2);
uncert = metacog(:,3);
plnning = metacog(:,4);
uncert_loc = evalcert(:,2);
uncert_obs = evalcert(:,3);
uncert_int = evalcert(:,4);
uncert_pro = evalcert(:,5);
spref = nav(:,2);
nbloc = nav(:,3);
rspac = nav(:,4);
nbfea = nav(:,5);
pdk = codecat(:,3);
idtrm = declarknow(:,2);
idrock = declarknow(:,3);
idcontact = declarknow(:,4);
idstruct = declarknow(:,5);
evalplac = plceval(:,2);
evlinplc = plceval(:,3);
evlidflt = plceval(:,4);
%Initialize cells for each type of visible action
brkrccell = num2cell(brkrc);
inspeccell = num2cell(inspec);
sdmcell = num2cell(sdm);
thclcell = num2cell(thcl);
cellothac = num2cell(othac);
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wnbcell = num2cell(wnb);
wmapcell = num2cell(wmap);
rmdcell = num2cell(rmdall);
infercell = num2cell(infer);
relatcell = num2cell(relat);
synthcell = num2cell(synth);
tstingcell = num2cell(tsting);
tstprecell = num2cell(tstpre);
tstconcell = num2cell(tstcon);
reviscell = num2cell(revis);
distrctcell = num2cell(distrct);
uncertcell = num2cell(uncert);
plnningcell = num2cell(plnning);
celluncert_loc = num2cell(uncert_loc);
celluncert_obs = num2cell(uncert_obs);
celluncert_int = num2cell(uncert_int);
celluncert_pro = num2cell(uncert_pro);
pdkcell = num2cell(pdk);
idtrmcell = num2cell(idtrm);
idrockcell = num2cell(idrock);
idcontactcell = num2cell(idcontact);
idstructcell = num2cell(idstruct);
sprefcell = num2cell(spref);
nbloccell = num2cell(nbloc);
cellrspac = num2cell(rspac);
nbfeacell = num2cell(nbfea);
cellevalplac = num2cell(evalplac);
cellevlinplc = num2cell(evlinplc);
cellevlidflt = num2cell(evlidflt);
othercell = num2cell(otherarr);
vidnamecell = cell(size(othercell));
for p = 1:length(vidnamecell)
vidnamecell{p} = vidname;
end
%Join the cells for visible actions with the redefined shapefile for the
%track segment
[pathsrev.SegName] = vidnamecell{:};
[pathsrev.Break] = brkrccell{:};
[pathsrev.Inspect] = inspeccell{:};
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[pathsrev.StkeDip] = sdmcell{:};
[pathsrev.TestHCl] = thclcell{:};
[pathsrev.OthrAct] = cellothac{:};
[pathsrev.WritNb] = wnbcell{:};
[pathsrev.WritMap] = wmapcell{:};
[pathsrev.ActNote] = acomments{:};
[pathsrev.RMD] = rmdcell{:};
[pathsrev.Infer] = infercell{:};
[pathsrev.Relat] = relatcell{:};
[pathsrev.Synth] = synthcell{:};
[pathsrev.Test] = tstingcell{:};
[pathsrev.Pred] = tstprecell{:};
[pathsrev.Confr] = tstconcell{:};
[pathsrev.Revis] = reviscell{:};
[pathsrev.Dstract] = distrctcell{:};
[pathsrev.EvalCrt] = uncertcell{:};
[pathsrev.Plan] = plnningcell{:};
[pathsrev.ECLoc] = celluncert_loc{:};
[pathsrev.ECObs] = celluncert_obs{:};
[pathsrev.ECInt] = celluncert_int{:};
[pathsrev.ECPro] = celluncert_pro{:};
[pathsrev.SpRef] = sprefcell{:};
[pathsrev.NBLoc] = nbloccell{:};
[pathsrev.ReSpace] = cellrspac{:};
[pathsrev.NBFea] = nbfeacell{:};
[pathsrev.PDK] = pdkcell{:};
[pathsrev.TakRec] = idtrmcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDRock] = idrockcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDCon] = idcontactcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDStruc] = idstructcell{:};
[pathsrev.EvalPlc] = cellevalplac{:};
[pathsrev.EvInPlc] = cellevlinplc{:};
[pathsrev.EvIdFlt] = cellevlidflt{:};
[pathsrev.Other] = othercell{:};
[pathsrev.Transcrpt] = talk{:};
%Save revised shapefile with joined action data using input from user.
shapewrite(pathsrev, (reply))
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Appendix I. Matlab Programs Altered Specifically for Tank
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%C. Callahan
%Load shapefile for a segment of Tank's track and create a new track with
%10-second increments between points instead of irregular intervals.
%Filename: maketrackdata_ForTank.m
%Created: December 2012; Revised February 2013 and March 2013
clear all
%Load shapefile for track segment
paths = shaperead('name_clip');
celldata = struct2cell(paths);
%Assign variables from GPS track data; store variable as cells
Geometry = celldata(1,:)';
X = celldata(2,:)';
Y = celldata(3,:)';
GPSHeader = celldata(4,:)';
North = celldata(5,:)';
N_Min = celldata(6,:)';
LAT = celldata(7,:)';
West = celldata(8,:)';
W_Min = celldata(9,:)';
LONG = celldata(10,:)';
Date_ = celldata(11,:)';
Time = celldata(12,:)';
AMPM = celldata(13,:)';
Time_mnt = celldata(14,:)';
Elevation = celldata(15,:)';
Ft1 = celldata(16,:)';
Leg = celldata(17,:)';
Ft2 = celldata(18,:)';
Interval = celldata(19,:)';
GPSTimeSpent = celldata(20,:)';
Interval_i = celldata(21,:)';
GPSdataspeed = celldata(22,:)';
Mph = celldata(23,:)';
Azimuth = celldata(24,:)';
True = celldata(25,:)';
PolylineID = celldata(26,:)';
Order_ = celldata(27,:)';
OFFSETA = celldata(28,:)';
%Convert time data from hh:mm:ss into seconds and assign new variable for
%time data. Note that the Y for year is left off because Y is used for the
%Y coordinate data.
[~, M, D, H, MN, S] = datevec(GPSTimeSpent);
ttags = H*3600+MN*60+S;
ettags = zeros(length(ttags),1);
ettags(1) = ttags(1);
for i = 2:length(ttags)
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ettags(i) = ettags(i-1)+ttags(i);
end
clear count
%Create a new time array with 10 second increments. The maximum value is
%based on the total elapsed time of the original GPS track file.
tarrlong = (0:10:max(ettags))';
revinterval_i = cell(size(tarrlong));
for j = 1:length(Interval_i)
revinterval_i{j} = str2num(Interval_i{j})';
end
%Create new variables that will comprise the new GPS track.
newGeometry = cell(size(tarrlong));
newX = cell(size(tarrlong));
newY = cell(size(tarrlong));
newGPSHeader = cell(size(tarrlong));
newNorth = cell(size(tarrlong));
newN_Min = cell(size(tarrlong));
newLAT = cell(size(tarrlong));
newWest = cell(size(tarrlong));
newW_Min = cell(size(tarrlong));
newLONG = cell(size(tarrlong));
newDate_ = cell(size(tarrlong));
newTime = cell(size(tarrlong));
newAMPM = cell(size(tarrlong));
newTime_mnt = cell(size(tarrlong));
newElevation = cell(size(tarrlong));
newFt1 = cell(size(tarrlong));
newLeg = cell(size(tarrlong));
newFt2 = cell(size(tarrlong));
newInterval = cell(size(tarrlong));
newGPSTimeSpent = cell(size(tarrlong));
newInterval_i = cell(size(tarrlong));
newGPSdataspeed = cell(size(tarrlong));
newMph = cell(size(tarrlong));
newAzimuth = cell(size(tarrlong));
newTrue = cell(size(tarrlong));
newPolylineID = cell(size(tarrlong));
newOrder_ = cell(size(tarrlong));
newOFFSETA = cell(size(tarrlong));
%Assign the first values in the arrays that will become part of the
%interpoloted GPS track.
newGeometry{1} = Geometry{1};
newX{1} = X{1};
newY{1} = Y{1};
newGPSHeader{1} = GPSHeader{1};
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newNorth{1} = North{1};
newN_Min{1} = N_Min{1};
newLAT{1} = LAT{1};
newWest{1} = West{1};
newW_Min{1} = W_Min{1};
newLONG{1} = LONG{1};
newDate_{1} = Date_{1};
newTime{1} = Time{1};
newAMPM{1} = AMPM{1};
newTime_mnt{1} = Time_mnt{1};
newElevation{1} = Elevation{1};
newFt1{1} = Ft1{1};
newLeg{1} = Leg{1};
newFt2{1} = Ft2{1};
newInterval{1} = Interval{1};
newGPSTimeSpent{1} = GPSTimeSpent{1};
newInterval_i{1} = revinterval_i{1};
newGPSdataspeed{1} = GPSdataspeed{1};
newMph{1} = Mph{1};
newAzimuth{1} = Azimuth{1};
newTrue{1} = True{1};
newPolylineID{1} = PolylineID{1};
newOrder_{1} = Order_{1};
newOFFSETA{1} = OFFSETA{1};
count = 1;
%Assign values to the variables in the interpolated GPS track.
%If the time increment is less than or equal to the next elapsed time tag,
%then the values for all variables at the previous elapsed time tag are
%reassigned to time increment.
%If the time increment is greater than the next elapsed time tag, then
%the values for all variables at the next elapsed time tag are
%reassigned to time increment.
for k = 2:length(tarrlong)
if tarrlong(k) <= ettags(count)
newGeometry{k} = Geometry{count};
newX{k} = X{count};
newY{k} = Y{count};
newGPSHeader{k} = GPSHeader{count};
newNorth{k} = North{count};
newN_Min{k} = N_Min{count};
newLAT{k} = LAT{count};
newWest{k} = West{count};
newW_Min{k} = W_Min{count};
newLONG{k} = LONG{count};
newDate_{k} = Date_{count};
newTime{k} = Time{count};
newAMPM{k} = AMPM{count};
newTime_mnt{k} = Time_mnt{count};
newElevation{k} = Elevation{count};
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newFt1{k} = Ft1{count};
newLeg{k} = Leg{count};
newFt2{k} = Ft2{count};
newInterval{k} = Interval{count};
newGPSTimeSpent{k} = GPSTimeSpent{count};
newInterval_i{k} = revinterval_i{count};
newGPSdataspeed{k} = GPSdataspeed{count};
newMph{k} = Mph{count};
newAzimuth{k} = Azimuth{count};
newTrue{k} = True{count};
newPolylineID{k} = PolylineID{count};
newOrder_{k} = Order_{count};
newOFFSETA{k} = OFFSETA{count};
else
count = count + 1;
newGeometry{k} = Geometry{count};
newX{k} = X{count};
newY{k} = Y{count};
newGPSHeader{k} = GPSHeader{count};
newNorth{k} = North{count};
newN_Min{k} = N_Min{count};
newLAT{k} = LAT{count};
newWest{k} = West{count};
newW_Min{k} = W_Min{count};
newLONG{k} = LONG{count};
newDate_{k} = Date_{count};
newTime{k} = Time{count};
newAMPM{k} = AMPM{count};
newTime_mnt{k} = Time_mnt{count};
newElevation{k} = Elevation{count};
newFt1{k} = Ft1{count};
newLeg{k} = Leg{count};
newFt2{k} = Ft2{count};
newInterval{k} = Interval{count};
newGPSTimeSpent{k} = GPSTimeSpent{count};
newInterval_i{k} = revinterval_i{count};
newGPSdataspeed{k} = GPSdataspeed{count};
newMph{k} = Mph{count};
newAzimuth{k} = Azimuth{count};
newTrue{k} = True{count};
newPolylineID{k} = PolylineID{count};
newOrder_{k} = Order_{count};
newOFFSETA{k} = OFFSETA{count};
end
end
%Assign variables names for each attribute in the revised shapefile.
f1 = 'Geometry';
f2 = 'X';
f3 = 'Y';
f4 = 'Header';
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f5 = 'North';
f6 = 'N_Min';
f7 = 'LAT';
f8 = 'West';
f9 = 'W_Min';
f10 = 'LONG';
f11 = 'Date_';
f12 = 'Time';
f13 = 'AMPM';
f14 = 'Time_mnt';
f15 = 'Elevation';
f16 = 'Ft1';
f17 = 'Leg';
f18 = 'Ft2';
f19 = 'Interval';
f20 = 'Time_spent';
f21 = 'Interval_i';
f22 = 'Speed';
f23 = 'Mph';
f24 = 'Azimuth';
f25 = 'TRUE';
f26 = 'PolylineID';
f27 = 'Order_';
f28 = 'OFFSETA';
%Write the interpolated GPS track data to a new shapefile.
newstruct =
struct(f1,newGeometry,f2,newX,f3,newY,f4,newGPSHeader,f5,newNorth,f6,newN_Min,f
7,newLAT,f8,newWest,f9,newW_Min,f10,newLONG,f11,newDate_,f12,newTime,f13,new
AMPM,f14,newTime_mnt,f15,newElevation,f16,newFt1,f17,newLeg,f18,newFt2,f19,newI
nterval,f20,newGPSTimeSpent,f21,newInterval_i,f22,newGPSdataspeed,f23,newMph,f2
4,newAzimuth,f25,newTrue,f26,newPolylineID,f27,newOrder_,f28,newOFFSETA);
shapewrite(newstruct,'newname_clip.shp');
newpaths = shaperead('newname_clip');
%Plot the interpolated GPS track data against the original GPS track data
%to confirm overlap between points.
figure
trackcolors = makesymbolspec('Point',{'Default','Marker', '.','MarkerEdgeColor','k'});
trackcolors2 = makesymbolspec('Point',{'Default','Marker', 'o','MarkerEdgeColor','r'});
mapshow(paths,'SymbolSpec',trackcolors);
mapshow(newpaths,'SymbolSpec',trackcolors2);
xlabel('easting in meters')
ylabel('northing in meters')
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%C. Callahan
%Load movement data from video coding and speed data from GPS track
%shapefile, find best syncronization, and join data (visible actions,
%coded segments, and transcript) to revised shapefile.
%Path: ..\Files based on full time sync\Syncfiles\
%Filename:syncvideogps_ForTank.m
%Created: October 2012; Revised: November 2012; Revised: January 2013 to
%include output from coding of transcripts in MaxQDA;
%Revised February 2013; Revised March 2013 to include revised data from
%makeaction.m and to remove risk of error with size of calibration array.
%Revised February 2013 to account for new track data for Tank based on
%10-second increments.
clear all
%Load movement arrays
load ../Actionfiles/movearr.txt
%Recall content of data matrices
%codecat = [timearr rmd_arr pdk_arr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr other_arr];
%datacoll = [timearr brkrc_arr inspec_arr sdm_arr thcl_arr otherac_arr];
%datarec = [timearr wnb_arr wmap_arr];
%rmd
= [timearr infer_arr relat_arr synth_arr tsting_arr tstpre_arr tstcon_arr
revis_arr];
%metacog = [timearr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr];
%evalcert = [timearr uncert_locarr uncert_obsarr uncert_intarr uncert_proarr];
%nav
= [timearr spref_arr nbloc_arr rspac_arr nbfea_arr];
%declarknow = [timearr idtrm_arr idrock_arr idcontact_arr idstruct_arr]
%plceval = [timearr evalplc_arr evlinplc_arr evlidflt_arr];
%otherarr
load ../Actionfiles/codecat.txt
load ../Actionfiles/datacoll.txt
load ../Actionfiles/datarec.txt
load ../Actionfiles/rmd.txt
load ../Actionfiles/metacog.txt
load ../Actionfiles/evalcert.txt
load ../Actionfiles/nav.txt
load ../Actionfiles/declarknow.txt
load ../Actionfiles/plceval.txt plceval -ASCII
load ../Actionfiles/otherarr.txt
fid = fopen('../Actionfiles/editedtranscript.txt','r');
time_transcript = textscan(fid,'%d %s\n','delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
fid = fopen('../Actionfiles/actioncomments.txt','r');
actioncomments = textscan(fid,'%d %s\n','delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
talk = time_transcript{1,2};
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acomments = actioncomments{1,2};
%Assign time array
tarr = movearr(:,1);
%Assign array for coding based of walking versus stationary
movedat = movearr(:,2);
%Load second time array for comparison and test to make sure that time
%arrays match
timearr = datacoll(:,1);
timearr_rmd = rmd(:,1);
checktimearr1 = sum(tarr(:,1)-timearr(:,1));
checktimearr2 = sum(timearr(:,1)-timearr_rmd(:,1));
checktimearr3 = sum(tarr(:,1)-timearr_rmd(:,1));
if checktimearr1 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: tarr-timearr ~= 1');
pause
end
if checktimearr2 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: timearr-timarr_rmd ~= 1');
pause
end
if checktimearr3 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: tarr-timearr_rmd ~= 1');
pause
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Load shapefile for track segment
paths = shaperead('newname_clip');
%Assign variable for speed from GPS track data
GPSdataspeed = [paths.Speed]';
%Note these are the only specific revisions for Tank's data set.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Convert GPS track data for speed into binary to compare against video
%coding; for moving, speed >= .372 mph = 1
%for stationary (or barely moving), speed < .372 mph = 0
GPSbinary = zeros(length(GPSdataspeed),1);
count = 1;
for i = 1:length(GPSdataspeed)
if GPSdataspeed(i) >= 0.372
GPSbinary(count) = 1;
count = count + 1;
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else
GPSbinary(count) = 0;
count = count + 1;
end
end
%Clear value of count from previous use and reassign to equal length of the
%movement array from the video clip
clear count
count = length(movedat);
%User inputs minimum index number of GPS speed data to be used for
%calibration calculations.
disp('>>> At the prompt, enter the index number to be used as the start time')
disp('for calibration with the GPS data. If this video clip is a continuation with')
disp('the previous clip, enter the maximum index number of that previous calibration.')
reply = input('Otherwise, enter 1 as the minimum value: ');
%To prevent an error in the calibration calculation, determine the
%differences between the input shapefile, the minimum value entered by the
%user for the calibration, and the length of the input data set for this
%calibration.
diffwithmin = length(GPSbinary) - reply;
diffwithinputdata = diffwithmin - length(talk);
%If the difference is more than twenty, use the minimum value to set the
%values for the calibration array. Otherwise, set the maximum calibration
%value to be twenty.
if diffwithinputdata < 20
%Initialize calibration array
calibarr = (0:1:(diffwithinputdata));
%Initialize variables that will store results from calibration calculations
cstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
else
%Initialize calibration array
calibarr = (0:1:20);
%Initialize variables that will store results from calibration calculations
cstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
end
%Initialize variables that will store the minimum and maximum index values
%of the GPS speed data array to be used for calibration calculations.
minstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
maxstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
minstore(1) = reply;
maxstore(1) = minstore(1)+count-1;
%Use length of the movement array to determine maximum index number of GPS
%speed data to be used for calibration calculations.
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for k = 2:length(calibarr)
minstore(k) = minstore(k-1)+1;
maxstore(k) = minstore(k)+ count-1;
end
%Use mod 2 addition to find best calibration between the GPS speed data and
%the movement data array from the video clip.
for i = 1:length(calibarr)
gpsrev = GPSbinary(minstore(i):maxstore(i));
a = mod(gpsrev + movedat, 2);
c = sum(a);
cstore(i) = c;
end
disp('>>> Calibration results');
disp('First Column = Minimum index value of GPS segement');
disp('Second Column = Maximum index value of GPS segment');
disp('Third Column = Calibration calculation');
disp('Best calibration is typically the smallest calibration calculation');
%Store and output results of calibration calculations
carr = [minstore maxstore cstore]
%User selects best calibration results to redefine shapefile
reply = input('Enter minimum value of the best calibration: ');
umin = reply;
reply = input('Enter maximum value of the best calibration: ');
umax = reply;
[pathsrev] = paths(umin:umax);
gpsbestfit = GPSbinary(umin:umax);
%Prompt user to enter name for video log
disp('At prompt, enter name for video log (all one word)');
disp('The name will be used as the filename for the revised shapefile.');
reply = input('Enter name for video log: ', 's');
vidname = reply;
%Plot comparison of GPS speed data and video coding data to illustrate
%extent of match and mismatch for best calibration
plot(tarr/60,gpsbestfit,'x-',tarr/60,movedat,'o')
title(['Calibration of GPS speed data and video movement for ',(vidname)])
xlabel('Time(min)');
ylabel('Stationary or Walking');
%Save the comparison of GPS speed data and video coding data for future
%plotting in excel or other format
gpsviddata = [tarr/60, gpsbestfit, movearr];
save gpsviddata.txt gpsviddata -ASCII
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Recall content of data matrices
%codecat = [timearr rmd_arr pdk_arr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr other_arr];
%datacoll = [timearr brkrc_arr inspec_arr sdm_arr thcl_arr otherac_arr];
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%datarec = [timearr wnb_arr wmap_arr];
%rmd
= [timearr infer_arr relat_arr synth_arr tsting_arr tstpre_arr tstcon_arr
revis_arr];
%metacog = [timearr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr];
%evalcert = [timearr uncert_locarr uncert_obsarr uncert_intarr uncert_proarr];
%nav
= [timearr spref_arr nbloc_arr rspac_arr nbfea_arr];
%declarknow = [timearr idtrm_arr idrock_arr idcontact_arr idstruct_arr]
%plceval = [timearr evalplc_arr evlinplc_arr evlidflt_arr];
%otherarr
%Initialize variables for each type of visible action
brkrc = datacoll(:,2);
inspec = datacoll(:,3);
sdm = datacoll(:,4);
thcl = datacoll(:,5);
othac = datacoll(:,6);
wnb = datarec(:,2);
wmap = datarec(:,3);
rmdall = codecat(:,2);
infer = rmd(:,2);
relat = rmd(:,3);
synth = rmd(:,4);
tsting = rmd(:,5);
tstpre = rmd(:,6);
tstcon = rmd(:,7);
revis = rmd(:,8);
distrct = metacog(:,2);
uncert = metacog(:,3);
plnning = metacog(:,4);
uncert_loc = evalcert(:,2);
uncert_obs = evalcert(:,3);
uncert_int = evalcert(:,4);
uncert_pro = evalcert(:,5);
spref = nav(:,2);
nbloc = nav(:,3);
rspac = nav(:,4);
nbfea = nav(:,5);
pdk = codecat(:,3);
idtrm = declarknow(:,2);
idrock = declarknow(:,3);
idcontact = declarknow(:,4);
idstruct = declarknow(:,5);
evalplac = plceval(:,2);
evlinplc = plceval(:,3);
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evlidflt = plceval(:,4);
%Initialize cells for each type of visible action
brkrccell = num2cell(brkrc);
inspeccell = num2cell(inspec);
sdmcell = num2cell(sdm);
thclcell = num2cell(thcl);
cellothac = num2cell(othac);
wnbcell = num2cell(wnb);
wmapcell = num2cell(wmap);
rmdcell = num2cell(rmdall);
infercell = num2cell(infer);
relatcell = num2cell(relat);
synthcell = num2cell(synth);
tstingcell = num2cell(tsting);
tstprecell = num2cell(tstpre);
tstconcell = num2cell(tstcon);
reviscell = num2cell(revis);
distrctcell = num2cell(distrct);
uncertcell = num2cell(uncert);
plnningcell = num2cell(plnning);
celluncert_loc = num2cell(uncert_loc);
celluncert_obs = num2cell(uncert_obs);
celluncert_int = num2cell(uncert_int);
celluncert_pro = num2cell(uncert_pro);
pdkcell = num2cell(pdk);
idtrmcell = num2cell(idtrm);
idrockcell = num2cell(idrock);
idcontactcell = num2cell(idcontact);
idstructcell = num2cell(idstruct);
sprefcell = num2cell(spref);
nbloccell = num2cell(nbloc);
cellrspac = num2cell(rspac);
nbfeacell = num2cell(nbfea);
cellevalplac = num2cell(evalplac);
cellevlinplc = num2cell(evlinplc);
cellevlidflt = num2cell(evlidflt);
othercell = num2cell(otherarr);
vidnamecell = cell(size(othercell));
for p = 1:length(vidnamecell)
vidnamecell{p} = vidname;
end
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%Join the cells for visible actions with the redefined shapefile for the
%track segment
[pathsrev.SegName] = vidnamecell{:};
[pathsrev.Break] = brkrccell{:};
[pathsrev.Inspect] = inspeccell{:};
[pathsrev.StkeDip] = sdmcell{:};
[pathsrev.TestHCl] = thclcell{:};
[pathsrev.OthrAct] = cellothac{:};
[pathsrev.WritNb] = wnbcell{:};
[pathsrev.WritMap] = wmapcell{:};
[pathsrev.ActNote] = acomments{:};
[pathsrev.RMD] = rmdcell{:};
[pathsrev.Infer] = infercell{:};
[pathsrev.Relat] = relatcell{:};
[pathsrev.Synth] = synthcell{:};
[pathsrev.Test] = tstingcell{:};
[pathsrev.Pred] = tstprecell{:};
[pathsrev.Confr] = tstconcell{:};
[pathsrev.Revis] = reviscell{:};
[pathsrev.Dstract] = distrctcell{:};
[pathsrev.EvalCrt] = uncertcell{:};
[pathsrev.Plan] = plnningcell{:};
[pathsrev.ECLoc] = celluncert_loc{:};
[pathsrev.ECObs] = celluncert_obs{:};
[pathsrev.ECInt] = celluncert_int{:};
[pathsrev.ECPro] = celluncert_pro{:};
[pathsrev.SpRef] = sprefcell{:};
[pathsrev.NBLoc] = nbloccell{:};
[pathsrev.ReSpace] = cellrspac{:};
[pathsrev.NBFea] = nbfeacell{:};
[pathsrev.PDK] = pdkcell{:};
[pathsrev.TakRec] = idtrmcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDRock] = idrockcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDCon] = idcontactcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDStruc] = idstructcell{:};
[pathsrev.EvalPlc] = cellevalplac{:};
[pathsrev.EvInPlc] = cellevlinplc{:};
[pathsrev.EvIdFlt] = cellevlidflt{:};
[pathsrev.Other] = othercell{:};
[pathsrev.Transcrpt] = talk{:};
%Save revised shapefile with joined action data using input from user.
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shapewrite(pathsrev, (reply))
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%C. Callahan
%Load movement data from video coding and speed data from GPS track
%shapefile, find best syncronization, and join data (visible actions,
%coded segments, and transcript) to revised shapefile.
%In this file, calibration is based on first 15 minutes ONLY.
%Filename: syncvideogps.m
%Created: October 2012; Revised: November 2012; Revised: January 2013 to
%include output from coding of transcripts in MaxQDA; Revised: February
%2013 to account for new track data for Tank based on 10-second increments.
clear all
%Load movement arrays
load ../Actionfiles/movearr.txt
%Recall content of data matrices
%codecat = [timearr rmd_arr pdk_arr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr other_arr];
%datacoll = [timearr brkrc_arr inspec_arr sdm_arr thcl_arr otherac_arr];
%datarec = [timearr wnb_arr wmap_arr];
%rmd
= [timearr infer_arr relat_arr synth_arr tsting_arr tstpre_arr tstcon_arr
revis_arr];
%metacog = [timearr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr];
%evalcert = [timearr uncert_locarr uncert_obsarr uncert_intarr uncert_proarr];
%nav
= [timearr spref_arr nbloc_arr rspac_arr nbfea_arr];
%declarknow = [timearr idtrm_arr idrock_arr idcontact_arr idstruct_arr]
%plceval = [timearr evalplc_arr evlinplc_arr evlidflt_arr];
%otherarr
load ../Actionfiles/codecat.txt
load ../Actionfiles/datacoll.txt
load ../Actionfiles/datarec.txt
load ../Actionfiles/rmd.txt
load ../Actionfiles/metacog.txt
load ../Actionfiles/evalcert.txt
load ../Actionfiles/nav.txt
load ../Actionfiles/declarknow.txt
load ../Actionfiles/plceval.txt plceval -ASCII
load ../Actionfiles/otherarr.txt
fid = fopen('../Actionfiles/editedtranscript.txt','r');
time_transcript = textscan(fid,'%d %s\n','delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
fid = fopen('../Actionfiles/actioncomments.txt','r');
actioncomments = textscan(fid,'%d %s\n','delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
talk = time_transcript{1,2};
acomments = actioncomments{1,2};
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%Assign time array
tarr = movearr(:,1);
%Assign array for coding based of walking versus stationary
movearr = movearr(:,2);
movedat = movearr((1:91),1);
tarrdat = tarr((1:91),1);
%Load second time array for comparison and test to make sure that time
%arrays match
timearr = datacoll(:,1);
timearr_rmd = rmd(:,1);
checktimearr1 = sum(tarr(1:91)-timearr(1:91));
checktimearr2 = sum(timearr(1:91)-timearr_rmd(1:91));
checktimearr3 = sum(tarr(1:91)-timearr_rmd(1:91));
if checktimearr1 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: tarr-timearr ~= 1');
end
if checktimearr2 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: timearr-timarr_rmd ~= 1');
end
if checktimearr3 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: tarr-timearr_rmd ~= 1');
end
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Load shapefile for track segment
paths = shaperead('newname_clip');
%Assign variable for speed from GPS track data
GPSdataspeed = [paths.Speed]';
%Note these are the only specific revisions for Tank's data set.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Convert GPS track data for speed into binary to compare against video
%coding; for moving, speed >= .372 mph = 1
%for stationary (or barely moving), speed < .372 mph = 0
GPSbinary = zeros(length(GPSdataspeed),1);
count = 1;
for i = 1:length(GPSdataspeed)
if GPSdataspeed(i) >= 0.372
GPSbinary(count) = 1;
count = count + 1;
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else
GPSbinary(count) = 0;
count = count + 1;
end
end
%Clear value of count from previous use and reassign to equal length of the
%movement array from the video clip
clear count
count = length(movedat);
%User inputs minimum index number of GPS speed data to be used for
%calibration calculations.
disp('>>> At the prompt, enter the index number to be used as the start time')
disp('for calibration with the GPS data. If this video clip is a continuation with')
disp('the previous clip, enter the maximum index number of that previous calibration.')
reply = input('Otherwise, enter 1 as the minimum value: ');
%To prevent an error in the calibration calculation, determine the
%differences between the input shapefile, the minimum value entered by the
%user for the calibration, and the length of the input data set for this
%calibration.
diffwithmin = length(GPSbinary) - reply;
diffwithinputdata = diffwithmin - length(talk);
%If the difference is more than twenty, use the minimum value to set the
%values for the calibration array. Otherwise, set the maximum calibration
%value to be twenty.
if diffwithinputdata < 20
%Initialize calibration array
calibarr = (0:1:(diffwithinputdata));
%Initialize variables that will store results from calibration calculations
cstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
else
%Initialize calibration array
calibarr = (0:1:20);
%Initialize variables that will store results from calibration calculations
cstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
end
%Initialize variables that will store the minimum and maximum index values
%of the GPS speed data array to be used for calibration calculations.
minstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
maxstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
minstore(1) = reply;
maxstore(1) = minstore(1)+count-1;
%Use length of the movement array to determine maximum index number of GPS
%speed data to be used for calibration calculations.
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for k = 2:length(calibarr)
minstore(k) = minstore(k-1)+1;
maxstore(k) = minstore(k)+ count-1;
end
%Use mod 2 addition to find best calibration between the GPS speed data and
%the movement data array from the video clip.
for i = 1:length(calibarr)
gpsrev = GPSbinary(minstore(i):maxstore(i));
a = mod(gpsrev + movedat, 2);
c = sum(a);
cstore(i) = c;
end
%Store and output results of calibration calculations
carr = [minstore maxstore cstore]
%User selects best calibration results to redefine shapefile
reply = input('Enter minimum value of the best calibration: ');
umin = reply;
%Identify maximum value from calibration
umax = umin + length(movearr)-1;
%Identify index for entire segment
maxarr = umin + length(datacoll)-1;
%Clip original GPS shapefile based on best calibration
[pathsrev] = paths(umin:maxarr);
gpsbestfit = GPSbinary(umin:umax);
%Prompt user to enter name for video log
disp('At prompt, enter name for video log (all one word)');
disp('The name will be used as the filename for the revised shapefile.');
reply = input('Enter name for video log: ', 's');
vidname = reply;
%Plot comparison of GPS speed data and video coding data to illustrate
%extent of match and mismatch for best calibration
plot(tarr/60,gpsbestfit,'x-',tarrdat/60,movedat,'o')
title(['Calibration of GPS speed data and video movement for ',(vidname)])
xlabel('Time(min)');
ylabel('Stationary or Walking');
%Save the comparison of GPS speed data and video coding data for future
%plotting in excel or other format
gpsviddata = [tarr/60, gpsbestfit, movearr];
save gpsviddata.txt gpsviddata -ASCII
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Recall content of data matrices
%codecat = [timearr rmd_arr pdk_arr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr other_arr];
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%datacoll = [timearr brkrc_arr inspec_arr sdm_arr thcl_arr otherac_arr];
%datarec = [timearr wnb_arr wmap_arr];
%rmd
= [timearr infer_arr relat_arr synth_arr tsting_arr tstpre_arr tstcon_arr
revis_arr];
%metacog = [timearr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr];
%evalcert = [timearr uncert_locarr uncert_obsarr uncert_intarr uncert_proarr];
%nav
= [timearr spref_arr nbloc_arr rspac_arr nbfea_arr];
%declarknow = [timearr idtrm_arr idrock_arr idcontact_arr idstruct_arr]
%plceval = [timearr evalplc_arr evlinplc_arr evlidflt_arr];
%otherarr
%Initialize variables for each type of visible action
brkrc = datacoll(:,2);
inspec = datacoll(:,3);
sdm = datacoll(:,4);
thcl = datacoll(:,5);
othac = datacoll(:,6);
wnb = datarec(:,2);
wmap = datarec(:,3);
rmdall = codecat(:,2);
infer = rmd(:,2);
relat = rmd(:,3);
synth = rmd(:,4);
tsting = rmd(:,5);
tstpre = rmd(:,6);
tstcon = rmd(:,7);
revis = rmd(:,8);
distrct = metacog(:,2);
uncert = metacog(:,3);
plnning = metacog(:,4);
uncert_loc = evalcert(:,2);
uncert_obs = evalcert(:,3);
uncert_int = evalcert(:,4);
uncert_pro = evalcert(:,5);
spref = nav(:,2);
nbloc = nav(:,3);
rspac = nav(:,4);
nbfea = nav(:,5);
pdk = codecat(:,3);
idtrm = declarknow(:,2);
idrock = declarknow(:,3);
idcontact = declarknow(:,4);
idstruct = declarknow(:,5);
evalplac = plceval(:,2);
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evlinplc = plceval(:,3);
evlidflt = plceval(:,4);
%Initialize cells for each type of visible action
brkrccell = num2cell(brkrc);
inspeccell = num2cell(inspec);
sdmcell = num2cell(sdm);
thclcell = num2cell(thcl);
cellothac = num2cell(othac);
wnbcell = num2cell(wnb);
wmapcell = num2cell(wmap);
rmdcell = num2cell(rmdall);
infercell = num2cell(infer);
relatcell = num2cell(relat);
synthcell = num2cell(synth);
tstingcell = num2cell(tsting);
tstprecell = num2cell(tstpre);
tstconcell = num2cell(tstcon);
reviscell = num2cell(revis);
distrctcell = num2cell(distrct);
uncertcell = num2cell(uncert);
plnningcell = num2cell(plnning);
celluncert_loc = num2cell(uncert_loc);
celluncert_obs = num2cell(uncert_obs);
celluncert_int = num2cell(uncert_int);
celluncert_pro = num2cell(uncert_pro);
pdkcell = num2cell(pdk);
idtrmcell = num2cell(idtrm);
idrockcell = num2cell(idrock);
idcontactcell = num2cell(idcontact);
idstructcell = num2cell(idstruct);
sprefcell = num2cell(spref);
nbloccell = num2cell(nbloc);
cellrspac = num2cell(rspac);
nbfeacell = num2cell(nbfea);
cellevalplac = num2cell(evalplac);
cellevlinplc = num2cell(evlinplc);
cellevlidflt = num2cell(evlidflt);
othercell = num2cell(otherarr);
vidnamecell = cell(size(othercell));
for p = 1:length(vidnamecell)
vidnamecell{p} = vidname;
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end
%Join the cells for visible actions with the redefined shapefile for the
%track segment
[pathsrev.SegName] = vidnamecell{:};
[pathsrev.Break] = brkrccell{:};
[pathsrev.Inspect] = inspeccell{:};
[pathsrev.StkeDip] = sdmcell{:};
[pathsrev.TestHCl] = thclcell{:};
[pathsrev.OthrAct] = cellothac{:};
[pathsrev.WritNb] = wnbcell{:};
[pathsrev.WritMap] = wmapcell{:};
[pathsrev.ActNote] = acomments{:};
[pathsrev.RMD] = rmdcell{:};
[pathsrev.Infer] = infercell{:};
[pathsrev.Relat] = relatcell{:};
[pathsrev.Synth] = synthcell{:};
[pathsrev.Test] = tstingcell{:};
[pathsrev.Pred] = tstprecell{:};
[pathsrev.Confr] = tstconcell{:};
[pathsrev.Revis] = reviscell{:};
[pathsrev.Dstract] = distrctcell{:};
[pathsrev.EvalCrt] = uncertcell{:};
[pathsrev.Plan] = plnningcell{:};
[pathsrev.ECLoc] = celluncert_loc{:};
[pathsrev.ECObs] = celluncert_obs{:};
[pathsrev.ECInt] = celluncert_int{:};
[pathsrev.ECPro] = celluncert_pro{:};
[pathsrev.SpRef] = sprefcell{:};
[pathsrev.NBLoc] = nbloccell{:};
[pathsrev.ReSpace] = cellrspac{:};
[pathsrev.NBFea] = nbfeacell{:};
[pathsrev.PDK] = pdkcell{:};
[pathsrev.TakRec] = idtrmcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDRock] = idrockcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDCon] = idcontactcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDStruc] = idstructcell{:};
[pathsrev.EvalPlc] = cellevalplac{:};
[pathsrev.EvInPlc] = cellevlinplc{:};
[pathsrev.EvIdFlt] = cellevlidflt{:};
[pathsrev.Other] = othercell{:};
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[pathsrev.Transcrpt] = talk{:};
%Save revised shapefile with joined action data using input from user.
shapewrite(pathsrev, (reply))
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%C. Callahan
%Load movement data from video coding and speed data from GPS track
%shapefile, find best syncronization, and join data (visible actions,
%coded segments, and transcript) to revised shapefile.
%Path\Filename: ..\Files based on full time sync\Syncfiles\syncvideogps.m
%Created: October 2012; Revised: November 2012; Revised: January 2013 to
%include output from coding of transcripts in MaxQDA;
%Revised February 2013; Revised March 2013 to include revised data from
%makeaction.m and to remove risk of error with size of calibration array.
clear all
%Load movement arrays
load ../Actionfiles/movearr.txt
%Recall content of data matrices
%codecat = [timearr rmd_arr pdk_arr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr other_arr];
%datacoll = [timearr brkrc_arr inspec_arr sdm_arr thcl_arr otherac_arr];
%datarec = [timearr wnb_arr wmap_arr];
%rmd
= [timearr infer_arr relat_arr synth_arr tsting_arr tstpre_arr tstcon_arr
revis_arr];
%metacog = [timearr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr];
%evalcert = [timearr uncert_locarr uncert_obsarr uncert_intarr uncert_proarr];
%nav
= [timearr spref_arr nbloc_arr rspac_arr nbfea_arr];
%declarknow = [timearr idtrm_arr idrock_arr idcontact_arr idstruct_arr]
%plceval = [timearr evalplc_arr evlinplc_arr evlidflt_arr];
%otherarr
load ../Actionfiles/codecat.txt
load ../Actionfiles/datacoll.txt
load ../Actionfiles/datarec.txt
load ../Actionfiles/rmd.txt
load ../Actionfiles/metacog.txt
load ../Actionfiles/evalcert.txt
load ../Actionfiles/nav.txt
load ../Actionfiles/declarknow.txt
load ../Actionfiles/plceval.txt plceval -ASCII
load ../Actionfiles/otherarr.txt
fid = fopen('../Actionfiles/editedtranscript.txt','r');
time_transcript = textscan(fid,'%d %s\n','delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
fid = fopen('../Actionfiles/actioncomments.txt','r');
actioncomments = textscan(fid,'%d %s\n','delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
talk = time_transcript{1,2};
acomments = actioncomments{1,2};
%Assign time array
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tarr = movearr(:,1);
%Assign array for coding based of walking versus stationary
movedat = movearr(:,2);
%Load second time array for comparison and test to make sure that time
%arrays match
timearr = datacoll(:,1);
timearr_rmd = rmd(:,1);
checktimearr1 = sum(tarr(:,1)-timearr(:,1));
checktimearr2 = sum(timearr(:,1)-timearr_rmd(:,1));
checktimearr3 = sum(tarr(:,1)-timearr_rmd(:,1));
if checktimearr1 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: tarr-timearr ~= 1');
pause
end
if checktimearr2 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: timearr-timarr_rmd ~= 1');
pause
end
if checktimearr3 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: tarr-timearr_rmd ~= 1');
pause
end
%Load shapefile for track segment
paths = shaperead('name_clip');
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
celldata = struct2cell(paths);
newGeometry = celldata(1,:)';
newX = celldata(2,:)';
newY = celldata(3,:)';
newGPSHeader = celldata(4,:)';
newNorth = celldata(5,:)';
newN_Min = celldata(6,:)';
newLAT = celldata(7,:)';
newWest = celldata(8,:)';
newW_Min = celldata(9,:)';
newLONG = celldata(10,:)';
newDate_ = celldata(11,:)';
newTime = celldata(12,:)';
newAMPM = celldata(13,:)';
newTime_mnt = celldata(14,:)';
newElevation = celldata(15,:)';
newFt1 = celldata(16,:)';
newLeg = celldata(17,:)';
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newFt2 = celldata(18,:)';
newInterval = celldata(19,:)';
newGPSTimeSpent = celldata(20,:)';
newInterval_i = celldata(21,:)';
newGPSdataspeed = celldata(22,:)';
newMph = celldata(23,:)';
newAzimuth = celldata(24,:)';
newTrue = celldata(25,:)';
newPolylineID = celldata(26,:)';
newOrder_ = celldata(27,:)';
newOFFSETA = celldata(28,:)';
%Assign variables names for each attribute in the revised shapefile.
f1 = 'Geometry';
f2 = 'X';
f3 = 'Y';
f4 = 'Header';
f5 = 'North';
f6 = 'N_Min';
f7 = 'LAT';
f8 = 'West';
f9 = 'W_Min';
f10 = 'LONG';
f11 = 'Date_';
f12 = 'Time';
f13 = 'AMPM';
f14 = 'Time_mnt';
f15 = 'Elevation';
f16 = 'Ft1';
f17 = 'Leg';
f18 = 'Ft2';
f19 = 'Interval';
f20 = 'Time_spent';
f21 = 'Interval_i';
f22 = 'Speed';
f23 = 'Mph';
f24 = 'Azimuth';
f25 = 'TRUE';
f26 = 'PolylineID';
f27 = 'Order_';
f28 = 'OFFSETA';
%Write the interpolated GPS track data to a new shapefile.
newstruct =
struct(f1,newGeometry,f2,newX,f3,newY,f4,newGPSHeader,f5,newNorth,f6,newN_Min,f
7,newLAT,f8,newWest,f9,newW_Min,f10,newLONG,f11,newDate_,f12,newTime,f13,new
AMPM,f14,newTime_mnt,f15,newElevation,f16,newFt1,f17,newLeg,f18,newFt2,f19,newI
nterval,f20,newGPSTimeSpent,f21,newInterval_i,f22,newGPSdataspeed,f23,newMph,f2
4,newAzimuth,f25,newTrue,f26,newPolylineID,f27,newOrder_,f28,newOFFSETA);
shapewrite(newstruct,'newname_clip.shp');
newpaths = shaperead('newname_clip');
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%Plot the interpolated GPS track data against the original GPS track data
%to confirm overlap between points.
figure
trackcolors = makesymbolspec('Point',{'Default','Marker', '.','MarkerEdgeColor','k'});
trackcolors2 = makesymbolspec('Point',{'Default','Marker', 'o','MarkerEdgeColor','r'});
mapshow(paths,'SymbolSpec',trackcolors);
mapshow(newpaths,'SymbolSpec',trackcolors2);
xlabel('easting in meters')
ylabel('northing in meters')
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Assign variable for speed from GPS track data
GPSdataspeed = [newpaths.Speed]';
%Convert GPS track data for speed into binary to compare against video
%coding; for moving, speed >= .372 mph = 1
%for stationary (or barely moving), speed < .372 mph = 0
GPSbinary = zeros(length(GPSdataspeed),1);
count = 1;
for i = 1:length(GPSdataspeed)
if GPSdataspeed(i) >= 0.372
GPSbinary(count) = 1;
count = count + 1;
else
GPSbinary(count) = 0;
count = count + 1;
end
end
%Clear value of count from previous use and reassign to equal length of the
%movement array from the video clip
clear count
count = length(movedat);
%User inputs minimum index number of GPS speed data to be used for
%calibration calculations.
disp('>>> At the prompt, enter the index number to be used as the start time')
disp('for calibration with the GPS data. If this video clip is a continuation with')
disp('the previous clip, enter the maximum index number of that previous calibration.')
reply = input('Otherwise, enter 1 as the minimum value: ');
%To prevent an error in the calibration calculation, determine the
%differences between the input shapefile, the minimum value entered by the
%user for the calibration, and the length of the input data set for this
%calibration.
diffwithmin = length(GPSbinary) - reply;
diffwithinputdata = diffwithmin - length(talk);
536

%If the difference is more than twenty, use the minimum value to set the
%values for the calibration array. Otherwise, set the maximum calibration
%value to be twenty.
if diffwithinputdata < 20
%Initialize calibration array
calibarr = (0:1:(diffwithinputdata));
%Initialize variables that will store results from calibration calculations
cstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
else
%Initialize calibration array
calibarr = (0:1:20);
%Initialize variables that will store results from calibration calculations
cstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
end
%Initialize variables that will store the minimum and maximum index values
%of the GPS speed data array to be used for calibration calculations.
minstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
maxstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
minstore(1) = reply;
maxstore(1) = minstore(1)+count-1;
%Use length of the movement array to determine maximum index number of GPS
%speed data to be used for calibration calculations.
for k = 2:length(calibarr)
minstore(k) = minstore(k-1)+1;
maxstore(k) = minstore(k)+ count-1;
end
%Use mod 2 addition to find best calibration between the GPS speed data and
%the movement data array from the video clip.
for i = 1:length(calibarr)
gpsrev = GPSbinary(minstore(i):maxstore(i));
a = mod(gpsrev + movedat, 2);
c = sum(a);
cstore(i) = c;
end
disp('>>> Calibration results');
disp('First Column = Minimum index value of GPS segement');
disp('Second Column = Maximum index value of GPS segment');
disp('Third Column = Calibration calculation');
disp('Best calibration is typically the smallest calibration calculation');
%Store and output results of calibration calculations
carr = [minstore maxstore cstore]
%User selects best calibration results to redefine shapefile
reply = input('Enter minimum value of the best calibration: ');
umin = reply;
reply = input('Enter maximum value of the best calibration: ');
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umax = reply;
[pathsrev] = newpaths(umin:umax);
gpsbestfit = GPSbinary(umin:umax);
%Use enters name for video log
disp('At prompt, enter name for video log (all one word)');
disp('The name will be used as the filename for the revised shapefile.');
reply = input('Enter name for video log: ', 's');
vidname = reply;
%Plot comparison of GPS speed data and video coding data to illustrate
%extent of match and mismatch for best calibration
plot(tarr/60,gpsbestfit,'x-',tarr/60,movedat,'o')
title(['Calibration of GPS speed data and video movement for ',(vidname)])
xlabel('Time(min)');
ylabel('Stationary or Walking');
%Save the comparison of GPS speed data and video coding data for future
%plotting in excel or other format
gpsviddata = [tarr/60, gpsbestfit, movearr];
save gpsviddata.txt gpsviddata -ASCII
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Recall content of data matrices
%codecat = [timearr rmd_arr pdk_arr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr other_arr];
%datacoll = [timearr brkrc_arr inspec_arr sdm_arr thcl_arr otherac_arr];
%datarec = [timearr wnb_arr wmap_arr];
%rmd
= [timearr infer_arr relat_arr synth_arr tsting_arr tstpre_arr tstcon_arr
revis_arr];
%metacog = [timearr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr];
%evalcert = [timearr uncert_locarr uncert_obsarr uncert_intarr uncert_proarr];
%nav
= [timearr spref_arr nbloc_arr rspac_arr nbfea_arr];
%declarknow = [timearr idtrm_arr idrock_arr idcontact_arr idstruct_arr]
%plceval = [timearr evalplc_arr evlinplc_arr evlidflt_arr];
%otherarr
%Initialize variables for each type of visible action
brkrc = datacoll(:,2);
inspec = datacoll(:,3);
sdm = datacoll(:,4);
thcl = datacoll(:,5);
othac = datacoll(:,6);
wnb = datarec(:,2);
wmap = datarec(:,3);
rmdall = codecat(:,2);
infer = rmd(:,2);
relat = rmd(:,3);
synth = rmd(:,4);
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tsting = rmd(:,5);
tstpre = rmd(:,6);
tstcon = rmd(:,7);
revis = rmd(:,8);
distrct = metacog(:,2);
uncert = metacog(:,3);
plnning = metacog(:,4);
uncert_loc = evalcert(:,2);
uncert_obs = evalcert(:,3);
uncert_int = evalcert(:,4);
uncert_pro = evalcert(:,5);
spref = nav(:,2);
nbloc = nav(:,3);
rspac = nav(:,4);
nbfea = nav(:,5);
pdk = codecat(:,3);
idtrm = declarknow(:,2);
idrock = declarknow(:,3);
idcontact = declarknow(:,4);
idstruct = declarknow(:,5);
evalplac = plceval(:,2);
evlinplc = plceval(:,3);
evlidflt = plceval(:,4);
%Initialize cells for each type of visible action
brkrccell = num2cell(brkrc);
inspeccell = num2cell(inspec);
sdmcell = num2cell(sdm);
thclcell = num2cell(thcl);
cellothac = num2cell(othac);
wnbcell = num2cell(wnb);
wmapcell = num2cell(wmap);
rmdcell = num2cell(rmdall);
infercell = num2cell(infer);
relatcell = num2cell(relat);
synthcell = num2cell(synth);
tstingcell = num2cell(tsting);
tstprecell = num2cell(tstpre);
tstconcell = num2cell(tstcon);
reviscell = num2cell(revis);
distrctcell = num2cell(distrct);
uncertcell = num2cell(uncert);
plnningcell = num2cell(plnning);
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celluncert_loc = num2cell(uncert_loc);
celluncert_obs = num2cell(uncert_obs);
celluncert_int = num2cell(uncert_int);
celluncert_pro = num2cell(uncert_pro);
pdkcell = num2cell(pdk);
idtrmcell = num2cell(idtrm);
idrockcell = num2cell(idrock);
idcontactcell = num2cell(idcontact);
idstructcell = num2cell(idstruct);
sprefcell = num2cell(spref);
nbloccell = num2cell(nbloc);
cellrspac = num2cell(rspac);
nbfeacell = num2cell(nbfea);
cellevalplac = num2cell(evalplac);
cellevlinplc = num2cell(evlinplc);
cellevlidflt = num2cell(evlidflt);
othercell = num2cell(otherarr);
vidnamecell = cell(size(othercell));
for p = 1:length(vidnamecell)
vidnamecell{p} = vidname;
end
%Join the cells for visible actions with the redefined shapefile for the
%track segment
[pathsrev.SegName] = vidnamecell{:};
[pathsrev.Break] = brkrccell{:};
[pathsrev.Inspect] = inspeccell{:};
[pathsrev.StkeDip] = sdmcell{:};
[pathsrev.TestHCl] = thclcell{:};
[pathsrev.OthrAct] = cellothac{:};
[pathsrev.WritNb] = wnbcell{:};
[pathsrev.WritMap] = wmapcell{:};
[pathsrev.ActNote] = acomments{:};
[pathsrev.RMD] = rmdcell{:};
[pathsrev.Infer] = infercell{:};
[pathsrev.Relat] = relatcell{:};
[pathsrev.Synth] = synthcell{:};
[pathsrev.Test] = tstingcell{:};
[pathsrev.Pred] = tstprecell{:};
[pathsrev.Confr] = tstconcell{:};
[pathsrev.Revis] = reviscell{:};
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[pathsrev.Dstract] = distrctcell{:};
[pathsrev.EvalCrt] = uncertcell{:};
[pathsrev.Plan] = plnningcell{:};
[pathsrev.ECLoc] = celluncert_loc{:};
[pathsrev.ECObs] = celluncert_obs{:};
[pathsrev.ECInt] = celluncert_int{:};
[pathsrev.ECPro] = celluncert_pro{:};
[pathsrev.SpRef] = sprefcell{:};
[pathsrev.NBLoc] = nbloccell{:};
[pathsrev.ReSpace] = cellrspac{:};
[pathsrev.NBFea] = nbfeacell{:};
[pathsrev.PDK] = pdkcell{:};
[pathsrev.TakRec] = idtrmcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDRock] = idrockcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDCon] = idcontactcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDStruc] = idstructcell{:};
[pathsrev.EvalPlc] = cellevalplac{:};
[pathsrev.EvInPlc] = cellevlinplc{:};
[pathsrev.EvIdFlt] = cellevlidflt{:};
[pathsrev.Other] = othercell{:};
[pathsrev.Transcrpt] = talk{:};
%Save revised shapefile with joined action data using input from user.
shapewrite(pathsrev, (reply))
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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%C. Callahan
%Load movement data from video coding and speed data from GPS track
%shapefile, find best syncronization, and join data (visible actions,
%coded segments, and transcript) to revised shapefile.
%In this file, calibration is based on first 15 minutes ONLY.
%Path:..\Files based on 15 min sync\Actionfiles\
%Filename: syncvideogps_15min.m
%Created: October 2012; Revised: November 2012; Revised: January 2013 to
%include output from coding of transcripts in MaxQDA; Revised February 2013
clear all
%Load movement arrays
load ../Actionfiles/movearr.txt
%Recall content of data matrices
%codecat = [timearr rmd_arr pdk_arr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr other_arr];
%datacoll = [timearr brkrc_arr inspec_arr sdm_arr thcl_arr otherac_arr];
%datarec = [timearr wnb_arr wmap_arr];
%rmd
= [timearr infer_arr relat_arr synth_arr tsting_arr tstpre_arr tstcon_arr
revis_arr];
%metacog = [timearr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr];
%evalcert = [timearr uncert_locarr uncert_obsarr uncert_intarr uncert_proarr];
%nav
= [timearr spref_arr nbloc_arr rspac_arr nbfea_arr];
%declarknow = [timearr idtrm_arr idrock_arr idcontact_arr idstruct_arr]
%plceval = [timearr evalplc_arr evlinplc_arr evlidflt_arr];
%otherarr
load ../Actionfiles/codecat.txt
load ../Actionfiles/datacoll.txt
load ../Actionfiles/datarec.txt
load ../Actionfiles/rmd.txt
load ../Actionfiles/metacog.txt
load ../Actionfiles/evalcert.txt
load ../Actionfiles/nav.txt
load ../Actionfiles/declarknow.txt
load ../Actionfiles/plceval.txt plceval -ASCII
load ../Actionfiles/otherarr.txt
fid = fopen('../Actionfiles/editedtranscript.txt','r');
time_transcript = textscan(fid,'%d %s\n','delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
fid = fopen('../Actionfiles/actioncomments.txt','r');
actioncomments = textscan(fid,'%d %s\n','delimiter','\t');
fclose(fid);
talk = time_transcript{1,2};
acomments = actioncomments{1,2};
%Assign time array
tarr = movearr(:,1);
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%Assign array for coding based of walking versus stationary
movearr = movearr(:,2);
movedat = movearr((1:91),1);
tarrdat = tarr((1:91),1);
%Load second time array for comparison and test to make sure that time
%arrays match
timearr = datacoll(:,1);
timearr_rmd = rmd(:,1);
checktimearr1 = sum(tarr(1:91)-timearr(1:91));
checktimearr2 = sum(timearr(1:91)-timearr_rmd(1:91));
checktimearr3 = sum(tarr(1:91)-timearr_rmd(1:91));
if checktimearr1 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: tarr-timearr ~= 1');
end
if checktimearr2 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: timearr-timarr_rmd ~= 1');
end
if checktimearr3 ~= 0;
disp('Error in time: tarr-timearr_rmd ~= 1');
end
%Load shapefile for track segment
paths = shaperead('name_clip');
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
celldata = struct2cell(paths);
newGeometry = celldata(1,:)';
newX = celldata(2,:)';
newY = celldata(3,:)';
newGPSHeader = celldata(4,:)';
newNorth = celldata(5,:)';
newN_Min = celldata(6,:)';
newLAT = celldata(7,:)';
newWest = celldata(8,:)';
newW_Min = celldata(9,:)';
newLONG = celldata(10,:)';
newDate_ = celldata(11,:)';
newTime = celldata(12,:)';
newAMPM = celldata(13,:)';
newTime_mnt = celldata(14,:)';
newElevation = celldata(15,:)';
newFt1 = celldata(16,:)';
newLeg = celldata(17,:)';
newFt2 = celldata(18,:)';
newInterval = celldata(19,:)';
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newGPSTimeSpent = celldata(20,:)';
newInterval_i = celldata(21,:)';
newGPSdataspeed = celldata(22,:)';
newMph = celldata(23,:)';
newAzimuth = celldata(24,:)';
newTrue = celldata(25,:)';
newPolylineID = celldata(26,:)';
newOrder_ = celldata(27,:)';
newOFFSETA = celldata(28,:)';
%Assign variables names for each attribute in the revised shapefile.
f1 = 'Geometry';
f2 = 'X';
f3 = 'Y';
f4 = 'Header';
f5 = 'North';
f6 = 'N_Min';
f7 = 'LAT';
f8 = 'West';
f9 = 'W_Min';
f10 = 'LONG';
f11 = 'Date_';
f12 = 'Time';
f13 = 'AMPM';
f14 = 'Time_mnt';
f15 = 'Elevation';
f16 = 'Ft1';
f17 = 'Leg';
f18 = 'Ft2';
f19 = 'Interval';
f20 = 'Time_spent';
f21 = 'Interval_i';
f22 = 'Speed';
f23 = 'Mph';
f24 = 'Azimuth';
f25 = 'TRUE';
f26 = 'PolylineID';
f27 = 'Order_';
f28 = 'OFFSETA';
%Write the interpolated GPS track data to a new shapefile.
newstruct =
struct(f1,newGeometry,f2,newX,f3,newY,f4,newGPSHeader,f5,newNorth,f6,newN_Min,f
7,newLAT,f8,newWest,f9,newW_Min,f10,newLONG,f11,newDate_,f12,newTime,f13,new
AMPM,f14,newTime_mnt,f15,newElevation,f16,newFt1,f17,newLeg,f18,newFt2,f19,newI
nterval,f20,newGPSTimeSpent,f21,newInterval_i,f22,newGPSdataspeed,f23,newMph,f2
4,newAzimuth,f25,newTrue,f26,newPolylineID,f27,newOrder_,f28,newOFFSETA);
shapewrite(newstruct,'newname_clip.shp');
newpaths = shaperead('newname_clip');
%Plot the interpolated GPS track data against the original GPS track data
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%to confirm overlap between points.
figure
trackcolors = makesymbolspec('Point',{'Default','Marker', '.','MarkerEdgeColor','k'});
trackcolors2 = makesymbolspec('Point',{'Default','Marker', 'o','MarkerEdgeColor','r'});
mapshow(paths,'SymbolSpec',trackcolors);
mapshow(newpaths,'SymbolSpec',trackcolors2);
xlabel('easting in meters')
ylabel('northing in meters')
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Assign variable for speed from GPS track data
GPSdataspeed = [newpaths.Speed]';
%Convert GPS track data for speed into binary to compare against video
%coding; for moving, speed >= .372 mph = 1
%for stationary (or barely moving), speed < .372 mph = 0
GPSbinary = zeros(length(GPSdataspeed),1);
count = 1;
for i = 1:length(GPSdataspeed)
if GPSdataspeed(i) >= 0.372
GPSbinary(count) = 1;
count = count + 1;
else
GPSbinary(count) = 0;
count = count + 1;
end
end
%Clear value of count from previous use and reassign to equal length of the
%movement array from the video clip
clear count
count = length(movedat);
%User inputs minimum index number of GPS speed data to be used for
%calibration calculations.
disp('>>> At the prompt, enter the index number to be used as the start time')
disp('for calibration with the GPS data. If this video clip is a continuation with')
disp('the previous clip, enter the maximum index number of that previous calibration.')
reply = input('Otherwise, enter 1 as the minimum value: ');
%To prevent an error in the calibration calculation, determine the
%differences between the input shapefile, the minimum value entered by the
%user for the calibration, and the length of the input data set for this
%calibration.
diffwithmin = length(GPSbinary) - reply;
diffwithinputdata = diffwithmin - length(talk);
%If the difference is more than twenty, use the minimum value to set the
%values for the calibration array. Otherwise, set the maximum calibration
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%value to be twenty.
if diffwithinputdata < 20
%Initialize calibration array
calibarr = (0:1:(diffwithinputdata));
%Initialize variables that will store results from calibration calculations
cstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
else
%Initialize calibration array
calibarr = (0:1:20);
%Initialize variables that will store results from calibration calculations
cstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
end
%Initialize variables that will store the minimum and maximum index values
%of the GPS speed data array to be used for calibration calculations.
minstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
maxstore = zeros(length(calibarr),1);
minstore(1) = reply;
maxstore(1) = minstore(1)+count-1;
%Use length of the movement array to determine maximum index number of GPS
%speed data to be used for calibration calculations.
for k = 2:length(calibarr)
minstore(k) = minstore(k-1)+1;
maxstore(k) = minstore(k)+ count-1;
end
%Use mod 2 addition to find best calibration between the GPS speed data and
%the movement data array from the video clip.
for i = 1:length(calibarr)
gpsrev = GPSbinary(minstore(i):maxstore(i));
a = mod(gpsrev + movedat, 2);
c = sum(a);
cstore(i) = c;
end
%Store and output results of calibration calculations
carr = [minstore maxstore cstore]
%User selects best calibration results to redefine shapefile
reply = input('Enter minimum value of the best calibration: ');
umin = reply;
%Identify maximum value from calibration
umax = umin + length(movearr)-1;
%Identify index for entire segment
maxarr = umin + length(datacoll)-1;
%Clip original GPS shapefile based on best calibration
[pathsrev] = newpaths(umin:maxarr);
gpsbestfit = GPSbinary(umin:umax);
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%Prompt user to enter name for video log
disp('At prompt, enter name for video log (all one word)');
disp('The name will be used as the filename for the revised shapefile.');
reply = input('Enter name for video log: ', 's');
vidname = reply;
%Plot comparison of GPS speed data and video coding data to illustrate
%extent of match and mismatch for best calibration
plot(tarr/60,gpsbestfit,'x-',tarrdat/60,movedat,'o')
title(['Calibration of GPS speed data and video movement for ',(vidname)])
xlabel('Time(min)');
ylabel('Stationary or Walking');
%Save the comparison of GPS speed data and video coding data for future
%plotting in excel or other format
gpsviddata = [tarr/60, gpsbestfit, movearr];
save gpsviddata.txt gpsviddata -ASCII
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%Recall content of data matrices
%codecat = [timearr rmd_arr pdk_arr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr other_arr];
%datacoll = [timearr brkrc_arr inspec_arr sdm_arr thcl_arr otherac_arr];
%datarec = [timearr wnb_arr wmap_arr];
%rmd
= [timearr infer_arr relat_arr synth_arr tsting_arr tstpre_arr tstcon_arr
revis_arr];
%metacog = [timearr distrct_arr uncert_arr plnnig_arr];
%evalcert = [timearr uncert_locarr uncert_obsarr uncert_intarr uncert_proarr];
%nav
= [timearr spref_arr nbloc_arr rspac_arr nbfea_arr];
%declarknow = [timearr idtrm_arr idrock_arr idcontact_arr idstruct_arr]
%plceval = [timearr evalplc_arr evlinplc_arr evlidflt_arr];
%otherarr
%Initialize variables for each type of visible action
brkrc = datacoll(:,2);
inspec = datacoll(:,3);
sdm = datacoll(:,4);
thcl = datacoll(:,5);
othac = datacoll(:,6);
wnb = datarec(:,2);
wmap = datarec(:,3);
rmdall = codecat(:,2);
infer = rmd(:,2);
relat = rmd(:,3);
synth = rmd(:,4);
tsting = rmd(:,5);
tstpre = rmd(:,6);
tstcon = rmd(:,7);
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revis = rmd(:,8);
distrct = metacog(:,2);
uncert = metacog(:,3);
plnning = metacog(:,4);
uncert_loc = evalcert(:,2);
uncert_obs = evalcert(:,3);
uncert_int = evalcert(:,4);
uncert_pro = evalcert(:,5);
spref = nav(:,2);
nbloc = nav(:,3);
rspac = nav(:,4);
nbfea = nav(:,5);
pdk = codecat(:,3);
idtrm = declarknow(:,2);
idrock = declarknow(:,3);
idcontact = declarknow(:,4);
idstruct = declarknow(:,5);
evalplac = plceval(:,2);
evlinplc = plceval(:,3);
evlidflt = plceval(:,4);
%Initialize cells for each type of visible action
brkrccell = num2cell(brkrc);
inspeccell = num2cell(inspec);
sdmcell = num2cell(sdm);
thclcell = num2cell(thcl);
cellothac = num2cell(othac);
wnbcell = num2cell(wnb);
wmapcell = num2cell(wmap);
rmdcell = num2cell(rmdall);
infercell = num2cell(infer);
relatcell = num2cell(relat);
synthcell = num2cell(synth);
tstingcell = num2cell(tsting);
tstprecell = num2cell(tstpre);
tstconcell = num2cell(tstcon);
reviscell = num2cell(revis);
distrctcell = num2cell(distrct);
uncertcell = num2cell(uncert);
plnningcell = num2cell(plnning);
celluncert_loc = num2cell(uncert_loc);
celluncert_obs = num2cell(uncert_obs);
celluncert_int = num2cell(uncert_int);
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celluncert_pro = num2cell(uncert_pro);
pdkcell = num2cell(pdk);
idtrmcell = num2cell(idtrm);
idrockcell = num2cell(idrock);
idcontactcell = num2cell(idcontact);
idstructcell = num2cell(idstruct);
sprefcell = num2cell(spref);
nbloccell = num2cell(nbloc);
cellrspac = num2cell(rspac);
nbfeacell = num2cell(nbfea);
cellevalplac = num2cell(evalplac);
cellevlinplc = num2cell(evlinplc);
cellevlidflt = num2cell(evlidflt);
othercell = num2cell(otherarr);
vidnamecell = cell(size(othercell));
for p = 1:length(vidnamecell)
vidnamecell{p} = vidname;
end
%Join the cells for visible actions with the redefined shapefile for the
%track segment
[pathsrev.SegName] = vidnamecell{:};
[pathsrev.Break] = brkrccell{:};
[pathsrev.Inspect] = inspeccell{:};
[pathsrev.StkeDip] = sdmcell{:};
[pathsrev.TestHCl] = thclcell{:};
[pathsrev.OthrAct] = cellothac{:};
[pathsrev.WritNb] = wnbcell{:};
[pathsrev.WritMap] = wmapcell{:};
[pathsrev.ActNote] = acomments{:};
[pathsrev.RMD] = rmdcell{:};
[pathsrev.Infer] = infercell{:};
[pathsrev.Relat] = relatcell{:};
[pathsrev.Synth] = synthcell{:};
[pathsrev.Test] = tstingcell{:};
[pathsrev.Pred] = tstprecell{:};
[pathsrev.Confr] = tstconcell{:};
[pathsrev.Revis] = reviscell{:};
[pathsrev.Dstract] = distrctcell{:};
[pathsrev.EvalCrt] = uncertcell{:};
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[pathsrev.Plan] = plnningcell{:};
[pathsrev.ECLoc] = celluncert_loc{:};
[pathsrev.ECObs] = celluncert_obs{:};
[pathsrev.ECInt] = celluncert_int{:};
[pathsrev.ECPro] = celluncert_pro{:};
[pathsrev.SpRef] = sprefcell{:};
[pathsrev.NBLoc] = nbloccell{:};
[pathsrev.ReSpace] = cellrspac{:};
[pathsrev.NBFea] = nbfeacell{:};
[pathsrev.PDK] = pdkcell{:};
[pathsrev.TakRec] = idtrmcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDRock] = idrockcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDCon] = idcontactcell{:};
[pathsrev.IDStruc] = idstructcell{:};
[pathsrev.EvalPlc] = cellevalplac{:};
[pathsrev.EvInPlc] = cellevlinplc{:};
[pathsrev.EvIdFlt] = cellevlidflt{:};
[pathsrev.Other] = othercell{:};
[pathsrev.Transcrpt] = talk{:};
%Save revised shapefile with joined action data using input from user.
shapewrite(pathsrev, (reply))
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Appendix K. Calculation of Rate of Themes/Codes/Visible Actions
per 5 Minutes
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Explanation of Table
Calculated rates of themes/codes/visible actions per 5 minutes using raw counts of
themes/codes/visible actiosn reported in the Chapter 4.
Table K.1

Tank (E)

Pairique (I)

Samson (I)

Boca (N)

Dingo (N)

Salvador (N)

Collecting and
Recording Data
Breaking/Scratching
Rocks
Inspecting Rocks
Measuring
Orientation
Testing with HCl
Writing in
Notebook
Writing on Map

Gidget (E)

Overview
Procedural and
Declarative
Knowledge
Reasoning and
Model
Development
Spatial Referencing
Metacognition
Other

Fiamme (E)

Rates of themes/codes/visible actions from participants’ first hour in the field

6.50

2.83

3.17

4.33

4.08

5.33

4.92

4.33

1.00
1.33
2.67
0.33

5.08 3.67
1.17 3.50
7.17 12.00
3.17 2.33

2.75
1.00
4.58
1.83

1.42
1.42
8.08
1.83

1.58
2.00
5.58
1.17

1.58
3.33
9.83
0.92

1.58
3.00
6.08
2.92

0.75
1.25

0.17
0.25

0.67
0.33

0.50
1.67

0.25
0.25

1.83
2.17

0.08
0.42

0.00
0.67

0.58
0.42

0.25
0.00

0.33
0.25

0.50
0.17

0.33
0.33

0.00
0.75

0.67
0.08

0.25
0.00

1.25
0.58

0.92
1.08

0.00
0.67

1.25
0.92

0.33
0.75

0.17
1.08

0.83
1.42

0.83
0.58
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Fiamme (E)

Gidget (E)

Tank (E)

Pairique (I)

Samson (I)

Boca (N)

Dingo (N)

Salvador (N)

Table K.2—Continued

3.25
0.00

1.58
0.08

1.58
0.67

2.25
0.00

3.42
0.08

5.17
0.17

1.92
0.25

2.00
0.17

1.50

0.67

0.92

1.75

0.50

0.00

1.83

0.92

3.75

1.17

2.33

1.67

0.17

0.00

1.67

2.25

Reasoning and
Model
Development
Inferring
Relating
Synthesis
Predicting
Confirming
Revising

0.00
0.25
0.58
0.25
0.00
0.00

0.92
0.17
3.17
1.00
0.33
0.00

1.08
1.08
1.33
0.92
0.00
0.08

0.33
0.67
1.00
1.50
0.00
0.17

0.33
0.17
0.42
0.42
0.08
0.00

0.08
0.17
0.67
0.08
0.17
0.42

0.58
0.08
0.50
0.50
0.08
0.00

0.08
0.42
0.83
0.67
0.00
0.17

Spatial Referencing
Noting Location
Relating to Space
Noting Features

0.75
0.42
0.17

0.42
0.67
0.17

1.00
0.67
0.08

1.00
0.00
0.00

1.00
0.00
0.42

1.58
0.25
0.17

1.08
2.08
0.17

1.75
0.92
0.58

Evaluating
Certainty
Location
Observations
Interpretations
Relevance

0.17
0.25
0.08
0.00

0.25
0.42
1.17
1.25

0.17
1.67
1.17
1.33

0.08
1.83
0.25
0.83

0.25
0.50
0.42
1.83

0.42
0.75
0.17
0.50

1.67
1.67
0.50
1.42

0.75
1.25
0.58
0.42

Procedural and
Declartive
Knowledge
Identifying Rocks
Identifying Contacts
Identifying Rock
Features
Taking and
Recording
Measurements
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Table K.2

Fiamme (E)

Gidget (E)

Tank (E)

Pairique (I)

Samson (I)

Boca (N)

Dingo (N)

Salvador (N)

Rates of themes/codes/visible actions for time while participants were in the nose of the fold

80.7

35.8

45.5

39.5

17

22.2

42.7

38.2

4.77

0.93

1.24

2.35

0.37

0.25

1.55

2.42

3.10
2.35
3.47
0.25

2.11
0.25
4.40
0.12

2.35
0.50
4.52
0.25

1.12
0.37
1.73
0.00

1.05
0.12
1.92
0.31

0.37
1.12
2.60
0.06

1.80
1.18
1.43
0.37

1.61
0.93
4.28
0.50

Collecting and
Recording Data
Breaking/ Scratching
Rocks
Inspecting Rocks

0.37
0.56

0.00
0.19

0.37
0.43

0.00
0.00

0.06
0.00

0.12
0.00

0.50
0.81

0.62
0.19

Measuring
Orientation
Testing with HCl
Writing in Notebook
Writing on Map

0.74
0.31
0.37
0.56

0.12
0.12
0.06
0.19

0.06
0.25
0.00
0.37

0.50
0.00
0.74
0.43

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.12

0.00
0.06
0.00
0.31

0.31
0.19
0.37
0.62

0.12
0.00
0.19
0.37

Time in Nose of Fold
Overview
Procedural and
Declarative
Knowledge
Reasoning and Model
Development
Spatial Referencing
Metacognition
Other
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Fiamme (E)

Gidget (E)

Tank (E)

Pairique (I)

Samson (I)

Boca (N)

Dingo (N)

Salvador (N)

Table K.2—Continued

1.43
0.00

0.43
0.00

0.87
0.00

0.62
0.00

0.19
0.00

0.25
0.00

0.56
0.06

0.56
0.00

2.42

0.19

0.31

1.36

0.19

0.00

0.93

1.43

2.60

0.68

0.12

0.93

0.00

0.00

0.68

1.43

Reasoning and Model
Development
Inferring
Relating
Synthesis
Predicting
Confirming
Revising

0.19
0.00
1.55
0.68
0.00
0.99

0.19
0.00
0.25
0.43
0.87
0.50

0.06
0.06
0.87
0.68
0.25
0.68

0.06
0.00
0.43
0.50
0.19
0.06

0.00
0.06
0.50
0.37
0.19
0.25

0.00
0.00
0.31
0.00
0.19
0.06

0.31
0.00
0.74
0.43
0.31
0.37

0.00
0.00
0.06
0.31
0.31
0.99

Spatial Referencing
Noting Location
Relating to Space
Noting Features

1.05
0.12
1.86

0.12
0.00
0.12

0.37
0.00
0.00

0.37
0.00
0.81

0.31
0.00
0.19

0.74
0.06
0.12

0.12
0.00
0.00

0.56
0.25
0.31

Evaluating Certainty
Location
Observations
Interpretations
Relevance

0.00
0.37
0.37
0.19

0.00
0.19
0.68
0.06

0.00
0.06
0.43
0.00

0.00
0.37
0.12
0.06

0.00
0.00
0.06
0.00

0.25
0.00
0.00
0.00

0.06
0.06
0.37
0.00

0.00
0.93
0.12
0.06

Procedural and
Declartive
Knowledge
Identifying Rocks
Identifying Contacts
Identifying Rock
Features
Taking and Recording
Measurements
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